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Abstract 
Strategies for Securing the Unity of the Self In Augustine and Certain 
Modern Psychologists ~ Robert Neil Innes 
My thesis explores what is involved in attaining an integrated sense of self, a question which is both 
interesting in its own right and which can also provide one enlightening means of comparing the 
disciplines of theology and psychology. 
The first two chapters establish the theological method to be followed and provide an ideological 
context. I describe why the relationship between theology and psychology is a particularly 
problematic one and outline why I think some of the methods so far proposed for relating them are 
unsatisfactory. I suggest instead that in some respects the two disciplines may be seen as providing 
alternative strategies for securing the unity of the self. With the aid of Charles Taylor's philosophy of 
personhood, I set out what I mean by the self and what constitutes the unity of the self. I describe how 
the modem self has developed historically through the relation of individuals to sources of value, and 
I suggest that theology and some forms of psychology can be understood as offering expressions of 
complementary sources of such value and hence can be related to one another. I consider postmodern 
attacks on the unified self and conclude that our contemporary context is one which demands less 
strongly ordered forms of integrating the self than those which have come down to us in the Western 
intellectual tradition. 
The next four chapters focus on the work of key representatives of the theological and psychological 
traditions. From the side of theology, I describe Augustine's conviction that an individual might move 
from a state of fragmentation to a state of wholeness through being remade in the image of the one 
God (chapter 3). From the psychological side, I consider Freud's methods for enabling us to move 
from a state of neurosis to limited self-mastery (chapter 4), and Jung's suggestion that wholeness is 
attained though discovery and acceptance of the natural realm lying within the psyche (chapter 5). I 
then review the proposals for uniting the self behind the project of self-actualisation that have been 
developed by the humanistic psychologists, in particular Fromm, Maslow and Rogers (chapter 6). 
In conclusion (chapter 7) I suggest some ways in which Augustine's theology needs to be revised if it 
is to be relevant to our contemporary self-understanding, and show how the most promising strategy 
for unifying the self is likely to arise from a combination of an Augustinian theistic outlook with the 
insights of these modem psychologists. 
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1 
Introduction: A Dialogue Between Theology 
and Psychology 
In this thesis I set out what I hope is a fruitful and suggestive way of conceiving the relationship 
between theology and psychology. My proposal is that in certain respects theology, and some forms 
of psychology, can be seen as alternative and to some extent complementary strategies for securing 
the unity of the self. Using Charles Taylor's philosophy of personhood as a framework, I argue that 
theological and psychological systems are alternative means of conferring a sense of psychic 
wholeness. 
This introductory chapter has a number of aims. To begin with, I wish to explore why the relationship 
between theology and psychology is a particularly problematic one, to explain why I find 
unsatisfactory some of the ways of conceiving this relationship that have so far been proposed, and to 
introduce the method for relating the two disciplines that I will use in the present work. This last 
requires me to justify my use of Charles Taylor's work, to describe Taylor's notion of the self and to 
set out what, on his view, is required to integrate the self. My work focuses on St. Augustine, from the 
theological side and Freud, Jung and the humanistic psychologists from the side of psychology, and I 
want to explain here the reasons for my choice of these figures. I also want to explain something of 
the scope and method of the work, and to discuss whether the integration of the self is a goal that we 
ought to pursue. 
1. The Problem of Relatina= Theoloa:y and Psycholoa=y 
There appears to be a much larger literature on the relationship between theology and psychology 
than between theology and any of the natural sciences, or between theology and social sciences such 
as economics or even sociology. For example, a bibliographic essay on the relation between just one 
psychologist, Carl Jung, and theology, cites 450 references which between them offer a bewildering 
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array of approaches and perspectives.1 There seem to me to be three principal reasons why there 
should be so much confusion and controversy in the relation between these two disciplines. 
Firstly, there is a considerable overlap in the entities which theology and psychology take as their 
central object of study. Strictly, theology is the study of God (from the Greek theos) whilst 
psychology is the study of the mind (from the Greek psyche). But, unfortunately, the matter is not 
quite so simple as that. Christian theologians have taken it that human beings are made in the image of 
God, and that image has most often been supposed to reside in the human soul. Thus it has seemed 
that we might learn about God most especially from knowing the human soul. For example, Augustine 
took it that the twin objects of interest in his theological philosophy were "God and the soul''2• 
Augustine's dictum is "may I know myself; may I know thee"3. In theology there is a close 
relationship between knowledge of the soul and knowledge of God. From the side of psychology there 
is a problem in that our modern English word "psyche" can mean either the "mind" in its specifically 
modern sense or the "soul" following the original Greek sense. Modern psychology tries to establish 
itself as a discipline concerned with the study of the mind. But it is never precisely clear where the 
limits of this discipline lie and where the narrower study of the mind shades into a broader study of 
the soul, or, indeed, precisely what is the difference between the mind and the soul. Thus, in practice, 
theology and psychology can find themselves claiming the same territory as their rightful domain. 
Secondly, theology and psychology share some common therapeutic aims. Theology is concerned 
with issues of human salvation, and one of the senses of the Greek word soteria indicates human 
health and well-being. In all four gospels Jesus's miraculous works constitute the central part of his 
public ministry, and in these works we see men and women granted physical and psychological health. 
One important aspect of the Christian doctrine of salvation is therefore connected with the restoration 
of individuals to health and wholeness. Some forms of psychology, for their part, seek to provide 
criteria for mental well-being and to find ways in which people can be assisted in moving from states 
of illness to mental health. Thus both theology and psychology offer their own models for 
understanding growth in mental or spiritual well-being, although it is not always clear how these 
understandings are to be related to one another. 
Thirdly, there is a major question as to what is the appropriate method to be followed in carrying out 
the study of psychology. By and large the twentieth century discipline of psychology has tried to 
model itself on the natural sciences by following empirical methods and stating its results in terms of 
lHeisig (1973). 
2.:i21. I.ii. 7. 
3.wl. II.i.l. 
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falsifiable hypotheses. It seems that more than any other of the human sciences, modem psychology 
has felt the need to define and defend itself as an empirical science. This means that there is a major 
break between the twentieth century academic discipline of psychology and the classical psychology 
of, say, Aristotle or Hume. It also means that many of those whom the ordinary person considers to be 
the most influential psychologists, people like Freud and Jung, are not really counted as academic 
psychologists. The split between academic and "popular" (it is hard to find a word that is not 
pejorative) is reflected in a division between the kinds of scientific psychology validated by university 
departments and the kinds of therapeutic psychology validated by professional institutions such as the 
Tavistock Institute or the British Association for Counselling. This is a particular problem for 
theology in its relation to psychology. For it is precisely those psychologists who supply us with 
interpretative frameworks for understanding the human condition, and who are not counted as 
academic, scientific psychologists, that are generally of the most interest to theologians. 
2. Some Ways of Copcejyine the Relationship Between Theoloey and 
Psycholoey 
The combination of different views of the nature of the psychological enterprise combined with more 
"conservative" or "liberal" theological viewpoints generates a range of models for relating the two 
disciplines. The following alternatives are not intended to be exhaustive but they are representative of 
some of the main positions on offer. The first is an influential "conservative" viewpoint; the remaining 
three are cited because of their contemporary interest, each being propounded in a recent public 
lecture. 
2.1 Psychology and Theology are Concerned with Lower and Higher Levels of the 
Human Person 
This is the view put forward by Malcolm Jeeves, formerly professor of psychology at St Andrews 
university. The cover of his book Christianity and PsycholoLty: the yiew both ways4 states: "This is a 
book about what psychologists have discovered and what Christians believe." According to Jeeves 
psychology is concerned with the basic facts about the human mind, facts which can be 
experimentally validated. Christian theology on the other hand, operates at the level of metaphysical 
beliefs about the person. They are true at different levels and in different ways and there is no scope 
for conflict. Jeeves is scathing about those forms of psychology, such as Freudian psychoanalysis, 
which claim to operate at higher levels. The Freudian psychoanalytic model of man is, he says, 
"imprecise, unscientific, and largely rejected by academic psychologists" (p52). And with the word 
"unscientific" he has ruled out psychoanalysis from what he thinks constitutes valid psychology. 
4 Jeeves ( 1976). 
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According to Jeeves, the discipline of psychology is concerned with such things as visual perception, 
cognition and brain function. On his reckoning, psychology simply gives us basic facts and low level 
models about human mental functioning. The relation of theology to this kind of psychology would 
then, in principle, be no different from its relation to any other natural science such as neurology or 
chemistry. 
The problem is that we expect more of psychology than this. We do not simply want psychology to 
tell us about mechanisms of visual perception. We somehow feel that a psychology which only 
concerns itself with brain function is ducking the real issues. We expect psychology to answer some 
of the bigger questions about the nature of human love, about our emotions, motivations, needs and 
aims. It seems doubtful that a study of the human mind at this level could ever be adequate if 
conducted solely at the level of experimental analysis. We need to allow for more interpretative, 
empathetic and self-involving approaches. You do not, it seems, know the nature of the human mind, 
in quite the same way as you know the structure of benzene or the thermodynamics of heat engines. 
To understand a person's mind you need a degree of insight that no amount of data gathering or 
controlled experimentation can grant. 
2.2 Theology and Psychology Articulate Rival World-Views 
A second, and very different, understanding is that psychology offers a world-view and that it is a 
world-view which forms an alternative to Christianity. This view is put forward by Paul Vitz, 
professor of psychology at New York university. The cover of his bookS suggests that "modem 
psychology is a religion, a secular cult of the self'. If Vitz is right then the appropriate relation of 
theology to psychology is a question of the theology of religions. 
Some of the psychologists we shall be studying here (Maslow and Rogers) have indeed seen their 
enterprise as being about the construction of a world-view. This view has also recently been taken up 
by Professor Emmy Van Deurzen-Smith of Regents College London in his 1994 Hartop lecture6. Van 
Deurzen-Smith said: "Humanistic counselling will come into its own only if it is willing to take up its 
role of secular and post-scientific religion." He speaks of humanistic psychology as a "total discipline" 
that must "rise to the challenge of overseeing the whole of human life". (p18) 
svitz (1994). 
6Van Deurzen-Smith (1994). 
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But this is surely a grandiose claim. Psychology is, after all, primarily about the human mind; it is not 
about nature or history or politics or any number of other areas of human interest. As a world-view 
humanistic psychology is woefully deficient. Even when certain psychologists claim to be writing 
world-views, this claim cannot be taken too seriously. Theology therefore cannot relate to psychology 
in quite the same way as it would relate to a religion. 
2...3 Psychology forms Part of a new and definitive world-view which theology ought 
to embrace 
Vitz is a conservative Christian, but one sometimes hears a related viewpoint put forward by liberals. 
Psychology may be taken to fonn part of a new world-view which Christian theology ought to 
embrace. This was the line taken by Felicity Edwards, professor of theology at Rhodes university, 
South Africa in a paper presented at the 1995 conference of the Society for the Study of Theology7. 
Edwards' paper opened with the words: "Humankind is in the process of discovering and articulating a 
new world-view. The emerging world-view is arising particularly from interdisciplinary work being 
done on the frontiers of psychology, science and spirituality." According to Edwards this new world-
view involves the key discovery that at the deepest level we do not exist as separate selves but are all 
part of one holistic reality. In Edwards' view, theology must base itself on the new world-view which 
psychology is helping to shape. 
But one would want to ask Edwards just how far this new world-view she claims to have uncovered is 
actually true. The work of the psychologists she quotes (notably the trans-personal psychologist Ken 
Wilber) is highly speculative, not to say mystical in nature, and is certainly not representative of any 
contemporary psychological consensus. Moreover, theology has its own distinctive contribution to 
make to our contemporary self-understanding and should not over hastily yield to the claims of other 
disciplines here. Theology may, perhaps, rightfully claim a certain degree of autonomy from 
psychology in this instance. 
2.4 Psychology is the Handmaid of Theology 
In his 1994/95 Gilpin lectures at Durham the psychiatrist Jack Dominian argued that psychology is the 
"handmaid" of theology. In Dr Dominian's view the contemporary relationship between theology and 
psychology is analogous to that between patristic theology and Greek philosophy. Psychology forms 
the lingua franca of our age. It gives us the authorised language by which people understand 
?Transformation of the Self unpublished paper given at the British Society for the Study of Theology 
March 1995, Collingwood College, Durham. 
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themselves. If theology is to make sense to contemporary men and women it will have to be translated 
into psychological terms. 
There is much truth in Dominian's claim that modern psychology forms the set of concepts by which 
modern people understand themselves. But should it be the only or even the main set of concepts 
used? If theological language is translated into psychology there is a conceptual price to pay. For 
example, one translation that is commonly made is the equation of the theological concept of 
salvation with the psychological and specifically Jungian concept of wholeness. Now, as we shall see, 
what lung means by wholeness is the individual learning to accept the shadow side of the personality. 
But the biblical notion of salvation includes an element of deliverance from, of being saved from 
something that is not present in Jung. The angel says to Joseph: "You shall call his name Jesus for he 
shall save his people from their sins."8 Moreover, the biblical notion of salvation has a corporate and 
political dimension that we should not expect to find in the psychologists. When God saves the 
Israelites from the Egyptians he transfers a whole people from a situation of bondage to a situation of 
freedom. So we should have to say that the Jungian notion of wholeness is a rather poor translation 
for the theological notion of salvation. Some of the meaning is altered and other parts of the meaning 
are lost in the translation. 
Overall;-hm-not-convinced-that-modern-psychology-has-the-conceptuai-breadth-and-depth-to ·function· 
as the handmaid to theology in the way that Neo-Platonism did for Augustine or Aristotelian 
philosophy did for Aquinas. Psychology is, after all, psychology not philosophy. The translation of 
theology into psychology will inevitably produce a theology which focuses narrowly on the mental 
health of the individual. This is the situation in which much contemporary pastoral theology finds 
itself. However, theology in general is properly concerned in the first instance not with individual 
mental health -but- with-God. And-modern psychology will have things to say about mental health that 
theology knows nothing about. Theology and modern psychology are distinct disciplines and the one 
cannot function as a straightforward secular translation of the other. 
3. Theologx and Psxcholw:J as Supplxing Strategies for Securjng the Unitx of 
the Self 
All the above four methods of relating theology to psychology have been advanced with seriousness, 
but none of them is fully adequate. Part of the problem seems to be that our notion of psychology is 
either pitched too low or too high. Either psychology is conceived simply as a low level empirical 
8Matth 1:21. 
6 
Introduction: A Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology 
science working on specific and technical problems of the human mind, or else it is conceived as an 
all-embracing world-view, a theory of everything. 
But actually it seems to me that psychology, at least in its most interesting forms, is neither of these. 
What the most culturally influential psychologists give us, people like Freud, Jung and Maslow, are 
suggestive interpretations of the human condition. As Paul Ricoeur has argued in respect of Freud9, 
they give us a language by which we can understand ourselves. For example, after Freud we quite 
routinely think of ourselves as having an unconscious, and we quite readily explain someone's 
behaviour in terms of repression. After Jung we think of people as having a shadow side to their 
personality. After the humanistic psychologists we think in terms of the need to realise our own 
unique potential. These psychologists open up new ways in which we can conceive ourselves and 
make sense of our lives. 
If certain influential forms of psychology operate at the level of providing us with convincing and 
suggestive self-interpretations then we can ask what might be the therapeutic benefits of such 
psychological descriptions. I suggest that one way in which a psychology might be effective is in 
generating an integrated sense of self, or, at least, in providing resources for increasing the 
possibilities of a sense of psychic wholeness. Indeed, this might be a way of drawing together in 
conversation various theological as well as psychological interpretations of the human person. We can 
ask of those self-descriptions that call themselves theological, as well as those that are psychological, 
what resources and strategies they offer for integrating the self. 
The notion of psychic integration or wholeness has become a prominent one in recent years. 
Increasing numbers of people seem to be endeavouring to find ways in which they may develop a 
sense of being at peace with themselves. The issue of what psychological wholeness comprises and 
how it is to be achieved is therefore an important and interesting one in its own right. Moreover, as I 
indicated above, both theology and psychology have, as one of their major concerns, the exploration 
of questions of human mental health and well-being. A comparison of theology and psychology in 
terms of their ability to integrate the self should therefore prove natural and unforced. This 
comparison, inasmuch as it brings together the different emphases and insights of the two disciplines, 
should prove fruitful and enlightening, as well as being directly relevant to our contemporary context. 
Whilst the aim is to establish a dialogue between theology and psychology it must be recognised that 
we are not dealing with completely discrete disciplines. Theological and psychological understandings 
9Ricoeur (1970). 
7 
Introduction: A Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology 
of the human condition have mutually infonned one another. Neither does either discipline articulate 
a single, authorised interpretation. Both theology and psychology are pluralistic enterprises which 
sustain a wide range of alternative and sometimes competing viewpoints and perspectives. If a 
dialogue between the two disciplines is to be established we will therefore, in practice, have to choose 
a figure or figures to represent each side. However, such choices need be far from arbitrary. 
From the side of theology, St Augustine stands, as I shall demonstrate in chapter 2, in a unique 
position so far as our present purposes are concerned. His writing has to a large extent generated the 
sense of "inwardness" that is characteristic of our Western identity and which fonns the precondition 
for modem psychological explorations of the self. In this sense, Augustine stands at the head of a 
whole cultural tradition. His ideas have, for better or worse, affected our consciousness of ourselves 
more than any other single theologian. He thus constitutes an obvious dialogue partner. 
From the side of modern psychology, it seems necessary to put to one side those psychologists, such 
as behaviourists and cognitivists, whose interests are largely confined to giving narrowly scientific 
explanations of the workings of the mind, and to focus instead on those who are concerned with more 
general questions of human flourishing. Of the latter, and notwithstanding the great importance we 
must assign to Freud, no one figure has the pre-eminence that Augustine has in the theological realm. 
On-the-other hand, for my work to be kept within a reasonable scope, some limit -must-be set-to -the 
number of modern psychologists to be considered. In this light, it seems there are three streams of 
psychology that really ought to be reviewed: those due to Freud, Jung and the humanistic 
psychologists. Each of these brings a distinctive contribution to the question of integrating the self. 
Moreover, all three have deeply influenced the way we think about ourselves. Other recent 
psychological schools, such as British object-relations theory (Winnicot, Guntrip and Fairbairn) and 
American ego-psychology (Kohut, Hartmann and -Rapaport)--have-generated ideas .of__ theoreticaL 
significance, but they have not, I think, percolated into our culture and shaped our sense of self to the 
same extent as these three. 
If Augustine and these three streams of modern psychology are to be compared in tenns of their 
ability to unify the self, we shall need at the outset a clear understanding of what is meant by the 
"self' and to what the unity of this self amounts. It is to this major question that I now tum. 
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4. CoptextuaUsipg the Comparison Between the Disciplines 
4.1 The Notion of the Self 
The notion of the "self' is related to a considerable degree to particular cultural and philosophical 
traditions to. To take one (albeit extreme) example, the Buddhist religion considers the idea of the self 
to be an illusion. The Buddhist teaching of not-self (annata) is that any belief in an individual "self' 
over and above the five heaps (skandhas) of which the stuff of human beings consists is illusory .11 
The imaginary belief in self is believed to produce harmful thoughts of "me" and "mine" that lead to 
the desire which is itself the root cause of all suffering. By contrast with Buddhism, ours is a culture 
in which "care for the self", in one form or another, has been a dominant concern from the time of the 
ancient Greeks onwards12. Indeed, in our own century the flourishing of academic and popular 
psychologies reflects an unprecedented interest in the development of the self. 
Here I am less concerned with cross-cultural or universal notions of selfhood, than with the idea of 
the self as it appears in our "Western" culture, a culture that has been broadly formed out of a 
synthesis of Greek classical philosophy and Christianity. The theology and the three streams of 
psychology that I consider have arisen out of this particular culture. This "Western" culture supplies 
the underlying context for the notion of the self which is shared by Augustine and the psychologists 
and which enables a conversation between them to take place. This is true irrespective of the extent to 
which~a ~great many of~those who~live~in~the-'LWest''.--such-as-minority~ethnic-groups, the poor and, in 
certain respects, women, feel themselves marginalised from such a culture and self-understanding. In 
view of the kind of dialogue I am trying to establish my focus in this thesis must therefore be on the 
dominant Western tradition of thinking about the self. 
When we say "she is only a shadow of her former self' or "I am not feeling myself today" we seem to 
~ be operating-with some definite-knowable picture of-the~self. But how is this body of knowledge to be 
characterised? 
One approach, we may call it the belief-based approach, is to explore how far the notion of the self 
arises out of structures of belief generated through the conditions of human life in society. This line 
was taken by the French sociologists Durkheim and Mauss. Mauss thought that the notion of the self 
tOsee. e.g. Geertz (1979) p229ff. 
11So Collins (1982); Conze (1951); Snelling (1987) and against Humphries (1951 p21ff). 
12See, for example, Foucault's HistorY of Sexuality 3: The Care of the Self Part II for a description of 
the widespread ideas of self-care in ancient Greece and Rome. Foucault's account needs to be 
qualified by Snell's argument that the notion of the psyche as "soul" (and hence the self as an object of 
concern) was not present in Homer, but was the product of pre-Socratic Greek reflection, being 
articulated for the first time, he thinks, by Heraclitus (1960 p17). 
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is tied to a srructure of beliefs that arise in different societies according to their systems of "law, 
religion, customs, social sbUctures and mentality"13. He thought that our own, seemingly self-evident, 
notions of selthood are the product of a long social history which he traces from primitive tribal 
notions, through legal notions of selthood in ancient Rome and metaphysical valuations of the self in 
Cluistianity to the "psychological" self of our century. Mauss thought that the contemporary self is 
one that is identified with self-knowledge and psychological consciousness, and that this self is a quite 
specific product of certain seventeenth and eighteenth century religious, political and philosophical 
movements. Mauss assigned particular importance for this development to pietistic Protestant groups 
who posed questions regarding such matters as individual liberty, the individual conscience and the 
right to communicate directly with God. From these groups it was but a short step to our 
contemporary notions of the fundamental value of personal consciousness. 
A second approach, and the one taken by P. F. Strawson and especially Charles Taylor, is to argue 
that selthood is constituted by a particular structure of sentiments that arise in the interactions of 
human society. We may call this an attitude-based approach. Whereas the belief-based approach 
focuses on the beliefs about the self that are generated by social institutions, an attitude-based 
approach focuses on the moral attitudes that arise in our human acting, one with another. Thus 
Strawson suggests that human selthood arises out of a srructure of sentiments, such as gratitude, 
resentment; forgiveness and-love, that are manifested-in~rrormal-i.titeFpersonai-rela:tionships~14-Taylor 
takes the particular line that our sense of selthood is defined by our attitude to entities, either personal 
or supra-personal, that have moral value for us. Taylor develops his account from an analysis of 
human agency which I shall now briefly explain. 
Taylor argues15 that what distinguishes real agents from artefacts is that the former but not the latter 
can be described as beings-capable-of-acting-according to purposes-that are intrinsic-to themselves. 
Thus one may enquire of a person as to whether he or she is turning the heating in their house down in 
order to benefit the environment or in order to save money. But one could not sensibly ask this 
question of the heating system itself, or at least could only find out the answer by reference to a 
design document and not exclusively by reference to the artefact itself. Taylor describes agents to 
whom one can atttibute intrinsic purposes as beings for whom things can have "significance". Taylor 
suggests that what is distinctive about real agents as compared to artefacts is not so much that the 
former are conscious beings, as that they can represent to themselves different choices and 
possibilities which they regard as more or less valuable. 
13Ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985) p3. 
14Sttawson (1968) p74f. 
lSRef. ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985) Ch. 12 and Taylor (1989) Part I. 
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Taylor contends that what distinguishes human beings from animals is that the contents of human 
consciousness affect and are affected by things that have moral significance for us. We might 
consider as an example the experience of shame. To be ashamed means to be conscious of what is 
shameful to one. Yet what is shameful is itself a function of standards set by self-aware subjects. The 
experience of shame is thus bound to participation in a human community in which certain things are 
held to be of moral significance. It would not be possible for an animal, who is not a member of such 
a linguistic community, to feel shame in this way. The same can be said for a host of other emotions 
such as pride, dignity and guilL The move from sub-personal to personal agency is therefore not 
simply a matter of a greater degree of consciousness as expressed in the ability to form a wider range 
of representations of the world. It is rather the acquisition of a range of moral significances which are 
essentially those of self-aware agents. Human beings are "agents-plus" in that their actions take place 
in a context of significances that do not apply to non-human agents. Taylor describes human beings as 
"selves" inasmuch as we are beings of the requisite depth and complexity to have a moral orientation 
of this kind. 16 
Taylor's strongest claim - that seltbood is a function of one's orientation to morally significant goods -
is vulnerable to anthropological criticism. Certainly, it seems difficult to specify a universal set of 
moral-attitudes that-characterise-the-self;-For-example,-A-;W~R-Adkins-has shown -that the concept-of 
personal moral responsibility, which seems so foundational to our own ethical thinking, among the 
ancient Greeks "undeniably held a minor position"l7; for them, shame was a much more significant 
motivational source. It seems difficult for us to conceive of a people whom we would recognise as 
human which did not have some kind of basic moral orientation but, at the limits, the nature of this 
ethical dimension to seltbood might be very difficult for us to recognise and define. IS I am, in any 
case, not particularly concerned here with an anthropological defence of this-most-general form_of 
Taylor's thesis, but I do wish to use his notion of the self in the less general sense of a theory of the 
development of our modern Western identity. Here Taylor's thesis does a very good job indeed. It is 
justified historically in the later parts (II to V) of his monumental Soyrces of the Self. By providing 
an adequate historical account of the modern sense of self, and by locating alternative conceptions of 
seltbood within this account, Taylor succeeds to a high degree in vindicating his own "significance-
based" ontology of seltbood against its rivals. This history is on a much broader scale than, for 
example, the belief-based account given by Mauss. 
16rfaylor (1989) p33. 
17 Adkins (1960) p 1. 
18Cf. Marlow's inability in Conrad's Heart of Dar1cness to comprehend the ethical nature of the natives 
he encounters. 
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Of course our attitudes to sources of significance and our position relative to a range of socio-
economic institutions mutually condition one another. In this respect, Taylor and Mauss each tell 
complementary parts of the story. However, the four systems of thought I consider all give a degree of 
priority to the psychological over the social pole of our identity and, to this extent, Taylor provides a 
better framework for my discussion than Mauss. This is without prejudice to the issue of how far 
Taylor's source of significance are themselves socially determined. Moreover, it is a further question 
as to how this thesis could be enriched by consideration of the social dimension of the construction of 
our identity, for example, by reviewing the social thought of Augustine's City of God as a counter-
weight to the psychological thought of his Confessions. 
4.2 The Western "Inward" Self 
One of the most salient features of our modem Western sense of self, and one that lies behind the 
great contemporary interest in psychology, is that of "inwardness". We have the sense that mental 
states and feelings are located "within" us and that the objects these bear on are located "outside" us. 
We perceive ourselves as having inner depths. We talk of the possibility of expressing our inner 
selves. We commonly say that we have inner potentials and capacities that need to be developed. We 
may understand our conscious self to be merely the tip of an iceberg that conceals a vast personal or 
evencosmicunconscious. We readilydistinguish~between our "persona", or what people seeof-us~on 
the outside, and our "real self' that lies hidden and protected on the inside. 
These features are so much a part of our identity that we find it hard to imagine that they might not be 
intrinsic to human nature per se. However, cross-cultural research indicates that we have here to do 
with a sense of inwardness that is particular to our own Western tradition. J.S. La Fontaine tells us19 
that the Taita ttibe~of-Kenya attribute various emotions-to different~parts of~the body.~Moreover,~she 
notes that the Oahuku-Oama tribe of New Guinea attribute particular significance to the skin, the 
surface of the individual. Moral evaluations may be expressed with reference to the skin, so that a 
person can be described as having a good or a bad skin. Closer to our own culture, in the psalms, one 
of our major sources of ancient Hebrew anthropology, the person is concretely identified with his or 
her flesh; the self is not "inside" the body but is the body. Various elements of what we would 
recognise as selfhood are then localised in particular parts of the body, so that the spirit is placed in 
the throat and the heart is identified as the site of planning and thinking.20 
19&J. Carrithers et. al. (1985) p123ff. 
2llRef. Kraus (1986) pp143-150. 
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Of course there is a certain sense of the distinction inner/outer woven into many different cultures 
besides our own. The sense that what I hold back from speaking somehow remains inner and that 
what I speak into the public domain is outer is a rather general feature of human experience. Thus 
Clifford Geenz reports on a Javan distinction between the realm of "batin'', or subjective feeling, and 
"lair" or external action and speech.21 But this does not seem to be connected to individuality in the 
Western sense nor does it bear on the soul/body distinction to which we are accustomed. "Balin" 
refers to the common characteristics of the emotional life of human beings in general not to the 
particularity of an individual soul. Or again, if we take Islam, a near relative of our Western tradition, 
there are discussions of the relation of the inner state of faith (iman) to the outer expression of 
submission (islam)22• However, the huge development of the modem Western sense of inwardness is 
the product of a particular tradition of thought that I shall be outlining in chapter 2, and which finds 
its main source in the writings of St Augustine. 
4.3 lnte&rating the Self 
On a significance-based account of selfhood, the possibility of developing an integrated or unified 
sense of self involves unifying our sources of moral significance. This possibility was initiated in a 
decisive way by Plato. Against a Homeric ethic of valour and glory, Plato propounded an ethic in 
which the individual unites his or her powers in the pursuit of the Good. For the Homeric hero 
different dmughts and-feelings-were· quite· naturally associated with-the-beating-heart· or the panting 
lungs and not necessarily with the rational mind. For the hero, the higher moral condition involves 
being filled with a surge of energy that grants victory on the battlefield. The Homeric psuche denotes 
something like a life-force; there are no strict Homeric equivalents to our "mind" or "soul". Plato's 
ideal, on the other hand, privileges a state of self-recollection in which all the individual's powers are 
united under the rational contemplation of the Good. This involves bringing all the powers of thinking 
-·and·feeling-together-in-the·single-locus-of-the-mind-(psuche ), -
Since the Good is apprehended by the intellect, the Platonic ideal involves subjugating the passions to 
the control of reason. Thus Plato describes the state of the properly unified self as follows: 
"The just man will not allow the three elements which make up his inward self [reason, spirit 
and appetite] to trespass on each other's functions or interfere with each other, but, by keeping 
all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle and low, and any others there be), will in 
the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and order, and live on good terms with 
21Geenz (1979) p230f. 
22Ref. Waines (1995) Ch. 4. 
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himself. When he has bound these elements into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so 
become fully one instead of many, he will be fully ready for action of any kind, whether it 
concerns his personal or financial welfare, whether it is political or private; and he will reckon 
and call any of these actions just and honourable as it contributes to and helps maintain this 
disposition of mind, and will call the knowledge which controls such action wisdom."23 
It follows that the health of the mind consists in proper relations of control and subordination among 
its constituent parts. By contrast, Plato describes the condition where the passions are not under the 
control of reason as one of "civil war" .24 Plato initiates the dominant Western moral tradition. This is 
a tradition in which the possibility of unifying the self seems to be linked with achieving rational self-
mastery. 
Taylor argues25 that, historically, people have derived their sense of self from some good, such as the 
Platonic Good or the Augustinian God, which transcends all others in significance, and that they have 
become whole persons to the extent that they are truly orientated towards this supreme source of 
value or "hypergood". A hyper good not only provides people with a sense of what is right, as other 
things are ordered in accordance with it, but love of this good also provides a powerful motivation to 
people to act in accordance with this sense: in Taylor's terms it acts as a "moral source", or what I 
shall usually refer to as a "source of significance". 
Taylor argues that the source of significance which has had the most enduring influence on the 
Western sense of self is the Christian God, as articulated in Western, Augustinian theology. But 
Taylor demonstrates that, in addition to the traditional, theistic source of significance, modernity has 
opened up two new frontiers of moral exploration: firstly the dignity of the rational agent and 
secondly the realm of nature. He suggests that both these sources are derived from Christian theism 
but have subsequently developed independently and indeed are now frequently taken to oppose 
theism. This need not be the case, he suggests. Rather we should conceive of the three groups of 
sources (theism, the rational agent and nature) as representing three axes of moral space so that 
progress in accordance with one source complements rather than opposes progress in the direction of 
one of the others. Moreover, progress in one direction may cause us to revise our understanding of 
one of the other sources of significance, as for example the green movement has influenced Christian 
theology, so that moral progress takes a spiral form. On Taylor's account, developing an integrated 
23Republic 443. 
24Republic 444. 
25Taylor (1989) pp62-75. 
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sense of selfhood involves orientating oneself to some combination of these three groups of sources 
of significance. 
One of the main objectives of my second chapter is to show, in outline, how the modem sense of self 
can be shown to be formed as the historical outworking of our interaction with these three groups of 
sources of significance. This chapter offers a justification of the validity of the concept of the self and 
its "sources" that I am working with. I hope to show in the unfolding of this account that certain 
modem psychologists can be located at the end of the story as offering contemporary articulations of 
one or other of the moral sources of rational agency and the realm of nature. By demonstrating that 
the psychologies may be considered as articulations of Taylor's "sources of significance" I am able to 
place them in conversation with the Augustinian theistic moral source. The ideological history I give 
in chapter two is thus an essential pre-requisite of the kind of dialogue I wish to establish. 
5. Ogestjons of Scope apd Method 
I have chosen to bring into conversation an ancient theologian (St. Augustine, Ch. 3) and some 
modem psychologists (Chs. 4-6), and this decision needs some explanation. For example, would it not 
have avoided all kinds of possible anachronisms if I had selected a modem theologian rather than a 
Church Father? 
My over-riding concern has been to choose figures whose ideas have permeated deeply into our 
culture and hence had a major influence in shaping our contemporary sense of self. As I have 
indicated, Augustine casts his shadow over a whole cultural tradition. It is therefore not surprising that 
when modem psychologists wish to take issue with theology they more typically engage (directly or 
indirectly) with Augustine than with some modem theologian. It is inconceivable that any 
contemporary theologian could achieve the degree of cultural influence that Augustine has done. The 
psychologists I have chosen to discuss are likewise those whom I consider to have been the most 
influential in cultural terms, namely Sigmund Freud (chapter 4), Carl Jung (chapter 5) and the 
humanistic psychologists (chapter 6). 
In his Sources of the Self Taylor chooses artists, novelists and poets as those whom he sees as 
articulating the sources of significance in our contemporary culture. This is fair up to a point, but it 
may be objected that appreciation of contemporary art and literature is restricted to a rather small 
minority of our society. The influence of the psychologists is, I think, much wider, pervading not just 
"high culture" but popular newspapers, chat shows and counselling agencies of all kinds. It is the 
agony aunt with her psychological wisdom, at least as much as the poet, to whom people tum for 
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resources to make them whole. A dialogue between Augustine and the most influential modem 
psychologists can, I think, articulate some of the most important ideas in the contemporary moral 
ethos out of which (on a significance-based account) the contemporary self is formed. 
Particularly in the case of Freud and Jung there is a vast secondary literature.26 Precisely because of 
their cultural importance, these psychologists have generated a huge array of interpreters whose own 
views have fallen into rival schools of thought27. This has frequently led to considerable confusion as 
to what the psychologists themselves actually said. One of my aims, therefore, is to return to the 
primary sources to try to establish for myself the intentions of the founding psychologists. Likewise 
my purpose is not so much to engage with those Christian theologians who have drawn out the 
pastoral and spiritual implications of the psychologists' work, as to see what the psychologists 
themselves had to say about the specific question of the unity of the self. I should add that the thesis is 
concerned with the psychologies as theoretical systems, and I do not analyse any experimental or 
clinical evidence here. 
I make the major assumption that psychologies and conceptions of selfhood across varying ages and 
outlooks are in principle commensurable. I assume, for example, that we can discern a recognisable 
"self' that can be used as a basis for dialogue between Augustine and the modem psychologists, and 
tlranbere-is-a-recognisable-sense-of-inwardness-whose development can be traced across centuries of 
thought. Some postmodernists would argue that systems of discourse are actually far more fragmented 
than I have allowed28. They would say that history is not continuous in the way I assume· and that 
there are insurmountable barriers between ancient and modem ways of speaking about the self. They 
might further suggest that rational debate even between modem psychological communities with 
different commitments is problematic. If such postmodemists are right, then we have to deal with a 
-multiplicity of psychological "sects", whether of a-religious or psychoanalytic character, who-can only 
tell persuasive stories to each other but cannot engage in meaningful dialogue. I have to admit that the 
contemporary, highly fragmented, psychological landscape does make this look a real possibility. On 
the other hand, if my assumption is correct then the language used by each tradition can, albeit with 
great care, be translated and understood by a different tradition29, We are then in the more promising 
situation of dealing with strategies for integrating the self that can be tested by those not already 
26See, for example, the bibliographic essays by Gay on Freud (1988, pp741-779) and by Heisig 
(1973) on Jung. 
27The Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels comments: "Unlike the Freudians, post-Jungians have not yet 
formed officially recognised schools, although the process has certainly taken place informally" 
(Samuels 1985 p6). 
28E.g. see Foucault AK (1972). 
29So Macintyre (1988) Ch. 19 "Tradition and Translation". 
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committed to them. Perhaps my thesis could be taken as a wager that some kind of public truth can 
still be salvaged from a baUleground fought over by interest groups deeply committed to their own 
ways of speaking about the self. 
In proposing that theologies and psychologies can be seen as articulating sources of significance, I am 
suggesting that they provide resources which help us to make sense of our thinking, feeling and 
acting. They confer value on us. The notion of a source of value is not the same as that of a moral 
code. We are less concerned here with prescriptions for behaviour than with something by means of 
which our lives become charged with significance. A strong source of significance is something 
sufficiently attractive that the different parts of our selves are drawn together and united in the pursuit 
of it. What I am endeavouring to do is to establish whether, for us today, any one of the sources of 
significance I consider is sufficient to generate an integrated self or, failing this, whether a sense of 
wholeness might be achieved by some combination of the different sources. 
In my expositions of Augustine and the modern psychologists I endeavour to discern what it is that 
grants each of these systems their power for us. It seems to me that the source of this power varies 
considerably between the figures I consider. In the case of Augustine and Freud we are dealing with 
thinkers who, in their different ways, explore the workings of the mind with a high degree of analytic 
skill and intellectual rigour. Here it is possible to be quite precise about the means and strategies by 
which the authors suppose that the self is to gain a higher degree of unity. Both these figures have a 
high regard for the power of intellectual argument, and my exposition of both these can therefore, I 
trust, be correspondingly tightly argued. Jung's style, by contrast, is more mystical; his power seems to 
lie in the fascination we may find in the mythical world of the unconscious that he describes for us. 
My discussion of Jung therefore seemed to require a more general evaluation of the "feel" of this 
world.--The -hwnanistic--psychologists __ are _a differenLcase_again. The theoretical_strength_ oLtheir 
systems seems rather weak, yet their culture influence is very large. Here, more than with the other 
authors, I have found it necessary to review some of the sociological reasons why their ideas have 
taken hold in Western culture. 
For each author, I attempt to elucidate what is meant by the self. In Augustine's case, this involves 
relating his Latin tenns to our English words; for Freud it means discussing the relation of the ego to 
the self; whilst in Jung's case I have examined his quite particular understanding of the self as an 
archetype of the unconscious. I consider how each author proposes the self is to be united. This 
involves unpacking their technical vocabulary and giving some explanation of their overall 
psychological systems. Since my notion of the integrated self involves reference to sources of 
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significance, I am particularly concerned to discern the vision of the human goal found in each 
author's work. Each author gives us some kind of moral vision or ethos which needs to be elucidated. 
In evaluating Augustine and the psychologists I shall be concerned with their ability to integrate the 
self, and in my concluding chapter I shall suggest some criteria by which this ability can be measured. 
These are what might be called "applied" criteria, that is, criteria associated with therapeutic 
effectiveness. Each of the figures I consider could also be evaluated according to "pure" criteria 
associated with his own discipline. Thus in the case of Augustine one can discuss his consonance with 
scripture and tradition. and I shall on occasion do this. In the case of the psychologists one could 
apply pure psychological criteria such as consonance with clinical and experimental data, or the 
fruitfulness of theories for further research. In general I avoid comments in these areas since they go 
beyond my field of competence as a theologian. However, where a psychologist makes claims of a 
theological nature, and this applies especially in the case of Jung, then I have felt able to offer some 
comment. 
6. Oqht we to J)U[SUC the Upity of the Self? 
I have suggested that theologies and psychologies can be evaluated in terms of their ability to supply 
resources for unifying the self. However, I have so far avoided the question, which I must now 
address, as to the nature of the integration of the self as a goal for living. Is it a goal we should 
pursue? If it is, how does it relate to other human goals, such as the pursuit of moral excellence? 
The most radical answer to these kinds of questions comes from some of the postmodernists whom 
we shall meet in chapter two. They argue that the very notion of the self as an object of psychological 
and moral reflection works to enslave us to powerful and anonymous strategies of control operating in 
society. They -suggest that-the elemental forces of desire within the person form_a_creative principle_of 
resistance to societal conttol. In their view the centred self must be deconstructed if these forces are 
to be released. For them life would at least be more pleasurable (if not happier) in the absence of the 
ordering of our desires which seems to be implied by the notion of a unified self. Therefore the 
therapy they prescribe does not serve to build up the self but to break it down. 
Postmodernism forms an important part of our contemporary cultural context. However, as I hope to 
show, in its most extteme forms it is self-defeating. It is best taken as a protest against a tradition 
which, from Plato onwards, has construed the unity of the self in ways which have emphasised order 
and discipline. The critique of the tradition offered by the postmodernists leads me here to suggest 
new ways of construing the unity of the self which take seriously the less ordered parts of the self. 
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The arguments of the postmodemists have not led me to abandon the unity of the self as a worthwhile 
goal but have encouraged me to propose a less tightly bonded model of the integrated self. I suggest 
that one way of doing this might be to consider the biblical notion of "spirit", which comprises both 
ordered and "unordered"30 aspects, rather than the Platonic intellect, as the highest part of the 
personality. 
By contrast with the postmodemists, all the theological and psychological systems of thought I review 
in chapters 3 to 6 consider the unity of the self to be a desirable goal. Indeed, each of them, more or 
less explicitly, takes the integration of the self, or as much integration as is possible, as its therapeutic 
goal. Thus, for Augustine the spiritual journey was one in which the individual progressed from an 
initial state of fragmentation through a gradual restoration to unity and wholeness after the image of 
the one God. Freud saw the aim of psychoanalysis as being to enable the ego to extend its control over 
lost regions of the psyche so as to extend the individual's sense of psychic unity. The central concept 
of Jung's psychology, individuation, involves finding a sense of wholeness through reconciling 
opposites in the personality. Humanistic psychology is concerned with recovering a true sense of self 
(Fromm), putting people in touch with their emotions (Rogers) and enabling all parts of the self to be 
united in "self-actualisation" (Maslow). 
Whilst all these authors agree on the desirability of the unity of the self, they differ on the question of 
the status of this goal against what might be taken as a plausible alternative goal, namely the pursuit 
of moral goodness. The differences arise largely from the differences in the "sources of significance" 
that empower the vision represented by each. Augustine's source of significance is the God who is 
perfectly good. For Augustine, as the self approaches God so it grows in moral goodness. For him, the 
goal of integrating the self and the goal of moral goodness coincide. Freud's source of significance, by 
·contrast,-is-the-dignity-of-the-rational-agent.-For-Freud,-becoming-rational-involvesbecoming-critical-
of traditional moral values. The goal of psychoanalysis is to become rational, not to become morally 
good. Jung's source of significance is the realm of nature. Jung, like Freud, is suspicious of moral 
goodness as a life goal. His own goal of individuation incorporates (and hence subsumes) growth in 
goodness as one pole in a balanced form of psychological development that is in harmony with the 
natural life of the psyche. The humanists, like Jung, take the realm of nature as their source of 
significance. But, unlike Jung, they argue that genuine moral goodness is consonant with the natural 
desires of human beings. For them the integration of the self coincides with growth in moral 
goodness. With the humanists we return, in one sense, to Augustine's position. However, Augustine 
30J will use "unorder" as a tenn of contrast with order so as to avoid the negative connotations of 
"disorder"- a distinction I owe to Hardy and Ford (1984) p96ff. 
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and the humanists start from opposite ends: where Augustine defines what is required to integrate the 
self by reference to a moral-spiritual Good, the humanists define what is good by reference to what is 
needed for the natural development and actualisation of the self. 
What any particular person takes to be the relation of the integration of the self to the pursuit of moral 
goodness will depend on which of these figures speak most convincingly to him or her, that is, which 
of them can articulate most powerfully a source of significance by which one can live. The conclusion 
of this present work (chapter 7) is that whilst none of the systems of thought described, by itself, has 
the power fully to give us an integrated sense of self, Augustine's system seems to be the strongest. 
However, Augustine's thought is itself strengthened by interaction with the work of the other authors I 
consider. It seems that the greatest chance of gaining a unified sense of self may arise from taking the 
Augustinian God as one's dominant source of significance, whilst also allowing space for the other 
sources of significance. According to this position it would seem that the integration of the self does 
coincide with moral excellence. However, it envisages that our notion of moral excellence will itself 
need to be conditioned by the insights and criticisms of the psychologists. 
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The Modern Self: Historical Development 
and Postmodern Critique 
1. Iptroductiop 
In this chapter I wish to give, in outline, a historical justification for the notion that the modern 
sense of self has developed through the relation of the individual to one or more moral sources. 
Historically, I argue, personal identity has been gained through the relation of the individual to 
some powerful source of meaning, and the sense of self is strengthened and united as one 
orientated oneself more fully to this source. I begin by exploring the role of St Augustine in 
imprinting the characteristically Western quality of inwardness on our cultural tradition. I show 
how, with Augustine, the mode of access to our sources of moral significance became an inward 
one (Section 2). I next indicate some of the ways in which the sense of self developed from 
Augustine through to the outset of the twentieth century. I trace this development through the 
medieval period (Section 3.1) to the uncovering in the modern period of two new sources of 
moral significance: the rationality of the human subject (Section 3.2) and respect for the realm of 
nature (Section 3.3). I thus propose that at the opening of our present century the self was 
understood along three axes of inward moral sources: Augustine's traditional theistic moral 
source, the inner rationality of the human mind, and the natural realm lying within the human 
soul. 
However, I also wish to show that the notion of a centred self defined by its relation to sources of 
moral significance is under threat. I suggest that the modern Western sense of self, was thrown 
into crisis by the writing of Sigmund Freud, the person who has influenced the contemporary 
sense of self more than anyone else in this century (Section 4). Freud's opening up of the realm of 
the unconscious had two effects. It hugely deepened and extended our sense of self, but it also 
cast doubt on the possibility of unifying the self. Freud revealed new regions of the personality 
which are not susceptible to rational control and which seem to be difficult to hold together with 
the conscious realm. After Freud we have seen numerous attacks on the unified self. The most 
influential have been those which form part of the contemporary cultural shift into postmodernity 
(Section 5.1). These have been generated especially by certain radical French readings of Freud, 
notably by Lacan (Section 5.2) and following him by Deleuze and Guattari (Section 5.3). These 
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thinkers saw in Freud's description of the unordered unconscious a resource with which to break 
down constructs of the unified self that they took to be oppressive. 
I show that the early work of the most important of the French postmodemists, Michel Foucault, 
was also sympathetic to this point of view. Foucault, following Lacan, thought that a radical form 
of psychoanalysis could be used to undermine the self. However, in his later writing, Foucault 
came to see psychoanalysis as part of Ute very apparatus of power by which we are enslaved. His 
final position is not that the self should be destroyed, but that we should seek new and liberating 
forms of selthood (Section 5.4). After Foucault, the critique of the postmodernists should, I think, 
not lead us to abandon the project to unify the self but to seek alternative and less controlling 
ways of unifying the self, ways which respond to the situation of flux and celebration of 
difference that the postmodemists have drawn to our attention (Section 5.5). 
This part of the thesis deals with a whole intellectual tradition and is necessarily very general. It 
sets up a historical framework within which Augustine and the modem psychologists we shall 
meet in subsequent chapters may be brought into conversation. It allows that these authors may 
be understood as offering complementary means for defending the unity of the self through their 
articulations of the deeply established moral sources of our selthood. It describes the postmodern 
critique of traditional notions of the self and suggests that our contemporary context is one in 
which the integrated self should be understood in a less strongly ordered manner than has hitherto 
been the case. 
2. Auaustine and the Roots of the Modern Western Self 
The-initiation-of-the-tradition of the- Western "inward" self may be attributed -largely to St. 
Augustine. Augustine synthesised the Judaeo-Christian faith and Neo-Platonic philosophy in a 
way that resulted in a tradition of thought bearing a remarkably inward notion of selthood. Indeed 
our modem "psychological" sense of selthood finds its ultimate ancestor in Augustine. This is not 
to say that other philosophers such as Plotinus or theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa 
contemporary with Augustine did not use the language of inwardness. Christian theologians of the 
patristic era had the sense of a spiritual interiorism born out of the pursuit of the soul towards the 
vision of Godl. Nco-Platonic philosophy operated with a metaphysic in which, through 
contemplation, human beings might recognise the divine in themselves and restore it to unity with 
the transcendent source of all being2. But Augustine personalised the Neo-Platonic philosophy in 
the light of his own experiences and Christian religious convictions to a remarkable degree. He 
has had a far greater effect on the intellectual tradition than his contemporaries. 
tsee, for example, Gregory of Nyssa's Life of Moses, to which I shall refer again in due course. 
2Ref. Armstrong (1970) Ch. 14. On his death-bed Plotinus stated his aim as being "to bring back 
the divine in man to the divine in the All". (Quoted in Armstrong p272.) 
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The major change in the notion of selfhood made by Augustine to the Platonic tradition is that, 
after Augustine, the mode of access to the sources of moral significance is now understood to be 
from within the self. We can detect a topological shift in the language used of the soul's journey 
towards the good. Of course Plato had located moral sources in the realm of thought. But Plato 
did not equate access to the Ideas with a tum inward. Rather, as the allegory of the cave makes 
clear, becoming rational involved a turning around of the soul from facing what is transient to 
facing the light The soul as immaterial and eternal ought to tum towards what is immaterial and 
eternal. Plato's moral sources are best identified not with the distinctions inner/outer but with the 
dichotomy transient/eternal: to be ruled by reason is to have a correct vision of the eternal rational 
order. But with Augustine the eternal is linked with the inner and the transient with the outer. 
Plotinus forms the crucial bridge between Plato and Augustine here.3 Central to Plotinus's work is 
the desire of the soul to return to God. Plotinus speaks equally of the soul's journey as an upward 
one and as an inward one. Thus: 
"We must ascend again towards the Good, the desired of every soul. Anyone that has seen 
This knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful. Even the desire of it is to be desired 
as aGood"4• 
"He that has strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by 
the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joyS ... When you 
know that you have become this perfect work, when you are self-gathered in the purity of your 
being, nothing ... can shatter your inner unity. n6 
Plotinus takes Plato's Sun Simile and links the turning upward to see the light with a turning 
inward upon oneself'1. For Plotinus, any being exists in its self-identity only in the measure in 
which it is in immediate relationship of union with and dependence on its inner principle of 
origin. Introversion is in the strictest sense reversion or return upon one's principle and, since the 
principle is always superior to the product, introversion is therefore also elevation. 
3Plotinus certainly deserves a larger place in the history of the Western self than the two passing 
references to him in Taylor's account would indicate. However, his influence, though profound, is 
indirect. Plotinus's works were not available in the middle ages and his ideas were transmitted 
through the work of pseudo-Dionysius and (especially) Augustine - irrespective of the extent to 
which Augustine was personally acquainted with his writings. 
4Enneacls 1.6.7 
5Enneads 1.6.8 
6Enneads 1.6.9. 
7Enneads 1.6.9. 
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Following Plotinus, Augustine held that the search for God requires a turning inward upon 
oneself. 8 Where Plato's Ideas were to be seen in the field of objects, insofar as these participated 
in the realm of Ideas, Augustine's God is known in the power of seeing itself. This involves what 
Taylor has called a "radically reflexive"9 stance. God is made known in our experiencing of 
ourselves. The mind's true self-presence to itself, or what Augustine calls the mind's remembering 
of itself, must therefore emerge into the mind's remembering of God. For Augustine the inner 
presence of God is a fundamental theological and philosophical principle, and interiority is 
therefore a notion that occurs widely in Augustine's writings. , 
All of Augustine's early dialogues display a tendency to examine inner mental data. The 
Soliloguies, in which Augustine records his nocturnal meditations at Cassiacum, has Reason 
(ratio) questioning Augustine in a manner that shows some of the workings of Augustine's 
introspective method during his early years. Augustine's Sermons place a very special emphasis 
on interiority. Here one might note Augustine's detailed expositions of Luke 15:14 "He entered 
into himself' or Isaiah 46:8 "Return therefore to the heart" to. Among Augustine's later theological 
works, the psychological models of the second half of de Trinitate offer some of the most 
profound examples of Augustine's interiorism. Perhaps most importantly, Augustine's 
Confessions are the first autobiography in the ancient world written with the purpose of 
describing oneself, one's own character and one's inner life. This book alone marks a major 
contribution to the modem notion of the self as a person with definite character, complexities, 
motives and aims. 
None of this is intended to suggest that Augustine was a solitary or what we might call an 
"introverted" person. He was, to the contrary, a man who did not like being alone and who was 
constantly surrounded by friends U. Indeed he operated-at-a-level of sociability that most modem 
Westerners would find intolerable. Augustine's "inwardness" was a theological principle that 
emphasised the importance of attention to inner psychological states; it did not at all mark for him 
a withdrawal from society. Here he is to be contrasted with Plotinus, for whom the spiritual path 
was a "passing of solitary to solitary"12, or in its more familiar translation "the flight of the alone 
to the Alone". 
Closely liked to Augustine's emphasis on inwardness is the central place he came to give to the 
problem of the desiring will in human psychology. In his early life Augustine was optimistic that 
Sgjn, VIII.ll. 
9-faylor (1989) p130. 
10See Pellegrino's introduction to Seonons 111/1 pp79-81 and, e.g., sermons 102.2; 104.1; 161.8; 
255.6. 
llRef. Brown (1969) Ch. 6, 17. Taylor does not seem to register this important point 
12A phrase given added emphasis through being placed by Porphyry as the final statement of 
Plotinus's work <Enneads VI.9). 
24 
The Modem Self: Historical Development and Postmodem Critique 
one might achieve the Platonic ideal of a perfect ordering of the passions under the control of 
reason.l3 However, in his mature years Augustine came to see the sheer difficulty of achieving 
the perfect life and became deeply aware of the apparent permanence of evil in human actions. 
This led him to a profound change in his view of humanity, a change aptly described by Peter 
Brown as "the Lost Future"14. Human beings could not look forward to an earthly future in which, 
in their old age, they might achieve the Platonic ideal of serene, rational contemplation with 
potentially disturbing passions fully mastered; It was precisely his meditations on the loss of the 
bright future he had envisaged in his earlier years that generated the subtleties of the mature 
Augustine's motivational theory. Augustine came to see that the human will is not entirely under 
the control of the individual. It is moved by external sources of "delight". A person can only act if 
he can mobilise his feelings, and his feelings can only be roused if they are affected by an object 
of delight. Delight, for the mature Augustine, is the key to human action for it alone can motivate 
the will and meet human desire. Moreover, the processes that prepare a person's heart to take 
delight in their God are not only hidden but are actually unconscious and beyond our controJ.l5 
Augustine's mature psychology, as manifested in, for example, the Confessions, is therefore a 
complex mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled desire, a will tom between conflicting delights and 
dependent on divine grace if it is to be directed aright. The problem of the will has been crucially 
important to human psychology to the present day with, as we shall see, different psychologists 
offering very different proposals for how the question should be tackled. 
Augustine was deeply influenced by the Stoic philosophy which pervaded the ancient world and 
in which happiness was seen to reside in the proper ordering of a human being's powers. 
Throughout his career Augustine's key conception of humanity was the rightful authority of the 
mind and will over all other functions of human lifel6. This was not merely the dominance of the 
souLover _the body, although __ Augustine frequently expresses it in_this_way, buLthe _properly 
ordered relationship of the various aspects of the soul, of humanity's animate life as a whole. The 
"Lost Future" that characterises Augustine's later work does not repudiate the Stoic ideal but 
rather loses the hope that Stoic order might be achieved in the saeculum. Unfortunately, 
Augustine's enduring commitment to right order leaves him with little place in his psychology for 
any positive contribution from unordered parts of the psyche. Augustine identifies aspects of the 
person that escape the ordering powers of the will as evidence of human fallenness and sinfulness. 
This identification is made supremely in the case of human sexuality. 
The implications of the commitment to Stoic order were not to be fully exposed and critiqued 
until Freud. A central concern of my work here is to establish how we might retain a unified sense 
13E.g. s. dom. m. I.ii.9. 
14Brown Ch. 15. 
15Ref. Brown p155; ~I., qu.ii.22. 
16See further Wetzel (1992) ppS0-55; TeSelle (1970) p61ff. 
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of selfhood whilst doing justice to the unordered parts of the self that have, until quite recently, 
been neglected or deprecated in the Western tradition. Within Christian theology it is the Spirit 
who has been taken to represent creativity and spontaneity and might, more generally, be taken to 
represent unorder and diversity. Unfortunately, however, Augustine tended to focus only on the 
ordered and bonding dimensions of the Spirit's activity. A proper emphasis on the unordered parts 
of the self will therefore involve us in some re-thinking of the doctrine of the Spirit beyond what 
we find in Augustine. 
3. Streams jn the Formation of the Contemporary Self 
I now wish to give a very broad brush outline of how the Augustinian sense of inwardness has 
been transmitted to modern times and how it has informed our contemporary sense of self. At 
appropriate points I will indicate where the historical ideas of selfhood that I describe have a 
particular bearing on the specifically psychological notions that I will be exploring in later 
chapters. This section does not, of course, aim to chart a complete history of the modern self. 
Such a history, if it were possible, would need to chart the causal sequence of the practices in 
which human identity is embedded. Rather I aim to discuss briefly some of the leading ideas of 
selthood that articulated historical practice and sometimes stimulated new practices. I will 
generally be leaving open the question of causality: I am not arguing (in an idealistic way) that the 
ideas directly caused each other, nor do I wish to say (in a Marxist way) that certain socio-
economic practices directly caused the ideas. I am attempting, rather, to uncover and trace the 
stock of ideas which I believe form a key part of the cultural inheritance that conditions our 
contemporary sense of se1f17. 
3.1 Developments in the Medieval Period 
Some authors, and Taylor -is an example, have too readily leapt over the one thousand years of 
history from Augustine to Descartes as if nothing of importance happened in between. Descartes 
can be seen as standing in a tradition of "inwardness" initiated by Augustine, but he received this 
tradition as it was refracted through medieval spirituality. In particular, the early medieval period, 
1050-1200, was of great importance in the formation of our modern notions of seltboodts. In the 
twelfth century social changes, such as the growth of cities, increased prospects for mobility, new 
educational and vocational opportunities were associated with a new focus on the individual and 
his or her inner resources. 
17In terms of theological method my approach might be described as "traditional" rather than 
"liberationist". The latter approach takes the view that an exploration of the human situation must 
start not from our ideas about ourselves but from a politically committed analysis of socio-
economic praxis. For a recent example of this genre see Pattison (1994). 
18Ref. Morris (1972) esp. Ch. 4 "The Search for the Self'. 
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Changes in patterns of confession are a particularly striking example of a general development of 
a sense of inwardness during this period. Up until the tenth century, the penitential system, in line 
with ecclesiastical canons fonnulated from the fifth to the seventh centuries, generally awarded 
fixed and public penalties according to the degree of harm done by the sinful act and irrespective 
of the intention of the sinner. Even the emperor Louis the Pious, could, in 822, be required to do 
public penance under this system. And the soldiers in the army of William the Conqueror were 
required to petfonn fixed penalties after the Battle of Hastings in 1066 despite the fact that they 
were acting under orders in war and that they were likely to repeat the offences as part of their 
duties as soldiers. Nowhere does the document which spells out the penances refer to inner 
intention. However, between the tenth and the twelfth centuries a system of private penance and 
private reconciliation that focused on the inner intentions of the sinner spread from Celtic 
monastic communities across the whole of Europe. Peter Lombard, writing around 1150, 
expressed the important theological principle that the intention of repentance was of more 
importance for one's standing before God than fonnal confession and penitential action.19 The 
increasing emphasis on interiority culminated in Peter Abelard's insistence that God judges the 
gravity of a sin solely on the basis of the inner intention and irrespective of the wrong 
committed. 20 
Patterns of "inwardness" were sustained especially in the monastic movement. In twelfth century 
monasticism it appears that the interior way came to predominate over the sense of belonging to 
the wider body of believers in finding one's path towards God. The writings of authors such as 
Bernard of Clairvaux, William of St. Thierry and Aelred of Rievaulx are marked by a radically 
reflexive stance in which self-knowledge is seen as the main pathway to God. Thus Bernard 
writes: "Begin by considering yourself- no, rather, end by that. .. For you, you are the first; you are 
also the-last!'2L And-Aelred-exclaims: "How much does-a man--know- if he does not know 
himself1"22 This century also witnessed a desire for self-expression, as evidenced in a huge 
increase in the preaching and preservation of sennons, and a flourishing of poetry in which 
personal emotions and experience were described. Guibert of Nogent suggested that the 
19Sentences Bk. 4 17.2, in a reference to death-bed confessions: "Accordingly, the penitent ought 
to confess his sins if he have time: and yet, before the confession is in his mouth, if the intention 
be in his heart, forgiveness is accorded him." (Quoted in Watkins p745.) 
2~ef. Sikes (1932) Ch. VIII. 
21Quoted in Morris (1972) p66. Although, as with Augustine, we need to be careful to distinguish 
a theological emphasis from what we might call an "introverted" pattern of behaviour. Bernard 
was not at all the remote mystic that one might surmise from a reading of Morris. He was a 
powerful leader and preacher who travelled widely, operated at a senior diplomatic level and 
maintained a vast correspondence. (ref. Hugh Martin's introduction to Bernard's On Loving God 
SCM 1959). 
22Quoted in Morris (1972) p66. 
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promotion of self-understanding was the main function of the preacher, and that this had to come 
from the preacher's own self-analysis23. 
The twelfth century desire for self-knowledge generated a keen interest in psychology. The 
starting point here was the work of Augustine. Augustine's psychological trinities fitted well with 
the monastic concern to find through self-knowledge the way to God. But within the broad lines 
of Augustine's spiritual psychology, authors such as William of St Thierry (The Nature and 
Dianity of Love c.1120) and Aelred of Rievaulx (The Mirror of Charity c. 1142) .developed a 
"clinical theology" of the affections and dispositions which motivate the soul's progress towards 
God. 
Up until1050 there had been virtually no autobiographical writing since Augustine's Confessions. 
From the late eleventh century there is a great increase in the autobiographical content of books 
on a wide variety of subjects. The eleventh century monk Otloh of Saint Emmerson may be 
regarded as the first autobiographer of the new era, producing On His Temptations and Writings 
and The Confession of my Dee<is. His sensitivity drove him into what we would now call mental 
illness, the episodes of which are recorded in his works. The full development of autobiography is 
found in two writers of the early twelfth century, Guibert of Nogent (Autobioarnphy) and Peter 
Abelard (Historja Calamjtatum). The autobiographies of both these men are "confessions" in the 
sense of a description of the writer's own sin and the just judgements of God, and are rooted in 
self-examination. The former, though not the latter, is modelled on Augustine's Confessions. 
Sarah Coakley has argued quite plausibly that in the spiritual writing of the thirteenth an~ 
fourteenth centuries we see a tendency to hark back to the inward self that was developed in the 
period-1 050.1-200.24 -Moreover she suggests that this later medieval-period is distinguished from 
the earlier period by a whittling away of the traditional Augustinian plurality of mental faculties 
(memory, understanding and will) to a single mental entity. Thus, whereas Bernard and William 
of St. Thierry held a balance in theories of mystical union between intellect and will, a new sense 
of disjuncture between these two becomes apparent in the writings of Thomas Gallus (d. 1246). 
For Gallus the intellect is rendered radically unimportant in approaching God. This is continued in 
the great later medieval work The Cloud of Unknowina in which there is an overwhelming 
precedence given to the loving power over the knowing power. Furthermore, in this work the self 
is clearly identified with the soul and not with the body. In summary, by the fourteenth century 
the self has been distinguished from the body and has typically been narrowed down to a single 
23Guiben: "No preaching seems to me more profitable than that which reveals a man to 
himself ... Whoever has the duty of teaching, if he wishes to be perfectly equipped, can first learn 
in himself, and afterwards profitably teach to others, what the experience of his inner struggles 
has taught." (Quoted Morris p67.) 
24Coakley (1992). 
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mental faculty. This, as Coakley suggests, would seem to provide fertile ground for the Cartesian 
cogito. 
3.2 The Deyelopmept of the Modern Ratiopal Self 
The work of Descartes is usually taken to mark the beginning of the modern Western 
philosophical era, and his account of the internalised self is highly important and influential. For 
Descartes, as for Augustine, we are at our most personal when we are at our most reflexive. On a 
significance-based account of selthood, the decisive change as we move from Augustine and the 
mediaeval theologians to Descartes is a change in the location of the moral sources of 
significance: these are now no longer located outside but inside oneself. For Plato, to gain mastery 
over one's self, to be ruled by reason, was a matter of turning one's gaze upwards to the realm of 
the Ideas. One needed to be turned towards the cosmic order which is imbued with the Good. 
Whilst, in Augustine, the mode of access to God involved a turning inwards to fmd God at the 
~ of the soul, the God one found was the Creator who transcended oneself. For Descartes, by 
contrast, one turns inwards to discover certainty in one's own rational thinking. 
In the Platonic and Augustinian views, the world was charged with a certain moral significance. 
For Plato, the world was patterned on the Ideas and was imbued with the Good. For Augustine, 
the world was the good. though fallen, work of the Creator. Descartes, however, envisages a 
radical separation between God and the soul on the one hand, and the material universe as a set of 
"extended" things on the other hand. The Cartesian material universe is what we could call a "de-
sacralised" one. Knowledge of it does not come about through the disclosure of the Ideas latent 
within it, nor through the revelation of God. Rather, we understand it by formulating our own 
rational ideas within the mind about the world and testing them empirically. Cartesian physical 
science proceeds mechanistically and demands no related mor~ ~isionof !_he WOI'l~. 
In classical philosophy, establishing the authority of reason over the passions was understood to 
mean bringing the whole person into line with the cosmic order. However, Descartes understands 
this mastery in a more instrumental way. The essence of Cartesian reason is the power to 
objectify the world, the body and its passions. The sense of the good life and the inspiration to 
obtain it then come from our ability to order and control the natural realm: "Instead of that 
speculative philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by 
means of which ... we can ... render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature."25 This notion 
foreshadows our contemporary ethical and political ideas about the dignity of the individual self 
as rational agent. The self is of value inasmuch as it'S rational powers contrast with the non-
rational natural world in which it acts. 
25From Descartes' Discourse on Method VI (In trans. Haldane and Ross p 119). 
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There is no reason to think that Descartes' professions of religious belief were insincere26. 
Descartes' Meditations are explicitly written to defend theism and establish the idea of God 
clearly and distinctly present within the soul. Of course Descartes would have said that his 
ultimate moral source was God. But the procedure of the cogito opens up a second moral source 
within the human mind itself. Augustine's journey inward led him to greater awareness of his own 
imperfection in the light of God's perfection. Descartes, by contrast, moves from radical doubt to 
certainty about his own existence. Only then does he proceed to the idea of God, and thence to 
certainty about the existence of the material world. In Descartes' procedure the existence of God 
is one step on a chain that is concerned with establishing one's own certainty about one's self and 
the world. Following Descartes, the rational self becomes a source of moral significance in its 
own right. 
~ is best known as the founder of modem empirical philosophy and his philosophical method 
is typically contrasted with that of Cartesian rationalism. However, he shared with, and in his 
Essay on Human Understanding further developed, Descartes' high view of the rational, thinking 
subject. His work marks a further step in overturning the classical and medieval view of the 
cosmos, as imbued with ontic reason, in favour of a self-responsible subject who acts on a de-
sacralised world. Like Descartes, Locke's stance is radically reflexive. It involves disengaging 
from spontaneous and customary beliefs in order to submit them to first-person scrutiny27• But 
Locke goes further than Descartes in rejecting the notion of innate ideas - including moral ideas 
~ Bk. 1 ). Our inward journey no longer discloses the idea of God but merely supplies us with 
the empirical data from which we may build up a reliable base of knowledge. Locke's central 
thesis ~ Bk. 2) is that we get all our ideas from experience, either from experience of the 
world or from reflection on our inner states. Thus our ideas about perception, thinking, believing, 
doubting and so on come from reflection on the-operation-ofour own-minds28. -'fhe-mind-~turns 
its view inward upon itself and observes its own actions about those ideas it has [and] takes from 
thence other ideas"29, 
For Locke, the two principle actions which characterise and ennoble the mind are those of 
thinking and willing30, The activity of thinking is one of building up knowledge through 
connecting together the ideas given in experience. The activity of willing is the highly reflexive 
one of beginning, continuing or ending the actions of our minds or the motions of our bodies31. 
26So Bernard Williams in Descartes trans. Cottingham p ix; despite Williams comment that 
"theories that ascribe to him complex strategies of deceit have a strange capacity to survive". 
27~ I.i.2; cf. I.iv.23: "Some, taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by 
lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their 
duty carefully to examine ... ". 
28~II.i.4. 
29~II.vi.l. 
3~II.vi.2. 
3t~n.xxi.5. 
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The will is, in fact, a faculty concerned with a particularly intimate fonn of self-mastery: 
"Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have 
over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action"32. 
Locke opposes earlier teleological accounts of selfhood. He thought that the will is not moved by 
a longer tenn view of the good but by immediate. pleasure and pain - or what Locke calls 
sensations of "uneasiness". "Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind. But 
that which immediately detennines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the 
uneasiness of desire."33 Uneasiness may secondarily reflect good and evil, for an external law 
ordained by God rewards good action with pleasure and punishes evil action with pain. Locke's 
corresponding ontology of personhood is what Taylor tenns the "punctual self', the self as a 
punctuated series of states of consciousness: "For it is by the consciousness it has of its present 
thoughts and actions that [the self] is self to itself ... "34• This attempt to divorce the self from 
considerations of long tenn moral significance leads in our own century to the questioning by 
Derek Parfit of the very notion of seltbood that I mention in Section 5.1 below. 
Locke's hedonistic theory of motivation appears at first to be leading him to a fonn of 
detenninism, in which the will is under the control of external sources of pain and pleasure. But it 
becomes clear that Locke thought that we have the power to alter to a remarkable extent the 
associations we make between degrees of internal uneasiness and external goods.35 We do this by 
choosing which items to pursue. When we have attained the desired item the pleasure it gives 
generates further desire for such goods and sensations of uneasiness at our lack of them36. We 
can thus modify our habits of behaviour. The rational human being will choose to cultivate 
appetites and habits that make for the rewards of eternal life and that hence coincide with the 
good. 37 The cultivation of habit is now not understood in the classical sense of perfection of a 
_given fonn_ofnature. Rather, habit links elements between which there are purely instrumental 
connections. Locke's self actually has an unprecedented power to objectify itself, for it can form 
and make traits of character so that they make for pleasure/good in line with the choices of the 
individual. The self now turns inwards to impose order not merely upon the body, but upon its 
very self. This Lockean self is a forerunner of the Freudian ego, which in its tum seeks to impose 
order on the elements of the mind (see further chapter 4). 
Immanuel Kant's understanding of the self may be regarded as a later descendant of both the 
Cartesian cogito and the Lockean empirical self. Kant's philosophical system distinguishes 
sharply between the self which is given through empirical introspection and the self in itself. It is 
32~ II.xxi.15. 
33~ II.xxi.33. 
34~ II.xxvii.lO 
35~ II.xxi.53. 
36~ II.xxi.56. 
37~ II.xxi.70. 
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the latter, the self as pure subjectivity, that Kant is most concerned with. In the terms of Kant's 
philosophy this self (das /ch) is the thinking subject which accompanies all our perceptions of the 
world. This self can only be thought. It exists outside the chains of physical cause and effect; it 
experiences freedom and is the basis of the practical reason of Kant's ethics. It is disclosed in 
moments of moral obligation. However, it lies beyond the self given to us in experience and is not 
perceived by us as an object of perception in space and time. Therefore this self cannot be placed 
under one of Kant's Categories and known either through self-awareness or, still less, by empirical 
observation. Of this self Kant says: "I am conscious not of how I appear to myself, or of how I am 
in myself, but only that I am. "38 As with the Cartesian self one is at one's most personal when one 
is at one's most reflective. For Descartes this was achieved in conscious thought; for Kant it 
occurs when one is consciously acting according to the dictates of the categorical imperative of 
practical reason. Kant's relation of the self to the categorical imperative foreshadows the Freudian 
relation of the ego to the super-ego (chapter 4). However, whereas it was of the essence of Kant's 
categorical imperative that we consciously and willingly submit to it, Freud thinks our submission 
to it is more typically a matter of unconscious compulsion. 
3.3 The Develo.pmeot of the Modem Natural Self 
There is a second kind of journey inward that is radically different from that initiated by 
Descartes and continued by Locke and later by Kant. It is a search which aims not to find a self 
that operates according to clear and distinct rational principles, but to find a self that is 
distinguished by its originality and particularity. An early exemplar of this search is the sixteenth 
century French essayist Michel Montaigne. Montaigne goes inward not so as rationally to 
disengage himself from himself but so as to immerse himself in himself: "The world always looks 
outward, I tum my gaze inward, there I fix it, and there I keep it busy. Everyone looks before him; 
I look witbin."39 The gbje~t 9f _s_ucb immersion is not, as for J\yg~_!ill._~. t_o di~~Qver God, but to 
discover oneself. Through engaging with his own particularity it seems that Montaigne felt he 
could, in the face of self-depreciating moral demands to the contrary, learn self-acceptance. "I 
have no business but with myself, I unceasingly consider, examine and analyse myself. n40 
For Montaigne, the only safe way of establishing a pattern of life was by means of knowledge of 
one's own self.41 Where Descartes understood the self as the rational, responsible self, Montaigne 
saw it as the natural self. "I have ... quite simply and crudely accepted for my own use the ancient 
rule that we cannot go wrong in following nature, and that the sovereign precept is to conform to 
her .. .I let myself go on as I come; I struggle against nothing; my two dominant parts live, of their 
38Trans. Komer (1987) p67. 
3~ 11.17 (trans. Cohen p219). 
40 . op. ell. 
41so Holyoake (1986) p24. 
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own accord in peace and amity."42 Montaigne offers an early example of a third source of moral 
significance, that of the realm of nature. Where the Cartesian/Lockean self numbers among its 
descendants the Freudian ego, Montaigne's self leads in our century to the immersion in, and the 
acceptance of opposing parts of, the self recommended by Carl Jung (see further chapter 5). 
The notion of the natural order as a source of moral significance was considerably developed in 
the late 17th and 18th centuries by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Shaftesbury was Locke's pupil but 
strongly opposed Locke's theory of an external law which motivates us to the good. Shaftesbury 
held instead that we have an inherent tendency towards the good. In part, Shaftesbury's ethic of a 
natural life lived in accordance with the whole order of things reflects a return to classical, and 
especially Platonic and Stoic themes. However, we find a new subjectivity in Shaftesbury. The 
classical philosophers considered what was natural in terms of a rational understanding of human 
growth in virtue or towards an apprehension of the Gooo.43 In Shaftesbury's work there is a much 
greater emphasis on analysing the sentiments in isolation from rational analysis of the good. This 
is reflected in his preference for speaking about the "natural affection" by which he thought that 
we love the whole. Shaftesbury thought, in a characteristically modem way, that the affections we 
feel for those who are close to us might carry over into a disinterested benevolence towards 
humanity in general. (See, for example, my analysis of Erich Fromm in Ch. 6.) 
Hutcheson relied on Shaftesbury's psychology for his moral sense theory. Our internal moral 
sense motivates us to act benevolently. To be good now requires attention not to an external law 
but to the sources of goodness we find inside ourselves, albeit that these derive ultimately from 
God. As Macintyre points out«, the key change made by Hutcheson to the moral tradition is his 
assertion that we do not reason about our ultimate ends but that our ultimate ends are given by 
prior dispositions or desires. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson-articulate -a crucial component of 
modem subjectivity, a,nd one which is important for the humanistic psychologists (Ch. 6), namely 
that an analysis of our own sentiments and intuitions provides us with the most convincing 
account of the human good. 
In 17th and 18th century Deism nature (or, increasingly, Nature) was understood as a beneficent 
harmony. The way to be good was now not, as in the classical view, by a rational grasp of the 
Good, but by discerning how to act according to Nature. Nature remained the rational product of 
a divine Author, but one's mode of access to Nature was now not necessarily through the intellect. 
The mode of access to the design might be through reason, and this is the route advocated, for 
example, by Locke. According to Locke, we must rationally reflect on our own inclinations, on 
42~ lll.12 (trans. Cohen p338). 
43E.g. see Sandbach ( 1989) p31 ff on the Stoic view of the natural life and Aristotle Nic. Eth. 
1114a27. 
44Maclntyre (1988) p272. 
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what brings us pain and pleasure, in order to attain to our highest good. But, alternatively, the 
mode of access might be through sentiment, and this is the path explored by Hutcheson. In 
Hutcheson's form of Deism the sentiments become normative. It is not our reason but our deepest 
sentiments that move us towards the highest good. The sentiments yield insights that cannot be 
independently discovered through reason. Taylor suggests45 that this laner form of Deism tended 
to become predominant over the course of the eighteenth century. Whilst Taylor's contention 
should not divert us from the essentially rationalistic temper of Deism, a heavy access on 
sentiment was certainly reflected in many aspects of 18th century culture including literature, 
attitudes to the family, feeling for the countryside and religious piety. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau offered a statement of nature as a source of moral significance which has 
been particularly influential in modern educational theory and modern psychological notions of 
self-exploration46. Rousseau thought that evil arose through the corruption of individuals in a 
depraved culture. People became too easily dependent on the misleading opinions and wishes of 
others. Goodness was to be recovered by regaining contact with the original impulse of nature as 
it is disclosed either privately in the dictates of conscience or publicly in a pure and undistorted 
social contract. The ideal education that Rousseau proposed for "Emile" was one in which the 
child was reared close to nature and preserved for as long as possible from the harmful effects of 
society. 
Rousseau's Confessions share many similarities with Augustine's book of the same name, not least 
an intense exposition of the subject's sexuality. But Rousseau marked a fundamental objection to 
the Augustinian theological tradition by his rejection of Augustine's doctrine of original sin in 
favour of his own notion of natural goodness: "Let us set down as an incontestable maxim that the 
, 
-first movements-of-nature-are-always-right.-'There is no-original perversity-in-the human heart"47. 
Where Augustine turned inwarfl in reco~nition of his inadequacy and dependence on God, 
Rousseau's inward turn hoped to make cont~ct with the innate goodness of the human soul. 
45faylor (1989) p283. 
46for the purposes of this exposition I follow Taylor (also articles on "Romanticism" in the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Encyclopaedia Britannica) in placing Rousseau as a pre-cursor 
of the Romantic movement rather than as a proper member of this movement. Other authors take 
Rousseau as a Romantic, or even as the leading Romantic (so Irving Babbitt in his important 
Rousseau and Romanticism). The argument depends on the notoriously difficult question of how 
we defme Romanticism, whether, for example, it is identified with a reaction against the French 
radical enlightenment (so Babbitt p39 "Romanticism .. .is all that is not Voltaire") or whether it is 
identified with predominantly German and English nineteenth century developments in art, 
literature and music. My argument here is that the notion of nature as a moral source is a larger 
phenomenon than Romanticism, and that Rousseau and the Romantics can be seen as earlier and 
later exponents of this idea. 
47~p92. 
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Rousseau identifies goodness with self-responsible freedom. The mature Emile is a man who can 
find reasons for action from within himself, who acts autonomously. He is capable of 
relationships of deep friendship and love, and he feels a general sense of benevolence towards 
humanity, but he does not fall into unhealthy relationships of dominance and dependence. 
I ' f 
Rousseau's quest for autonomy through regaining contact with the natural, inner self has· been 
taken up in our century by the humanistic psychologists, whom I discuss in chapter 6. 
The notion of nature as a source of moral significance leads to a view that we may call 
"expressivism"48 and that is articulated in different ways by Herder, by the Romantic movement 
and by Hegel. By this term, is meant the sense that the self and the natural realm are not fully 
known until they are expressed and, more than this, that the very act of articulation itself 
decisively shapes the content of self and nature. In the Romantic movement, the mode of access 
to the realm of nature is through one's feelings, not through Cartesian disengaged reason. Nature 
is now not studied in an objective and instrumental way, but is produced in imaginative art and 
literature. So too, the self becomes an object which is uniquely created as one searches to express 
it. Thus, whereas in the tradition of Aristotle one could speak of human nature tending towards 
some complete form, Herder sees growth as the manifestation of an inner power seeking to realise 
itself externally, a power which is expressed differently by each individual. Once we see life in 
this way we are obliged not merely to live up to some general notion of humanity but to tread our 
own unique path. In Herder's words: "Each human being has his own measure, as it were an 
accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to each other"49. As we shall see (chapters 5 and 6), this 
is developed in the modem psychological notions of individuation and self-actualisation. 
The expressive view goes with the important modern idea that human beings have inexhaustible 
psyehologieal-depths.-The- sense of-depth -arises-when-we-have-the feeling of- going inward to 
bring psychological material to the fore so that it can be articulated. The depth gains the feeling of 
inexhaustibleness when we sense that however much we retrieve there is further material there 
waiting to be discovered and expressed. It is not, as with Augustine, that the move inward actually 
takes us outside of ourselves - to God. Rather as we move more and more deeply into ourselves 
we (merely) penetrate more closely to (although perhaps never quite reaching) the natural roots of 
our own selfhood. The point is not to arrive at some complete form, but to move to ever more 
profound expressions of our inner selv~s. 
Hegel offers us one important formulation of human subjectivity as the expression of nature. For 
Hegel human consciousness is the locus in which "Spirit" comes to consciousness of itself. In 
their reasoning about the world human beings participate in truth. As their reasoning progresses 
48A term I owe to Taylor (1989) Ch. 21. 
49Herder ~vii. I quoted in Taylor (1989) p375. 
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from abstractions to higher degrees of concretisation human beings express the universal 
development of the reason with which nature is imbued. Hegel thought that the essence of religion 
is the rise of the human spirit above itself towards God. From God's perspective this is seen as the 
return of his own Spirit to himself. In this way religion unites spirit with Spirit, and in the practice 
of worship humanity becomes conscious of its unity with God's being. The human self is thus the 
site in which nature finally realises itself and is reconciled with itse1f50. I will explore the 
possibilities offered by the language of spirit for uniting the self in subsequent chapters. 
Human life is at its most expressive in the field of art. For those whose sense of moral 
significance comes mainly from nature, art may therefore come to replace religion as fulfilling the 
spiritual dimension of life. For such people, It is the creative imagination rather than disengaged 
reason which is taken as granting access to the deepest reality. We shall see that the artist is an 
important example of the fully actualised person for the humanistic psychologists (chapter 6). 
A final twist to this stream in the making of the modem self comes with the questioning by some 
in the 19th century of the goodness of nature and the rejection of nature as a source of moral 
significance. One mode of response to the disenchantment of nature, and that taken by 
Schopenhauer, is to affirm art despite nature. Another response is to affirm the self independently 
of nature. This latter is exemplified in different ways by Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. 
According to Kierkegaard, in choosing ourselves we, for the first time, become true selves. 
Through self-choice we sense ourselves for the first time as loved and worthy to be chosen, and 
attain self-love and self-affirmation irrespective of conditions in the external world. Kierkegaard 
stands at the head of twentieth century existentialist philosophy and those contemporary therapies 
I 
that efllphasise the healing possibilities of self-choice (see further my description of Rogers in 
cbapter-6).- - .. --- --- --
S!lll11Di!lJ' 
Let me briefly summarise the argument of the last two sections. I have suggested that the modem 
Western notion of selfbood is distinctively characterised by a sense of inwardness, and I have 
argued that this sense was inaugurated by Augustine. I have indicated how Augustinian 
inwardness percolated medieval spirituality and suggested that this provided the context for the 
Cartesian cogito ergo swn - the reflexive statement that is frequently taken as a marker for the 
starting point of modem Western philosophy. I have suggested a certain continuity of ideas 
through Descartes, Locke and Kant in the notion of a self constituted by rational norms. As an 
alternative and competing viewpoint, I have traced the development of a "natural self' that is 
discovered through being in touch with nature and with one's own feelings. I cited Montaigne, 
Rousseau and the Romantic movement as expressions of this nat .. ral self. 
sosee further "Introduction to the History of Philosophy" in Q. L~uer (1983). 
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At the end of the nineteenth century we therefore have a self defined along three axes of 
inwardness: the original Augustinian journey inward to discover God; the self-consciousness of 
the Cartesian rational or Kantian moral self; and the natural, expressive self of the Romantics. 
Each Western individual draws on some combination of these three streams for our own self-
identity. I want now to suggest that, in this century, the modem "inward" self has been both 
hugely deepened and at the same time seriously threatened by the work of our most important 
modem psychologist, Sigmund Freud. 
4. Freud apd the Jweptietb Century Crisis of Seltbood 
It seems to me Sigmund Freud has had more influence on our contemporary sense of self than any 
other twentieth century figure. His critic, the sociologist Philip Rieff, comments that Freud has 
left us with "the most important body of thought committed to paper in the twentieth century"s 1. I 
believe that Freud has generated more secondary literature than any other author this century52. 
Freud's influence has arisen because his ideas have percolated deeply into our culture. He has 
given modem Western men and women a language by which they can interpret themselves to 
themselves. As Ricoeur says, Freud has given us "a monument to our culture ... a text in which our 
culture is expressed and understood"53, 
With a deliberate sense of occasion Freud published what he took to be his most important work, 
The lntemretation of Dreams, in 1900. This was the same year that Joseph Conrad completed his 
influential novel Heart of Parkness. The two works together were to set the context for a great 
deal of thinking about the self in this century. We now perceive ourselves as creatures with inner 
depths, with partly unexplored and dark interiors. Freud was not the discoverer of the 
unconscious: references to the existence of mental processes-that-escape--conscious-control go 
back beyond Augustine to Plotinus and St Paul. But the high degree of contemporary interest in 
the unconscious is largely due to Fre'+d· Freud's conception of the unconscious was sufficiently 
powerful that he was able to give us depth-psychological explanations for a wide range of hitherto 
unconnected aspects of human behaviour such as human sexuality, slips of the tongue, jokes and 
neuroticism. Freud provided a theoretical scheme that opened up the unconscious as a field of 
interest and investigation to an unprecedented degree. 
Freud massively deepens the sense of inwardness that was initiated by Augustine. Augustine had 
wondered about the caves and caverns of the mind54. Freud actually goes down into the caves and 
attempts to map them. To change the metaphor very slightly to a deliberately psychoanalytic 
51Rieff (1959) p x. 
52So Masson (1985) p12. 
53Ricoeur (1970) page xi. 
54~. X.xvii.26. 
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one55, it is as if in previous centuries we had conscientiously explored the different levels of the 
house of the mind, thinking that we were well on the way to putting everything in its place. Then 
Freud comes along, opens a trapdoor and invites us down into the basement. He finds a myriad of 
passages and tunnels that are, in fact, much more extensive than the house that is visible above 
the ground. Disturbingly, things in the underground are far from in order. He finds snakes and 
skulls down there. It appears to be animated by strange and unknown powers. 
In the terms of Conrad's imagery, as we explore the dark interior the ego is perceived as a small 
and uncertain steamboat penetrating deep into the heart of the unknown jungle of the Belgian 
Congo. The small river along which the boat plies its course is surrounded by dark, impenetrable 
forest. In the forest live people who speak languages we do not understand and who seem not to 
share some of our most basic moral sensibilities. Our relationship with the forest is ambivalent, 
for whilst the forest is a continual source of threat, yet it is also the indispensable source of the 
boat's fuel. The journey contains little sense of excitement or prospects for the joy of discovery. 
Rather the atmosphere is one of foreboding and threat. 
Once the trapdoor has been opened the self can never appear the same again. Indeed. does the 
opening up of these vast depths actually signal the end of the self or does it, at least, mean the end 
of an integrated sense of self? Does it still make sense to talk of the self if the centre of gravity of 
this entity lies buried deep beyond our comprehension? Even if we can chart its depths, how can 
the orderliness of the house be held together with the unseemliness of the cellar? Can the centre 
sdU hold? 
The answer to these questions will depend on exactly what our conception of the unconscious is. 
Is it completely impenetrable or merely relatively-so'?-€an-it -ultimately be conquered, or at least 
domesticated? Are the creatures who inhabit the jungle's interior entirely 'other' than us, or might 
they be sympathetically comprehended? To begin to answer these questions we shall need to 
return to Freud. Since his wor" has been so susceptible to misinterpretation and to development 
' 
by competing schools, it will be important to try to discover exactly what was Freud's conception 
of the mind. I do this in chapter 4. Whatever the results of our investigation, it seems that, after 
Freud, the original Platonic project of uniting the self under the hegemony of conscious reason 
can never be quite so straightforward again. 
I have described some of the backgroupd to and history of our modem sense of self. I now wish to 
spend some time exploring our contemporary situation. I take this to be one of crisis for the self. 
55Ref. Carl Jung's MD& (Fontana) p 182 for a discussion of the significance of this image for Jung 
and Freud. 
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5. The fostwoderpisls; The End of the Modern Self? 
5.1 Contemporary Attacks on the Self 
The late twentieth century is marked by a profound uncertainty as to whether and how the modern 
sense of self can be held together. Thus Stephen Frosh, senior lecturer in psychology at Birkbeck 
college comments: "Perhaps the most generally accepted characteristic of the modern mi.ild is that 
it is a condition in which the 'struggle to be a self is nearly impossible"56• In a similar vein the 
American psychologist Kenneth Gergen suggests that "the very idea of individual selves is now 
threatened with eradication"S7, The questioning of our traditional Western view of unified 
selfbood arises from a number of sources and disciplines, for example: philosophical attacks on 
the usefulness of the notion of personal identity (Parfit, 1984 ); "functionalist" explanations of the 
mind as sophisticated computer software (Dennett, 1991); and biological reduction of the mind to 
a system ofneurones (Crick, 1994). 
However, rather than analysing these philosophical and scientific criticisms of the self, I wish to 
consider the line of attack on the self put forward by the postmodernists, and for two reasons. 
Firstly, postmodemist understandings of the self are part of a general cultural shift into 
postmodemism that has wide influence in the Western world Secondly, this line of thinking stems 
from certain radical readings of Freud and thus has a particularly psychological focus. Where 
"orthodox" Freudians, following Anna Freud, had developed Freud's doctrines so as to defend the 
ego, French psychoanalysis developed in a direction we could call"ego-critical" and was used to 
undermine the unity of the self. 
The leading figures in this movement are the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the philosopher-
come-psychologist-come-historian of ideas Michel Foucault. Lacan was the father-figure who 
inspired -much-recent- French psychoanalytic theory, and I -explore-some of his "ego-critical" 
theories below (Section 5.2). One of Lacan's more important disciples was the psychoanalyst 
F~lix Guattari. After the Parisian upheavals of May 1968 Guattari collaborated with the 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze in producing a radicalised version of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory 
published in 1972 as Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and SchizQpbrenia. This book gained a certain 
iconic status in postmodern French thought, and I discuss its argument in Section 5.3. Lacan also 
influenced the early writing of Foucault. Whilst Foucault's professorial chair was in the "History 
of Systems of Thought", the young Michel Fouca11lt trained in psychology and psychopathology 
at the hospital of St Anne (the institution at which Lacan gave his weekly "seminars") and a large 
proportion of his work either directly or indirectly relates to psychology and psychoanalysis. 
Foucault is probably the most influential of all the French postmodernists. The unfolding of his 
position on the self is particularly interesting and I describe it in Section 5.4. 
56Frosh (199l)p5. 
S7Qergen (1991) p x. 
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5.2 Jacques Lacan 
Jacques Lacan was born in 1901 to a family belonging to the Parisian haute bourgeoisie. He 
studied medicine and then psychiatry as a student of Clerambault, one of the masters of 
traditional psychiatry. In 1932, Lacan received his doctorate in psychiatry with a thesis on the 
relationship of paranoia to personality structure. Through the 1930s, Lacan's literary productions 
oscillated between studies in classical psychiatric journals, and essays and poems in surrealist 
publications. He was interested in paranoia, language, fantasy and the formal character of 
symptoms, all concerns shared by the surrealists. In 1934, after undergoing his own analysis, he 
joined the Paris Psychoanalytic Society. He presented his theory of the "mirror stage" to the 14th 
Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1936, where he first made public his 
belief that the ego does not exist as a coherent entity. During the 1950s he initiated and 
subsequently steered a movement to reinterpret Freud's theories in the light of structuralist 
theories of linguistics, focusing on the human subject as he or she is defined by social and 
linguistic pressures. His lectures and articles were published as ~ in 1966. Lacan's relations 
with Freudian "onhodoxy" were fraught, and in the early 1960s he was removed from the French 
and International psychoanalytic societies. His commentator, Malcolm Bowie, says that "Lacan is 
the only psychoanalyst of the twentieth century whose intellectual achievement is in any way 
comparable to Freud's"ss. Lacan died in 1981. 
Lacan's psychology may be read as a sustained attack on the modem notion of the centred ego or 
"I". Thus the opening paragraph of &!m reads: "I think it wonhwhile to bring [the mirror stage] 
again to your attention .. .for the light it sheds on the formation of the I as we experience it in 
psychoanalysis. It is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from 
· the-G'ogito'!.-Jn-this way, bacan marks his-psychology-with--a-strongly-post (or anti)--modem 
character. Lacan goes behind the Freudian Oedipal stage, where the child's ego is constituted out 
of relations to its mother and father, to the pre-Oedipal infant of 6 to 18 months who sees its 
gestures reflected in those of an adult or in a mirror. Lacan holds that it is this experiencing of the 
mirror image that establishes the notion of the ego. The child is temporarily held captive by the 
image. Instead of continuing with its play the infant briefly fixes its identity. Lacan's point is that 
such identity making is fundamentally deceptive. The mirror image was actually a mirage, and the 
ego which is constructed on ·the basis of it is destined to be tragically alienated from reality. In 
Lacan's words, the mirror stage leads to "the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, 
which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development"59. 
ssaowie (1991) p203. 
5~p4. 
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Lacan draws his inspiration from the early Freud, whose notion of the unconscious had served to 
destabilise the Cartesian ego. But Lacan criticises the later (post-1923) Freud for failing to carry 
through what Lacan takes to be a project to unseat the ego. 1n Freud's later work, says Lacan60, by 
identifying the perception/consciousness system with the ego, Freud had suddenly seemed to fail 
to recognise all that the ego neglects and misconstrues. Freud had now started to value the 
rational, ordering powers of the ego too highly. What had begun, we may sunnise Lacan as 
saying, as a project to decentre the self ended in conferring self-mastery at an even deeper level. 
Lacan strives to re-present the earlier, more subversive Freud. According to Lacan, the ego's 
rational will for mastery is nothing but the misguided attempt by man to impress his carefully 
nurtured self-image on reality. Far from bolstering the ego, Lacan's treatment aims to fracture the 
ego, for "the ego represents the centre of all the resistances to the treatment of symptoms"61• Just 
how far all this is fair to Freud I hope will become clear in my fourth chapter. 
Where the Platonic tradition had envisaged a primal hannony, and Freud had, less optimistically, 
spoken of a battle between a life-force and a death-force, Lacan pessimistically envisages a primal 
aggressivity. Lacan finds ancient precedent for his notion of basic Strife in the Greek Heraclitus 
whom he cites (mistakenly62) as having proclaimed the primacy of Discord over hannony. 
Switching to a botanical metaphor, he speaks of the "vital dehiscence that is constitutive of 
man"63. "Dehiscence" refers to the bursting open of a seed pod. We are to understand that the 
primal nature of the human psyche is one of fragmentation and splitting apart. Against this 
background human beings have derived a "peculiar satisfaction from the integration of an original 
organic disarray"64. According to Lacan, the healthier attitude is that shown by the paranoiac 
personality who throws back onto the world the disorder of which his being is composed65. 
Lacan cites Augustine's description-of-the-jealous-infant66-as an-!!exemplary image"67_ of what-he -
means. The infant forges his identity, his ego, in the context of a gaze at a foster-brother that is 
filled with primordial aggression, rage and bitterness. Lacan says that Augustine in this way 
"foreshadowed" psychoanalysis, and that he was able to do this because "he lived at a similar 
time" to ourselves. What Lacan appears to mean here is that Augustine pre-dates the modern 
construals of selfbood by which, until now, we have been ensnared. The postmodem and the 
~p22. 
61:Ecrits p23. 
62Lacan may have got this notion from a frllgment of Heraclitus: "One should know that war is 
common, and justice strife; and that everything comes about in accordance with strife and what 
must be." (B 80) But this does not refer to the primacy of strife. Rather, it is an example of 
Heraclitus' theory concern1ng the Unity of Opposites. Justice and strife are always found together. 
Heraclitus' position is actually nearer tp Frepd than Lacan. See further Barnes (1979) Ch. IV. 
63~p21. 
64~p21. 
65~p21. 
66mnf.. I. vii.ll. 
67&m,ap20. 
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premodern are united in their opposition to an intervening Cartesian tradition. Of course there is a 
fundamental difference between Augustine and Lacan, which Lacan does not go into, in that the 
former regards the jealous infant as a manifestation of a fallen nature, a state of sickness from 
which it is possible to recover, whereas Lacan takes him as indicative of the true nature of things. 
Augustine believes in ~ underlying harmony where Lacan holds to a state of primary discord. 
In his later work Lacan sees the human thought-world as constituted out of three orders: the 
imaginary, the symbolic and the real.68 In a move not unlike that made in Buddhism, Lacan's 
imaginary order is said to consist of much of what we usually take to be most real. It is the ord~r 
of perceptions and images. For Lacan, these are all derivatives of the ego's primal "mirror" 
experience and as such have a basically mistaken, mirage quality. The symbolic order is the realm 
of language and of the unconscious. Lacan takes it to be this order that is constitutive of the 
human subject Our subjectivity is formed out of a chain of linguistic signifiers. It is at this level -
the level of language - and not the level of the ego, that psychoanalysis does its work. The third 
order, the real, is the ineffable, the underlying substructure that may be approached but never 
grasped. The real indicates humanity's "being for death"69. The symbolic order provides a 
temporary space for flying in the face of the real. The goal of psychoanalysis, for Lacan, is not so 
much affirming life in the face of death, still less trying to find some coherent sense to our lives, 
as exploring the expressive plenitude of speech, of mapping the possibilities of the second, 
symbolic order. In the brief breathing space provided to us before we are swallowed up by the 
real, we can, at least, talk. 70 
For Lacan, desire is not energetic or biological as it was for Freud, but the dynamo which propels 
all acts of speech, which keeps the chain of signifiers going.71 Understood in this linguistic, non-
biological sense, desire is not something -intrinsic to the-individual· that the individual might be 
able to control, but something trans-personal to which the individual is subjected. Lacan makes an 
interesting distinction between desire and need. He thinks that "need" refers to particular 
biological lacks, whereas "desire" goes beyond needs in referring to the "unconditional element of 
the demand for love"72. However many needs are satisfied the individual still lacks an 
unconditional "Yes"73.Jn Lacan's scheme this demand can never be satisfied since it is addressed 
to other human beings who themselves have their own lacks. Since the other is himself divided 
and wounded he can never give ,one the complete and unconditional affirmation that one craves. 
Desire is now understood as "pUfe los$"74• Human life is characterised by an unbreachable "split" 
68Ref. ~ p ixf. and Bowie (1991) Ch. 4, 
6~p104. 
1oaowie p66f. 
71Bowie pl22. 
72~p286. 
73Bowie pl35. 
74~p287. 
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between the meeting of needs and unmet desire. As a result, says Lacan, "man cannot aim at 
being whole (the 'total personality' is another of the deviant premises of modern 
psychotherapy) ... "" We might agree with Lacan that a sense of wholeness is linked to the 
meeting of an unconditional demand for love. But Lacan's view that this cannot in principle be 
met is a theological viewpoint that is susceptible 'to a different answer, as our analysis of 
Augustine in chapter 3 will make clear. 
5.3 Deleuze and Guattari 
In their Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari offer us a radicalised Lacan in which the attack on the 
self is further intensified. This work is accurately described by Mark Seem in his introduction as, 
"an attack on the ego, on what is aU-too-human in mankind, on oedlpalized and oedipalizing 
analyses and neurotic modes of living ... for we are sick, so sick, of our selves!"16 Deleuze holds 
that not only the school and the nation, but also - and especially • the family unit of father, 
mother, child are structures of control. Traditional psychoanalysis, inasmuch as it has focused on 
the Oedipal relation of the family unit. has itself become an agent of control rather than liberation. 
Beneath the Oedipalised self, however, there exists the "desiring-machine" that provides a means 
of escape from the self. Anti-Oedipus thus provides a psychoanalytic rationale for the aspirations 
to obtain political and social freedom from control that found expression in the Parisian events of 
1968. 
Anti-Oecljpus opens with a graphic and disturbing account of the human being as a machine built 
up from smaller machines. When all is reduced to machinery there is no place for higher level 
descriptions of humanity: "There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that 
produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, 
-desiring-machines everywhere ... the self-and the-non-self,outside-and-inside,--no-longer -have any -
meaning whatsoever"77. The energy on which the machines run is libido, sexual desire. The 
human subject is to be understood as a series of intensity states beginning at level zero and 
increasing with the building up of desire. According to Deleuze, "individuations are brought about 
solely within complexes of forc~s that detefiJline persons as so many intensive states"78, Society 
exerts an oppressive influence on the desiring-machines, attempting to "codify" the flows of 
desire, tci see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channelled and regulated. 
The libido is made to repress its flows in order to contain them within the narrow confines of 
societally specified types such as "couple", "family", "person" or "object".79 
75Jkmap287. 
76Anti-Oedipus pxxi. 
77 Anti-Oedipus p2. 
78 Anti-Oedqms p86. 
79 Anti:.Qedipus p293. 
43 
The Modem Self: Historical Development and Postmodern Critique 
The therapy prescribed by Deleuze and Guattari is a radicalised kind of psychoanalysis that they 
call "schizoanalysis". The task of schizoanalysis is to decode the codes and hence to liberate 
desire. Schizoanalysis has a negative and a positive moment. In its negative moment it constitutes 
a virulent assault on everything that would constrain or unite or unify elements of the human self. 
"Destroy, destroy. The task of psychoanalysis goes by way of destruction -a whole scouring of 
the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the 
superego ... oo80 Schizoanalysis proceeds to a point where "the connections are always partial and 
nonpersonal, the conjunctions nomadic and polyvocal, the disjunctions always included ... " The 
individual must be wrenched free from all the relations and self-images that constrain him or her. 
Even, indeed especially, the basic relations of mother, father, child must be eliminated. At the 
limit distinctions between basic gender types male/female and sexual orientations 
homosexualJheterosexual are obliterated. 
At this point we might detect a superficial resemblance between the aims of schizoanalysis and 
the Buddhist spiritual path. Both regard the self as an illusory and oppressive construct which 
must be broken down. However, whereas, for the Buddhists the therapy of no-self is a means to 
liberating us from desire, the therapy of schizoanalysis aims to liberate us for desire. The telos of 
the programme to deconstruct the self is the opposite in Buddhism from what we find in 
postmodernism. Thus the positive moment of schizoanalysis consists in discovering the elemental 
"desiring-machines" independent of superimposed interpretations. The individual regains touch 
with the basic flows of libidinal energy out of which he or she is constituted. 
Deleuze and Guattari posit a direct opposition between basic human desire and the ordering of 
modem society. Using an analogy from physical chemistry they describes the former as 
!!molecular!!_ and the-latter-as_!!molar!'. -Molar society, they say, effects-a-'!unification, a totalisation 
of the molecular forces through a statistical accumulation obeying the laws of large numbers "81• 
Culture, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is a heavy, aggregate phenomenon that tends to 
smooth out and regularise the particular characteristics of individual human beings. 
Schizoanalysis aims to enable the individual formations of desire to m~ter the molar aggregate. 
Individuals are freed insofar as they are broken down to the point where the discrete quanta of 
desire out of which they are constituted recover their primitive randomness over and against the 
ordering and averaging processes of society. 
Now whilst . this might have been the experience of those reacting against the formality and 
bureaucracy of French culture in 1968, it is, of course, far from being our universal experience of 
culture. Classical social and political theory has more usually assumed that culture is of positive 
80Anti-Oedipus p311. 
81Anti-Oe<ljpus p342. 
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therapeutic value to the individual. For example, Aristotle thought that only within the polis is a 
man able to exercise those gifts and powers that make him fully human and not a being crippled 
or arrested in his humanlty.82 In the classical tradition the healthy person is, in fact, the good 
citizen. If culture is experienced as overwhelmingly oppressive this might indicate a problem with 
a particular fonn of culture, not with human culture per se. The protests of Deleuze and Guattari 
are best taken, in the light of their political context. as demands for a more flexible, more 
heterogeneous, more infonnal pattern of social relations. If Deleuze and Guattari's programme 
were pursued as far as they suggest they would saw off the platfonn on which they stand: there 
would be no presses to print their books and no money to pay the schizoanalysts' fees. 
The authors' analogy from physical chemistry is, at first sight, appealing. There is the suggestion 
that, in line with developments in natural science at the beginning of this century, what had 
appeared to be basic stable laws are, in fact, approximations imposed on an underlying 
randomness. However, assuming we allow the validity of such analogies from lower physical to 
higher psychological orders, a more contemporary understanding of physical science might 
suggest a variation on the analogy. For, as the distinguished physical chemist llya Prigogine has 
made clear, disorder is not a more fundamental reality than order. The basic chemical systems of 
the biological universe are in states of non-linear disequilibrium in which a small input may lead 
either to an increase in disorder or, equally, to an increase in order. Two of the most interesting 
physical examples of the latter are: the emergence of highly ordered hexagonal patterns of 
molecules (the so-called Benard cells) when a thin film of liquid is heated; and the so-called 
"chemical clocks" in which millions of molecules switch state simultaneously. The bio-chemical 
world is, more than the inorganic world, characterised by non-linear (e.g. catalytic or enzyme-
based) reactions which lead to spontaneous irruptions of order. As Prigogine suggests, human life 
is-riot-imposed upon the natural realm in an alien-or---"heavy aggregate''-manner,-but-appears as the 
supreme example of self-organising processes occurring within nature.83 Thus, if the chemical 
analogy is pursued, whilst a contemporary account of the self will, I believe, need to account for a 
I 
higher degree of unorder witltin the human being than previously allowed for, this will not 
exclude or delegitimate ordering processes within the self. The question of how the self can be 
both be made up of both ordered and unordered elements has, as we shall see in chapter 5, been 
addressed especially by Carl Jung. 
Deleuze and Guattari agree with Lacan's distinction between desire and need. But whereas Lacan 
said that desire was different from ordinary need in that it went beyond need, these authors wish 
to separate the concept of desire from the concept of need altogether. They think84 that we have 
actually been misled into associating desire with lack. Lack is created, planned and organised 
82~I.i.12. 
83Pfigogine (1984) p141ff. 
84 Anti-Oedipus p25ff. 
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through economic social systems. The dominant classes link our desire to these organised lacks so 
as to subjugate and control us. Desire should, instead, be seen as something productive, indeed, 
"desire produces reality"85, Following Freud we have thought that desire produces only fantasies, 
but according to Deleuze and Guattari desire produces real objects. "What is missing is not things 
a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, 
the objective being of man. n86 It is not human persons that lack things and hence desire, and 
maybe even create fantasies to make up for what they lack, but the flows and currents of desire 
that create reality87. 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of desire forms a kind of analogy to the role of energy in physics. 
Indeed they sometimes refers to desire as libidinal energy, thus: "We use the term libido to 
designate the specific energy of desiring-machines"88, The idea that desire is primarily a matter of 
the basic energy of human beings, and only secondarily about satisfying lacks is, I think, a 
suggestive one. It emphasises that desire is not simply a matter of the building up and release of 
tension, but that desire is a fundamentally creative force in human life. 
5.4 Michel Foucault 
Michel Foucault is of especial interest to me here because of his somewhat dialectical relationship 
with psychoanalysis. Foucault's work falls broadly into three periods. In the first, his 
archaeological period, Foucault saw psychoanalysis as a tool for destabilising the constructions of 
"man"89 by which we have been imprisoned. In this period he continues the stance taken by 
Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari. However, in his second, genealogical phase, psychoanalysis 
becomes part of the problem, a part of those very power relations in which we are trapped. 
Fmally, in his third, ethical phase, Foucault seems to leave psychoanalysis behind in favour of a 
renewed attempt auelf-making; Hhink-that-with-Foucault the logic of the postmodernist view of 
the self unfolds to the greatest degree. 
5.4.1 The Archaeological Period 
Whilst Foucault's earliest papers, such as the 1954 Maladie mentale et personalit¢. concerned the 
pqsitive search for a true psychology, during most of Foucault's writing career he adopted a 
critical approach to psychology. This critical attitude arose no doubt in part because of his own 
sense of being classified as psychologically deviant, and his experience of living on the psycho-
85 Anti-Oedipus p30. 
86Anti-Oedjpus p27. 
87We might compare Augustine (Ch. 3 infra.) for whom desire is likewise a primal and positive 
feature of human psychology that leads one on to deeper forms of reality. Both see desire as a 
creative force, although they perceive this creativity as achieving opposite psychological results. 
Augustine thinks that desire (properly conceived) builds up the self; Lacan thinks it shatters the 
self. 
88Anti-Qedipus p291. 
89 A term used here in a quasi-technical sense to refer to modem descriptions of ourselves. 
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social margins of society as a homosexual9o. Thus his 1961 Folie et d¢raison (ET Mruiness and 
Civilisation 1965) attacks our modern psychological notions of madness, and his 1963 1& 
Naissance de Ia CliniQJle (ET The Birth of the Clinic 1973) relativises psychological knowledge to 
particular structures of discourse arising in the modern hospital. But his critique of psychology 
and the human sciences in general (what he frequently refers to as "the sciences of man") reached 
its most theoretically intense form in his 1967 Les Mots et les Choses (ET The Order of Things: 
An A!chaeolgiV of the Human Sciences 1971). 
This book is a dense study of the conditions of the possibility of the human sciences. It can be 
read as a psychoanalytically inspired attempt to destabilise the human sciences and their object 
"man". Foucault takes it that continuous history is the indispensable correlative to the founding of 
the modern subject. It unites past, present and future in a way that mirrors the unification and 
centring of the subject: a total history corresponds with a total human being. His "archaeology" 
works to break down the myth of historical continuity. It celebrates discontinuity. Its task is "to 
operate a decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre ... to make differetices"91, Foucault 
gives two examples of what this means. In terms of world history, Archaeology stays with the 
decentring operated by Marx - the historical analysis of relations of production and class struggle 
-against Hegelian attempts to impose a rational telos on humanity. In terms of the psychology of 
the individual it stays with the unknown and unregulated character of the unconscious and 
sexuality. It resists attempts to make the unconscious the object of a consciousness. It thereby 
hinders the self from grasping its deepest conditions and constructing a comprehensive history for 
itse1f.92 At this stage, Foucault is clearly influenced by a Lacanian psychoanalytic outlook in 
which the subversive qualities of the Freudian unconscious are stressed. The existence of the 
unconscious prevents a rational description of total selfhood such as is sought by the human 
sciences. Psychoanalysis may therefore contribute to--our- liberation from these -objectifying 
disciplines. Foucault's archaeology sides with psychoanalysis in freeing us from the unified self 
that is the object of the human and specifically psychological sciences. 
5.4.2 The Genealagical Period 
Following the events of May 1968 and through the 1970s Foucault's interests shifted from theory 
to practice, from analysis of structures of discourse to analysis of the mechanisms of power. 
Indeed he makes the retrospective comment: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it 
was that I was talking about in Madness and CMlisation or The Birth of the Clinic, but power? 
90see, for example die biographies of Foucault by James Miller (HarperCollins 1993) and Didier 
Eribon (Faber 1993). 
91AK.p205. 
92AKp13. 
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Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses 
at my disposal. "93 
For Foucault, power is not a "thing", the control of a set of institutions or the implicit rationality 
of history. Rather, "it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in 
society."94 The aim is "to move less towards a 'theory' of power than towards an 'analytics' of 
power"9S, This means identifying and analysing the web of unequal relationships that are set up 
by political technologies. Power relations are "both intentional and nonsubjective"96, We can thus 
envisage people caught up in networks of power but would be mistaken to search for controlling 
subjects. Indeed Foucault wants to insist that in a cenain sense power constitutes the subject. 
"The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is 
that effect, it is the element of its articulation. n97 
The most important ex.ample of Foucault's genealogy of power is his 1976 Volont.e de Sayoir (ET 
Histoty of Sexuality 1 <HSl) 1978). HSl addresses the question: "Why do we say, with so much 
passion and so much resentment against our recent past, that we are repressed?"98. The answer 
that unfolds reveals a new conception of power. Power is not a judicial concept experienced as 
negation and repression. Rather it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. "It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body."99 
Foucault's declared interest in sex is that it joins together two kinds of power interests: the state 
macro-interest in securing the health, fertility and productive force of its people, and the micro-
interest in classifying and controlling the behaviour of the individual. 
His argument is that rather than see the 18th and 19th centuries as a history of increasing 
repression of sex-( what Foucault calls- -'!the repressive -hypothesis''} they in fact disclose a 
regulated incitement to discourse about sex. The roots of inducement to talk about sex lie in the 
monastic Christian confession. In the seventeenth century regular confession was decreed as an 
ideal for every Christian. Towards the beg:inning of the eighteenth century there arose a public 
interest in sex. Governments became concerned not merely with subjects but with a "population", 
with its birth and death rates, fertility and states of health. The sexual behaviour of the population 
became an economic and political problem. 
93"Truth and Power" in ~ p57. 
94HSlp93. 
9SHS.lp82. 
96HS.lp94. 
97From "Two Lectures" in Gordon (1980) p98. 
9811Slp8. 
99"Truth and Power" in Gordon (1980) pll9. 
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In the nineteenth century discourse on sex was medicalised. With Charcot sex was granted a 
general and diffuse causal power. (Foucault's omission of Freud in this genealogy is part of his 
rhetorical technique.) The questionnaire, hypnosis, free association were developed as ways of 
proceduralising confession in a clinically acceptable way. The notion of latency suggests that sex 
is obscure, that energy is needed to track it down. The truth is only partially revealed by the one 
who spoke it. A skilled interpreter is needed to complete the act of truth telling. Sex thus becomes 
a crucial locus for subjectivity, truth, power, knowledge and pleasure. One is induced to discover 
the delightful - and perhaps painful - pleasure of telling the truth about oneself. By submitting to 
the knowledge and power of the other one knows oneself and constitutes oneself as a subject. The 
irony is that in confessing one's sexuality one believes one is achieving one's liberationlOO. 
There can be little doubt that Foucault has psychoanalysis in mind here; indeed at one point he 
remarks that his enterprise could be considered as the archaeology of psychoanalysis.l01 Clearly a 
marked change has occurred: instead of conceiving psychoanalysis as a principle of criticism with 
which to lay bare the epistemic assumptions of the human sciences, psychoanalysis has now itself 
become one element in the entire apparatus of knowledge-power. No longer the privileged critic, 
psychoanalysis now has a place, perhaps the central place, in the new apparatus of power. This 
change in the function of psychoanalysis is bound up with Foucault's innovative understanding of 
power. If power is understood to be repressive of sexual pleasure, as it had been in Freud, Lacan, 
Deleuze and Guattari, then the discourse of sexuality may be taken to oppose power. But if power 
produces pleasure, then the practice of psychoanalysis is a manifestation of power. 
The psychoanalyst would have us believe that sexuality is some deep mysterious essence hidden 
under societal repression. Rather, says Foucault, it is "a great surface network in which the 
stimulation~of-bodies, the~intensification-of' pleasures, the-incitement to discourse,-the-formation-~­
of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in 
accordance with a few ml\ior strategies of knowledge and power"102. The "few major strategies" 
are very simple: firstly the contract between analyst and analysand in which the latter agrees to 
pay the former to listen for some fixed time; secondly the rule that the analysand says whatever 
comes into his or her head. Psychoanalysis is now revealed as the purest and most economical of 
all the strategies of domination.I03 
.5.4.3 Tbe Ethical Period 
Towards the end of his life, Foucault's analysis developed into~ third stage. Writing in 1982 he 
said: 
100US1 p159. 
101HS!p138. 
l02HS.l pl06. 
I03so Forrester p297ff. 
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"Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover who we are, but to refuse who we are. We 
have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double 
bind" which is the simultaneous individualisation and totalization of modem power 
structures ... We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind 
of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries."104 
This third period, then, is a phase of self construction. It is concerned with "the kind of 
relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a soi, which I call ethics, and which 
determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own 
actions"lOS, Foucault's late work is a history of "ethics" or, what is now for him the same thing, a 
history of the modem identity. Perhaps to our surprise, the postmodernist Foucault now aspires to 
an understanding of sel:fhood not unlike that which we have found in Taylor. 
Foucault develops his ethical history in Volumes 2 and 3 of the Histozy of SexualiLY. Volume 2 
covers classical Greece and Volume 3 the Graeco-Roman period. The fourth volume which was 
entitled "Confessions of the Flesh" and covered the early Christian centuries was, unfortunately, 
not published. However, we can gather the argument of Foucault's history of the early Christian 
period from the published record of his 1982 seminar "Technologies of the Self' and from the 
overview of work that Foucault had in progress at the very end of his life recorded by Paul 
Rabinow as "On the Genealogy of Ethics" (1983). This last article also gives us a valuable late 
summary of the whole of Foucault's genealogical argument. 
I shall omit the details of Foucault's ethical genealogy here, suffice to say that his overall aim is to 
demonstrate-the possibility of an-ethic which assigns a signific~t role-to-p/easure,--to show that 
an ethic solely based on desire is not some kind of anthropological necessity. What this amounts 
to, however, is unclear. Whilst he seems to reject a return to the ethics of classical Greece106, he 
is, nevertheless, sympathetic to the Greek "aesthetic of existence". Overall, it is difficult to escape 
the impression that Foucault is searching for a way back over the bridge of Christianity to 
something similar to what he took to be a less repressive Greek ethic. Certainly his preferred 
"mode of formation" is similar to the lU'tistic telos he identifies in classical Greece. He expresses 
the hope that the creativity which has now been restricted to the specialised work of artists be 
practised by everyone. "From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one 
practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art ... couldn't everyone's life 
become a work of art?" too 
104"Afterword" in Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983). 
lOSFrom "On the Genealogy of Ethics (GE)" .B;R p352. 
106"GE" p347. 
107"GB". p350f. 
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5.5 The Contribution of the Postmodemists 
The postmodernists raise important questions concerning the notion of the self. They present us 
with a spectrum of views ranging from the highly intellectualised psychoanalysis of Lacan, 
through the radical critique of Deleuze and Guattari to the genealogy of the self suggested in the 
later Foucault. Their final conbibution is. I think, a mixed one. 
~ offers us a radical reading of Freud. He is less interested in Freud's positive proposals than 
in his power of critique. Bowie comments: "Where other Freudians appoint themselves as 
explainers, emendators, or continuators of the original theoretical texts, Lacan wants to keep on 
feeling their initial shock"108, Yet Freud's efforts to root his psychology in clinical practice gave 
Freud's work at least some rootedness and verifiability that Lacan lacks. When Lacan tells us that 
our human world is constituted by the imaginary, the symbolic and the real why should we believe 
him? According to Lacan, it would seem that we have to see if we are convinced by the power of 
his rhetoric: "I truth will speak"l09. Actually Lacan turns all our usual understandings of truth on 
their heads, "I [truth] wonder about in what you regard as the least true in essence: in the chain, in 
the way the most far-fetched conceit, the most grotesque nonsense of the joke defies sense, in 
chance, not in its law, but in its contingence"l 10. Lacan's work is aptly summarised by Bowie as 
"an outstanding feat of literary imagination" 111, 
Nonetheless, we will need to return to a number of Lacan's points. How can a notion of integrated 
selfhood take account of the primal aggressivity that Lacan has discovered in the human soul? 
What are we to make of Lacan's suggestion that psychological wholeness is related to the 
unconditional demand for love? Must we really abandon all hope of making sense of our lives and 
resign ourselves to playf~l disc.o~rse without-end?-
So far as Deleuze and vuatUUi!s Ang-Oedipus is concerned, we see here a tendency towards 
breaking down the persqnality struct"ll'e aqd exalting the schizophrenic that is one of the most 
problematic aspects of postmQdcmisrq. Things have now been taken too far. What began as an 
emphasis on difference, on the fragmentary, the unordered, and the small-scale, risks ending in a 
collapse into nihilism. The rise of this fadic~ised form of psychoanalysis was deeply bound to the 
social and political turbulence of Ma~-Jum; 1968. It seemed that psychoanalysis might forge an 
alliance with Marxism in effecting a transformation of French society112. However, the self which 
is completely shattered cannot be the alien~ted self of Marxism, and it is therefore difficult to see 
108Bowie (1991) p196. · 
1~p121. 
liO&rm p122. 
Itt Bowie p200. 
112See, e.g., the sociological analysis of French postmodemism given by Turkle. 
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how the post-1968 alliance of Marxism and psychoanalysis could be sustained. In carrying 
through a ferocious attack on the self the radical psychoanalyst is left with no place on which 
organised resistance to perceived reactionary forces in society might take its stand. Far from being 
instrumental in freeing the individual, radical psychoanalysis might now be taken to collude with 
oppression and actually facilitate the slide into fascism. In its guise of "schizoanalysis", 
postmodemism becomes self-defeating. 
This is the logic that unfolds in the middle and later Eoucault. Foucault's genealogical period 
shows a fundamental shift in which psychoanalysis moves from being a tool for subverting the 
powers to itself being at the very centre of an apparatus of power. Foucault came to the realisation 
that power does not oppose basic human desire, so that psychoanalysis in unlocking desire might 
oppose the powers, but that power is rather constitutive of desire. Power, desire and pleasure all 
form one single mesh. Thus, in Foucault's final "ethical" period he moves to a concern for self-
making: how may we constitute ourselves so as to achieve liberation from the mesh in which we 
are ensnared? 
The final appeal from this, the most significant of the postmodemists is, then, not for the 
dissolution of the self but a demand for a new (or, perhaps, ancient?) mode of selthood. We 
should notice, moreover, that nowhere in his ethical account does Foucault reject the basic notion 
of self-mastery. His quarrel seems to be, rather, with the norms according to which one is 
supposed to master one's self and the aims towards which this mastery is directed. In which case, 
I suggest that Foucault, at the end of his life, returned to an appreciation of the desirability of the 
project to unify the self. His disagreement with the modem self is not that of the other 
postmodemists we have reviewed, who have argued that the very existence of a centred self is 
oppressive. Rather, Foucault sought a mode of-being a- self -which could be liberating in the 
context of contemporary culture. 
I do not think that Foucault found this mode. His limited positive proposals for an "aesthetic of 
existence" were certainly not very inspiring. He seems to have in mind a kind of self-related 
freedom and pure pleasure seeking of the least morally worthwhile kind. In any case, I think 
Foucault's harking back to classical Greece is misplaced for two reasons. Firstly, Foucault's 
"genealogy" of Greek ethics is, on its own terms, a very particular and selective reading of the 
Greek situation. Foucault tells the story in such a way that the "Use of Pleasure" becomes the 
central ethical concern rather than the more usual pursuit of the Good. But can one really claim to 
give a fair representation of the Greek ethic when goodness is dropped from the picture entirely? 
Secondly, even if one were to adopt Foucault's pleasure-centred reading of Greek ethics, "desire" 
cannot, realistically, be eliminated from our rapport a soi. Our understanding of ourselves as 
desiring, willing, creatures is just too deeply impressed on our historical consciousness. Foucault 
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seems to want to go back beyond the entire stream of "inwardness" that we have seen developed 
from Augustine onwards into the modem era. I think that in trying to do this he simply 
underestimates the weight and cultural power of the transmitted sense of identity. 
The final challenge of postmodemism is then, it seems to me, not that of abolishing the self. It is, 
rather, to find new and liberating ways of constituting the self, ways which Foucault sought for 
but did not find. Postmodemism, I wish to suggest, does not mark the end of the self. Instead it 
marks a radical questioning of sel:fhood, a demand for new ways of uniting the self which take 
account of the flux, fragmentation and non-order that characterise late twentieth century life. As 
my historical account of the evolution of the modern self has shown (Sections 2 and 3) our 
contemporary sense of self has very deep roots indeed. The option of simply jumping out of it is 
not one that is, realistically, open to us. Rather, the task we are set is to see how our historically 
conditioned sense of self might be developed to might the demands of our present context. We 
will do this in the following chapters with reference to Augustine, who initiated the Western 
psychological self, and by considering some of the modem psychologists whose work seems to 
have articulated most strongly the contemporary sense of self. 
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1. A Theqloaical Proaramme for Unitina the Self 
I have suggested that Augustine is of fundamental importance for the formation of the 
characteristic inwardness of the Western identity. I have also indicated that Augustine expounds 
one of the three major moral sources by which, on a significance·based understanding of 
selthood, the modem self is constructed, namely the theistic source of moral value. In this chapter 
I wish to describe and evaluate how Augustine understands that the self is unified through its 
relation to God. This proposal, however, seems to raise an initial difficulty in relation to modem 
psychologically orientated descriptions of seltbood. 
Modem psychologists, conceiving their discipline as a strictly empirical one and especially 
insofar as they are still influenced by behaviourism, are frequently incUned to bracket out 
theological beliefs from the data they consider relevant to their study of the human subject. For 
Augustine, by contrast. theology was inseparable from psychology. He thought that the highest 
function of the human mind was contemplation of eternal truth (sapientia). Mental well-being 
was, therefore, bound up with a theological attitude. Thus at the end of what is possibly his most 
profound work Augustine exclaimed to God: "Let me seek your face always ... Let me remember 
you, let me understand you, Jet me love you. Increase these things in me until you restore me to 
~--------· -- -- -·---- ---~--
wholeness (ad integrum)" 1• Personal transformation was always, for Augustine, a function of 
one's relationship with God. Augustine's Confessions, for all its psychological insight. describes a 
spiritual journey that begins with the soul's restlessness without God and ends with the soul's 
hope of the heavenly Jerusalem. For the modem psychologist, theological beliefs are usually of 
only secondary interest, and m'ay actually distract one from the empirical data, whereas for 
I 
' Augustine psychology was deriv~ti ve qf theology. 
One possible approach to this dilemm~ would be to focus on the human pole of the divine-human 
relationship proposed by Augustine, that is, to try to isolate what Augustine has to say about 
human flourishing from what he has to say about God. This would, however, do violence to 
Augustine's intentions and treat as primary data what Augustine would have regarded as 
consequences of deeper realities. An alternative approach, and the one I adopt here, is to treat the 
1mn. XV.51. My translation on this occasion. Translations in this chapter are henceforth taken 
from the versions cited in the bibliography. 
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theological tenets themselves as providing a means for some definite psychological end, namely 
the integration of the self, and to evaluate how far they help do this. Such an approach is 
consistent with the significance-based view of seltbood that I have adopted. 
Of course if one could show on independent empirical grounds that the theological tenets· were 
true or untrue this would be of decisive importance. However theological statements are not 
usually open to independent empirical falsification in quite the same way that scientific 
psychological statements are. Indeed, I am inclined to follow Vincent Brummer's line that 
questions of the truth of ultimate theological assertions are bound up with an assessment of the 
whole forms of life in which they are embedded. A belief system would be expected to lose its 
psychological effectiveness if and when the believer came to discover that it possessed less truth 
than some other system available to him. The highest degree of personal integration might be 
expected from a system which was believed by the adherent to possess more truth than any of the 
other belief systems he had encountered. By contrast, on a significance-based view of selthood, 
the attempt to live according to a belief system which one knows to be untrue cannot lead to 
psychological wholeness since it involves a basic act of moral self-deception. Thus the reader 
cannot evaluate the psychological effectiveness of Augustinian (or any other) theology without, 
indirectly, also coming to some view of its truth-value. 
My approach is difficult to reconcile with psychologies which see our beliefs as mere 
epiphenomena that arise out of primary emotional states. It may, however, correspond with more 
cognitive styles of modem psychology that see our beliefs as having a determinative effect on our 
behaviour and feelings. Major reviews of the empirical evidence relating the effect of religious 
belief on psychological health have been carried out in the USA by Batson,. Schoenrade and 
Ventis2 and-in the UK by Kate-Loewenthal3. lam-concerned here with theoretical-considerations 
such as the extent to which the belief system has the rational coherence and power to give one a 
unified sense of self, although there is no reason in principle why the empirical effects on mental 
health of this particular belief system could not be investigated as a separate ex~rcise. 
2. Aueustipe apd the Notion of the Self 
In considering the success of Augustine's theology in integrating the self we are faced with an 
immediate difficulty in terminology. There is no one-to-one Latin equivalent of our English word 
"self', with its connotations of the individual as the object of his or her own reflection and 
introspection. The Latin ego, for example, was only used as a term of emphasis to indicate 
contrast or distinction ~tween individu~s. In Augustine, the two words animus and, especially, 
mens probably give ~e closest equivalents. These words are usually translated as soul and mind 
2Batson et. al. (1993). 
3Loewenthal (1995). 
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respectively, but may equally be used to refer to what we would call the "self'.4 Nonetheless, 
Augustine's language nuances what is taken to be the self in a particular way. 
Augustine Ulkes from Neo-Platonism the notion of soul (anima) as an immaterial and unextended 
substance. Soul in its bfoadest sense is the principle of life in things. Anima may be U!ied in 
connection with animals as well as human beings. The mind or self (animus) is then said to be a 
"part" of the soul, namely its best partS. Animus is the human principle of life precisely as rational 
and spiritual. Animus is never used with reference to animals. Augustine does use animus to refer 
to the emotional and volitional aspects of the human being, but only insofar as these are viewed 
from a rational perspective. The alternative mens, is a somewhat narrower term than animus, 
referring to the mind in its specifically inward and upward orientations of rational judgement 
about things given by sense-perception (scientia) and contemplation of eternal truth (sapientia). It 
is thus clear from his Latin terminology that Augustine's "self' will tend to be equated with the 
"rational self'. 
Mens and animus are terms that developed out of several centuries of Greek and Roman 
anthropological reflection, and it is worth pausing to notice how the conceptual framework might 
have been assembled differently if Augustine had had access to the older biblical Hebrew 
category of spirit (ruach). Augustine is aware of, and allows, a range of meaning to spiritus6. But 
he tends to oppose "spirit" to the material and bodily. Indeed, a Platonic interpretation of the 
Pauline spirit/flesh pair allows him to find biblical support for such a polarity: " 'We know that the 
law is spiritual but I am of the flesh [Rom 7:14]; spiritual in mind, of the flesh in body"7. 
Sometimes he identifies spiritus with anima8, sometimes with the rational part of anima, the 
animus or mens9. He will equally describe man as body and soul, or as body and spiritlO. By 
contrast-the-biblical Hebrew ruach word signifies, at root. the power or energy-in breath or a gust 
of wind enabling it to move and is not in any sense opposed to the body or corporeality. It always 
refers to a life-energy, to what acts and causes to act. Frequently ruach is used in the Old 
Testament to refer to strong emotions, such as anger, grief, sadness, bitterness and longing (e.g. 
Gen. 26:35; Num. 5:14; Judg. 8:3). One would obviously obtain a quite different sense of self, not 
least one which celebrated the non-rational aspects of the person, if one took ruach as the 
individual's highest principle compared with taking mens as the highest part of the human being. 
4So Hill (Introduction to .f!in.) p25. 
s &dW. 1.2.5. 
6uin. XIV .2-4. 
7Sf.IW!. 154.8. Although he can also give a much more nuanced interpretation of the Pauline 
"flesh" ~ XIV.2). 
8Gn.liu. 12.9.20 
9trin. XIV.22, orif1. an. 4.36 
10JDn. XIV .22 
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3. Aggstipe apd The Desire of God 
For Augustine the "desire of God" is the basic drive which draws the self on to maturity and 
integration. The whole of one's life can be seen as either the outworking or the frustration of this 
principle. It The term "desire" embraces the multitude of terms and expressions, including but 
not restricted to "love": and - most importantly - "will", by which Augustine designates the 
fundamental drive of human beings towards God.12 
The background to Augustine's notion of the desire for God comes, in large part, from Nco-
Platonic philosophy, in which the concept was of dominating importance. Augustine had access to 
the Nco-Platonic thought-world through his reading of what he enigmatically refers to as "the 
books of the Platonists"l3. Whilst we cannot be sure of the identity of these books, it is very likely 
that they included several treatises by Plotinus. 14 In Plotinus's cosmology, the whole world was 
charged with potentiality, movement and desire. Even plants and inanimate objects were said to 
be sttiving after contemplation. IS For Plotinus the human soul desired to escape entrapment in the 
realm of the material world, so as to obtain a vision of the supreme spiritual beauty. As the soul 
drew closer towards the Supreme principle, so it would become more and more like this principle. 
At the limit it would merge into the divine simplicity.16 Thus Plotinus says: "And one that shall 
know this vision - with what passion of love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, what 
longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering delight!"17 
However, Augustine's conversion to Christianity required him to conceive the notion of desire of 
God in a new way. Human beings according to Neo-Platonism had a natural tendency to return to 
the One from whom they had originally emanated. According to the Christian doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo, human beings are ontologically distinct from God. They do not, therefore, simply return 
to Goo-by natural processes-nor· may they autonomously attain to God -by-their own efforts. The 
Christian God is not only the end of the soul's journey but also supplies the way.18 We must 
therefore properly speak not simply of desire for God but rather desire of God. God is both the 
object of our desire and he who places this desire for himself within us 19. 
ttcf. saz. lo. tr. 4.6 "The whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire". 
l2Such terms include amare, appetere, concupiscere, cupere, delectare, desiderium, diligo, 
extensio, intentio and quarere. The actual phrase "desiderium Dei" does not occur in Augustine 
as far as I am aware. This could possibly be because Augustine iS anxious to avoid any suggestion 
of predicating "lack" (one of the senses of desiderium) of God as subject (so Bochet p4). 
13conf. VII.ix.13. 
t4so Brown p94 (following Hadot) who places Plotinus rather than Porphyry at the centre of 
Augustine's reading in 386. 
15Enneads III.8.1. 
16J;nneads III.8.8. 
17Enneads 1.6.7. 
18gmt VII.xvii.23f; cf. J1in XV .31. 
19Much theological comment on Augustine has been influenced by Anders Nygren's book~ 
and Eros. Nygren argued that Augustine's synthesis of the love which comes from God with the 
love which people feel towards God marked the corruption of a supposedly Christian agape 
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The range of terms that Augustine uses for love (notably, amor, dilectio, caritas) envisage both 
desiring, questing elements and also static, fulfllled components. A Christian notion of love could 
not solely be defined in terms of desire, a quality that connotes lack, since God himself is love (1 
Jn. 4:16) and God lacks nothing. However, after the fall human love for God takes the form of 
desire. It is the desiring aspects of love that dominate Augustine's work20, and this is one reason 
why I have chosen to take desire rather than love as my theme for explicating Augustine. In 
addition, desire is a dynamic notion which is suggestive for comparisons with the modem 
psychologies we shall meet in subsequent chapters. 
For Augustine, the desire of God is, to a certain extent, one desire amongst a multitude of other 
desires present in the human soul. In this respect it shares the volitional and affective 
characteristics of human desire in general. However, it is radically different from the other desires 
in that its object stands to other objects as creator to creation. Augustine argues that God alone is 
truly able to satisfy our desire and grant us genuine happiness. Therefore only God is to be 
desired and enjoyed for his own sake. None of the other objects which may excite our desire can 
make us truly happy. These temporal and material objects should be used as means to the 
enjoyment of God, not desired as objects of enjoyment in themselves.21 
In Augustine's terms, the desire for God in a human being is none other than the grace of God 
working within him. Desires and actions that lie outside this realm of grace are simply doing what 
is evil. Those in whom the fundamental desire of God has not been uncovered are living in a state 
of disorder and sin. We might say, in Taylor's terms, that the desire for God is a powerful and 
exclusive moral source. It confers on us our basic moral identity and is of determinative 
significance for all our other desires. 
4. The Desire of God Mistaken 
4. 1. The State of Sickness 
For Augustine, the great mass of humanity lives in a state of radical fallenness. Fallen humanity is 
characterised by a neglect of its basic orientation towards God. People live in the mistaken belief 
that fulfilment of desires for rpaterial objects would be sufficient to bring them happiness. 
Augustine gives an important autobio~P'aphical statement of this kind of mistake in a description 
of his youth. He says: 
(which descends on human beings from God) by the admixture of a Greek eros (the human 
quality by which people aspire upwards towards God). However, Nygren's thesis has been 
strongly contested and, I think, refuted by numerous authors including (in English) Burnaby 
(1938) and. in a different vein, O'Donovan (1980). 
2~.g.llin. XII.22 "What is the worship of [God] but the love of him by which we now desire to 
see him (desideramus eum videre) ... ?" 
21~.~. 1.3.3-5.5. 
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"I came to Carthage, where a cauldron of illicit loves leapt and boiled about me. I was not yet 
in love, but I was in love with love, and from the very depth of my need (secretiore 
indigentia) hated myself for not more keenly feeling the need ... For within I was hungry, all for 
the want of that spiritual food which is Thyself, my God; yet [though I was hungry for want of 
it] I did not hunger for it: I had no desire whatever for incorruptible food, not because I had it 
in abundance but the emptier I was the more I hated the thought of it. Because of all this my 
soul was sick ... "22 
This account may be read on three levels23. At the first level it is a straightforward account of the 
17 year old Augustine arriving in a big city and feeling an intense desire to love and be loved. At a 
second, symbolic, level the account introduces the leading psychological effects of desire which 
has gone astray. In substituting carnal desires for the desire of God, human beings experience a 
state of self-division - hungry/not hungry, loving/hating. At this level it is not Augustine but 
everyman who is the subject. At a third level, Augustine's account has ontological implications. 
The notion of poverty (Augustine's indigentia) is Neo-Platonic and connotes not just material 
deprivation but also a more general, insatiable, spiritual desire. Thus Porphyry spoke of the 
poverty of that part of the soul which, in turning away from Being and dispersing itself among 
sensible objects, loses its own being. Read on these upper two levels the account tells us how the 
mistaking of the desire of God leads to psychological and ontological fragmentation of self. It 
shows why the condition of humanity in the mistaking of the desire of God is to be summarised as 
one of "sickness". 
Whilst the image of sickness has roots in both Greek thought and scripture24, in Augustine it 
assumes-central-importance~He uses the tenn "sickness" to designate a-global state affecting the 
whole of a person: the body is subject to death, the will is enfeebled, the spirit is blinded. Even 
small children are afflicted.2s. For Augustine the image of sickness conveys the normative and 
existential character of the situation of humanity. 
Augustine's growing understanding of the comprehensive nature of humanity's disease was a key 
factor in his disillusionment with the Manichees, and led him to a radically different 
understanding of seltbood from them. According to Mani, weakness and sickness were identified 
with darkness and materiality. Through attending to Mani's teaching one might attain to true self-
knowledge, and by ascetic practice one might then liberate the light; spiritual self from the 
22gwt III.i.l (Sheed). 
23Bochet pp23-27. 
24E.g. (i) Plato's Timaeu~ 86 suggests excessive sensual desire is caused by a sickness of the soul; 
(ii) Math 9:12 "those who are well have no need of a physician but those who are sick". 
25~. I.vii.ll. · 
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darkness of materiality.26 The authentic self might thus be discovered if one could only strip 
away the darkness that clung to it.27 But Augustine found that Mani's doctrine did not properly 
account for his sense of inner conflict. "I liked to excuse myself and to accuse some identifiable 
power which was with me and yet not I. But the whole was myself and what divided me against 
myself was my impiety. ••28 He could not simply write off those warring elements of his being as 
"other" than his true self. The condition of sickness afflicted the very core of his self. On 
Augustine's understanding, if one stripped away materiality one would not so much discover a 
true self as a sick self. 
Augustine's revised understanding of selthood was bound up with a profound difference from the 
Manichees over the question of the location of evif_!he Christian Augustine held, against the 
Manichees, that evil resides neither in the body, nor in the passions through which desire for 
objects is experienced, nor in the desired material objects themselves. In humanity's fallen 
condition, evil is not something which is external to the true self. Rather, evil springs from a 
disorder of the will, the core of the self. Humanity wilfully neglects God in favour of lower, 
sensible and material goods as desired ends. For Augustine, recovery of a good and true sense of 
self could, therefore, never be simply a matter of self-discovery but had to be a matter of are-
orientation of the will leading to the selfs transformation. 
Augustine expresses humanity's disordered desire using three terms with similar meanings: 
cupiditas, concupiscentia and libido. Cupiditas is occasionally used in a neutral sense, as, for 
example, when Augustine refers to the four Stoic passions of joy, fear, gladness and desire, but it 
usually carries the pejorative sense of covetousness - the exact opposite of caritas.29 
Concupiscentia can have a positive usage in the sense of ardent desire but mostly refers to an 
immodetllte attraction to earthly things, particularly in the case of sexual attraction. Libido refers 
to all appetites that contradict the essential order of human nature, but especially to sexual desire 
inasmuch as it escapes the control of the will. 30 
26Cf. Assmusen's article on Manichaeism in eds. Bleaker and Widengren (1969). 
27cf. Quispel's comment in Segal (1992) p245 that: "The discovery of the self is the core of both 
Gnosticism and Manichaeism". 
28gmt V.x.18. 
2~.g. gmt Vlll.v.l2 "I was sure it was better to render myself up to your caritas than to 
surrender to my own cupiditas". See also the discussion of Augustine's terms for love in 
O'Donovan Ch. 1. O'Donovan comments that whilst Augustine can sometimes use delectio, amor, 
and caritas as synonyms, caritas alone of these three is never used with reference to evil or 
worldly things but is always contrasted with cupiditas (p 11 ). 
31lE.g. dD,. XIV.15 "Pleasure ... is preceded by ... the feeling normally called lust [libido], when it 
is concerned with the sexual organs, though lust is the general name for desire of every kind ... 
Thus we have the lust for vengeance, called anger; the lust for possession of money, called greed; 
the lust for victory at any price, called obstinacy; the lust for boasting, called vanity." 
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Unfortunately, Augustine's account of disordered desire leaves him with no ways of saying 
anything good about sexuality as we experience it. For Augustine, sexual desire was experienced 
in a morally good form before the fall when it was fully ordered, fully under the control of the 
will. But Adam's punishment was to have the link between the will and sexual desire weakened3 1• 
As a result sexual desire became a source of shame, present when one did not want it and, 
sometimes, not present when one did want it. Since, after the fall, sexual desire seems inevitably 
to be tinged with "un-order", Augustine thinks it is necessarily marked by sin and shame32. He is 
left with, what seem to us, some very strange conclusions, such as that the ideal form of Christian 
marriage is one in which the partners abstain from intercourse. Augustine never found a way of 
articulating any possibility that sexual pleasure might, in itself, enrich the relations between 
husband and wife. Augustine's opponent Julian of Eclanum rightly argued that sexual desire, 
understood as humanity's natural tendency to seek satisfaction for its animal desires, is morally 
indifferent. For Augustine, on the other hand, concupiscentia or libido is already disorderly and 
perverted. For Augustine human sexuality is intrinsically opposed to the moral demands of the 
will. Much later, as we shall see, Freud develops a model of the mind which is also based on an 
opposition between libido and the demands of morality but which grants to the libido a legitimacy 
that it could never have had for Augustine. 
For Augustine the healing of the selfs sickness involves the ordering of desire, and we can detect 
in Augustine two kinds of ordering principles. The first, and simpler, is the eudaimonist principle 
whereby one posits a right end to "enjoy" and uses everything else as a means to this end.33 On 
this understanding the substance of disordered desire is the positing of a goal which ultimately 
fails to satisfy. The things of the world are loved and enjoyed for their own sake, rather than being 
loved as gifts of the Creator and as means to the enjoyment of the divine Giver.34 
Augustine's eudaimonist scheme sharply preserves the ontological difference between God and 
his creation. It may, for example, form a valid principle of criticism of those therapeutic forms of 
Christianity which would see the development of the self as the chief goal and the notion of God 
as little more than a means to this end. However, it leads to two major kinds of problems. 
In the fust place, it is difficult to accommodate love of neighbour within this dual scheme. Are 
neighbours to be used or enjoyed, or what? In his discussion-in On Christian Doctrine I Augustine 
repeatedly insists that only God is to be enjoyed for his own sake. As a result he is forced into the 
3lar. et pecc, or, 11.36.41. 
32It is the lack of order in sexual desire, not its physicality, which disturbs Augustine. In this 
respect he is markedly different from Christian contemporaries such as Jerome and Gregory of 
Nyssa who took it as axiomatic that in a state of paradise there would be no physical relations. 
33cf. O'Donovan's discussion of "positive love" (p24ff.) 
34Io.eu,tr, 2:11-14. 
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scandalous suggestion that we should use our neighbours in order to enjoy God.35 Faced with the 
scriptural injunction that we are to "enjoy one another in the Lord"36 he suggests that this is 
merely a rather loose way of indicating "use with delight". What we are really doing when we 
enjoy a neighbour, he says, is not enjoying the neighbour in himself but using our relationship as a 
means of enjoying the·G~ who is in him.37 
Secondly, and more generally, this use/enjoyment scheme reinforces a Platonic division between 
time and eternity, the present realm of the mutable and the realm of the changeless. It suggests 
that things on our temporal plane are merely of utility value whilst only God is of real and lasting 
value38. The pleasures and pains of the current life are now all relativised by the overriding 
commitment to a future hope. But this may not so much unify and strengthen the self as give it a 
sense of utter provisionality. 
In psychological tenns, Augustine urges a drive towards personal transformation that devalues the 
experience of inner peace in the present. Augustine's doctrine of the fall would not, of course, 
have allowed him to recommend any kind of acceptance of the self in its current temporal 
condition. This limits the therapeutic effectiveness of his theology for our modern age in which 
the need for self-affirmation seems to be dominant and where low self-esteem is one of our most 
prevalent neuroses. 
However, we can also discover another ordering principle in Augustine beyond the eudaimonist 
scheme. Here things are to be loved not in accordance with their subjective usefulness for meeting 
one's chosen end but in accordance with the objective divine value placed on them. Augustine 
explicitly compares the two schemes in City of God XI.16 entitled: "The distinctions among 
created things; and their different ranking by the scales of utility and logic". By way of example, 
he suggests that we might want to have food in our house more than fleas, but that the animate 
flea has a higher intrinsic value than the inanimate food. Again, a slave might be sold for less than 
a horse, but a human being has a higher rational value than any animal. According to Augustine 
there is a deeper, natural order of things which questions of human utility and convenience may 
obscure. According to Augustine's rationq! order things are to be valued and desired in the 
ascending sequence: inanimate objects, animals, human beings, angels, God. The suggestion 
seems to be that only when we move beyoqd what seems superficially attractive and useful to an 
appreciation of things that is consistent with the natural order will we find that our desires are 
truly fulfilled. 
35doctr. chr. 1.22.20. 
36Philemon v20. 
37doctr, chr. 1.33.37. 
38Cf. his quotation ofTimaeus 29c: "As eternity is to that which has originated, so truth is to 
faith." (ltin. IV.24). Plato's original Greek reads: "As being is to becoming, so is truth to faith." 
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Despite some significant differences of approach, Augustine's "hierarchy of desires" can be taken 
as prefiguring to a certain extent the "hierarchy of needs" propounded by Maslow and which we 
shall encounter in chapter 6. Augustine thinks his hierarchy is given objectively by theological 
science, whilst Maslow thinks his is given objectively by psychological science. Both suggest an 
"ordering" for our desires which ranks material goods lowest, goods connected with our fellow 
human beings at an intermediate level, and spiritual goods highest. 
Augustine's rational order suggests an improved approach to the question of love for neighbour39. 
Neighbours are now not to be "used" but to be loved in accordance with the value placed by God 
upon them. According to Augustine's rational order of love, human beings are granted value 
inasmuch as they have been created in the divine image. Even where this image has been 
seriously defaced by the effects of the fall they are still to be loved insofar as they have the 
potential to regain it. Human beings are thus to be loved both in their essential nature qua human 
beings and for the potential they have to fulfil this nature. Correct rational love of a person 
discerns what is truly loveable in him. The opposite of this kind of love, for Augustine, is to love a 
person without reference to God. In this case one sets the other up as his own source of value, 
making the mistake of thinking that he has value independently of the God who created him. The 
risk of this kind of love would be that one loves the other qua sinner and thus confirms him in his 
sin rather than loving him in such a way as to lead him on to God.40 
Augustine's concept of love for neighbour has a creative element, in that it wills the neighbour to 
aspire to that place in the divine order from which he has fallen.41 It is not, now, that the 
individual uses the other as means to his own enjoyment of God. Rather the individual wishes the 
other to enjoy the God who alone can bring the other true happiness. For Augustine, this purpose 
for the other is not something that one posits for oneself and then imposes on the other. Rather, it 
is something that is disclosed by the divine order of things. 
When we come to consider the humanistic psychologists (chapter 6) we shall discuss a modem 
protest against this Augustinian model of neighbqur love in the name of human autonomy. The 
idea that any individual (or church) might have Q fully reliable insight into the divine order of 
things is now regarded with suspicion. The potentiJl}ly manipulative or even coercive implications 
of this kind of love are now vie~ed with concern by many, including the humanistic 
psychologists. 
39Cf. O'Donovan's discussion of "rational love" (p29ff). 
40W:d:. ~- I.27.28. 
41Cf. O'Donovan's discussion of "benevolent love" (p32ff). 
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In the light of Augustine's reflection on the rational ordering of desire, it is fruitful to examine the 
condition of disordered desire that he describes at length in Confessions X.30ff. Here he 
expounds one of his favourite texts, 1 Jn 2:16, under the heads of the lust (cupiditas) of the flesh, 
the lust of the eyes and the pride of life. The frrst, he says, refers to the delight gained by the 
senses in eating, drinking and sex by which one may be enslaved. The second, the lust of the eyes, 
refers, analogically, to the knowledge acquired about the objects of sense-perception for its own 
sake- what Augustine calls "vain inquisitiveness" or "curiosity"42. But Augustine confesses it is 
the third temptation - worldly ambition or the desire for praise - that is "the main reason why I fail 
to love and fear You in purity"43. The three form a progression in Augustine's thought, from the 
more fleshly to the more spiritual, from the more exterior to the more interior44. This reveals the 
essence of cupiditas to be pride. For the mature Augustine the sickness of mistaken desire is not, 
in essence, the Neo-Platonic dispersion of the self in a multitude of desirable objects, although he 
can still speak in these terms, but the subtle search of the self whereby it falsely overvalues itself 
and desires to take itself as the object of its desire. Sexual compulsion and the vain attachment to 
physical and intellectual objects, are symptoms of this deeper sickness. 
It seems clear that, in Confessions X.30ff, rejection of the divine ordering of things in favour of 
an unjust order is at stake. It is not human praise per se that Augustine fears45 but praise which 
neither properly refers its object to the divine Giver nor praises what genuinely deserves to be 
praised. The effect of this on the recipient is to encourage him to appraise himself according to a 
standard which is not God's and is hence inherently defective. "You have commanded us not only 
continence -that is, that we should restrain our affections from certain things - but also justice - by 
which we must bestow love on certain things."46 Augustine's response to the third temptation is to 
run through all aspects of his abilities and interior life to try "to make distinctions and to evaluate 
each entity according to its proper rank"47. The fundamental cause of the state of sickness, for the 
mature Augustine, is the abandonment of the divine order in which one loves things justly and 
truly, and loves God above all else, in favour of a disordered and unjust state in which the self is 
loved above all else. Thus Augu!ttine insists that the root of all sin is preferring oneself to God and 
hence rejecting the divine order.48 The person who does this gathers material possessions to build 
up the self and loves these rather than God. The tum from the material to the spiritual may now 
42&.Qilf. X.xxxvi.54f. 
43£QDf. X.xxxvi.59. 
44so Bochet p39ff. 
45~ X.xxxvii.60: "But how can we live so as to be indifferent to praise ... Are we to live evil 
lives, so abandoned and depraved that no one who knows us does not detest us? .. .If admiration is 
the usual and proper accompaniment of a good life and good actions, we ought not to renounce it 
any more than the good life which it accomvanies. II 
46£QDf. X.xxxvii.61 (Sheed). 
47~ X. x1.65. 
48e.g. dJ.l. XIV.l3. 
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be understood as symptomatic of fallen humanity's proud rejection of the divine order and its 
attempt to impose its own order. 
4.2 Fragmentation of the Self 
Augustine holds that fallen humanity's inability to order its desires under God produces 
debilitating psychological consequences. Augustine describes the drama of the fall and 
redemption of humanity as one in which the divine image in human beings is deformed and must 
then be reformed (De Trinitate XII-XV). In psychological terms, the fall is manifested in the 
fragmentation of the self, whilst the process of redemption is worked out in the selfs slow healing 
and ultimate integration. The perfection of the self is the attainment of that unity which consists 
in being the image of the perfect divine unity.49 To show how the loss of the divine image takes 
effect psychologically it will be necessary to examine a little more deeply Augustine's 
understanding of the make-up of the self. 
Augustine views the human animus as a structure of functions. The lower and outward functions 
of the soul are concerned with the sense faculties and appetites that belong to humanity's animal 
nature whilst the higher and inward functions are concerned with the mind's relations with itself 
and with God. Augustine argues that the trinitarian image in human beings consists in what he 
takes to be the three core functions of the mens, the higher aspect of the soul, namely: self-
memory, self-knowing or understanding, and self-willing or loving50. Each of these refers not to a 
part of the mens but to the whole of the one mens, just as the names Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
refer to one God and not three Gods. Self-remembering, knowing and willing are three distinct but 
consubstantial activities of mens51• 
Augustine therefore does not describe the loss of the selfs unity as being experienced in terms of 
tensions between different regions of the self, as we shall see that Freud does (chapter 4 ). 
Augustine's basic commitment to the oneness of God could not allow him to envisage that there 
might be parts of the mens that have the capability to function in very different ways from each 
other. Rather, the deformation of the divine imag~ is manifested as an overall impairment of the 
three core functions by which the whole self relates to itself, as I shall now describe. 
4.2 .1 Faulty Memory qfSelf 
Augustine's memoria includes what we should call memory; he thought that in the memoria were 
preserved traces of past experiences as in a kind of storehouse or stomach. But memoria includes 
very much more than this. In his discussion in Confessions X he extends its scope to include 
knowledge of moral values, truths of reason, of ourselves and of God. Augustine is troubled by 
49llin.. XV.51. 
sawn. Bks. IX-X. 
Slllin.. X.18 
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the awareness of his memory as "a profound and immeasurable multiplicity"52• He is confident 
that at the eschaton the vision of God will illuminate the whole of the memory53, but in his 
earthly, fallen state the person seems to lack the power of making the whole contents of his 
memory present to himself, 54 Self-memory fails in three particular ways. 
Eill1lxo the mind "forgets" God. God is always intimately present to the mind, whether this 
presence is acknowledged or not. According to Augustine's metaphysics God's presence pervades 
everything. To this principle the human mind is no exception. However, in their fallen condition 
human beings have deliberately turned away from God, causing them to forget God's intimate 
presence to them. Augustine' memoria functions in a somewhat similar way to the Platonic 
anamnesis: the mind has an implicit knowledge of God which it may or may not acknowledge. 
However, there are two important differences. Firstly, Augustine's memoria never refers to things 
seen by the soul in a previous existence. Secondly, the effects of the fall mean that human beings 
may not autonomously tum around to face the divine light but must be empowered to do this 
through divine grace, and specifically through the mediatorship of Christ55. In post-Freudian 
terms we might say that the knowledge of God is buried so deeply within the mind that it requires 
the assistance of the divine Other for this knowledge to be recalled. 
The Christian Augustine saw his earlier life as a period of self-contradiction in which this intimate 
presence of God had been denied, in which God had been forgotten. For Augustine the problem 
of forgetting God was not a form of atheism; Augustine had never ceased, deep down, to believe 
in God. It was, rather, a moral failure of the self to recall itself in the light of divine truth, a denial 
of the selfs basic moral orientation. Using Taylor's language, we might say that, for Augustine, 
forge_tnng GQd_inyoJyes a basic act of self-deception in which tlliL ~If ~ttempts to live according 
to a different set of values from those which it implicitly, if only dimly, knows to be its highest 
values. It is thereby plunged into what we might call an "identity crisis".S6 
Secondly, the mind becomes aware of images in the memory which sometimes escape the control 
of the conscious will. The celibate Augustine is troubled by dreams containing images from his 
I ' 
sexually active past. He can coritrol apd suppress these images while he is awake but they recur 
when he dreams. Augustine does not feel t~at he himself has committed the acts that occurred in 
52~. X.xvii.26. 
53.trin. XV.26. 
S4orig. an. 4.10. 
ssso Bourke (pl44) who argues, against O'Connell, that Augustine's theory of divine illumination 
supplants the doctrine of the Mfmu. 
56rhe problem raised for us in Augustine's later works, and which I do not intend to discuss here, 
is how human beings can have any personal moral responsibility at all if they are born into a 
radically fallen condition from which they can only be rescued by grace. 
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his dreams. They were rather, "done to him". Yet, he says, "surely I am myself in sleep"57• Past 
disordered desires have created the impression of a split self. Augustine struggles to reconcile his 
certainty that he is "one" self with the experience of memory traces that elude the control of this 
self~S. Here Augustine seems to demonstrate an awareness of unconscious realms but assumes 
that because the images 'produced do not conform to the dictates of his conscious will. they are 
pathological. The implication is that Augustine's ideal self would be so strongly unified that even 
its dreams were consonant with its daytime ideals. As we shall see in chapter 4, Freud will 
propose that nocturnal dreams operate according to essentially different rules from the rational 
will, and Carl Jung (chapter 5) will offer a rather different solution from Augustine to the problem 
of integrating these kinds of desires and images into the self. 
Thirdly. a person's imperfect ability to recall his total life experience seems to lead to a gap 
between that self which is the sum of his historical experiences and the self which is the sum of 
his remembered experiences. This applies, in the first instance to the state of infancy, of which 
Augustine says: 
"This period of my life, Lord, I do not remember having lived, but I have believed what others 
have told me and I have assumed how I behaved from observing other infants. Despite the 
high probability of this assumption, I do not wish to reckon this as part of the life that I live in 
this world; for it is lost in the darkness of my forgetfulness, and is on the same level as the life 
I lived in my mother's womb .. .I feel no sense of responsibility now for a time of which I recall 
not a single trace. nS9 
It also applies to the experience of something being forgotten and subsequently remembered. It 
feels as if when I forget something the item is subtracted from "me" and when-1 recall something 
this item is added to "me". Augustine wonders how the effort to recall an item temporarily 
forgotten feels like a search "outside" the self: 
"Why is it, then, that we are somehow withdrawn from and denied to ourselves and likewise 
somehow revealed and restored to ourselves, as if we were other persons apd were elsewhere, 
when we seek and do not find what we have deposited in our memory, and as if we ourselves 
could not reach ourselves when we have, as it were, been deposited elsewhere ... For where do 
we search, if not in ourselves?"6o 
S7.Gru1f. X.xxx (Sheed). 
SS.GQ.Df. X.xxx.41. 
S9gmt. I.vii.12. 
60orta=. an. 4.10 quoted in O'Daly pl49. 
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Yet something that has been forgotten and is subsequently remembered must have been located, 
after all, somewhere within the memory.61 It is this son of experience which leads Augustine to 
wonder at the "profound multiplicity" of memory62 with its deep and scarcely accessible caverns. 
It is, I think, a little too simple to say, as O'Daly does, that Augustine thinks that our personal 
identity as historical individuals is constituted by our remembered experiences. 63 Augustine is 
aware, for example, that deposited in the mind are half-forgotten experiences that can only be 
recalled if someone else prompts us. 64 Our identity consists not just of fully recalled experiences, 
but also of a twilight zone of experiences that we can only partially recall. 
However, I think O'Daly is right in highlighting the absence of a theory of the unconscious here. 65 
Two factors are decisive. Firstly, Augustine assumes that both the commitment of sense-
impressions to memory and their recall from memory are efforts of the will. Thus, referring to 
recall, he says: "I can request whatever I wish (quidquid volo) to be brought forward."66 He does 
not suspect, as modern psychoanalysts have demonsttated67, that a whole range of impressions 
may be captured by the memory irrespective of the intentions of the will, and that the will may, in 
principle, only have limited power in choosing whether to admit the images of such sense 
impressions to consciousness. In other words, he does not (nor could he) allow that there could be 
a whole region of the mind that functions independently of the will. Secondly, he does not allow 
that memories that a subject genuinely believes himself to have forgotten could still be a pan of 
one's identity. 68 One of the characteristics of the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious 
(as opposed to the pre or subconscious) is precisely this kind of radical inaccessibility to 
consciousness. 
Augustine indicates that the inability of the-self-to -be fully present to itself is a consequence of 
• 
humanity's fallen nature.69 It seems that if! the world to come this failure of memory would be 
healed and the gap between our remem1>ered identity and our historical identity would be 
overcome.70 
61conf. X.xix.28. 
62~. X.xvii.26. 
63Q'Daly p148 and p135. 
64~. X.xix.28. 
65Q'Daly p150. 
66gm!. X.viii.12 (ttans. Bourke). Cf. mn. Xl.15 "Just as it is the will which fastens sense to body, 
so it is the will which fastens memory to sense and the thinking attention to memory." 
67for example with reference to the phenomenon of hypnosis. 
68gmt. X.xvi.25 and my discussion of infant experience above. 
69ori&. an. 4.10; O'Daly p149. 
70gmt. X.v.7; .d.ll. XXII.30. 
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4.2.2 faulty Knowledge a[ Self 
Augustine links misplaced desire with faulty knowledge of self71• The self should have observed 
the command to "know itself'72, that is, it should have fonned a true estimate of itself as being 
above the material realm but beneath God. Instead, thinking itself to be its own god.. it seeks to 
derive from itself the being that is only God's to give. It takes material objects and enjoys them as 
if they were the selfs own possessions rather than being the gifts of the Creator. Abandoning 
interior knowledge it attempts to build itself up through an insatiable desire for the knowledge of 
sensible things. Where desire should have been concentrated on the One who alone could 
properly satisfy it, desire is instead scattered amongst a multiplicity of lower goods.73 
Augustine took it that knowledge of God and knowledge of self are closely linked. On this point 
he was influenced both by the Neo-Platonist notion that introspection corresponds with 
contemplation of the One74 and by the Christian doctrine of the imago Dei. Thus in an early work 
he says simply, "May I know myself, may I know thee" (noverim me, noverim Te).1S In an 
exploration of the problem of self-knowledge (£Qnf. X.5) he contends that a person can only truly 
be said to know himself through divine illumination. When a person finally sees God face to face 
all of the hitherto dark parts of the self will be illuminated and known. "For what I know of myself 
I know because you grant me light, and what I do not know of myself, I do not know until such 
time as my darkness becomes like noonday before your face". 
What Augustine has in mind is not the idea of a supportive relationship within which the self 
comes to knowledge of itself, as in modem counselling, but the selfs correct apprehension of 
itself in the light of divine standards of truth and justice. As these standards are more correctly 
discerned and contemplated so the self will grow in interior knowledge of itself. 
We should not, however, assume that Augustine thought that growth in knowledge of self was a 
lonely spiritual task. Friendship with others was of central importance to Augustine. In her work 
on patristic views of friendship, Carolinne White comments: "With Augustine we reach the 
culmination of fourth century Christian theories of friendship. for it is he who provides the most 
profound views, touching on many areas of Christian life and doctrine and according a crucial 
role to friendship in each Christian's progress towards salvation"76. Augustine held that by loving 
a friend we see the love which is the bond between two friends, and this love is none other than 
11t!inX.7. 
7:ZCicero's intellectualised version of the Delphic oracle, viz. "Cum igitur: 'Nosce te' dicit, hoc 
dicit 'Nosce animum tuum". (Hill on mn. p301 n9) 73mn. XII.ix.14. 
74so Plotinus, ''knowing itself [mind] will also know its source" <Enneads 6.9.7) and conversely 
"looking towards the Good it will know itself' <Enneads 5.6.5). O'Daly's translation (pl). 
75.521. 2.1.1 
76White p218. 
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God the Holy Spirit. In loving the love between friends we love God.77 Augustine's stress on 
interiority is thus complemented by a stress on sociability which would not always be maintained 
in later thought. 
Augustine came to see the monastic life as the best means of gaining knowledge of God, since 
God himself, as love, is present in this community of Christians loving one another intimately in 
God78. The sharing of property among the members of the community creates suitable conditions 
for spiritual unity and mutuallove.79 Within this context of love, Christians have the duty to 
encourage each other in the life of faith. A true love of neighbour is, in Augustine's terms, always 
one which will strengthen the other's knowledge and enjoyment of God. Life in the community 
involves a high degree of mutual responsibility for one another so that, for example, if one 
member acts in a way that is inconsistent with the spiritual goal the other members have a duty to 
bring this to his attention. 80 
The strongly social context envisaged by Augustine provides one strategy for controlling against 
the risk of self-deception that introspective attempts to unify the self otherwise run. In our own 
time, we are highly aware of the possibility of someone leading an apparently deeply spiritual life 
and yet shutting off knowledge of certain aspects of the self from himself. Thus one may discover 
clergy with long histories of child abuse. In the absence of the intensive friendships advocated by 
Augustine, other ways must be found of guarding against self-deceit. The tradition of confession 
to a priest that developed in the medieval church and which, in certain respects, anticipates the 
expert/analysand relationship of Freudian psychoanalysis, is one option. A second option, which 
seems closer to the Augustinian ideal, is the peer relationship of counsellor/client in modem 
humanistic counselling. 
4.2.3 Faulzy seu-Willing 
We may distinguish two kinps of affliction of the will in Augustine. The first, and more 
straightforward, is the v~)}untacy willing of something less than God, or directly against God, as 
the selfs final end. AuP,stine's cites his youthful theft of pomaBl (the same word is used in the 
Vulgate for the fruit eaten by Adam) as paradigmatic of this kind of failure. Here Augustine 
discerned a deliberate attempt by the self to set up its own norms and ambitions in the place of the 
divine order. This is, for Augu~tine, the essence of pride, or wrongful self-love. 82 One takes 
oneself, rather than God, as the object in which one hopes to satisfy one's deepest desires. And 
77e.g. ep.lo.tr. 5.7; Io. eu. tr. 17.8; mn. VIII.v.l2. 
78~.132. 
79n:a.I.2. 
8~IV.6ff. 
8l~. II.iv.9. 
82s;iy. XIV .13. 
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the result of turning away from the source of being to one's own self, says Augustine, is that one's 
own being is attenuated. 83 
Augustine traces this kind of voluntary sin to human descendency from Adam. Adam had been 
created rational so that he could understand the commandment not to eat the apple, but he had yet 
to develop the wisdom which comes through the practice of living righteously.B4 By disobeying 
the commandment Adam had rather turned aside from wisdom to a morally culpable state of 
"vicious folly". Subsequent generations are born into this state of ignorance. They lack a 
sufficiently motivating knowledge of the summum bonum, so that they can only voluntarily will 
inferior goods: "Because of his ignorance man has not free choice of will to choose what he 
should rightly do. "85 Augustine says of those who sin voluntarily that they have a free will but not 
a freed will; that is; they voluntarily choose to sin but they lack the freedom not to sin. 86 
The second, and psychologically more subtle affliction of the will, is characterised by a person 
finding himself divided against himself in carrying out what he knows to be good. He does what 
he does not will and does not do what he wills. The will seems estranged or alienated from itself. 
In his earlier, Manichaean, days Augustine had explained this phenomenon in terms of the 
presence of two souls within the person, one good the other bad. Having rejected the Manichaean 
notion of a principle of autonomous evil, however, Augustine came to see the true reason for the 
will's alienation as being its enslavement to the law of sin87• The original sin of Adam, whereby 
man chose in accordance with his own pride and against God, had set up a contradiction in human 
nature whence the will became enslaved. In this condition, even when supplied with knowledge of 
the good, a persop mifht find himself unable to respond to it. 
Augu~tine describes the psychological mechanism by which voluntary~sin-leads ~to~the involuntary 
sin of a divided will as follows: 
"The consequence of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is formed, 
and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as it were, 
connected one to another (hence my term chain), a harsh bondage held me under 
restraint. n88 
83gy,_ XIV.13: "A man is diminished when he elects to be self-sufficient and defects from the one 
who is really sufficient for him." 
84lib. arb. III.xxiv. 
85Ub. arb. III.xviii; cf.Io. eu. tr. 5.1. 
86corrept. 42; c. ep. Pel. 1.5. 
87So Rom 7.23 cited in &QDf.. Vll.xxi.27. 
88gmt VIII.v.lO. 
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Sin brings about its own punishment in fostering, through habit, the compulsion to sin. 
Augustine's tenn consuetudo connotes something stronger than our usual understanding of habit. 
Habitual action is nonnally thought of as unreflective. Consuetudo can be unreflective, but it does 
not have its source so much in unreasoned activity as in the co-ordination of judgement and desire 
that enables us to act intentionally. Weakness of will comes about through a mismatch between 
past and present constellations of reason and desire. To identify past desires alone as the problem 
would be to adopt a fonn of Manichaeism in which present enlightened reason is set against the 
past darkness of desire. On the other hand past erroneous judgements of the good can be 
straightforwardly shown to be wrong in the light of present knowledge and so in themselves have 
no hold over us. It is, rather, the past approval of reason to an unworthy object of delight 
combined with the practice of a desire for this object which leaves its traces in the memory in the 
fonn of habit and so enchains the person89. 
Weakness of the will does not, therefore, indicate a "spatial" division in the self between light and 
darkness, reason and passion, as the Manichees thought and, as we shall see, Jung indicates. 
Rather there is a temporal dislocation (distentio) between present and past selves. "We are dealing 
with a morbid condition of the mind which, when it is lifted up by the truth, does not unreservedly 
rise to it but is weighed down by habit. So there are two wills. Neither of them is complete, and 
what is present in the one is lacking to the other.'190. The sinner finds that, even when he knows 
the good, he is unable to perfonn it. He has lost that freedom which is constituted by his 
knowledge, will and feeling being wholeheartedly united in the object of his desire. He has 
become a slave to sin. He is divided against himself. 
Augustine's reflections on the weakness of the will led him to an important reassessment of the 
nature of· human motivation;-He-concluded that-a-person-cannot move himself-to-action-merely 
through his own self-wiUing, nor can he autonomously respond to what is given by his intellect. 
Rpther, a person can only be motivated through the supply of an external source of attraction. 
Delight, concluded Augustine, is the only possible source of action, nothing else can move the 
wiU.91 A person can act only if he can mobilise his feelings, only if he is "affected" by an object 
of delight.92 "It is not enough to be drawn by the will ... give me one that is travelling in this 
wilderness and thirsting and panting after the fountains of his eternal home; give me such a one 
89See further Wetzel p135ff. 
90gmt VIII.ix.21. 
91Simpl. I, qu. ii.21: "The will can by no means be set in motion unless an object be presented 
which delights and atttacts"; cf. spir, et litt. III.5: "When the right action and the true aim has 
begun to appear clearly, unless it also be delighted in and loved, there is no doing, no devotion, no 
good life; Even after his duty and his proper aim shall begin to become known to him, unless he 
also take delight in and feel a love for it, he neither does his duty, nor sets about it, nor lives 
rightly.'' 
92Sioml. I, qu ii.21 "Who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him delight?" 
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and he will know what I mean."93 Yet the processes which enable a person in this state to take 
delight in God are now not only hidden from him but they are actually unconscious and beyond 
his control: "The fact that those things that make for successful progress towards God should 
cause us delight is not acquired by our own intentions, earnestness and the value of our own good 
will - but is dependent on the inspiration granted us by God. n94 
Augustine's psychology now becomes a subtle interplay of the conscious will with a source of 
motivation that lies beyond the control of the will, and it was this subtlety that was to find 
expression in his Confessions. In our century, the idea that the sources of human motivation lie in 
part beyond our conscious control has been taken up, as we shall see, in a somewhat analogous 
way by Freud in his suggestion that human motivation is determined by the spontaneous response 
of certain regions of the psyche to sources of pleasure. 
S. The Desire of God Upcoyered 
5.1 The Nesative Work of Unfulfilled Desire 
For Augustine man in his fallen state is a being subject to disparate unfulfilled desires. His sexual 
desire seems "insatiable"95. His desire for material possessions seems to lead merely to an ever 
increasing desire for more goods rather than to satisfaction. The self tends to be pulled apart by 
attraction to a multiplicity of objects. The state of those whose desires are dispersed amongst 
temporal and sensible things is above all one of "restlessness".96 
But this state of restlessness has a salvific function. Firstly, it draws attention to the infinite size 
of the desire that requires satisfaction. Secondly it performs the "negative work" of moving a 
person on in search of that which will truly satisfy his desire. Ultimately, his restlessness spurs the 
unconverted person on to seek God, in whom-alone-true-happiness-may be found, 
It is in such terms that Augustine describes his own Platonic ascent towards God. Unsatisfied by 
material pleasures he turned inward from the desires of the body to the life of the soul. He 
ascended from the lower part of the soul, that region which deals with sense-perception and 
imagination, through the soul's power of judging temporal things, to the highest part of the soul 
which deals with the contemplation of eternal truths.97 At length he received a momentary, 
mystical experience of Being. 98 
93e.p. Io. tr. XXVI.4. 
94SiuwJ.. I qu.ii.21 (trans. Brown (1967) pl55). 
95gmf. Vl.xii.22. 
96~ I.i.l"Our heart is restless ... ";~ V.ii.2 "Let the restless and wicked depart from you". 
97Cf. the ascent of eros described by Socrates in Symposium p92f. 
98gmf. VII.xvii.23. 
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This transient experience did not, however, mark the end of his quest and the satisfaction of his 
restlessness. He found he lacked the strength to remain in this mystical state. His "weakness" 
reasserted itself and he tumbled back down into the material realm. But he now carried with him, 
as a trace in his memory, an experience which he took to be truly satisfying. The desire for God 
had been aroused. His appetite had been whetted even if he did not yet have, as he puts it, the 
strength to eat. 
5.2 The Positive Work of Strengthening The Desire for God 
Having been awakened, the desire of God must now be fostered and strengthened. Thus 
Augustine exhorts his readers in many different figures to desire God more intently. A recurring 
model in his commentary on the Psalms is the legendary ldithun who "leaps beyond" earthly 
things towards the vision of Goo.99 At three key points in de Trinitate he quotes Psalm 105:3-4: 
"Seek his face always." 100 For Augustine "the whole life of a good Christian is a holy desire" 101. 
Augustine talks of the movement towards God as an "extension" and contrasts this with the 
"distension" of a life which is scattered amongst numerous temporal and sensible desires.102 He 
suggests that the person who loves the world is like a man who immerses himself in the river of 
temporal things and finds himself hurried along and swept away by it. The person who loves God, 
on the other hand, clings fast to the tree, which is Christ, planted by the river103. The desire of 
God both extends and unifies the soul, whilst desire for the world overwhelms and disperses the 
soul. 
Augustine's notion of the "extension of desire" has two senses104• Firstly, he refers to the 
extension of the mind through godly desire. The image Augustine uses here is of stretching the 
-opening· of a sack-to-make- it capable-of-holding more:- "For-just as; if you would-fill- a -bag; and 
knowing how big the thing is that shall be given, you stretch the opening of the sack or skin ... so 
God by deferring our hope stretches our desire; by the desiring, stretches the mind; by stretching 
makes it more capacious."tos Secondly, he refers to the extension of desire itself. The picture 
here is of the athlete straining to attain the prize1°6. "Holy longing" is like exercise- the more it is 
undertaken the more the person is capable of. The two forms of "extension" are bound together: 
when someone extends himself through the desire of God his desire is itself strengthened, and in 
99~ 38, 61, 76. 
100gm. 1.5, IX.l, XV.2. 
lOlep. Io. tr. IV .6. 
102"Not stretched out in distraction but extended in reach, not by being pulled apart but by 
concentration." gmt. XI.xxix.39. Relying on the Plotinian imagery of the fall from the One as a 
scattering and dispersion. 
103ep. Io. tr. 11.10. 
104e.p. Io. tr. IV.6 
105e.p. Io. tr. IV .6. 
l06Phil. 3:13,14. 
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desiring more he further extends the 'capacity' of his soul. Thus a virtuous circle operates linking 
the desire of God with the growth of the self. Albeit in very different tenns, Augustine prefigures 
Lacan's insight that desire is a positive and creative force in human life. 
In summary, the desire for God is at work in both a negative and a positive manner to transform 
the self. In its negative aspect, the desire of God engenders that restlessness which, ultimately, 
drives us to ascend from the physical to the spiritual. In its positive aspect, the desire of God 
brings that fulfilment and happiness which incites our further desire and enjoyment of God. In the 
first case we may speak of the lack of the desired object; in the second case we may speak of the 
further enjoyment of an object already in part possessed. 
5.3 Desire from God and for God 
These two aspects of desire take us to the central paradox in the concept of the desire of God, a 
paradox connected with the immanence and transcendence of God. On the one hand, Augustine 
argues107 that an individual could not desire something of which he was totally ignorant. He can, 
in fact, only seek God because deep in his memory he already knows God. God is invariably 
immanent within human beings whether they recall this presence or not. But, on the other hand, 
the search for God does not end with the simple awareness of God, for God transcends a human 
being's memory. There is always more of God to be laid hold of. People are in a state of 
continually seeking and continually finding there is more to be sought. lOS. 
Augustine wrestles with the problem of relating to God using the image of the soul as a house to 
which God is invited as a guest109. Augustine's dilemma is that, much as he desires God's 
presence with him, his soul is too small for so great a guest. The solution to this impasse is that 
-ooo-himself enlarges-Augustine's-house. God-works from- within to enable Augustine to-invite 
God in to his soul. To change the metaphor, where Augustine wanted to love God but was unable 
to, God nonetheless "commands" Augustine to love him. God himself overcomes the 
disproportion between himself and humanity by stimulating humanity's desire for God and by 
enabling this desire to be fulfilled. Thus we may speak of a desire which both comes from God 
and is for God. It is from God inasmuch as God is already immanent to the soul, and for God 
inasmuch as God remains transcendent to the soul. 
Questions of the immanence and transcendence of God seem to the modem reader rather 
removed from the problem of integrating the self. However, in Augustine's thought they are 
vitally connected. As O'Connell comments: "Intellectually, Augustine was convinced, one of 
man's most decisive exigencies, if he was to arrive at any just idea of himself ... was to think rightly 
107~Xandmx 
tosmxv.2, IX.i.l andlo.eu. tr ... LXlll.l. 
t09m. I.v.6. 
75 
Augustine: Integrating the Self through the Desire of God 
about God." 110 Augustine reminds us throughout the first seven books of the Confessions that the 
key to his earlier error was his failure to conceive God in spiritual terms. The Manichee notion of 
a material principle of light bounded on one side by darkness was reflected at the level of 
anthropology by a division in humanity between light and dark components. Through reading the 
"books of the Platonists" Augustine came to conceive of God as an undivided, spiritual reality, 
wholly present to each element of the lower, material world in each place.l11 It was this whole 
presence of God to human beings which could, he now realised, confer on human beings both 
being and unity, "You are not scattered but reassemble us. In filling all things you fill them with 
the whole of yourself' 112. The ubiquitous presence of the one God was the condition for the unity 
of the self. The desire of God is to be understood equally as that which we enact in reaching out 
to what lies U"anscendentally beyond ourselves and as the fundamental immanent principle of our 
own being. Attaining to God is therefore manifested psychologically by a true attaining to oneself. 
Where Lacan will reject the possibility of wholeness as predicated on an unrealistic demand for 
unconditional love, Augustine proposes an ontology in which a completely fulfilled love is bound 
to the achievement of an integrated self. 
5.4 The lntegratins Power of the Desire of God 
The Augustinian principle of the desire of God is embedded in an ontology and a cosmology that 
make for a very strongly unified structure and which, correspondingly, maximise the power with 
which the human desire of God is able to integrate the self. Fundamental to this scheme is the 
doctrine of the divine simplicity: God is he whose being is identical with his attributes.113 This 
means that as one draws closer to God, and is conformed more closely to his image, so all the 
attributes of the self are bound increasingly tightly together. 
·-Particularly·important·consequences·ariseftom-Augustine's·beliefthat·God·is·at·the·same-time·the·-
one sole Good and the one changeless Wisdom.114 This allows Augustine on the one hand to 
transform the classical virtues into aspect& of the human desire for God so that, for example, 
temperance becomes the triumph of the desire for God over carnal desire and justice becomes the 
ability to order the soul and body under God. 115 The pursuit of virtue is now none other than the 
pursuit of God considered from an ethical point of view. On the other hand, it allows him to see 
rational learning as a process whereby one seeks to reduce "to a simple, true and certain unity"116 
all the various branches of study and so proceed from an understanding of the physical realm, 
110Q•connell p31. 
11lmn. XIV.iv.21 "He is everywhere in his wholeness; so that in him the mind lives and moves 
and has its being." (Burnaby's translation.) Cf. Plotinus Enneads VI 4-5 whose title states, "Being 
is.integrally everywhere, one and the same". 
112~ I.iii.3 
113 . . XI 10 e.g.gy. .. 
114£iu.. XI.lO. 
115£ill.. XIX.4. 
116gnt. ll.l6.44. 
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through a grasp of the principles of reason to a vision of the divine intellect 117• The desire of God 
thus serves to unite the intellectual and ethical with the religious parts of the self behind a 
common aim. 
To be sure, the mature Augustine slackens somewhat the very strong unity of learning and ethics 
with spiritual progress that he had maintained in his early works. For example, he retracted his 
early suggestions that the wise scholar must at the same time be a person committed to living a 
virtuous life, and that God reveals himself only to the virtuous} IS It became clear to Augustine 
that, on the one hand, many saintly people were ignorant of the liberal arts, and that, on the other 
hand, many of those who were conversant with the arts were not saintly. Again, the priority he 
later granted to divine grace would not allow him to make a straightforward equation between a 
virtuous life and the reward of the vision of God. Nonetheless, the form of spiritual progress 
demonstrated in a central work such as de Trinitate is one in which understanding, piety and 
virtue are positively related to one another.ll9 
The Augustinian universe is strongly unified. It is the product of the one Creator. Whereas in 
Platonism the physical world was patterned on the ideas, and in Nee-Platonism the world 
emanated from the world-soul and thence from the second entity, the nous, Augustine takes the 
ideas into the mind of God and identifies them with the Divine Wisdom, the second person of the 
Trinity. The divine mind, omnipresent yet undivided, is the focal centre and first cause of the 
entire cosmic process120, There is nothing in existence which is not fundamentally related to 
God.121 The universe thus has a fundamental unity and intelligibility, indeed it is a "uni-verse" 
precisely in deriving from the olie God.122 There is therefore a close relationship between right 
knowledge of the self, of God and of the external world. The closer one draws to God the more 
tlie extemarworlCI maltessenseana may oo graspea as a wnole.- ~ 
Augustine's strong doctrine of creation, together with his assumption of the goodness of God, 
rules out any autonomous principle of' evil in the universe or the self. "There is no such entity in 
nature as 'evil': 'evil' is merely a pame for the privation of good"l23, Moreover, even allowing for 
the damaging effects of the fall, there can be no fundamental conflict in the universe; there are 
merely regions in which God's order is temporarily disturbed by human sin. John Milbank goes so 
far as to suggest that the ontological priority of peace over conflict is the key theme in Augustine's 
117Qill, 11.9.26. 
118Retractions to De Ordine Fathers of the Church Vol. 5 ed. Schopp p33lf. 
ll!JE.g.ltin. XII.21: "It is clear that when we live according to God our mind should be intent on 
his invisible things and thus progressively be formed from his eternity, truth and charity." 
120Qill, 1.2.3. 
121mn.IV.3. 
1222nl. 1.2.3. 
t23Wl., XI.22. 
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entire thought124, The assumption of an underlying harmony is obviously a major positive factor 
in a theological system that would hope to unify the self. Once we allow for real, autonomous evil 
in the self we must either aim at a unity that involves disowning parts of the self, as the 
Manichees did, or else try to attempt some negotiated compromise or "symbolic" unity as we shall 
see that Jung does. 
Augustine shared his rejection of what we would call"natural evil" with the Stoics. Again, like the 
Stoics, he identifies the pursuit of happiness with the pursuit of virtue. Augustine thought that the 
only real evil is what we should call "moral evil". If things that we would think bad, such as 
sickness and death, can be seen as only a part of some wider divine purpose, then our true 
happiness does not reside in the avoidance of these misfortunes but in ethical conformity to the 
divine will.12S Augustine's quarrel with the Stoics is not that their single-minded pursuit of virtue 
is misguided but that their goal cannot be achieved without the assistance of divine grace.126 
Augustine would agree with the Stoics that one should pursue moral good and flee moral evil in 
disregard of adverse bodily consequences. But he claims his ethic to be superior to the Stoic ethic 
firstly in that God works within the person to enable virtue to develop, and secondly in that God 
offers the hope that the virtuous life will indeed be rewarded with happiness in the world to 
come.127 Whereas the Stoics claimed to unite happiness with virtue but (according to Augustine) 
failed, Augustine succeeds in uniting happiness with virtue in God's future 128. 
Some parts of this ontology and cosmology may be transported to a modem, secular outlook 
whereas others may not. Augustine's conviction that the world is fundamentally a good place and 
that virtue and happiness are related in some way still carries weight. Again, modern science 
proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the universe is an intelligible, ordered place. At 
present the search for unifying "theories of everything"~in~physics is-fashionable~and- the-notion~of 
relating everything to a first cause fits well with current cosmology .. But we would generally want 
a looser relationship between theology and the other disciplines than Augustine envisaged. 
Sometimes developments in s~irnce have proceeded in the teeth of theological opposition. We 
would also agree with the later Augustine against the earlier Augustine that the most learned 
people are not necessarily the most virtuous. Overall, our century allows for more diversity and 
for a less tightly ordered scheme than Augustine eqvisaged. 
Whatever we make of Augustine's ontology, if w' ask what it is about his "desire of God" that 
makes it a successful force for uniting the self, we may identify at least five of its leading 
124Milbank p390. 
12Sconttast Aristotle's ethics (Nic. Eth. p84) which argues that happiness resides in some 
combination of virtue and good fortune. 
126Wl02. 150.9. 
127m&.XN.25; XIX.20. 
128gy. XIX.4. 
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characteristics that, in any case, survive transportation to a modern, secular world-view. Firstly, it 
is a single, fundamental drive and is not set in opposition to any other equally powerful drives. 
Secondly, it is a principle that is capable of being sustained. It is not exhausted by a conclusion 
early in life, nor as it applicable only to those at a certain stage in life or in certain situations, but 
it envisages a life-long project. Thirdly, it explicitly addresses many aspects of the self including 
the affections, the intellect and the moral sense. Fourthly, it is other-directed and therefore does 
not risk narcissism. Fifthly, it assumes the underlying, if damaged and fallen, harmony of the 
natural order and regards conflict as a secondary rather than a primary facet of reality. 
fi, The Desjre gf Ggd Fulfilled in the Order of Cacitqs 
In Neo-Platonic fashion, Augustine describes how the coming to be of humanity in the image of 
God has three moments129. Firstly, people are created out of matter. In this state humanity is 
formless. To the extent that humanity has being it is good, yet to the extent that it lacks form it 
tends to dissolution and darkness. Form is imposed through, secondly, humanity being recalled to 
God. The person must undergo conversion, understood as a turning around to face God. Only as 
someone responds to the call of the divine Word does he receive coherence and unity. So begins 
the third moment, the formation of the image of God in humanity. 
Augustine describes this threefold movement in explicitly scriptural terms in Bk. XIV of ~ 
Trinitate. Humanity was made in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1 :26), but this image has 
been deformed throu~ jnordinate desire for worldly goods. The image is "re-formed" in those 
who turn back to God &Jld away from the world (Rom 12:2). Renewal does not happen in this 
single moment but is a matter of continual formation, of "daily advances whereby the soul is 
made anew" (2 Cor 4:1~). Prqgress consists in the transfer of love from temporal things to the 
eternal.--from the-visillle-to the-intelligible, from-the-carnal-to the spiritual. In all-this,- success 
depends on divine assis~ce (Jn 15:5). Full transformation will only be achieved in the world to 
come (1 Jn 3:2). 
Transformation is more particularly a matter for the rational mind or inner self. Human beings 
discern the divine image in their remembering, understanding and loving of themselves. However, 
in fallen humanity these functions have been disturbed. The fallen self has ·tost the capacity to 
value itself truthfully and justly. This capacity cannot be reg~ed from within the selfs own 
resources. Rather, to regaln true relations with itself, the mind must look beyond itself to God 
who is the source of right standards of truth and justice. Through an inCreased understanding and 
129~XII and XIII. The threefold process is summarised in XIII.ii.2 and XIII.iv.5: "Formless 
things are dependant on your Word. It is only by that same Word that they are recalled to your 
Oneness and receive form. From you, the One, the supreme GoOd they have their being and are all 
'very good' ... You made [the creation] ... from the fullness of your goodness, imposing control and 
converting it to receive form." 
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loving of Ood the self may regain knowledge of the divine standards of truth and justice and so 
learn how to value and love itself properly. At the eschaton a person will see God face to face, 
that is he will remember, understand and love him perfectly. The mind will then know what it is to 
remember, understand and love in perfect accordance with divine truth and justice. This state will 
correspond to the perfection of the divine image in humanity, that is the selfs truthful and just 
remembering, understanding and loving of itself. "We shall be like him because we shall see him 
as he is" (1 Jn 3:2).130 
The long and slow positive transformation of the mind corresponds to the progressive degradation 
of the body through ageing. This might have tempted the earlier and more strongly Platonist 
Augustine to regard the body as a mere hindrance to the formation of the self. But the mature 
Augustine of de Trinitate Bk. XIV makes the point that, insofar as a person is conformed to the 
image of the divine Sonlll, he shares in the death and resurrection of the body.132 The person 
who has kept faith in Christ, who has continued to make steady progress in inner renewal, will get 
back his body at the end of the world, "not for punishment but for glory"133, The present mortal 
body which is subject to weakness, corruption and dishonour will be transformed into a strong, 
incorruptible and glorious body.134 
Importantly, the mature Augustine also took a positive view of the passions. Here he disagreed 
strongly with the Stoics. Augustine could not recommend apatheia; indeed he says "who would 
not judge this insensitivity to be the worst of all moral defects?"135 It is not desire which 
Augustine rejects but only disordered forms of desire. Where the Stoics took the passions to be a 
kind of intellectual sickness, Augustine takes them to be expressions of the will. Evil resides not 
in the passions as such but in the faulty orientation of the will. "[The] right kind of life exhibits all 
[the]-emotions in the-right-way, and a misdirected life-in a misdirected-way!'136 Brown aptly 
reflects Augustine's "high" view of the emotions in his comment that for Augustine "the life of 
feeling was what really counted in personal growth."137 The person who has attained a relatively 
high level of growth will be one who desires etemallife,fears sins and temptation, feels gladness 
in good works and experiences grief in his own shortcomings aqd failings.138 Augustine goes on, 
in CiLY of God XIV, to list a whole range of emotions with examples of how they are to be 
approved inasmuch as they spring from a love of the good and from holy charity. 
130uin. XIV.2lff. 
131Notwithstanding that the general argument and originality of mn.lies in its preference for a 
trinitarian over a Christie imago Dei. 1lln!n. XIV.24. 
133.trin. XIV.23. 
134mn. XIV.2s. 
135kill. XIV.9 (p565). 
136s;iy. XIV. 9; cf. Aristotle Nic. Eth. p 101. 
137Brown (1969) p 170. 
138kill. XIV.8 and 9. 
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There is, however, a disjuncture between the kind of "emotional wholeness" that can be achieved 
on this earth and that to be experienced in the world to come. In the latter there will be nothing to 
cause grief or pain and these emotions will cease, but in this world grief and pain may reflect 
praiseworthy charity towards our fellow human beings. So Augustine says: "Complete exemption 
from pain, whilst we are in this place of misery, is certainly as one of the literary men of this 
world expressed it, 'a piece of luck that one has to pay a high price for; the price of inhumanity of 
mind and insensitivity of body"'139. The morally praiseworthy person will exhibit not just those 
emotions which are to be found in heaven but also those which are symptoms of the brokenness 
of the world. Here Augustine may be contrasted with the humanist psychologists we shall meet in 
chapter 6, where the darker human emotions seem to find little place in the life of the healed 
individual. 
Augustine thus describes the resurrection life as one in which the desire of the mind is fulfilled in 
eternal contemplation of God, the desire of the body is fulfilled in incorruptibility, and the 
emotions are each experienced in appropriate ways. This will be a state of supreme order, with the 
soul ordered under God and the body ordered under the soul. God is accorded the supreme rank, 
the self and other human soul's are ranked equally below God, whilst the body and external 
material goods are ordered under the soul. An attitude of mastery over the body was seen by 
Augustine as a neces~ and good component of the divine order. 
Whilst the fulfilment of the desire of God seems to entail the fulfilment of all the person's other 
legitimate desiJl'&, Augustine has a less than full-blooded commitment to fulfilling the desires of 
the body. Undou~tedly his notion of "ordering" the body does grant the body real value. In his 
mature writing-hris-far-from the- active dislike of the body-preached-by-the Manichees and has 
moved beyond the austere tolerance of the body characteristic of Neo-Platonism. One could not 
say of the later Augustine, as Porphyry said of Plotinus that he "seemed ashamed of being in the 
body"140. But he was sufficiently influenced by a doctrine of the fall and by Stoicism as to grant a 
very low value to bodily pleasure. Burnaby comments that, whilst he could sometimes maintain a 
more liberal view as a teacher, Augustine had, for himself, "a profound distrust of all natural 
pleasures which he was little concerned to disguise" 141. This is, I think, well illustrated by his 
attitude to the use of music in the worship of God. 
At one point in his Confessions Augustine recalls how he was profoundly affected by the 
antiphonal hymnody at Milan: "How I wept during your hytnns and songs! I was deeply moved by 
the music of the sweet chants of your church. The sounds flowed into my ears and the truth was 
139~XIV.9. 
l40"Qn the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of his work" in Introduction to the Enneads p 1. 
141Bumaby (1938) pllS. 
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distilled into my heart. This caused the feelings of devotion to overflow. Tears ran, and it was 
good for me to have that experience."l42 Yet he later expresses suspicion about uninhibited 
delight in sacred music. He thinks that the power of music is only legitimate when it is used in 
conjunction with appropriate words. Moreover, he is anxious not to give more honour to the 
I 
melody than to the words. Music, he thinks, reflects all the diverse emotions of the soul. But 
because it acts as a mirror to all the different parts of the person it carries the possibility of the 
lower sensual parts of the person gaining precedence over the higher rational parts. So he says: 
"But my physical delight, which has to be checked from enervating the mind, often deceives me 
when the perception of the senses is unaccompanied by reason, and is not patiently content to be 
in a subordinate place. It tries to be first and to be in the leading role, though it <Jeserves to be 
allowed only as secondary to reason. So in these matters I sin unawares, and only afterwards 
become aware of it." 143 He now thinks that he has made moral progress by allowing himself to be 
moved by the words and not by the melody144. He contrasts the "danger" of pleasurable 
enjoyment of music with music's "use" value in leading one to appreciate the words. Sensual 
pleasure is of no value in its own right, and may even be harmful, but is only of value inasmuch as 
it points beyond itself to a higher rational delight. Augustine is suspicious of sensual pleasure in 
even as spiritual an activity as praising God. 
When Augustine's desire of God is completely fulfilled it loses its element of lack and becomes 
pure caritas. Love as pure caritas is not a striving, dynamic quality but is characterised by repose, 
contemplation and changelessness145. Pure Caritas represents a state of bonding to God in which 
the human substance takes on the characteristics of the divine substance: "When it [the self] 
totally cleaves to him it will be one spirit"146. Augustine sometimes spoke of this state in tenns of 
deification, but in the carefully considered argument of de Irinitate he maintains a clear 
distinction~between the nature of-God-and-the~nature-of-humanity. God is etemally-fully~formed 
divine substance. Humanity in a state of p~rfection is also fully formed, and to this extent like 
. . l 
God. But it was formed within history and to this extent is less than God. People may enjoy the 
simplicity and unity of the divine state but. tn view of their past histories, are not thus divine.147 
Augustine is not afraid to describe the state of perf~ct caritas in strikingly physical imagery: 
"Let there spring up in you this affecti9n .. .let h come to such strength that you also may say 
from the whole heart 'My soul has been glued on behind thee'. Where is that same glue? The 
142£2Df, IX.vi.l4. 
143~. X.xxiii.49. 
144&.QJ]f. X.xxxiii.SO. 
145d!L. XIV.9; XII.30. 
146ttin. XIV.20. 
147llin XV.26. 
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glue itself is love. Have thou love, wherewith as with glue thy soul may be glued on behind 
God. Not with God, but behind God; that he may go before, thou mayest follow."l48 
In this condition the will of the individual is perfectly submitted to the will of God. It is not that 
either, on the one hand, the individual loses his identity in God or that, on the other hand, the 
individual becomes divine. Rather the individual is fixed in a perfectly ordered state of 
dependence upon God. His sole activity is the praise of God, and he lives in a state of delight 
arising from the rational contemplation of the divine beauty. In contrast to his earlier restlessness 
he enjoys an eternity of perfect rest149. For Augustine the "glue" which binds the individual to 
God is the Holy Spirit He thought that the self reaches its goal inasmuch as it is completely fused 
into the unity conferred by the divine Spirit. ISO Augustine identifies the order of caritas with the 
order conferred by the Spirit 1St. 
However, I want to quibble with the strong identification that Augustine makes between the order 
of caritas and the order conferred by the divine Spirit. Augustine's notion of a static, "adhesive" 
goal for our spiritual development is unattractive to modern readers, and does not accord very 
well with the insights of the psychologists that we shall meet in the following chapters. Moreover, 
a biblical understanding of what it might be to be filled with the divine Spirit reveals that there 
could be dimensions to this state which are not envisaged by Augustine's static order of caritas. 
For the biblical understanding of Spirit is rooted in the Old Testament ruach, a word whose basic 
meaning is the power inhering in breath or a gust of wind.152 The opening reference to ruach in 
Genesis 1:2 describes the Spirit as "moving" or "hovering" over the face of the waters, and the 
verb used is from an Ugaritic root that describes the soaring of an eagle153. Caritas is hardly an 
equivalent for this kind of Spirit, not ·least because caritas is a static quality whereas ruach is 
~essentially dynamic. Moreover, ~~me of-the plain~tlleological-senses-of-ruach is-"the~inexhaustible 
power of the divine life"1S4, an4 the effect of the divine ruach on people is to raise them to new 
levels of strength, either literally (Judg~s 14:6) or metaphorically (2 Chron. 2:29; Isaiah 11:2). To 
be filled with ruach might suggest a conditfon of increasing energy rather than an approximation 
; 
to a more perfect state of rest. A modem u~derstanding of the selfs goal might do well to take up 
148m...f5. LXII.13. 
149Q.u.. XXII.30. 
tsoso he speaks of "the Holy Spirit who dwells in the saints, in those, namely, whom the glowing 
flame of love has fused together into the one Dove whose wings are covered with silver .. :•t50 (sm. 
XCVIII.S.) 
tSl Cf. Burnaby's comment (p173): "No part of Augustine's trinitarian doctrine has had a more 
profound effect or more lasting influence upon Christian thought than his 'appropriation' of the 
divine love to the Holy Spirit" 
152See Emn: Vol. III p118 on ruach as background to NT pneuma and cf. Dani6lou's comment: 
"What do we mean when we speak of 'spirit' and that 'God is spirit'? ... If we are speaking Hebrew 
we are saying that God is a storm and an irresistible force." (Quoted in Congar 1983 Vol. 1 p4.) 
t53Westermann (1984) p107. 
1S4Eichrodt (1961) p215. 
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the view of Augustine's Cappadocian contemporary Gregory of Nyssa that the soul does not so 
much aspire to a state of beatific changelessness as find itself ever rising beyond itself in 
perfection to discover new goods.1ss We might thus take the unity conferred on the self by this 
kind of Spirit to be a more dynamic form of unity than the static order of caritas, and I shall 
explore this in my final chapter. 
155Life of Moses 1,5-10. 
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through Psychoanalysis 
l. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I described the sense of self given to us by Augustine, the theologian who 
inaugurated some of the most distinctive aspects of the modern identity. I have suggested that 
Augustine's thought contributes to the first of the three moral sources by which the modern self is 
constructed, namely the theistic source. In this chapter I turn to Sigmund Freud, who stands 
within a tradition of thought that sees the self as constituted by its adherence to rational norms, 
the second of the "sources of significance" by which our modern identity is formed. Here I 
describe how the sense of self given to us by Augustine is deepened and enlarged by Freud's 
model of the psyche. I attempt to show how Freud's theory of the unconscious poses difficult 
questions for the task of uniting the self through rational self-mastery and discuss how far Freud 
thought that these problems could be overcome. 
A central argument of this chapter is that Freud does not lend unambiguous support either to 
those, like Lacan, who see in psychoanalysis a means of freeing us from the centred self, or to 
those, like the later Foucault, who see psychoanalysis as a means for increasing the possibilities 
for controlling and masterin-g the self. Oi..-the one hand~ -arid particularly in his early work, Freud 
sees the unconscious as a region with its own non-rational rules and its own needs that the 
conscious self can only tame to a small degree. On the other hand, and particularly in his later 
work, he sees psychoanalysis as offering real, though never total, possibilities for gaining control 
over one's self. Again his basic conception of the psyche as a battleground between a pair of 
competing instincts militates against the possibilities of feelings of psychological peace and 
wholeness. However, he also operates with a single notion of a psychic energy that underlies the 
instincts and which, if he had developed it further, could have given a firmer psychological basis 
for securing the unity of the self. 
2. Freud; Pbysiolo&ist or Psycholo&ist? 
It has often been assumed that Freud's properly psychological theories date from his contact with 
Charcot, whom he studied under in Paris in 1885, or from Breuer, the physician with whom he 
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published Stydies in HysJeria in 1895.1 However, as Ernest Jones insists2, the principles on which 
Freud constructed his psychological theories were essentially those he had acquired as a medical 
student under the physician Ernst Briicke. Freud said of Brticke that he was "the greatest authority 
that worked upon me"3. A proper understanding of Freud's psychology must therefore begin with 
his earlier more medically-orientated work in neurology and physiology. 
Freud set out his own neurophysiological and partly neuroanatomical model of the mind in his 
1895 Project for a Scientific Psycholo~y. referred to hereafter as the ~. In this work Freud 
attempts to ground psychological processes directly in "quantitatively determinate states of 
specifiable material panicles"4• Freud's material panicles are the neurones discovered by 
Waldeyer in 1891. These, however, are of less interest than the "quantitative states" which Freud 
labels "Q". He describes Q in two main ways. Firstly, he talks of Q in a state of flow; for example 
"neuronal excitation iDa state of flow" (SIU p296), "current" (p298) or "passage of excitation" 
(p300). Secondly he talks of a more static form of Q, for example, "a cathected neurone filled 
with Q" (p392). Q is the direct forerunner of what Freud will later call "psychic energy". 5 
Freud proposes that the psyche works according to a "principle of inertia". According to this 
principle, which is similar to what biologists call the law of homeostasis, the organism reacts to an 
external stimulus by endeavouring to return to a state of equilibrium in which Q falls to zero. The 
simplest means by which the organism can eliminate an external stimulus is through flight. There 
are, however, internal stimuli (what Freud will later call instincts - Trieben), such as hunger, 
respiration and sexuality, which originate in the needs of the body itself. The organism cannot flee 
from these latter but must act on external reality to satisfy them. For this it requires an internal 
supply of Q. His (modified) principle of psychic inertia therefore states that the organism reacts to 
maintain Qat that constant. low level which is consistent with meeting bodily needs;- -
The science of physiology has, of course, developed enormously since the late nineteenth century 
and Freud's simple model of a brain which attempts to reduce stored Q to a minimum is largely 
obsolete. Nonetheless, within the context of his own life-work, Freud's physiology remained of 
abiding significance. As the ,Sg editors comment, the ~ "haunts the whole series of Freud's 
theoretical writings to the very end"6. Freud was, in due course, forced to give up his relation of 
lSee, for instance, the rather too clear distinction made by Peter Gay between Freud's early 
"psychology for neurologists" and his main "psychology for psychologists" (Gay 1988 p80 et. al.). 
2Jones (1964) p65. 
3Quoted in Gay (1988) p33. Brticke's influence has not always been fully recognised. Thus, for 
example, Alasdair Macintyre's entry on Freud in Encyclopaedia of Philosgphy does not mention 
Briicke's name. 
4
.s.E..I p295. 
Sso Wollheim (1991 Ch. 2) and Solomon's contribution to Ed. Wollheim (1977), and somewhat 
against theSE ~tors (,Sg I "Appendix C: The Nature ofQ".) 
6.sJil p290. ' 
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psychology to brain structure because of lack of progress in the latter, but he never renounced the 
connection between the two. He always hoped that research into brain function might ultimately 
vindicate his psychology.7 Freud's physiology would obviously not be taken seriously by 
contemporary neurologists, but it remains the implicit theoretical structure within which the later 
Freud interprets his cfuucal ddta. 8 His physiology therefore 'remains important for a proper 
understanding of his later psychology - the work for which he is still taken seriously. 
3. Freud's Tbeot)' of Instincts 
Freud repeatedly emphasised that instinct was the most important element in psychological 
research.9 Yet he also found the instincts difficult and obscurelO, and Freud's theory of instincts 
remains one of the most problematic aspects of his work. The difficulty is compounded by the 
inadequacy of our English word "instinct" as a translation for Freud's Trieb. The English word, in 
its biological sense, means something like "flXed and innate determinant of behaviour"11• By 
contrast, it was of the essence of Freud's Trieben that they were dynamic and suffered learned 
modifications. Moreover Trieb has an energetic quality, as Freud says: "Every instinct is a piece 
of activity"12. We can best understand Freud's instincts if we consider them to be forms of 
psychic energy rather than innate responses to environmental demands. They are, I suggest, in 
succession to, and find their physiological grounding, in the description of energy or Q given by 
Freud in his~· 
An instinct makes itself felt through an increase in psychic tension. Successful meeting of an 
instinctual need corresponds to a flow of energy which is experienced by the ego as a source of 
pleasure. We might say that instincts are forms of stored energy - a notion that was literally true 
for Freud but might still be a useful analogy for us. Like the electrical energy stored in a battery, 
they set up-a-potential difference -or-tension in the psyche. The response-of-the -psyche to this 
tension is to initiate an activity which drains the energy from the instinct and reduces psychic 
tension. 
Freud runs into trouble in his attempt to cJassify the instincts. In his most sustained attempt at 
explaining the instincts, the 1915 paper "The Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (SE m}, he 
suggests and then discounts the idea that the instincts might be distinguished according to the 
mental qualities (sensations or affects) that they gene~ate. Instead he proposes, though as "merely 
1Cf. his comment in the centrally important paper on The Uncopscious (X!Y 120) that he had 
given up discussions of brain structure ''for the present". 
Bso Solomon op.cit. p28. 
9~,34;~. 118;~. 117. 
lOXIY 118, XX!194. 
llSo de Sousa in ed. Wollheim (1917) p200. 
l2XJY 122. 
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a working hypothesis"13, that they fall into two groups, the ego instincts and the sexual instincts. 
He suggests that biological grounding for the distinction may be found in the former's reference to 
self-preservation and the latter's reference to the trans-personal continuance of the species. 
Freud's tentativeness presumably arises because he himself had already undercut this distinction 
between personal and trans-personal instincts in his 1914 paper "On Narcissism", where he had 
proposed that the sexual libido could be directed inwards towards the self in the form of "ego-
libido". 
In his post World War I work Freud remained committed to a dualistic theory of instincts for 
clinical and theoretical reasons. The cases of his patients convinced him that conflict is endemic 
to the mind; and the basic psychoanalytic concept of repression seemed to require a duality in 
mental functioning. But Freud now found that the form of this conflict was better expressed by 
opposing the erotic drive not to an ego-drive but to aggression. Freud had always been aware of 
forces of aggression within his own psyche. For example, his letters to Fliess disclose his own 
childhood death wishes towards his brother and his cruel treatment of his niece14. An interesting 
autobiographical comment reveals his awareness of the opposed forces of love and aggression 
within his own self: "My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an intimate friend 
and a hated enemy. I have always been able to provide myself afresh with both of them ... "15. 
Moreover, in his 1905 Three esws on sexuality he had explored the phenomenon of sexual 
cruelty16. But the carnage of the war and the death of his favourite daughter Sophie greatly 
heightened his awareness of destruction and death.t7 He would later wonder how it was that he 
had taken so long to grant a stronger role to primary aggression: "I can no longer understand how 
we have overlo9ked the unambiguity of non-erotic aggressivity and destructiveness and can have 
failed to give it its due place in our interpretation of life."ts 
Freud worked out the concept of the death drive in his 1920 Beyond the Pleasure Principle. He 
sets out there his evidence that human behaviour is sometimes motivated by a desire which is 
"beyond" simple satisfaction of erotic desire. In particular he was struck by forms of behaviour, 
notably compulsive repetitive actions, which seemed to him to indicate a pressure for the 
restoration of an earlier, organic state of things. He saw this drive towards death manifested 
psychologically in phenomena such as masochism, guilt and the need for self-punishment19. 
When turned outwards he saw it satisfied in sadism, wanton destructiveness and war.20 Freud's 
13XJY 124. 
14Masson (1985) p268. 
t5y 483. 
16YU192ff. 
17Ref. Gay (1988) pp390-403. 
l8XXI.120. 
t9XXW243. 
20XXI 121 and his letter to Einstein entitled "Why War?" in Pencuin freud Library 12 p349ff. 
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final picture (as given, for example, in the posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis) is one of a 
psyche charged with the "total available energy of Eros" pitted against the destructive tendencies 
of the thanatos instinct. 21 
But the clinical evidence for the death instinct was, frankly, slim and has failed to convince many 
in the psychoanalytic community.22 Whilst human aggressiveness, whether turned inwards 
towards the self or outwards towards others is not in doubt, it is unclear what it means to talk of 
an instinct towards death that is directly comparable to the erotic drive. Freud indeed concedes 
that "we are without a term analogous to 'libido' for describing the energy of the death instinct"23, 
It might be better to conceive of the tendency of things to return to inorganic states as a kind of 
background against which the various manoeuvres of the erotic drive are played out, not as a 
drive which is directly opposed to eros. In this case, if eros is pictured as an energetic principle, 
the tendency towards death is better described not as an energetic principle but as an entropic 
principle. The triumph of death marks a final reduction of psychic energy (or Q) to zero and a 
maximisation of psychic entropy. On this basis, human life may be understood as a play between 
the possibilities of positive energy on the one hand and the tendency to a levelling of energy on 
the other. 
Freud thus always ostensibly operated with a duality of instincts, whether the duality was the ego 
and libido instincts of his early work, the ego-libido and object-libido of "On Narcissism", or the 
Eros and Thanatos of his later work. His final position on a duality of instincts was unambiguous: 
"Only by the concurrent or mutually opposing action of the two primal instincts - Eros and the 
death instinct - never by one or the other alone, can we explain the rich multiplicity of the 
phenomena of life."24 However, his attempt to classify the instincts into two fundamental kinds 
was-always problematic, and he was-never able- to-develop the non-libidinal pole-of-his instinct 
pairs (be it ego or Thanatos) to anything like the extent he developed the libido instinct. The 
reason for these difficulties, I dlink, i~ that Freud's model, though he never conceded it, was in 
essence a monistic one. His m<K~Fl of ~e psyche is an energetic one, and he envisaged, at bottom, 
only one kind of psychic energy pf wblch all the instincts are varying manifestations. 
Freud's insistence on a duality of instincts ~an. I think be traced to two motives. Firstly, Freud's 
theory assigned primary importance to psychic tension, repression and so on. Freud rightly 
thought that these phenomena pre-supposed the existence of opposing instincts. But it does not 
follow that such instincts should be fundamentally opposed. For, if this were true, it is difficult to 
see what would hold the self together. 
21xxiu 149. 
22R.ef. Gay (1988) pp390-403 op. cit. 
23XXW,t50. 
24XX1ll243. 
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The second motive is the polemical one shared by Freud and his supporters25 against those who, 
following Carl Jung, charged Freud with "pan-sexualism". The easiest way of responding to this 
charge was, and is, to point to Freud's enduring duality of instincts. Freud could say that he 
always allowed that some phenomena were caused by non-sexual factors; he did not reduce 
everything to libidinal attachments. But it was always a weak duality in which only one pole was 
seriously explored. Jung broke away from Freud in 1913, championing a single non-sexual 
libidinal energy, and the two men became bitter enemies. One can only speculate that had Jung 
not broken away on this issue Freud might have responded to the crisis in his instinct theory 
depicted in the 1914 "On Narcissism" in a different way from the dualistic proposal of an ego-
libido and an object-libido. Freud might have developed the notion of libido as psychic energy 
more thoroughly had his rival Jung not made this idea his own and used it as a central means of 
distinguishing his position from Freud's. 
The generation and release of psychic tension is better understood, and consistent with Freud's 
own underlying theoretical framework, by analogy with the storage and flow of energy. The 
opposing forces present in the psyche are best taken as consequent on this. One can envisage 
some form of psychic energy, not necessarily understood in Freud's literal sense, but perhaps in a 
more metaphysical or spiritual way, as providing the basic quality that engenders psychic unity. 
Certain configurations of this energy (what Freud refers to as stored energy) could generate the 
phenomena of psychic tension. The fullness of human life might be represented by the 
possibilities of the play of flows of energy, whilst the inverse of this - the cessation of energy 
flows - corresponds to the absence of possibilities manifested in death. 
41 -The Libido-lnstipct- -
The libido is far and away the most important instinct Freud deals with and the only one he 
explores at length. In the bulk of Freud's work, and up to around 1920, he describes the libido 
instinct in rigorously and explicitly sexual terms. Wollheim26 very plausibly suggests Freud 
granted fundamental importance to sexuality amongst the instincts for four main reasons: its 
antiquity, traced by Freud back to infancy; its strength; its plasticity - the tendency for a wide 
range of human activities to become sexualised; and its proneness to maldevelopment. But Freud 
surely also had polemic and rhetorical intentions. For he saw sexuality as, "the humiliation of the 
highest possessions of civilisation"27. Talk of sex conveyed, and still conveys, a certain shocking 
honesty. Freud would continue to speak of sex where, he conceded, he could equally well have 
spoken about Eros. It was, he said, a matter of avoiding "faintheartedness"28. 
25E.g. Hall (1985) p58; Glover (1950) p56f; Wollheim (1991) p179ff. 
26Wollheim (1991) p123. 
27From "The Resistances to Psychoanalysis .. quoted in Rieff (1959) p148. 
28"Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego .. (in Penguin Yol. 12) p120. 
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In his early writings, Freud understood sexuality in a fairly traditional, narrow, sense, but greatly 
expanded the range of its causal effects. Thus in 1895 he made the shocking discovery that 
hysteria is caused "in every case" by premature sexual experience.29 Then, in 1897, in a move 
which remains controversial, he rejected the idea of child sexual abuse in favour of what would 
come to be his mature position that neurosis has its roots in infantile sexuality.30 He discovered 
that the perverse details of his own adult dreams related to forgotten memori~s from early 
childhood • a fact he was able to check by consulting those who could remember qis chilGlhoqd 
home. One theme revealed itself as having determinative significance for his adult dream life, 
namely his childhood love for his mother and jealousy of his father. This phenomenon, the 
"Oedipus complex", enabled him to understand the compelling psychological power of literature 
such as the Greek Oedipus Rex and Shakespeare's Hamlet, and he took it to be a universal feature 
of early childhood. The Oedipus complex, with its highly charged configuration of sexual desire, 
and ambivalence towards the same sex parent would become the central problem around which 
the psychoanalytic encounter would revolve. 
The discovery of the Oedipus complex paved the way for a significant extension of Freud's 
concept of libido. Once sexuality is understood to be rooted in childish desires of a perverse kind, 
it may now be seen as much more diverse than merely the normal genital relations between adults. 
Freud developed his concept of sexuality especially in The Three Essays on Sexuality of 1905 
where he introduced the distinction between the sexual "aim" and the sexual "object". Sexuality 
may deviate in terms of object (as with homosexuality or bestiality) or in terms of aim (as in 
sadism or fetishism). Sexuality in the infant is associated with a succession of particular parts of 
the body - the "erotogenic zones" - first the mouth, then the anus and then the genitals. Freud took 
it--that the mother's-breast was -the -first sexuaL~object~.- meeting the infant's_need_for _ oral 
pleasure. 31 A much wider range pf be~aviour than previously suspected could now be seen to be a 
' manifestation of the libido in~qnct. As Freud says, "in psychoanalysis the concept of what is 
sexual ... goes lower and also higlter thap its popular sense. n32. 
r ! 
A further crucial extension to freud's concept of the libido instinct came with his discovery 
(explained in the 1914 paper "On Narcissism") that a person may take himself as his own sexual 
object. He suggests that the infant exists in a state of "primary narcissism" with all his or her 
energy invested in the self. As the child develops, he or she invests energy in external objects at 
the expense of the self. The picture Freud uses is of an amoeba temporarily putting out 
29Masson (1985) pl41-155. 
30J.etter to Fliess of 21 Sep. 1897 in Masson p264f. 
31m 314 andxn! 87. 
32X!222. 
91 
Freud: Achieving Limited Self-Mastery Through Psychoanalysis 
pseudopodia.33 We may understand that the psyche consists of a finite quantity of energy which 
may be invested in some balance between itself and external objects. In the former case Freud 
talks of ego-libido and in the latter case of object-libido. Freud says that the highest phase of 
development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when a 
person's psychic energy is fully invested in another person.34 The highest stage of psychological 
development, what Freud terms the genital personality, is thus only achieved in relationship with 
another. 
After the first world war Freud recast his psychoanalytic theory with the publication of the three 
important works: Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Group Psycholo&y and the Analysis of 
the BiO (1921) and The E&o and the ld (1923). Freud now saw sexuality as an aspect of a more 
general life-force which he termed "Eros". The counterpart to the libido was no longer the instinct 
of self-preservation but the destructive Thanatos instinct. He now defined libido as follows: 
"Libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name the 
energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable), of 
those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love' .. .In its 
origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the 'Eros' of the philosopher Plato coincides 
exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis ... n35 
This definition has a double aspect. On the one hand it represents an extension of the ·libido 
concept to include all the phenomena of love. Freud lists here self-love, love for parents and 
children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and finally devotion to concrete objects and 
abstract ideas. In this sense the libido is now quite far from what we ordinarily think of as the 
sexual drive; it is-the-much broader life-force of-the-Platonic··Eros.But-on the other-hand, Freud-
also thereby redefines love in terms of sex. So, for example, he takes it that the "nucleus" of love 
is sexual love with sexual union as its aim. Psychoanalysis, he says, gives the love instincts the 
name of sexual instincts, "by re~n of their origin". 36 
How are we to take this? In its negative aspect Freud's equation could be taken as a reduction of 
love to sex. Such a reduction d~s nof make sense of our experience of the rich and variegated 
aspects of love. Love mar have !ieXUal components, but we surely do not experience all love as, in 
essence, sexual. Admiration, self-sacrifice, loyalty, patriotism, religious duty, are other 
components of love aqd will sometimes be the dominant components. If Freud wishes seriously to. 
allege that all these are at root sexual then he will indeed find it difficult to escape the charge of 
33XIY. 75. 
34X!Y. 76. 
35Penguin edition of "Group Psychology" (Vol. 12) p 119. 
36jbid. p120. 
92 
Freud: Achieving Limited Self-Mastery Through Psychoanalysis 
pan-sexualism. 3? I think the negative element of the equation is better seen as part of Freud's 
continuing polemic against human pretensions to a respectable, civilised. order. Freud was 
unremittingly critical of his own society: "We can only regard the highest civilisation of the 
present as disfigured by a gigantic hypocrisy"38. He never celebrates sexuality in the manner of 
D.H. Lawrence or ev~n' de Sade. Sexuality is simply the brute and unlovely reality of human 
existence: "the position of the genital organs - 'inter urinas et faeces' - remains the decisive and 
unchangeable factor"39. Freud is deliberately attempting to humiliate human nature and human 
society by bringing it down to its biological basics. 
In its positive aspect, the equation continues the exercise in correlating human psychology with 
physiology begun in the ~· The Platonic Eros is now related to the libidinal energy of the 
human psyche. Thus Freud will say that libido is the "manifestation" of the force of Eros.40 Love 
itself can now be understood as having an analogue, or even as having its roots, in the 
physiological and physical notion of energy. In theological terms, we may compare the traditional, 
Augustinian, notion that God the Holy Spirit is the principle of love, with the older Hebrew 
conception of the Spirit as energy. In both psychology and theology there are fruitful parallels 
between energy and love as the fundamental principles that build up life. 
Where Freud's final statement of the libido instinct is weak is in the moral levelling effect he 
introduces into all its manifestations. His libido is actually not the same as Plato's Eros, for Plato's 
Eros had more and less noble forms depending on its object. Plato's Eros, and following it, 
Augustine's desire, admits of moral distinctions. But all forms of Freud's libido are morally 
indifferent; we can merely say of them that they are more or less aim-inhibited. more or less 
sublimated. 
Now I think it is highly questionable whether anyone could construct a sense of self in the 
absence of any moral distinctions between different kinds of desire - and Freud himself certainly 
held to rigorous moral distinctions in his own life. Thus he once wrote in a personal letter, "I 
stand for an incomparably freer sexual life, although I myself have made very little use of such 
freedom: only in so far as I myself judged it to be allowable"41 . This sentence is hard to 
understand on Freud's own terms since it is not clear how his libido theory allows for any basis on 
which one could determine sexual activity as "allowable" or not. One could only make a rational, 
calculated decision as to what kinds of activity would result in the most pleasure. Yet this was 
clearly not how Freud lived. In his own life Freud exemplified a much higher level of moral 
37For a full refutation of this reductionist pqsition see Oilman (1983) Ch. 3 "Love and Sexuality". 
38Jones (1964) p429. 
39Xl215. 
4DTbe Question of Lay Analysis" XX. 265. 
41Leuer to Putnam of 1915 quoted in Jones p473. 
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conduct than his own theory seems to dictate. His letter continues, "Why I - and incidentally my 
six adult children also • have to be thoroughly decent human beings is quite incomprehensible to 
me." Indeed! His self-understanding could surely only be completed if he were to admit to some 
moral ordering of the different manifestations of libido. Freud's levelling of the forms of desire 
serves well his polemic against what he took to be a morally hypocritical society. But if his theory 
is to be adequate to meet the demands of life it will have to be strengthened through allowing 
some such moral ordering of desire as we saw in Augustine. 
S. The Eyolution of Freud's Structure of the Psyche 
Thus far we have focused on Freud's psychology from the perspective of what may be termed 
"energetics". We now turn to consider his model of the psyche from the perspective of structure. 
Freud is best known for his tri-partite psychic structure of id, ego and super-ego, and it is this 
which I intend to concentrate on. However, he did not arrive at this structure until his late 60s, 
with the publication in 1923 of The Eso and the ld, and it will be important for us first to trace the 
main steps by which his thought reached this final form. 
5.1 The Unconscious 
The unconscious was always linked in Freud's thought to the concept of repression42, An idea is 
repressed; it remains in the mind removed from consciousness and yet still operative; it may at 
some future time be readmitted to consciousness. This cycle enabled Freud to explain not merely 
neurotic forms of behaviour, but also a wide range of apparently unconnected psychic 
phenomena, such as dreams, slips of the tongue and jokes, that form part of what Freud called 
"the psychopathology of everyday life"43. 
Freud's -first; neurological, attempt at distinguishing- consciousness and unconsciousness was 
given in his 1895 ~·The next, still neurological, development of his theory is found in a 
letter to Fliess of 189644. Whilst the phenomenon of unconscious psychic processes was 
fundamental for Freud's subsequent Jnter,pretation of Dreams (1900), it was not until 1912 that 
Freud presented a systematic account of th~ unconscious in a paper given to the London Society 
for Psychical Research. An expanded vers~on of this statement is given in his 1915 paper "The 
Unconscious" as part of a series of "Papers on Metapsychology". The series on metapsychology 
may well be the most important of all Freud's theoretical writings45, and the paper on the 
unconscious is the culmination of this series. Its contents bear directly on my theme, and I will 
therefore now discuss some of its leading arguments. 
42XIY,15. 
43Cf. his 1901 work of the same name. 
44Masson (1985) p207ff. 
4Sso SE editors. 
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Meumsycholg&ical PAW go "The Unconscious" 
Freud begins the paper% by rhetorically asking whether I should infer the existence of my own 
unconscious in the same way as one infers the existence of consciousness in other people. This 
would involve me saying that all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself but do not 
know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to 
someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. This 
procedure would, it seems, lead to the assumption of another, second consciousness which is 
united in my self with the consciousness I know. Freud offers three specific criticisms of this 
assumption. Ftrstly, the notion of an unconscious consciousness seems to cause even more 
philosophical confusion than the postulate of an unconscious per se. Secondly, since the psychic 
processes we infer seem to enjoy a high degree of mutual independence we must logically be 
prepared to assume the existence of a third and a fourth consciousness, and so on without limit 
Thirdly, the attributes of the psychic processes which analysis reveals are not at all the same as 
the attributes of consciousness with which we are familiar. Freud therefore concludes that the 
process of inferring the existence of the unconscious is not the same as inferring the existence of 
consciousness in an other person. Nor does the phenomenon of the splitting of consciousness, as 
in schizophrenia, militate against Freud's view. For in this case we do not have the existence of a 
second consciousness but a splitting of the mental activities of the one consciousness into two 
groups, to each of which <;:onsciousness turns its attention in turn. 
Freud's proposal of an unconscious realm of the psyche clearly discounts the assumption of 
"multiple selves" in the psyche. The Freudian unconscious cannot be considered as "another self' 
whose existence is to be inferred in the same way that one infers the existence of the selves of 
other individuals. Freud would rather say that within the one mind there exists a region that is 
conscious-and a further-region that mind-is-not-conscious of~ The unconscious-does not -function 
according to the rules that I nonpatly assoc;ate with my conscious self. But it is still a part of my 
own self, for it is associated with my own brain and my own body. It covers aspects of myself to 
which I stand in a special relation, su~h as a chip on the shoulder or an obsessive desire. It can 
frustrate my conscious goals. It may ~ experienced as a pull towards a centre in myself that I do 
not recognise. But there is nothing in Qle wtuch stands in the same, clearly distinct, relation to my 
self as the selves of other people do. In this central work Freud thus does not envisage the radical 
de-centring of the self or the existence of multiple selves in the ways suggested by Lacan and his 
followers. 
The question then arises as to how I may know about the unconscious if I cannot infer its 
existence in the same way as I infer the existence of my own or another's consciousness. The 
answer, says Freud, is that knowledge of it is gained empirically. I use my sense organs to gather 
46XIY. 169ff. 
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data about the unconscious in the same way as I gather data about the external world in general. 
This suggests it will be easier for me to gain information about the unconscious of other people 
than about my own unconscious. For the ability to treat my own psyche in a completely empirical 
way would seem to require an extraordinary degree of mental reflexivity and detachment Freud's 
own self-analysis, carried out after the death of his father and whose results are recorded in his 
In&emn;tation of Dreams. is a feat of this kind. But psychoanalysts have taken it that only Freud 
himself was capable of such an achievement; all his successors would need to be analysed by an 
other. 
Freud next returns to the description of the psyche as a set of systems that he had proposed in a 
letter of 1896 to Fliess. He suggests the psyche consists of two, or possibly three systems: the 
unconscious (the "Ucs."), the conscious ("Cs.") and possibly also the preconscious ("Pes"). He 
raises the question of whether the transition of an idea from the unconscious to the conscious 
really involves the writing out of a duplicate record in the mind, as he had suggested to Fliess (the 
"topographical hypothesis"), or whether it is represented by the idea moving from one region of 
the mind to another (the "functional hypothesis"). It is a question, he says, that could only finally 
be resolved anatomically. But unfortunately brain anatomy was not yet sufficiently developed to 
help. Therefore, he says, "our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with 
anatomy ... ln this respect, then, our work is untrammelled and may proceed according to its own 
requirements"47 (italics in the original). His systems of the mind will now be "no more than 
graphic illustrations", that is to say, they are now explicitly psychological rather than 
neurological. They cohere with neuroanatomy insofar as it was known to Freud, but now quite 
explicitly draw their evidence from psychoanalytic practice rather than brain science. 
He~now attempts to answer~his question concerning the movement ofideas from~the unconscious 
to the conscious with reference to psychoanalysis. He notes that the lifting of a repression is never 
achieved by the analy~t merely telling the patient the content of the idea. even when the analyst is 
certain that the idea is present in the patient's unconscious. This would, at first sight, support the 
"functional" model of psychic functioning. We inight suppose that what has happened is that a 
second record has been placed in the patient's consciousness but that the original record remains 
in the unconscious. What must, rather, be accomplished is the lifting of the repression and the 
moving of the original record into consciousness. But, says Freud, closer consideration shows that 
the "topographical" model might be equally valid. To have heard something and to have 
experienced it are two quite different things. According to this model, what has happened is that a 
second, conscious, record has been inserted into the patient's consciousness, but it is not a faithful 
translation of the unconscious record. 
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According to either model we have an interesting extension of the Augustinian notion of 
remembering oneself. Bringing an idea into consciousness which has been deliberately forgotten 
or repressed is not simply a matter of understanding some previously known concept or 
recollecting a piece of mislaid information about oneself. It is also a matter of bringing to mind 
the context and the feelings involved, in other words of "re-living", as we say, the experienced 
event. If I had access to a videotape that had recorded my life so far this would still not amount to 
a remembering of self. I would rather have to have to be able to recapture the emotions and 
relationships implicated in the recorded events; this would mean becoming an actor in the story 
rather than being a mere observer. In psychoanalysis this "re-living" is carried out by 
"transferring" the emotions from the original relationships onto the analyst. The transference 
facilitates a powerful form of remembrance in which emotions felt towards others, notably 
parents, are "worked through".48 
Freud says that the Ucs is made up of two components. Its nucleus consists of inherited mental 
formations - something analogous to instinct (instinkt) in animals. The Ucs represents the 
primitive element of the human psyche and in this respect may be compared with "an aboriginal 
population in the mind"49. The second component is made up of what is repressed or discarded by 
consciousness. Freud lists four characteristics of the system Ucs which distinguish it from 
consciousnessSO, each of which mark a significant increase in the range of psychic functioning 
compared with what we have observed in Augustine: 
1. Its contents exist side by side without being influenced by each other and are exempt from 
mutual contradiction. When two unconscious impulses whose aims appear to be contradictory 
become simultaneously active, they do not cancel each other out but combine to form an 
intermediate aim or compromise. Where-Augustine-had supposed-that the mind-was,-in its natural 
state, an ordered realm, Freud suggests that there are areas of the mind that do not operate 
according to even the most basic ordering principles. The unconscious is not a realm in which 
order has been overcome by disorder, 'so m'pch as a region that is in principle what we might call 
"non-ordered". 
2. Its processes are timeless; they are not ordered ~mporally and are not altered with the passage 
of time. Where Augustine had supposed that the phenomenon of time was integrally linked to 
processes of thought, Freud suggests there are re!Jions of the mind which do not distinguish the 
present from the recent or distant past. 
3. Its contents are highly mobile. In dreaming, for example, its contents are typically· altered 
("displaced") or combined ("condensed"). Where Augustine supposed that his dreams were quite 
48Xllt55f; XX t59f. 
49XIY 195. 
SOXIY 187. 
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straightforwardly linked to earlier sexual experience Freud proposes that the contents of dream~ 
life are fluid and related to their causes in highly convoluted ways. 
4. Its functioning is governed by the internal psychic demand for the reduction of tension (or 
demand for pleasure). It typically operates according to "wish~ fulfilment" and not by the demands 
and constraints of e'xtemal reality. Introspective though Augustine was, he never located 
psychical processes that were so interior as to operate without any reference to extra~psychic 
conditions. 
5.2 Early Notions of the Ego 
"Ego" is the SE editors'~ and now the standard- translation for Freud's "das lch". The Editors 
infonn us51 that Freud uses das lch in two senses, meaning: 
a) The person as a whole, including perhaps the body, in distinction from other people. This they 
suggest is equivalent to our word "self'. 
b) A particular part of the mind characterised by special attributes and functions. 
In the 1895 ~.and in the developed ego-psychology that is initiated with the 1923 Eso and 
llm.Jd, Freud nonnally uses the word in the second sense. In some intervening works, however, he 
uses it in the first sense. Self is, of course, a notoriously difficult word to define, but I take it that 
Freud's ego, in its much more common sense (b) refers to only a part of what we ordinarily mean 
by "self"52, Freud's ego refers to the self in its rational aspects; we might compare it with 
Augustine's mens. For Freud the ego is the "real me" or "true self'. 
After 1895 the ego is left unmentioned for 15 years while Freud focuses his efforts on explicating 
the unconscious regions of the psyche and on charting the progress of the libido instinct. It 
-reappears in 19tOS3;-when Freud beginno-explore-the-phenomenon of narcissism; -in-connection 
with the "ego-instincts" or self-preservative instincts (ego used in sense (a) above). In the 
imponant 1915 paper on "The Unconscious" what had been the ego became the system Cs and 
(possibly) the system Pes. This system is the progenitor of Freud's developed conception of the 
ego. It is very unfortunate that the paper in the metapsychological series entitled "On 
Consciousness" has been lost. We therefore lack Wl equivalent conceptual statement of the system 
Cs to that given by the paper "The Unconscious" on the system Ucs. Nevertheless the paper on 
"The Unconscious" gives some brief hints at its characteristics. He says the system Cs (or Pes) is 
responsible for setting up logical relations between different ideas, for giving ideas order in time, 
for testing ideas wtd wishes against the reality principle wtd for repressing wishes that fail to meet 
51 Introduction to The Ego and the Id S.E. XIX. 
52pace Oilman (1984) p106 who thinks it is more or less equivalent to our everyday notion of the 
self. 
53Xl214. 
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this principle.54 Thus the system Cs might be characterised above all as an ordering principle 
within the psyche. 
In this connection Freud re-iterates the distinction between the two states of psychic energy that 
he first made in the ~. He suggests that energy may either be bound or freely mobile, and 
that this distinction "represents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the 
nature of nervous energy"SS. He says a metapsychological presentation is "most urgently" called 
for on this point but does not yet feel able to engage in it. Whilst Freud does not quite explicitly 
say so, we could take it that the fundamental distinction between the system Cs and the system 
Ucs is that between bound and free energy. The latter is a realm of available energy, the former a 
realm in which energy is held within an ordered structure. 
The self may now be pictured as a dynamic disequilibrium between energy and structure. If it 
were entirely structure or maximum order, the Augustinian ideal, then the possibility of 
movement and change would be frozen out. On the other hand, if it were entirely free energy, or 
disorder, which seems to be the post-modernist position, this would in Freud's terms be nihilism 
and death. 
5.3 The EjW-ldeal 
In his 1914 paper "On Narcissism", Freud came to ask how it was that normal adults were not 
imbued with the high level of narcissistic self·love which characterised infants. One possible 
answer, which he considered but rejected, was that the whole of the child's self-directed ego-
libido was transferred onto external objects as the child grew. Instead he proposed a new psychic 
entity, the ego-ideal, and suggested that the ego-libido was transferred on to this. The ego-ideal 
consists-of-those cultural-and-ethical ideas that the subject has taken-as-his-or-her own; The ego 
may now be said to love itself not for its own sake, but to the extent that it meets the ethical ideal. 
Freud suggests there is an "agency", equivalent to our notion of conscience, that exists within the 
psyche to watch over the ego, to monitor how far it meets the ideal and to punish it for its failures. 
The e~o-ideal and the monitoring "agency" together form what Freud will, in the 1923 Ego and 
lbU!l. call the "super-ego". 
The notion of the ego-ideal invariably has negative overtones in Freud's writing. It is intimately 
linked to repression, for repression proceeds from the ego's attempts to preserve its own self-
respect in the light of the demands of the ideal. Freud would not have said that the ego should 
have no ideals. He was aware that if the ego remained charged with infantile narcissism the result 
in the adult would not be health but megalomania.56 He advocated a middle way between 
54XIY. 188. 
55Xl.Y188. 
56XIY93. 
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libertarianism and an over-rigid moral code.57 But, since Freud perceived his context as one of 
moral hypocrisy and not as one of unrestrained sexual license, it is unsurprising that his coverage 
of the ego-ideal is predominantly negative. 
The notion of an internal agency that watches over and disciplines the ego is one that gains 
powerful support from Foucault. It could be seen as voicing a deep criticism of certain forms of 
Augustinian self-love, where the self may only be loved insofar as it matches up to God's ideal, or 
where it is loved only for what it can become. But Augustine did also talk of a natural self-love, 
whereby the self loves and cares for itself on account of its natural goodness. This last kind of 
self-love would correlate with Freud's primary narcissism. The failure of the self to set itself 
within some wider moral context is Augustine's sin of "pride", and corresponds with Freud's 
megalomania. 
However, whatever comparisons we may draw between Freud and Augustine, they differ 
fundamentally on the relation of natural instinct to morality. Augustine thought that our bodily 
needs would be perfectly fulfilled if the body were properly subject to the soul and the soul were 
subject to the divine moral order. Freud opposed instinct to morality and supposed that greater 
obedience to the moral order meant less fulfilment for the instincts. Freud thought that this divide 
could partly be overcome through the sublimation of instinct in pursuit of higher moral goals, but 
sublimation could, he thought, only be tolerated to a limited extent. By proposing an intrinsic 
opposition between the demands of the ego-ideal and the instincts, Freud complicates the 
achievement of a unified sense of self. We can no longer unify the whole of the self behind some 
goal, whether the goal is the pursuit of pleasure or the moral good, for any goal is always achieved 
at the expense of some aspects of the self. 
6. Ereud's Fjnal Model of the Psyche 
Freud's fmal model of the psyche, and the one for which he is best known, is set out in his 1923 
Eio and the Id and is further developed in the third of his 1932 New Introductory Lectures. It 
then remains broadly the same right through to his posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis. There 
were two significant conceptual developments that caused Freud to revise his 1915 
metapsychology. The first, and more important, was the realisation that the ego could act 
unconsciously as an agent of repression. In other words the ego had unconscious components. 
The second, was the bringing together, of the ego-ideal and the monitoring "agency" in the single 
psychic region of the super-ego. "The super-ego, the ego and the id - these, then, are the three 
realms, regions or provinces into whicl} we divide an individual's mental apparatus. "58 I will begin 
57See Introductory Lectures (Penguin Vol. 1) p485f. 
ssxxun. 
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by describing Freud's conception of each of the three parts of the psyche, and then attempt to 
show how the self is created out of the interaction of the three. 
6.1 The Id 
Freud's description of the idS9 is in substantial continuity with his 191 S description of the system 
Ucs. The id is a region governed by the four principles of freedom from contradiction, 
timelessness, mobility of energy, and obedience to the pleasure principle. It is the "dark, 
inaccessible part of the personality" known only indirectly through its manifestation in dreams 
and neurotic symptoms. Moreover, the person experiences the id as something, a set of 
impersonal impulses and energies, to which he or she submits: the id escapes the rule of the will. 
Significantly, whereas for Augustine any part of the mind or body that was not subject to the will 
was defective and an indication of human fallenness, Freud tells us that independence from the 
will is a quite natural, morally neutral quality of parts of the mind. This is an obvious point in the 
light of modem physiological understandings of hormonal responses, reflexes, and so on. 
Freud says that the relation of the id to the ego is that of the untamed passions to reason and good 
sense. 60 This leads DUman to suggest that Freud's concept of the id partly coincides with older 
notions of "the flesh" or "the body".61 Oilman gives, as an example of an instinct taken up from 
the id into the ego, the transformation of lust into sexual love. There is some mileage in Oilman's 
comparison; the id is indeed closer to the bodily instincts than the ego. However, he risks lending 
Freud's id a negative moral evaluation which is not Freud's. For example, when Augustine 
considers the various meanings of "the flesh", he concludes that its psychological sense indicates 
moral "faults of the mind"62, But Freud's id, by contrast, "knows no good and evil, no morality"63, 
Freud's id is the-reservoir-of psychic-energy,instinct-and-passion. For Freud, the-will-gains its 
power only by being charged with the id's emotional energy. For Augustine, by contrast, the 
emotions were expressions of the conscious wiU. He thought that the will was at the very centre of 
! --' 
the human being, partaking of the life-force of the animus. But Freud's model fits better than 
Augustine's the contemporary ~If-identity. Modern people, with Freud, generally suppose that 
our emotional life has a certaip autonomy with regard to the will, and that our emotions spring 
from our "deep self'. 
Augustine conceived of lower and higher pQrtions of the mind according to the objects dealt with, 
not according to the divide between emotion and reason. Freud, by contrast, locates reason and 
59XX1173-80. 
OOXX!I76. 
61Di1man (1984 p105). 
6~XIV.2. 
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emotion in different pans of the psyche. Freud does not, however, go so far as Jung will do in 
proposing a complete dualism of reason and emotion. For Freud insists that the emotions as such 
do not exist within the id, only the passionate energy out of which they are formed. The discrete 
emotions are defined only by the ego's structuring of this energy. 
The notion of the id allows us to give form to the widespread, and characteristically modern, 
impression that the self has psychic "depth". To take just one example, we may now be able to 
articulate a deeper level of meaning in a well-worn phrase such as "the deceits of the heart". If we 
say that a preacher "speaks from the heart" we mean something to the effect that he or she speaks 
out of deeply ingrained convictions that are not conditioned by a sense of duty connected with the 
occasion of the delivery of the sermon. "Speaking from the heart" is belied by slips of the tongue 
or gestures that do not accord with the spoken message and which indicate to the attentive listener 
that the preacher's message does not accord with his or her deepest beliefs and feelings. 
Now this might indicate, at one level, a simple case of insincerity: the preacher's words are not a 
ttue reflection of his consciously held beliefs. But suppose the preacher steadfastly protests his 
sincerity? After Freud we would recognise a deeper level of psychic functioning explicable with 
reference to the id. The preacher may genuinely believe that he is wholly behind his message and 
yet still be wrong in this belief; there are, in fact, unconscious aspects of his personality that 
dissent from his conscious demeanour. We should not say that he is insincere but that he is self-
deceived; his ego is not in line with his id. Insincerity is a relatively simple phenomenon 
concerning the ego alone. But self-deception is explained in terms of the deeper disjunction 
between ego and id. Freud's model of the psyche enables us to picture the difference between 
I 
siplpl~ insincerity and more complicated self-deception in a powerful way. After Freud, the 
attainment of the unity of the self- musr involve--not-merely the -alignment of all-the conscious 
aspects of the mind but must also include strategies to identify and correct deeper and 
unconscious levels of self-deception. 
6.2TheEso 
Freud says that the ego is "that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and 
influence of the external world"64, a factor which is decisively important in its functioning. Firstly 
it defines the ego as the agent of perception. Secondly, it means that the ego is the region in which 
consciousness arises, although Freud will now say that not all of the ego is conscious. Thirdly, as 
the subject of intentional action in the world, it is that part of the psyche which attempts to act on 
the world to meet the individual's needs. Fourthly, it is the (only) region of the psyche which 
operates according to the reality principle. Fifthly, unlike the id, it registers contradictions and is 
characterised by a strong tendency to reconcile, unify and organise the forces acting upon it 
64XXU75. 
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Where the id's orientation is entirely to the present, the ego is especially concerned with 
calculating likely future consequences. 
Many of the functions of the ego arise in connection with the ego's relation to itself and to other 
parts of the mind, which I shall now discuss in tum. 
1. The ego may bestow libido on itself. This is the primary narcissism or self-love of the infant. 
As the child grows the ego projects its ego-libido on to the super-ego or onto ideal others65. The 
adult ego now gains self-esteem through behaviour in conformity with the ideal or through 
identification with an ideal figure or leader. Nonetheless, Freud indicates that the healthy ego 
must retain a certain degree of love for itself. We could see this as corresponding to the natural 
love of self commended by Augustine. 
2. Freud held that in relation to the super-ego the ego stands as the object of guilt and shame. 
Freud speaks of the ego as being driven, threatened and punished by the super-ego. Whilst this 
kind of self-punishment is no doubt a component of certain kinds of neuroses, his overwhelmingly 
negative construal of the ego's relation to its moral values is seriously inadequate as a description 
of mentally healthy people. On a significance-based view of selthood our values constitute us as 
persons; they do not so much punish us as "call us back to ourselves" or "put us in our right 
mind". At least part of the tension between the ego and the super-ego must therefore be taken as 
benevolent in character. Moreover, the experience of an overwhelmingly condemnatory set of 
moral values set over and against our rational selves is evidence, on a significance-based account, 
of a moral identity crisis. It is, perhaps, not so much the existence of the super-ego that engenders 
neurotic guilt ~ the super-ego's undue separation from the ego. Under normal conditions we 
expedence -moral promptings-as "our own!!_, not-merely as-the voice-of-some-internalised-other.-
Our standards and values routinely enter into all our actions and cannot, as Freud, thought, be 
neatly allocated to a separate component of the psyche. I suggest that, in line with Augustine's 
psychology, it is the separation of the ego from its moral values that is pathological. A distinct 
super-ego can only be thought of as a feature of neurotic personalities not of healthy ones. If 
Freud means to say that we are all more or less neurotic then we may agree with him. 
3. In relation to the id, the ego stands as the recipient of impulses, desires and dreams. What is in 
the id can only find its expression in consciousness through the ego. Occasionally the ego may 
find its autonomy limited thou~ id-ic urges leading to actions that are impulsive, compulsive or 
unintended. A complete take-oyqr of the ego by the id is manifested in the serious mental illnesses 
that we term psychoses. In the~~ cases the person loses contact with reality in favour of an inner 
65Ref. especially "Group Psyc~ology and the Analysis of the Ego" (Penguin Vol. 12). 
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world. But in non-psychotic states, the ego may influence the id, either through normal self-
control or through unhealthy repression of id instincts. 
6.3 The Super-Eso 
The super-ego, says Freud in a number of places, is "the heir to the Oedipus complex"66, It 
derives from a reversal of the little boy's hatred of his father into an identification with the father. 
Or, more precisely, the child attempts to conform to the moral standards laid down by the father 
and thus identifies with the father's super-ego. The super-ego in this way acts as the vehicle of 
moral tradition and authority. Where the id is orientated towards the present and the ego towards 
the future, the super-ego is orientated towards the past. 
In view of its aetiology in the Oedipus complex, Freud argues that the super-ego is closer to the id 
than is the ego. Diagramatically, he pictures it lying to the side of the ego, not above it, and 
having its roots stretching down into the id.67 This means that it has its own supply of energy 
independent of the ego and enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from the ego. 
The super-ego rarely carries positive connotations in Freud's work, although, in one place at 
leastfiB, he does refer to the "normal development" of the super-ego, and says it is characterised 
by the super-ego's having become "sufficiently impersonal". This would seem to be a pre-
figuration of Kohlberg's notion of a universal principle of justice as the highest stage of moral 
development. But this goal sits rather uneasily within Freud's psychology. For an impersonal norm 
is likely to be experienced as every bit as judgmental and condemnatory as a childhood father-
figure. Surely a better goal for the super-ego's development, in Freud's terms, would have to 
involve a more flexible, perhaps more relational, conception of moral growth. Moral sense is not 
necessarily more-developed by-~ing more impersonal. 
In general Freud saw himself developing a. theory of instinct, not a theory of ethics. He felt the 
latter had received ample attention from others. One result of this is that his portrayal of the 
super-ego as the moral agency within the self is very limited. If we are to gain a convincing 
account of the selfs moral dimensions we shall need to look beyond Freud. 
6.4 The Ouestion of the Self 
As we noted above (Section 5.2), there is a certain ambivalence in Freud as to whether what we 
mean by "self' corresponds to the ego in particular or to the whole of the psyche in general. This 
ambiguity (amongst other problems) has led Irving Thalberg to conclude that Freud's work is 
66E.g. XXU79. 
67XXU78. 
68"The Question of lay analysis" XX. 223. 
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riddled with, "deep conceptual snags"69. Thalberg thinks it makes no sense to talk of an ego that 
is addressed by a quasi-personal super-ego or that acts against a quasi-autonomous id. There is 
only one self that we may speak of, says, Thalberg, and all attempts to partition the psyche lead to 
confusion. However, I think that Thalberg suffers from a lack of philosophical imagination. For 
' 
we experience ourselves as driven by instincts and moved by moral imperatives which, whilst 
they originate from within our own minds, sometimes feel as if they come from beyond the 
conscious acting subject. Freud's subdivisions of the psyche express the sense we have of inner 
dividedness. Seen. from the perspective of another, or from the perspective of society at large, 
Freud would say that there is no question but that I am this one particular self. But as I know and 
experience myself internally, I may perceive myself as a battleground of competing forces. My 
self as acting subject is in tension with my self as moral censor and my self as reservoir of 
impulse and feeling. Of these three it is the first, Freud's ego, which, in situations of inner 
conflict, I perceive as my true self. (Although, as I indicated above, I think there are stronger links 
between the "true" and the "moral" self than Freud allows.) 
It is imponant to notice that Freud is concerned with the "self' only in what we might call the 
psychological sense of the term, that is, with a sense of oneself as an integrated, self-controlling 
and self-determining person. As far as I am aware, Freud never addresses the notion of self in the 
narrow philosophical sense of oneself as the subject of predication. To think, as Lacan does, that 
Freud somehow undoes the Cartesian cogito is therefore a confusion.70 
Freud gives a particularly interesting description of the relation between the self as ego and the 
self as the whole personality in a short paper written in 1925 entitled "Moral Responsibility for 
the Content of Dreams"71, We may recall that Augustine did not hold himself responsible for the 
contenn>nus areams- since they-escaped the control-of-his will. Freud, however,-says-that one 
must hold oneself responsible for the evil impulses of one's dreams. For, as he says, unless the 
content of the dream is inspired by alien spirits, it is a part of one's own being. Against those who 
think Freud's work is fundamentally a-moral72, Freud actually signals an extension of Augustine's 
notion of moral responsibility. Freud e,xplalns what he means with reference to the two different 
senses of the word ego. 
"If, in defence, I say that what is unlqlown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my ego 
[lch- wider sense (a)] then I shall nqt be basing my position on psychoanalysis .. .It is true 
that in the metapsychological sense tQis bad, repressed content does not belong to my 'ego' 
69&:1. Wollheim (1977) p170f. 
70See further Gardner p205ff. 
11m. 
72E.g. Forrester (1990 p72): "[The] very existence [of psychoanalysis] stems from an a-moralism, 
a refusal of ethical positions". 
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[lch - narrower sense (b)] but to an 'id' upon which my ego is seated. But this ego developed 
out of the id, it fonns with it a single biological unit. . .for my vital purpose a separation of the 
ego fonn the id would be a hopeless undertaking ... The physician will leave it to the jurist to 
construct for social purposes a responsibility that is artificially limited by the metaphysical 
ego. It is notorious that the greatest difficulties are encountered by the, attempts to derive 
from such constructions practical consequences which are not in contradiction to human 
feelings." 
Freud is saying that whilst I can separate the different parts of the psyche internally and 
metaphysically, so that I can distinguish a true self (ego) from forces that seem to act upon my 
self, these distinctions are of only secondary significance in the social world The point is of 
merely academic interest in respect of dreams, but it is clearly of practical import in a case, for 
example, where a criminal claims to be acting "under the influence", as we say, of drugs, or 
perhaps where he claims that in a moment of passion he "lost control of himself'. At the limit, a 
criminal might be a Jekyll and Hyde personality, where a law-abiding part of the psyche claims to 
have no knowledge of what a criminal part of the psyche does. According to Freud, a court might 
argue about how far the defendant in such cases might receive a lighter sentence owing to 
diminished responsibility, mitigating circumstances or insanity. But there is no question that the 
law could or should recognise a different moral self as having carried out the crime from the one 
that is in the dock. 
7. AcbjevipK Limited Self-Mastery 
7.1 The Ego's Struggle With Other Parts of the Psyche 
During his life Freud had-offered numerous-different proposals on the essential-nature ofpsychic 
neurosis, but the final position of his Outline of Psychoanalysis was that neurosis was "a disorder 
of the ego"73. The roots of neur<~sis lay in the first six years of childhood when the ego was weak 
and only partially fonned. The immature ego was unable properly to balance the competing 
demands of instinct, the parental super-ego and external reality. Unable to cope properly with 
developmental tasks, and most notably with resolving the Oedipus complex, the ego took refuge 
in repressions. None of us, thought Freud, escape such developmental trauma, and we are all, as a 
result, more or less neurotic. Psychopathology thus forms a basis for normal psychology. 
The adult ego is the slave of "three tyrannical masters": the external world, the super-ego and the 
id.74 Its aim must be to balance and harmonise the conflicting demands of each party. Failure to 
do so leads to the development of neurotic symptoms. The three parts of the psyche are engaged 
73XXU!I84. 
74XXU77. 
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in a "civil war"75 in which the ego too frequently finds itself embattled and vulnerable. The task 
of psychoanalysis is no more or less than enabling the different parts of the psyche to compete on 
a level playing field. In practice this means strengthening the ego, since power is naturally loaded 
in favour of the "three harsh masters". Normal psychic life is thus a matter of maintaining 
balanced relationships between the three regions of the psyche and the outside world. 
In relation to the id, Freud says the task may be compared to the draining of the Zuider Zee.76 
Freud suggests that the ego must be "enlarged" at the expense of the id. Portions of psychic 
. ~ ' 
reality that were hitherto unordered must be brought within the structure of the ego; "where id 
was, there ego shall be". This is, in effect, an extension of the conscious self. Psychic "land" that 
was hitherto mysterious and submerged, is now rendered fit for productive use. The "draining" is 
a lengthy process. It could be said to be "artificial"; the natural psychic landscape has been 
deliberately modified and enhanced. Thus Freud describes the process as, "a work of culture"77, 
F'mally, it involves the building of secure dikes to prevent the flooding of the reclaimed land by 
the watery unconscious. The problem with repression is that it is an ultimately unsatisfactory way 
of dealing with the chaotic forces of the id. Maintenance of repression saps energy from the ego, 
as the repressed forces continually threaten to break through into the ego. Freud suggests that the 
ego can and must instead defend itself by constructing strong, reliable and efficient defences 
against these forces. 
If the above image stresses the oppositional nature of the ego and the id, another of Freud's 
images, that of the ego as rider and the id as the horse, draws attention to their symbiotic 
relationship.78 The id provides the psyche's motive power whilst the ego's privilege is to decide 
the goal and to guide the movement towards the goal. But there are limits to the rider's influence 
over-the -horse. In-some circumstances; -suggests-Freud;-the rider may be obliged-to-guide the 
horse along the path which the horse itself wishes to go. Freud here marks something of a mid-
point in our analysis between Augustine apd Jung. For Augustine, in the ideal case the higher 
parts of the soul would perfectl:y order the lower parts. By contrast. for Jung (irifra. Ch. 5), the 
unconscious in principle .esca~s the ordering of consciousness. Here Freud is suggesting that the 
ego may negotiate a compromise with ~e id such that the ego sets a goal and direction that the id 
agrees to. The ego, governed as it is by the reality principle, can deduce what is in the long term 
interests of the psyche as a whole. But t~e motive power lies with the id, whose immediate 
interests cannot be completely disregarded. 
7sxxm t73. 
76xxnso. 
77xxuso. 
78XXI!77. Cf. "The Question of Lay Analysis" XX 201ff. 
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In relation to the syper-e~:o. Freud is more ambivalent. He says in the New lnqpductory Lectures 
that the aim is, "to sttengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego"79. This 
would accord with Freud's deeply held instinct of adopting a critical perspective towards 
traditional morality. However, it would be to concede nothing positive at all to the role of the 
super-ego in the healthy individual's psychology. Such a view would be problematic from Freud's 
evolutionist perspective, for, if the ultimate goal of humanity is independence from the super-ego, 
it is strange that the most developed societies have the sttongest super-ego manifestations. 
Moreover, if the super-ego was originally a part of the ego, as Freud's earlier work on the ego-
ideal implies, then striving for an attitude of independence to the super-ego is surely a 
perpetuation of an unhealthy division in the self. 
It may have been considerations like these that led Freud, in his later Outline, to suggest that the 
ego ought not to seek independence from the super-ego so much as to seek to integrate it. 
"Normal, stable, states", he says, are those where, "the super-ego is not distinguished from the 
ego, because they work together harmoniously"80. A fully integrated super-ego, or ego-ideal, 
would presumably be one on which the person had "owned" the moral ideals passed down 
through cultural ttadition. The conscience would now not be experienced primarily as an agent of 
punishment but as a reliable guide for living. Such a transformation of the super-ego would be 
equivalent to the Lutheran distinction between living according to the law and living according to 
the Spirit. 
Freud seems to glve q,nructing signals as to how much integration the self might hope to achieve 
from psychoanalysis. On the one hand, Freud describes the outcome of successful psychoanalysis 
in terms that indi~ate fhe ego ~ having increased its degree of mastery over the self. In treating a 
-patient the-psychoanalyst aims "fo-give-his-ego-back its-mastery over lost provinces-of his mental 
life. "81 Success is marked by an extension of the compass of the ego82. On the other hand. Freud 
had earlier said that hjs science aimed precisely "to prove to the ego that it is not even master in 
its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously 
in its mind"83. In this latter case psychoanalysis appears as a therapy to counter the ego's 
delusions of grandeur. Where Copernicus had dethroned humanity from its place at the centre of 
the physical universe, and Darwin had destroyed humanity's privileged place in the animal 
kingdom, Freud claims to have dealt the third and heaviest blow to the ego's pretension to 
mastery. The ego finally learns that it could not master the self. 
79xxnso. 
80XXW 165. 
81XXlllt73. 
82XXll!179. 
83lntroductoty I&ctures (Penguin Vol. 1) p326. 
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These comments raise sharply the question of how much mastery over the self the ego can and 
should achieve. The answer to this question will be of fundamental importance to our assessment 
of Freud's conception of the self. I will now briefly describe two opposing interpretations. The 
first, that of Richard Rorty, claims Freud as a forerunner of post-modern ethical pragmatism and 
of the deconstruction of the centred self. The second, that of llham Oilman, takes Freud to have 
the more conventional aim of deepening our sense of personal moral autonomy and bolstering the 
modern sense of self. 
7.2 The Question of How Much Mastery Over the Self 
7.2.1 Richard Rorzy.· FrewJ as Advocate qfthe Fra~mentetl Selj84 
Rorty takes his stand on the "Copernican revolution" wrought by Freud. He sees this as 
completing both the decentring and the mechanisation of the human being. No longer can we 
consider humans as an Aristotelian "natural kind" with a central essence and built-in purpose. 
Freud bas "partitioned" the self into a conscious and an unconscious. If being a person is a matter 
of having a coherent set of beliefs and desires then both the conscious and unconscious may be 
considered as persons. The human body can play host to both persons. Knowledge of both is 
necessary to predict and control human behaviour, but only one of these persons will be available 
at any given time to introspection. The human being is not to be seen as a hierarchy of elements 
under the direction of the psyche but as a set of equal conversation partners. Moreover those 
beliefs and emotions (including the moral) that we hold are to be seen as resulting from particular 
events in our own childhood and the childhood of the race. We may now see ourselves,· in 
Deleuzian terms, as a "machine that requires much tinkering, rather than as a substance with a 
precious essence to be discovered and cherished"ss. 
Rortydistinguishes two-fonns-of-private morality (or "the development-of-character-"), namely a 
search for purity and the search for self-enlargement. The former, he suggests, was held by Plato 
and Kierkegaard, the latter by de Sade, Byron, Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud. (Rorty would, 
presumably, have listed Augustine with Plato and Kierkegaard, although Augustine actually held 
that the self was enlarged precisely through its pursuit of purity.) Rorty's thesis is that the former 
has become much more difficult since Freud. We can no longer easily ask "Which is my true 
selfl" or "What is human nature?" And there are now too many selves for "selflessness" to seem 
a useful notion. 
Rorty urges that we stop using overarching narratives which describe our lives as, e.g., "the 
search for perfection". Instead, following Freud we should use piecemeal ad hoc narratives which 
describe all the actions one performs, including the silly, cruel and self-destructive actions. The 
84Ref. Smith and Kerrigan (1986) Ch. 1. 
85In Smith & Kerrigan plO. 
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mature self will give up the need to "see things steadily and see them whole"86. Maturity will 
rather consist in an ability to seek out redescriptions of one's past, and to let the dialogue between 
different parts of the person be an instrument for change in the future. Such an approach 
renounces appeals to moral philosophy and metaphysics when faced with a practical moral 
situation. Thus Rony 'suggests, if I am being tortured I may not try to appeal to something deep 
inside my tonurer ·his rationality. Rather I should content myself with asking: "If I do this rather 
than that now, what story will I tell myself later?"87 
7.2.2/lham Dilmqn: FrewJ as Advocal( of the Centred Self 
By contrast, Oilman argues88 we should not give undue weight to Freud's statements that the ego 
is "a mere servant" of three harsh masters. Oilman suggests that Freud is here attacking the 
"popular naivet6" that the ego has absolute autonomy over the person; he is not challenging a 
"metaphysical assumption" about the autonomy of the self. By way of illustration, Oilman 
suggests we compare Freud's conception of the ego to that of the place of the president of the 
United States. The view Freud is attacking is then similar to the naive view that people may have, 
as seen in their expectations and disappointments, about people in high places who wield power 
and influence. One might say to them that they are wrong to think that the President can get 
anything done that he likes without a great deal of convincing and persuasion of Congress, of 
Senate, etc. 
A weak president is at the mercy of his backers, supporters and fellow politicians. He may be able 
to do little more that balance the conflicting claims and interests of the groups on whose support 
he depends. But a strong president, with a mind of his own and with the courage of his own 
convictions, will do much more than this. He will act so as to win the agreement and enlist the 
support ofthose whom-he governs. To-say that the president cannot do anything-without the co-
operation of the Senate and the Congress is not to deny his autonomy; it is to characterise it as a 
relative autonomy. It is not to deny that h~ can lead with vision and independence, that he can 
lead those from whom he derives his power rather than be led by them. The ego may lead or be 
led by the horse it rides; but when it leads 't still depends on the horse's "locomotive energy" as 
I 
the autonomous president depends on his "power base". 
·Oilman thus argues that psychoanalysis, in its concern with the strengthening of the ego, widens 
the domain of the will and enlarges the sphere of personal responsibility and autonomy. Where 
Rorty sees psychoanalysis as pointing to the fragmentation of th~ self, Oilman sees it leading to a 
more centred, more integrated self. 
86op.cit. p9 
87op.cit. p18 
ssoilman (1984) p109. 
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Both Rorty and Dilman represent, I think, partial insights into Freud's work. Rorty and his fellow 
post-modern pragmatists are not being completely faithful to Freud since, whatever else he said, 
Freud never - as we have seen - allowed for the presence of multiple selves within the psyche. 
However, Rorty does take seriously the permanent presence of unordered elements within the 
psyche. DUman, on the other hand, correctly recognises that selthood is centred on the single ego. 
But he is inclined to give the ego too much authority over the rest of the psyche. Following 
DUman's presidential analogy, Freud might have said that if the ego is an American president 
some aspects of the psyche are not Americans; they follow different customs and obey different 
rules. 
Freud would, I think, want to say both that there is no question of which self "I" refers to and that 
"I", can only hope for limited mastery over my self. Rorty is wrong insofar as he suggests Freud 
would not have allowed for all one's actions to be seen as the responsibility of a single self. In 
fact, as we have seen, Freud had a strong notion of personal responsibility, even to the point of 
suggesting that I am responsible for my dreams. On the other hand, Freud insists that there are 
large portions of the psyche that the ego did not form, and can do little to influence. Freud insists 
that the shape of the psyche is determined in large part by the events of early childhood, while the 
ego is still weak; in his memorable phrase, "the child is psychologically father to the adult"89. In 
the adult, physiological factors such as puberty, the menopause and physical illness may 
overcome the ego.90 Finally, the ego must contend with the death instinct, a factor which is 
totally beyond any possibility of controt.91 
Freud's picture of the self has a tragic quality that we may miss, perhaps because we too easily 
read Freud through his more optimistic successors. Freud's therapy offers unremitting honesty 
and-insight-into-our-situation~ It proposes to-bring our psychic-battles·to light in order-that-they 
may be fought openly rather thJUl covertly. But it does not suggest that all the battles can be 
won92. It offers, at best, intflrnal compromises with the human condition, not its basic 
transformation. 
Freud's pessimism is in substantial continuity with Augustine. Both Augustine and Freud agree 
that the roots of human unhappiness result not merely from conflicts between a human being and 
society but derive from within Pte human being him or herself. Indeed, Freud, reveals a new 
depth to our unhappiness by ruthlessly explicating these conflicts. But where Augustine can offer 
a religious hope for the future, Freud dispels all such hope as "illusion". 
89.XXW187. 
90xxw 224ff. 
91 XXIII 242ff and editorial comment on p212. 
92Qn this point see especially Freud's 1937 essay, "Analysis terminable and Interminable" in 
xxw. Note especially p243: "We must bow to the superiority of the forces against which we see 
our efforts come to nothing." 
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7.3 The Psychoanalytic Process 
Having discussed the limited aim of psychoanalysis, it is necessary to describe briefly how Freud 
thought analysis should proceed towards its aim. I shall describe this with reference to the three 
Augustinian categories of self-memory, self-knowledge and self-willing. 
73.1 Self-Memocy 
In a phrase reminiscent of Augustine's Confessions, Freud described his own self-analysis in 
terms of reaching into the "storerooms" of the mind to take out what was needed.93 Memory was 
always central to Freud's analysis, although his conception of its role in creating neuroses 
developed over time. In his earliest work with Breuer, as set out in their joint 1892 "Preliminary 
Communication", Freud believed that neurotic symptoms were caused by traumatic events, 
notably child sexual abuse, that remained as traces in the memory. Indeed the central discovery 
during his work with Breuer was that, "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences"94. Freud 
thought that hysteria arises when a painful event is experienced, and the memory of it does not 
fade or lose its affective power in normal ways such as emotional discharge or plain forgetting. 
The memory survives either because the person attempts to repress it, which is a way of 
preserving it, or because at the time the person experienced the event she or he was in a hypnoid 
state. On this hypothesis the memory of the event is the direct cause of neurosis. Neurotic 
symptoms may then be eliminated by, for example, getting the patient to recall the memory under 
hypnosis and "talking" it out. 
Freud abandoned this hypothesis owing to his clinical experience that people would not or could 
not bring out facts from their memories that Freud felt were relevant to their case. This led Freud 
to propose that mechanisms of defence-and repression-were-at the heart of neurosis;-Moreover, he 
concluded that it was not memofies of real events that were troublesome but the presence in the 
unconscious of impulses repressed iq childhood.~s According to his revised hypothesis, adult 
neurosis arises when the individual forbids him or herself the expression of a libidinal desire 
repressed in childhood,96 The neurosis thus has its roots in childhood conflicts that have not been 
properly resolved. Analysis must now involve soq1ething qtuch more sophisticated than merely 
bringing to the surface painful memories. It requires the analysand to acquire a particular 
knowledge of the relation between repressed and repressing parts of the self. 
7.3.2 Self•Knowledge 
93Letter to Fliess Oct. 31, 1897 (Masson); cf . .GWlf X.viii.12: "When I am in this storehouse I ask 
that it produce what I want to recall." 
94117. 
95Letter to Fliess May 2 1897 (Masson p239). 
96See 1916 Introctuctoty Lectures (Penguin Vol. 1) Part III "A General Theory of the Neuroses". 
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Augustine had taken the tenn "self-knowledge" in the classical sense of the requirement to fonn a 
true estimate of oneself and one's position in the cosmos. By contrast, Freud has in mind a 
particular kind of empirical knowledge about one's psyche. By disclosing the contents of dreams 
and by adopting the technique of free association, the neurotic provides factual, but coded, 
infonnation about the regions of the unconscious which the skilled analyst can decode. The 
process of interpreting dreams follows certain defined rules which we can deduce from Freud's 
case histories and from his work called The lnteJ:pretation of Dreams. However, the competent 
analyst does not simply follow the rules, rather he must first have been analysed himself. This 
enables the analyst to acquire, as Freud puts it, the right "convictions"97. Whatever we make of 
Freud's claim of natural scientific status for analytic knowledge, we must add that it is knowledge 
of an experiential rather than a merely objective kind. In submitting to analysis one is 
participating in a tradition of convictions and technical knowledge that claims to offer true insight 
into the deepest secrets of one's mind. 
For both Augustine and Freud self-knowledge is a matter of discovering the truth about oneself. 
But the content of this knowledge reflects the different "sources of significance" by which each 
believes the self to be constituted. For Augustine, self-knowledge was linked to knowledge of 
God and had a necessarily moral component. Self-knowledge involved growth in one's knowledge 
of God. The more one knew and loved God the more one would understand oneself in tenns of 
the truth and justice which were God's attributes. For Freud, self-knowledge is a matter of gaining 
critical distance from the self so that one can learn to act rationally. Locke had thought that our 
seltbood is constituted especially by our capacity to objectify ourselves. Freud provides us with a 
comprehensive programme for achieving this self-objectification. It is a programme that includes 
moral values among the psychological data that must be put under scrutiny. Freud's psychological 
-man--is, in Rieffs· ·language, - 'lanti"heroic, shrewd; carefully counting his satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions, studying unprQ{\table commitments as the sins most to be avoided"98. 
For Freud, self·knowled~e is a matter of fUthless honesty about oneself: "Analysis is entirely 
' ' 
founded on complete cando~"~9. It is a- complete telling of the truth about oneself that is 
supposed to lead to power ov~r one~lf. ~uch truth telling is, recognises Freud, similar to the 
Catholic practice of confession to a priest. But confession should only be regarded as a prelude to 
analysis, for: "In confession the sinner tells what he knows; in analysis the neurotic has to tell 
more.''100 
97_xx 199. 
98Rieff ( 1959) p356. 
99XX207. 
100XX 189. 
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The context of such truth telling is a strong, aJbeit expedient, relationship to one's analyst. For 
during analysis it is not just infonnation but also emotion which is transferred from analysand to 
analyst. Freudian self-knowledge is less concerned with records of events than with basic 
impulses and instincts. Analysis involves the patient unconsciously transferring onto the analyst 
his or her repressed, Oedipal feelings towards parental figures. This brings the feelings and 
impulses out into the open and enables the analyst to work with them. By developing appropriate 
insight into the impulses he or she experiences in the analytic situation, the patient may come to a 
clear and distinct knowledge of the infantile conflicts lying at the base of the personality. 
There is a strong power dynamic involved here. The analyst, says Freud, comes as an ally to aid 
the embattled ego in its civil war. lOt The analytic situation is therefore set up to maximise the 
power of the analyst. He (Freud's circle were all men), the doctor, sits whilst the patient (at least 
in Freud's early career most likely female102) reclines. The doctor's authority and the patient's 
submission are thus emphasised. The doctor is positioned behind the patient so that the doctor 
can see the patient but not vice versa. "Analysis ... presupposes ... a situation in which there is a 
superior and a subordinate."103 The wisdom of psychoanalysis holds that parts of the ego may 
have strong motives for not getting weU104 and that the patient may be expected to resist the 
insights offered by the analyst. The analyst must, therefore, break down the resistance to analysis 
that the patient displays as treatment progresses. All this is quite intelligible within the tenns 
Freud set for himself. For in analysis the patient's authority relations with parents are exchanged 
for an authority relationship with the analyst as a means of gaining critical distance from these 
primal relationships. But after Foucault, we must surely interpret this remarkable constellation of 
power, knowledge and truth-telling with deep suspicion. It looks very much as if the analysand is 
not so much gaining power over him or herself as surrendering power to the analyst. Within the 
psychological-tradition; the neo-Freudianism-of Erich Fromm and the humanistic counselling 
movement is to be understood in part as a reaction against this imbalance of power between 
"doctor" and "patient". 
7.3.3 Self-Willine 
Freud offers two main accounts of the phenomenon of the divided will, the first in tenns of a 
division between the unconscious system and consciousness, and the second in tenns of a divided 
e~o. The psychic model used is different but the principles of psychic functioning are essentially 
tot"011tline" in XXIII 173. 
102TtWre is, of course, a massive gender/power dynamic involved which I leave to others to 
discu~. Rieff comments: "The therapy is really constructed, whatever the neutrality of role 
professed, in the image of the masterful and male analyst and the docile, co-operative female 
patient." (1959 p175n) 
103XlY. 49; cf. XXW248. 
104E.g. XX 221. 
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the same in the two accounts. The first account, in the (1915) InqgductOty I..ectures105, comes in 
the context of a discussion on parapraxes (faulty acts or mistakes). Freud argues that parapraxes 
arise from a clash between two opposing intentions in the mind. The leading, conscious, intention 
is partially forced back by an unconscious intention so that the resultant action is flawed. A 
surprisingly large range of human behaviour can be explained by this psychological mechanism. 
To take just one of Freud's examples, the case of a person failing to keep an appointment can be 
understood as a clash between an intention to meet and a counter-intention to avoid the person, or 
perhaps a counter-intention to avoid the place proposed for the meeting. Counter-intentions are 
unconscious and are motivated by the pleasure principle. The person or place concerned is 
associated with some painful experience from the past which the unconscious wishes to avoid 
repeating. The counter-intention is not strong enough to force a new willed action, such as the 
deliberate cancellation of the appointment. Instead, the counter-intention achieves its aim by 
subverting the intention to meet: the appointment is forgotten. 
More controversially, Freud extends his analysis to cases where the agent explicitly denies a 
counter-intention. Suppose a person forgets to pay a bill. This may be explained by the will to pay 
being opposed by a counter-will that does not wish to pay. The person may protest that they 
merely forgot; there was no intention to avoid payment. However, says Freud, the analyst may yet 
insist that the person did have an unconscious intent not to pay; the evidence that the person did 
actually forget is sufficient, says Freud, to prove the point. 
This case indicates, I think, both the strengths and the weaknesses of the analytic method. On the 
one hand there is an objective piece of behaviour that invites explanation, and the hypothesis of 
' 
an unconscious counter-will succeeds in providing an explanation of a rather ingenious kind. In 
some-cases it may-be-the-right explanation. However,-the explanation may-fail-precisely-by not 
being ingenious enough. There could be a rpyriad of other factors involved in forgetting to pay a 
bill. A complete description of all these might be extremely complicated, if it were possible at all. 
The person's protest that he merely forgot to paf may actually be a better description of this 
complexity than the analyst's proposal of a coupter-will. The case takes on an unacceptable 
element of power-play when the analyst now insists on the rightness of his own explanation 
against the account given by the analysand. 
In Freud's post-1923 ego-psychology, he describes phenomena associated with a divided will not 
in terms oh battle between consciousness and unconsciousness but in terms of a split within the 
ego itself. Thus, in a discussion of his favourite theme of the ambivalence of the patient towards 
being cured of his or her neurosis, he suggests this ambivalence is caused by a split in the ego and 
105Jntroduc1oty Lectures (Penguin) pp 99-103. 
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hence a split in the will.106 For example, a malingering soldier may repress his desire not to fight 
into the unconscious part of the ego and then exhibit neurotic symptoms. Under analysis the 
desire to avoid fighting expresses itself as a resistance to proceeding with treatment. Part of the 
ego wills to become healthy but another part wills to remain sick. Treatment involves 
strengthening the con~cious ego so that it can master the repressed material and so 'that the will 
can be re-united. 
Freud's accounts deal with cases where the will is divided or subverted as a result of unconscious 
processes. His analysis does not really deal with cases where the will is divided at the level of 
conscious moral choice - the level which Augustine was mainly concerned with. 
Interesting in this respect is his identification of Luther's statement at the Diet of Worms 'Here I 
stand I can do no other' as an utterance issued out of psychical compulsion.107 By contrast, we 
would normally recognise this as a statement expressing as~nt to a moral demand freely 
recognised as such. Freud's attempt to apply deterministic psychoanalytic categories to this kind 
of statement is, I think, confusing. There is a major difference between moral compulsion of the 
kind experienced by Luther and the psychological compulsion that is Freud's real concern. The 
former is a desirable thing, for it is the experience of someone who is able to give himself 
wholeheartedly to his conception of the good, whereas the latter is undesirable, for it represents a 
loss of control over the self. If the self is to be properly unified both levels must be addressed; 
psychoanalysis addresses the latter but not the former. 
7.3.4 Lifting the Mechanisms q[Dc.fence 
Freud's most enduring contribution to therapeutic practice has probably been his notion that 
healing requires ·the recognition-and removal-of-internal· "defences" present within-the-psyche. 
The concept of defence refers to a more or less unhealthy process whereby the ego seeks to avoid 
a legitimate conflict with another part of the psyche. Freud though that defensive strategies were a 
common theme in all the neurotic conditions that he studied and were therefore a crucial element 
of psychic distress lOB. Freud discusses defence mechanisms directly in his 1923 Eg,O and the Id 
and, especially, in his 1926 Inhibitions. Sympt9ms and Anxiety. Whilst Freud himself did· not 
develop a formal scheme for the defence mechanisms, this task was undertaken by his daughter 
Anna, who listed 10 different types of defence.109 
to6XX221. 
I07Yl253. 
108XX 159. 
109Namely (1966 p47): regression, repression, reaction fomtation, isolation, undoing, projection, 
introjection, turning against the self, reversal and sublimation. 
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For both Freud and his daughter the most significant and pervasive of all the defence mechanisms 
is "repression" 110. Impulses which are in some way disturbing are shut out of consciousness. The 
ego invests energy to form what Freud calls an "anti-cathexis", a kind of psychic road block, that 
prevents an unwanted impulse reaching consciousness and achieving its aim through action in the 
external world. In the short term repression alleviates an inner conflict and assuages the ego's 
anxiety concerning some emotion or impulse that it perceives as undesirable. However, the 
impulse does not merely disappear. Failing to achieve satisfaction through normal expression, the 
impulse may obtain a substitute form of satisfaction by finding expression as a "symptom". Freud 
suggested that a range of neurotic behaviours, such as compulsive actions, obsessions and 
phobias, could be understood in this way as the symptomatic response to a repressed impulse. 
Freud argues that repression is damaging both for the id and the ego. The id is inhibited from 
expressing an instinctual impulse in a healthy manner. The ego, whilst it has avoided conflict with 
the id, has at the same time, given the id some independence and has renounced some of its own 
sovereignty. "The repressed is now ... an outlaw; it is excluded from the great organisation of the 
ego and is subject only to the laws which govern the realm of the unconscious." 111 This loss of 
control may be manifested physically, for example, as a nervous tic or as the urge to repeat a 
certain action inappropriately. Such symptoms maintain their existence "outside the organisation 
of the ego and independently of it"112, The result of a defensive process, says Freud, is "an 
extremely restricted ego which is reduced to seeking satisfaction in the symptoms"113. In extreme 
situations this may lead to a paralysis of the will in which everything the ego attempts is drawn 
into the conflict with the id. 
Freud believed that once a process of repression has been initiated it is generally impossible for 
~tlfeegoto remove irby~its own power 1-14; Moreover;-even with the assistance of a~skiued~analyst, 
the task of uncovering repression is not straightforward, since the ego tries to protect itself from 
anxiety by clinging on to the symptom and refusing to face the original source of conflict. The 
action the patient takes to protect a repression whilst he or she is undergoing analytic treatment is 
termed "resistance"lls. Freud lists five types of resistance116, of which the most interesting 
example for our present purposes is what he terms resistance due to "gain from illness". Here the 
llOin his early work Freud could use the terms repression and defence interchangeably. Between 
1897 and 1926 he preferred to use the term defence instead of the term repression. In Inhibitions. 
Symptgms and AmielY (S.E. XX) he reintroduces the term defence and makes the formal 
distinction between it and the more specific concept of repression. (See further the SE editors' 
comments in Inhibitions Appendix A.) 
111XX 153. 
112XX 97. 
u3xx 118. 
tt4xx 153. 
11sxx 157. 
116xx 160. 
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patient's ego obtains a substitutionary satisfaction from the symptom which motivates it to hold 
onto the symptom. The ego and the id thus form a pact in which instinctual satisfaction is gained, 
but at the expense of optimal mental health. In structural terms, the ego's desire to "bind together 
and unify"l17 leads to a kind of fake integration of self. The ego has, so to speak, papered over 
underlying splits in the self. 
Psychoanalysis aims to undo resistance in the context of a therapeutic relationship with the 
analyst. The analyst tries to discover the source of the underlying repression. The ego is 
empowered so that it can gain the courage to lift its repressions. Emotions that were originally 
experienced in relation to other people, notably parents, are transferred onto the analyst and 
"worked through". The repressed material is thereby made conscious. The analyst then conceives 
various logical arguments against the repression, promising the ego various rewards and 
advantages if it wiU give up its resistance. Once this has been done it is expected that the ego wiU 
give up its attachment to symptoms and that the id wiU find healthy outlets for its instinctual 
drives.118 
In his 1926 work Freud defines the psychoanalytic goal as an extension of the power of the ego 
over the hitherto lost regions of the id.119 He argues against those who had taken his earlier work 
as indicating the ego to be radically powerless against the id.120 (This is the position taken, in 
different ways, by Jung and later by Lacan.) Rather, he now suggests that visible splits between 
the ego, id and super-ego are primarily a sign of pathology. In conditions of strength the ego is 
bound up with the other parts of the self and indistinguishable from them.l21 Whilst Freud's final 
position would be that such a goal of wholeness was in practice unattainable122, the emphasis in 
some of Freud's later work on the relative strength of the ego proved sufficient to generate 
schools of-psychology-that would take the autonomy of the-ego rather than the power-of-the 
unconscious as its focus.123 Melanie Klein, for example, developed (or, a classical Freudian 
might say, "modified") Freud's work in this direction. Thus she states: "As we all know, the 
ultimate aim of psychoanalysis is the integration of the patient's personallty. Freud's conclusion 
that where Id was, there shall Ego be, is a pointer in that direction."124 K.leinian psychoanalysis 
11'xx 98. 
tt8x_x 159. 
119XX97ff. 
t2oXX95. 
121X£ 97. 
122XX.W Analysis Terminable and Inteoninable. 
123Notably: (1) The British Object Relations school, following Melanie Klein and (2) the 
American Ego-Psychologists following Anna Freud. Both these are regarded a!! "heterodox" by 
classical Freudians. K.leinians and Classical Freudians formed as separate parts of the British 
Psychoanalytic Society and developed their own forms of training. 
124Klein (1957) p85. 
118 
Freud: Achieving Limited Self-Mastery Through Psychoanalysis 
aims quite explicitly at the ego's rational mastery over the self. Klein identifies rational self-
mastery with personal integration and the subjective feeling of wholenessl25. 
We can see in Klein the beginnings of a shift from the pessimistic Freudian sense of a self that is 
endemically in contlidt With itself, to a rather more optimistic vision of personal autonomy. This 
shift becomes highly pronounced in the "neo-Freudianism" of Erich Fromm and, beyond him, in 
the ideas of Maslow and Rogers, psychologists whom we shall meet in chapter 6. The focus on 
the ego represents one direction in which Freud's thought has been developed. But of equal 
importance has been a development in the opposite direction. Carl Jung expanded further the 
Freudian conception of the unconscious and argued strongly against any pretensions the ego 
might have to order the whole of the self. Jung suggested a quite different strategy for unifying 
the self from Kleinian self-mastery. It is his work that I address next. 
125Klein says (p88) that the psychoanalytic process leads to "considerable relief in feeling more 
of a whole person, in gaining control over one's self, and in a deeper sense of security in relation 
to the world in general." 
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1. Iptroduction 
In the previous two chapters I described the work of Augustine, one of the most important 
exponents of the theistic source of moral significance, and Freud, the psychologist who proposes 
an unprecedented deepening of the task of constructing the self according to rational norms, in 
line with our second source of significance. In this chapter I tum to the work of a psychologist 
who proposes a radical change to the ways in which the formation of the self had been viewed by 
both these authors. Carl Jung contributes in a remarkable way to the third of the sources of moral 
significance by which the self constitutes itself, namely that of the realm of nature. Jung argues 
that our primary source of moral orientation and value lies in the natural symbols and images 
produced from within our own minds. So far it has been assumed that the self is developed by 
ordering the lower parts of the self under a higher spiritual desire (Augustine) or by draining the 
unconscious of its power so that one could act rationally (Freud). Jung argues that the self is to be 
integrated neither by strategies of ordering, nor by control, but by a strategy of acceptance. Jung 
argues that our moral power for living, or what he terms the drive to individuation, has its roots in 
the unconscious. We must therefore seek to discover, learn from and reconcile ourselves to the 
natural inner core of our being. 
Jung professed a dislike for a priori theories about the mind1• He preferred to start from certain 
empirical facts, namely the images produced in dreams and fantasies and echoed in the imagery 
of the world's mythologies and religions. By grouping these images into patterns he hypothesised 
particular "archetypal" ways of mental functioning. Jung's data is not of a kind that lends itself to 
controlled, repeatable experimentation, and the empirical material could be arranged in other 
ways from those selected by Jung. Jung's theories are not, therefore, deductive principles open to 
sttaightforward scientific falsification. But they are valuable and suggestive as metaphors or 
myths by which we can attempt to understand ourselves. 
Our task is, as one prominent Jungian analyst has put it, to try to enter into "the imaginative 
conspiracy that all Jungians share with each other and with their patients"2• This will involve, at a 
10¥:17 p7. 
2Stevens (1990) p28. 
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number points, paying close attention to Jung's own psychology, for it was his own extraordinarily 
fertile unconscious lhat provided lhe primary material for his psychological system.3 We shall 
endeavour to see how far Jung can offer us new ways of conceiving our selves that have the 
power to give unity and coherence to the self. In an age which, as we have seen, gives particular 
emphasis to the "un-ordered" parts of the self, Jung's strategy of accepting the less ordered parts 
of the self would seem to be an avenue well worth exploring. 
2. lpdiyiduatlop apd its Relation to Au&mstinian Desire and Freudjan 
Ljbjdo 
I showed in chapter 3 how according to Augustine the self is unified by the integration of our 
desires within an overarching spiritual desire for God. In chapter 4 I indicated how Freud reduces 
desire to libido, a quality lhat is essentially sexual in nature and which is properly fulfilled in 
genital attachments to sexual objects. For Freud, the balancing and holding together of the 
different components of lhe self is a function of the proper channelling of the libido. In Jung's 
work neilher desire nor lhe libido play such a central role. For Jung it is the need to make explicit 
and hold together opposing qualities within the psyche, or what he terms the drive to 
individuation, that is of first importance. Where Augustine emphasised the spiritual desire of God, 
and Freud emphasised physical sexuality, Jung argues that only lhe two-sided process of 
individuation can lead to psychic wholeness. Individuation is the "central concept"4 of Jung's 
system. Jung saw bolh Augustinian theology and Freudian psychoanalysis as offering, in different 
ways, unbalanced accounts of lhe human psyche, and he proposes that his own two-sided 
psychology offers a more rounded picture of our mental life. 
We may recall that Augustine's thought is monistic inasmuch as he rules out the existence of any 
iiWependent principle of evil:-Augustine lherefore cannor allow ~at any God-given-human desire 
or external object can be evil of itself, but insists that desires are only made evil insofar as lhey 
are improperly ordered. For Augustine a desire is set up by a combination of the attractiveness of 
lhe object and the psychological make-up of the subject. Desires are good or defective in 
accordance with the extent to which their objects truly satisfy and bring delight to the subject. 
The moral tone of lhe desire is thus independent of the quality of the desire but depends on the 
appropriateness of the object in meeting the real needs of the subject. The self is integrated when 
each of the desires of the person is fulfilled in an appropriate object and there remain no internal 
conflicts between the desires. 
3"J speak chiefly of inner experie,nces, 4UDongst which I include my dreams and visions. These 
form the prima materia of my slfientiflc work." MQR (Fontana) pl8. Cf. Stevens' remark (p4) 
that: "To speak of Jung's psycholpgy is ... to use an innocent double entendre, since the analytical 
psychology devised by Jung in all important respects grew out of his own psychology." 
4MDR (Fontana) p235. 
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Jung's outlook, by contrast, involves a dualism of good and evil.s Perhaps his most deeply held 
disagreement with the Augustinian tradition is his insistence that what we call evil is not merely a 
deprivation of the good but that it is equally as real as what we call good6. Jung consequently 
divides our desires into two basic types which tend to pull in opposite directions but which must 
both be fulfilled if the self is to be integrated.? The first type of desire, associated with the 
conscious part of the psyche, is rational, reflective, co-ordinated and ethical. The second type of 
desire, associated with the unconscious part of the psyche, is irrational, instinctual, uncontrolled 
and sensual. The first type is exemplified by desire for God, the second by sexual desire. Jung 
thinks that people tend to class external objects as good or evil depending on the type and quality 
of the human desire they attract. So, for example, sex is typically labelled "bad" because it is the 
subject of instinctual desire, but God is typically labelled "good" because he is the subject of 
rational desire. Whereas for Augustine, the self is integrated through a proper ordering of our 
desires under the desire of God, Jung thinks that the spiritual desire for a good God merely forms 
one half of a pair of psychological opposites, and that taken as a supreme principle such a desire 
produces a somewhat lop-sided kind of psychological development. The formation of the whole 
self must involve the balancing of spiritual and sensual desires with their associated attachments 
to good and "bad"s objects. 
Jung's disagreement with Freud involved a methodologically similar positing of opposites. Jung 
alleged that Freud had mistakenly attempted to derive all human behaviour from the sexual drive. 
Jung felt that this could not do justice to the full range of human experience and, in particular, 
that it did not properly account for human religiosity.9 Freud had attempted to remedy the 
imbalance in later years, says Jung, w~en he proposed the thanatos drive as an opposing force to 
the libido, but Freud's strange notion of a death instinct was unsuccessful10• Instead of libido 
balanced-by-thanatos;-Jung argues that the libido itself has two-opposing orientations. It-may-be 
directed outward towards objects, in the form of the sex drive, in which case it yields the Freudian 
psychology. On the other hand, it may be directed inwards towards the self, in the form of the 
will-to-power, in which case an Adlerian psychology is produced. These types of psychology 
correspond to the character types extrovert and introvert. Having consigned both Freud and 
sThus when accused by his friend Fr. Victor White of Manichaean dualism Jung pleaded guilty to 
being a heretic. (Ref. correspondence cited in Charet p425). 
6QY11 para. 247. 
1f:Jl.5 page 84ff. 
Bunfortunately Jung does not use terms in a precise WilY· He tends, unhelpfully, to elide the 
distinction between moral evil (what we might call "b!ldness") and sensuality (what we might call 
"naughtiness") as my argument here indicates. 
9e.g. MDR (Fontana) p 191. Their growing disagreement ovqr the nature of the libido is well 
documented in the Freud/Jun~ Letters and came to a head with J\Jng's publication of Symbols of 
Iransfonnation ~5). 
1~ para. 33f. 
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Adler's systems to particular psychological "types" Jung proposes that his own psychology, with 
its core principle of individuation as the union of opposites, underlies both.11 
Jung conceived libido in a more general way than Freud. Where Freud rigorously insisted that the 
libido drive was sexual to nature, Jung considers it to be a more diffuse kind of psychic energy 
that includes higher emotions such as spiritual longing, hope, glory and love. But even in this 
general form, the libido still cannot be, for lung, the fundamental principle of his psychology. For 
although "every process is a phenomenon of energy", yet, "all energy can only proceed from the 
tension of opposites"12 and "life is born only of the spark of opposites"13. It is the encounter and 
union of opposites that provides the energy of libido and life. 
3. The Components of the Psyche apd their Place in the lndiyiduatiop 
Prgcea§ 
I now set out the major components of the psyche in lung's system. They are presented in the 
order in which they typically appear in life. Most of us are, according to Jung, only aware of the 
first, the persona. Those rare individuals who complete the task of psychological growth will, on 
the other hand, become aware of all of these components. The last component to appear is what 
lung calls the Self, an entity which is seen, in retrospect, to contain all the other components. 
"Self' here is a technical term that I shall indicate by capitalisation. The person who completes 
the task of psychological growth, or what Jung terms "the individuation process", will have 
integrated all the other entities within the Self. 
3.1 Personat4 
The persona-is that part of consciousness-that deals with the adaptation-of-the- individual to life in 
society. It consists of those psy~hic f4cts that are felt to be personal. The basic elements of the 
persona derive from what Jqn~ calls the "collective psyche"1' and are not unique to the 
individual. However, the way ip whic~ a person selects and combines these aspects of the psyche , 
into the persona is, says Jung, genuinely iQdividuaJ16. This very selection and differentiation, of 
course, marks a division of the p~yche. 
11bY:ll. Two Essus in which the first two c~apters of Essay I deal with Freud and the third with 
Adler. The fourth chapter opens with the comment that, "the incompatibility of the two theories 
discussed in the preceding chapters requires a standpoint superordinate to both in which they 
could come together in unis<:m". 
}2f"'U7 -. -~7 para. 34. 
13f:Y!IJ para. 78. 
14See especially r:.Y:/.7 Two Esseys essay two Ch. III "The Persona as a segment of the Collective 
Psyche" and the original version of this chapter in CYJ.7 Appendix 2. 
15f:J:I.7 para. 486. 
16CYi,7 para. 486. 
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The principles on which a person constructs his or her persona are governed by the need to 
present an acceptable face to the world The persona involves names, roles and job functions. 
These are all necessary for civilised life, yet they also represent an unavoidable compromise 
between what a person really is, in his or her genuine individuality, and what society expects of 
him or her. The persona is literally a mask, a semblance, a two-dimensional reality17. 
In Two EssB,Ys Jung indicates that a person's role accentuates one of the four functional types for 
relating to reality of feeling, thinking, sensing and intuition.18 Elsewhere, however, Jung 
associates relating to external reality with the particular mode of thought that he calls "directed 
thinking"19. Such thinking uses verbal concepts to link the person in with a community ofrational 
thought and shared moral judgements. This kind of thinking is relatively hard work for the 
psyche. It is to be contrasted with the fantasy and picture thinking which is the spontaneous and 
effortless activity of the unconscious. It is the task of education to force the human mind from its 
more natural subjective, individual sphere to the objective and social sphere. Directed thinking is 
enormously valuable for the development of a shared morality and for the technological 
exploitation of nature, but it comes with a psychological price-tag. It is particularly in the arena of 
morality that the strain of sustaining the persona is borne and the presence of the persona's 
psychological counterpart begins to be felt. For Jung, gaining a whole and integrated self involves 
allowing proper scope for the "fantasy thinking" that he thinks is the natural mode of the psyche's 
operation when it is unconstrained by social or moral norms. 
3.2 Shadow 
The shadow is the complement to the persona; it contains within it all that we have chosen not to 
accept as part of our persona. The shadow is that part of our psyches that is inferior, primitive, 
-unadapted and- awkward;20-As-Jung defines the term the shadow-is not-necessarily evil, for one 
could envisage a crimin~ ~ )NhO presents a thoroughly immoral face to the world yet has a 
heart (or shadow) of gold. Th~ shadow contains mistakenly rejected good parts of ourselves as 
well as evil parts. However, fpr the qrdinary non-deviant person living within a framework of 
moral norms in society, the s~~ow con~ns all the immoral impulses that are unacceptable to 
society. As Jung's close colleagpe Topi Wolff put it, the shadow contains all that one "rejects 
from moral, aesthetic or whatever grounds and keeps in suppression because it stands in 
contradiction to our conscious principles"21• 
17CYJ_7 para. 246. 
18QY? para. 487. 
t9~5Ch.2. 
20.CW:11 para. 134. 
21Wolff quoted in Jacobi (1943) page 102f. 
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The first step in the therapeutic process is the dissolution of the persona and the attempt to come 
to tenns with the shadow. Incorporation of the shadow adds "depth" to the personality.22 
Acceptance of the shadow is not, however, to be identified with a commitment to engage in 
immoral action. At least in his later (1958) Psycholqgy of Religion Jung attempts to distinguish 
between repression and suppression of elements of the shadow. Repression is an unhealthy 
activity which he takes to refer to tendencies which are not so much antisocial as merely 
unconventional and socially awkward. Suppression, on the other hand, is the conscious and 
deliberate disposing of by consciousness of antisocial elements in our nature.23 According to this 
account, the bringing of the shadow to consciousness is intended to enable one to make a 
conscious decision about what one is to do with its components. Repression of the elements of the 
shadow leads to neurosis; suppression may lead to worry, conflict and suffering, but not to 
neurosis. For Jung, neurotic repression is therefore a substitute for legitimate suffering24. To this 
extent, Jung follows the aims of Freud's psychoanalysis. 
Notwithstanding the above, it should not be supposed that the encounter of the persona with the 
shadow would leave our moral outlook unchanged. For what Jung calls the "problem of our time" 
is a serious imbalance between the moral demands of our society and the religious mechanisms 
available to deal with the resulting shadow-side. 
"Here is the source of most of our ethical conflicts. The urge to freedom beats upon the 
weakening barriers of morality: we are in a state of temptation, we want and do not want. And 
because we want and yet cannot think out what it is we really want, the conflict is largely 
unconscious, and thence comes neurosis. Neurosis, therefore, is intimately bound up with the 
problem of our time and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the individual 
to solve-the-general problem in his own-person;-Neurosis is self-division, In most-people the 
cause of the division is that the conscious mind wants to hang on to its moral ideal, while the 
unconscious strives after its - in the contemporary sense - unmoral ideal which the conscious 
mind tries to deny. "25 
For Jung, as for Augustine and Freud, self-division is essentially a problem of morality. However, 
Jung conceives the nature of the moral problem differently from the authors we have met so far. 
Augustine thought that moral self-division could be healed by empowering the will, whilst for 
Freud moral tension was a problem to be addressed by strengthening the rational ego. Both these 
are seen by Jung as misguide4 strategies of control. In Jung's psychology the conscious person 
cannot correct his self-division: by willing or by reason, for he really does not possess the 
22cf. Jacobi p102. 
23~11 para. 129ff. 
2~11 para. 129. 
25CYJ.7 para. 428. 
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unconscious impulses. Thrust out from the conscious psyche these impulses have become 
"autonomous complexes"26, Our selves are more deeply divided than either Augustine or Freud 
had allowed. As we shall see later, Jung's solution to the self-division of "modem man" cannot be 
at the level of mere consciousness or rationality. It must be through a profound acceptance of 
ourselves mediated at 'the level of symbol, which Jung considered to be deeper than both of these. 
3.3 Ei<> 
Unfortunately the majority of modem people, whom Jung disparagingly calls "mass man", do not 
make it even this far on the psychological journey to maturity. 27 Mass man does not face up to his 
need to assimilate the unconscious and integrate his personality. He is happy to identify himself 
with his persona. He lives according to the dictates of "the State" or "Society". He can happily 
project his own shadow onto society at large so that he has no problems of his own; society alone 
has problems and is responsible for the malaise of the world. However, there are a few who do 
attempt to come to term with the shadow. In the process these people differentiate and becomes 
aware of an ego that is distinct from the persona. 
The ego is the focal point of consciousness. It is that part of the mind that is able to form 
representations of the external world. It is what we refer to when we use the words "I" or "me". 
The ego carries our conscious awareness of existing, together with our continuing sense of 
personal identity. It is the conscious organiser of our thoughts, intuitions, feelings and sensations, 
and it has access to those memories that are unrepressed. The ego is also the bearer of 
personality. It mediates between external reality and the inner world, the objective and the 
subjective realms of experience. Whereas the persona is a somewhat inauthentic representation of 
the person that is moulded to fit the expectations of others, the ego is truly "me" insofar as I am a 
conscious;-rational being. 
However, the ego is by no means either the entirety or the essence of the psyche. It was born out 
of the unconscious and stands to the unconscious as "the moved to the mover, or as object to 
subject".28 The ego lies near the surface of the personality, rather distant from the deep centre 
within. 29 The ego-personality is pnly a, part of the whole person, and its life does not represent the 
' total life of the psyche. Indeed the m9re one is merely, "I", the more one risks splitting the ego 
from the collective unconscious. Wh~reas: for Freud becoming whole is a matter of becoming 
rational for Jung it is a matter of inte~ating one's ordinary rationality within a higher symbolic 
goal. 
2~ para. 435. 
27QY8 para. 409f. 
28.Q¥:11 para. 391. 
29Jacobi (1943) pl08f. 
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Jung equates the ego with the realm of consciousness. This, unfortunately, makes it difficult for 
him to conceptualise unconscious components of the ego. There is therefore no formal equivalent 
in lung's system to the important Freudian notion of the mechanisms of defence, whereby the ego 
unconsciously colludes in repression. 
3.4 The Archet)!pes of the Unconscious 
Further psychological growth involves meeting and coming to terms with additional aspects of the 
unconscious, manifested to us in certain archetypal ways. In his later works J ung spoke of 
"archetypes" as genetically transmitted predispositions to perceive and order experience in 
particular ways. The archetypes may, in this sense, be considered to be to the unconscious mind 
what Kant's categories are to the conscious mind. 30 But in his earlier works Jung did not 
distinguish between the archetypes themselves and the images they produced, and I will follow 
this earlier, popular usage.31 Jung thought that the images tend to manifest themselves in a 
particular order as follows. 
3.4.1 The Anima (Animus) 
The first archetype to arise32 is the anima for men or the animus for women. Jung suggests that 
men and women carry with them an ideal image of the opposite sex. They experience this image 
as a semi-autonomous or even completely autonomous "personality" within their unconscious. 
Failure to attend to the anima (animus) may lead to the male being caught out by unexpected 
"female" behaviour and vice versa. Moreover, the person will unconsciously project this ideal 
onto members of the opposite sex who will be implicitly judged in accordance with it. The person 
must therefore engage in dialogue with the anima (animus) so as to neutralise its power. In so 
doing he or she further expands and unites his or her personality. After Jung we perhaps accept 
more reamty-the idea that -"wnole" men or women will contain and will value-qualities within 
themselves that have traditionally been associated with the opposite sex.33 
' 
3.4.2 The Mana Personali~4 
In lung's scheme a "mana" persqnality is one who possesses extraordinarily effective power. The 
mana may take the fonn of the chief, the magician, the medicine-man or the saint, but especially 
30QY8 para. 342. 
31 Jung made the distinction to defend himself against charges of Lamarckism. (Ref. Stevens 1990 
pp36-38.) 
32Altematively one may, and Jung sometimes did, take the shadow as the first archetype. 
However, the shadow is a rather special case and does not possess the "personality" of the other 
archetypes. On the role of the anima and animus see especially Ch. 2 of Part 2 of the Second of 
the Iwo essays in f:i:/.7 pp186-209. 
33Jung's notion of the animus/anima has been subject to severe criticism from feminists. His 
critics rightly point out that Jung fails to notice how far ideals of manhood and womanhood are 
culturally conditioned rather than genetically or archetypally detennined. See, e.g., Naomi 
Goldenberg "A Feminist Critique of Jung" in eds. Moore and Meckel (1990). 
34see especially Two Essays CYi.,7 pp225-239 and Jacobi pp 115-117. 
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the form of the Wise Old Man (for men) or the Great Mother (for women). The mana represents a 
kind of primordial image for one's personality. In the encounter with the anima (animus) one 
came to terms with the contrasexual components of the unconscious; now one encounters the 
same sex elements. To deal with these successfully is to achieve liberation from one's psychic 
parentage, and with this comes the first genuine sense'oftrue individuality. 
Ttte person here faces a serious risk of what Jung calls "inflation", that is an identification of the 
ego with the mana, leading to delusions of grandeur and godlike pretensions. In this case the ego 
has effectively been subsumed by the mana. Rather, the ego must meet the forces of the mana, 
assimilate and draw strength from them, and yet also differentiate itself from the mana. If this is 
done successfully, the way lies open for the final step of the way, the formation of the Self, the 
"central archetype "3S. 
3.4.3 The Self6 
The assimilation of the contents of the mana personality leads to the discovery of "an actual, 
living something, poised between two world-pictures ... strange to us and yet so near, wholly 
ourselves and yet unknowable, a virtual centre ..... 37 This deep inner centre is what Jung calls the 
"Self'. Lying largely outside the realm of consciousness, the Self. cannot be grasped by the 
rational understanding of consciousness. Realisation of the Self is our destiny, the most complete 
expression of our individuality. Seen from the end-point of the journey we also realise that the 
Self is our beginning; it is that voice that all along had been calling us along the way · of 
individuation. Perhaps the Self is best expressed by the notion of voeation38, for the Self is what 
nature initially intends us to be, the inner voice that guides our life journey, and the fulfilment of 
that journey. 
The Self is not merely the deep centre of the psyche, but it is also its totality. In Jung's words, 
"When we now speak of man we mean the indefinable whole of him .. .I have chosen the term 
"Self' to designate the totality of man, the sum total of his conscious and unconscious 
contents. "39 In everyday language we frequently distinguish the two concepts of centre and 
totality, using "self' to mean the essence of a person accessible only to reflexive introspection, 
and "person" to refer to the fullness or whole of the indivi~uai.40 lung's notion of the Self 
3SQY18 para. 1158. 
36see especially Two EsSftYS f:J:/.7 paras. 398-406. 
37QJt7 para. 398. 
38Inteuatio0 of the Personality p291ff. 
39QJtll para. 140. 
40See for example the distinction made by Michael Carrithers in "An alternative social history of 
the self', Ch. 11 of ed. Carrithers et. al. (1985). 
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embodies both these aspects of the psyche. His concept of the Self may be likened to a circle that 
may be defined either by the location of its centre or by the area within its circumference. 41 
But there appears to be a problem here, for if the Self is a largely unconscious entity how can the 
ego know where the boundary of the self lies? Jung replies to this objection: 
"Since this growth of personality comes out of the unconscious, which is by definition 
unlimited, the extent of the personality now realising itself cannot in practice [sub. 'in 
theory'?] be limited either. But unlike the Freudian superego it is still individual. It is in fact 
individuality in the highest sense, and therefore theoretically [sub. "practically"?] limited, 
since no individual can possibly display every quality."42 
We might take this to mean that, viewed from the perspective of the collective unconscious, or the 
collective human gene pool, the individual Self is theoretically without limit, for any person 
might, if he or she lived long enough, develop the whole potential of the human genome. 
However, viewed from the perspective of an individual, the Self does have definite practical limits 
that are determined by those elements of the genetic inheritance that the individual ego fosters 
over a finite life span. But the ego could never know even what the practical limits to the Self are, 
since it is unaware of the totality of the genetic inheritance. The boundary to the Self might 
therefore best be conceived, from the point of view of the ego, as an asymptote to which the 
individual tends. It remains transcendent to the ego, but in the highly individuated person, the ego 
can get a "fix" on the Self to a good degree of accuracy. 
The ego's relation to the Self stands, says Jung, as the relation of the earth to the sun.43 The ego 
came into being from -the Self. It is-of-a smaller degree-of-magnitude-than the Self~ Whilst the-ego 
I 
is the pnly portion of the totality that is intelligible to us, the ego finds its orientation in relation to 
the Self. For lung the integration of the Self means bringing the ego into a proper relation with the 
Self. The ego must "sacrifice" its claims to be the entirety of the person.44 If it does this a proper 
balance and harmony is achieved between the conscious and the unconscious. Failure to do so 
means the impoverishment of the ego and the risk of autonomous "complexes" developing in the 
unconscious as a compensation for the neglect of the unconscious regions of the psyche. The ego 
and the Self are listed in the General Index to Jung's works as "opposites" and their relation 
cannot, consequently, easily be stated in unambigqous terms. lung wants to say both that the ego 
I 
is the object of the self (supra.) and also that the healthy ego has some autonomy from the self -
4l,CW9(i) para. 634; ,CW 12 para. 44. 
42QYtl para. 390. 
43f::K1 para. 405. 
44ne theme of sacrifice is a favourite of Jung's. See for example, Ch 8 of Symbols of 
Tmnsformation (0\!5) and the essay "Transforma~on Symbolism in the Mass" (QY.ll). 
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for the collapse of the ego into the self is psychosis. Later JungiWls have attempted to describe the 
relationship between the two in terms of an ego-Self "axis". 45 
Since the Self is essentially transcendent to understanding, formal description of it is difficult. 
Stevens descri~s it' ~ the "organising genius behind the personality" 46 but the term 
"organisation" coMotes more rationality than Jung wants to ascribe to the Self. Following Jacobi 
we should note that the unconscious is "purest nature without intention, with merely a 'potential 
directedness"'47 Insofar as it participates in the unconscious the Self has an "invisible, iMer order 
of its own"48, but this is not the moral or rational order of consciousness. 
Jung's notion of the Self throws an interesting perspective on a number of ChristiWl theological 
categories that relate to the growth of the human person. According to Jung each individual is 
psychologically deeply related to others through their common participation in the trans-personal 
unconscious. This would be one way of making sense of corporatist elements in the Christian 
understanding, including the AugustiniWl doctrine of original sin. Indeed Jung describes original 
sin as "an emotional fact"49; "of profound therapeutic significance"SO; a "salutary dogma. .. which 
is yet so prodigiously true"Sl, Jung understood that the identity of the individual self is bound up 
with the identity of humanity (cf. Hebrew "Adam"). The re-creation or redemption of an 
individual would thus seem to require that the person can re-image him or herself as part of a new 
humanity. Christian baptism and incorporation into Christ might, following JungiWl categories, be 
envisaged as operating at the level of the corporate unconscious. Baptism, for example, might be 
conceived as a sacrament that offers, through a shared archetypal experience, ways of being 
human by which a whole people can learn to remember and understand itself in a new light. The 
process of spiritual and psychological growth would at the same time involve growing into one's 
unique Selffiooo and also drawlnjfincreasingly-on the-shared inheritance of the-"corporate self'. 
As we shall see in due course this provides a useful way of thinking about the Christian notion of 
life in the Spirit (Section 8 and Chapter 7 below). 
4. lndjyjduatjon as an Eyplutipnary Process 
Heavily influenced, as Freud hl\(1 beep, by Darwin's theory of evolution, Jung liked to link the 
psychological development of tile individual to the evolution of the species as a whole. He saw 
I : 
the psychological growth of the individual as a small-scale reflection of the psychic development 
of humanity. We may distinguish within tbis history four stages: the primitive, the ancient, the 
4S.Samuels (1985) p90. 
4~Stevens (1990) p4l. 
47Jacobi (1943) p115. 
48Jacobi p115. 
490¥.16 para. 186 
SOQ¥. 16 para. 186 
Sl~ 7 para. 35. 
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modern and the contemporary52, The passage from one stage to another reflects the inexorable 
process of individuation working itself out in the manner that I shall now describe. 
1. The earliest, "primitive", state is discussed widely by Jung.53 Jung takes it that in its earliest 
condition humanity lacked fu1n boundaries between the self and the outside world. (This is 
consistent with the argument I put forward in chapter one that the notion of the self only arises 
within particular cuhural traditions.) Jung suggests that the primitive tribesman lacked a sense of 
individuality but acted together with other members of his tribe as part of a "herd"54. He 
projected himself onto external reality, endowing the realm of nature with divine or demonic 
powers. Like Rousseau's "natural man", Jung's primitive has a high degree of native psychological 
wholeness. This state corresponds with human infancy in which, as babies, we do not yet have a 
sense of self independent of the mother.ss 
2. To illustrate his second phase, Jung groups together the great pre-modern human civilisations 
from the Mesopotamian to the Christian and Muslim eras. In this "ancient" state the conscious 
ego emerges and the person becomes aware of himself as a conscious "I". The ancient state 
corresponds to our childhood. The emergence of the ego entails a division within the psyche 
between a region of consciousness and the wider unconscious. This division is, however, as yet 
not problematic, for the sacred images and ritual of religion (or the fantasy worlds of the child) 
provide a safe way of satisfying the irrational forces of the unconscious. 56 
3. The modern era corresponds not, interestingly, with our adulthood but with our adolescence57. 
The modern person develops a high degree of rationality, but purchases this at the expense of the 
neglect or even the rejection of the unconscious and emotional parts of the self. Religion, which 
had-previously satisfied-the irrational--components of our selves, now becomes -hardened into 
dogma and can no longer meet the natural needs of the unconscious. The person may become 
isolated from the inner world of irra~onality, subjecf.ivity and emotion.58 Our failure to accept 
these elements in ourselves may ,ead us to project lbem onto others in disastrous ways. 59 
4. The remedy for our modern cpnditi9n is the evolution of a fourth level of psychic functioning, 
the "contemporary"60. Contemporaries are FtOt sat~sfied with the somewhat flat, two-dimensional 
S2so Segal (1992) p11ff. 
S3Especially the essay "Archaic Man" in ~10. 
54QY10 para. 160. 
ss~s para. 757. 
S6so, e.g., QYtl para. 82. 
57QY8 para. 756. 
58E.g . .cl:Y,S Ch. 2, "Two ways of Thinking". 
59J>reface to First Edition of Two essAYs in r:::JiJ. 
6~y distinction between "moderns" and "contemporaries" is similar to Homans' distinction 
between "modern" and "Jungian" man (1979 p185t). 
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way of living that characterises the modem period. Yet they do not wish to return to the sterile 
dogmas of the religions. Instead they are turning inward to discover the resources available to 
them from within the depths of the psyche. These people are willing to use and reinterpret the 
symbols of the traditional religions in the light of analytical psychology.61 They may thus 
discover a new level of psychic wholeness in which the unconscious and conscious are reunited in 
the formation of the Self. Contemporaries attain to psychological adulthood. 
Jung posits a model of the human psyche in which consciousness evolves out of a generic 
unconsciousness and then returns to it. The evolutionary stages of the psyche correspond to the 
development of the healthy individual, although Jung believed that only a few attain to psychic 
health. Human development involves the differentiation or division of consciousness from the 
unconscious and their reuniting at a higher level. The process is dialectical in that, while 
consciousness first needs to differentiate itself precisely in order to be consciousness, it must also 
return to the unconscious to draw energy and, so to speak, find its proper place in the collective 
world. For Jung, there is a natural tendency to wholeness in the evolution of the species that 
reflects on a macro scale the attainment of a unified self in each person. 
In the important work Symbols gf Iransfprmatign Jung illustrated the process of individuation 
with the powerful image of the rising and setting sun. At sunrise the baby begins life with an 
unconscious identity that is bound up with the mother. In the morning of life the young man 
leaves his parents and makes his own way in the world. In mid-life he may experience a crisis as 
the instincts of youth give way to cultural and religious interests. The sun's descent marks the 
return of the individual to the unconscious mythical "land of the mothers". Much of Symbols of 
Transformation is taken up with the ambivalent attitude towards the unconscious, the symbolic 
mother, which-characterisesthis-leaving and-return. 
The sun image conveys the physical, biological, inevitability of the process. Jung later wrote on 
this, "Whatever man's wholeness, or the Self, may mean per se, empirically it is an image of the 
goal of life spontaneously produced by the unconscious, irrespective of the wishes and fears of 
the conscious mind. It stands for the goal of the total man ... with or without the consent of his will. 
Tlte dfDamiC of this process is instinct .. "62 Individuation is therefore the fundamental instinctive 
drive 11pringing from our unconscious. It is formally analogous to Augustine's desire of God or 
Freud's libido drive. Our attitude to it is of determinative significance for our psychological 
health. 
61~5 para. 340: "The medical psychotherapist today must make clear to his more educated 
patients the foundations of religious experience, and set them on the road to where such an 
experi~nce becomes possible .•. my sole purpose is to conserve, through understanding, the values 
[religipus symbols) represent and to enable people to think symbolically once more." 
6~11 para. 745. 
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The individuation drive works itself out whether we attend to it or not. Consciousness will 
inevitably return to unconsciousness in death. But a person whose life is marked by ignorance or 
repression of the unconscious will be altogether less complete or whole than someone who is 
reconciled to and lives in harmony with the unconscious. lung wrote: "The difference between the 
'natural' individuation process, which runs its course unconsciously, and the one which is 
consciously realised, is tremendous. In the first case consciousness nowhere intervenes; the end 
remains as dark as the beginning. In the second case so much darkness comes to light that the 
personality is penneated with light, and consciousness necessarily gains in scope and insight. "63 
The sun image highlights the importance of the second half of life, for it is this stage when the 
person must try to make some accommodation between consciousness and the demands of the 
unconscious. Jungian psychology can thus be seen as complementary to Freudian psychology 
which, with its emphasis on sexuality, would seem to be more relevant to the first half of life. But 
there are a number of problems with Jung's image that he never fully resolves, and that reduce the 
power of his psychology to unify the self. These arise from his talk on the one hand about a 
psychological life characterised by continuous growth and progress and his attempt on the other 
hand to illustrate this life with an image that is symmetrical about its mid-point 
We may ask what strategy Jung's young man setting out on life should adopt in order to fmd a 
unified sense of self. He might attempt an immediate reconciliation of his ego with the 
unconscious. But if he does this will he will short-circuit the process of psychological growth and 
enter a period of pre-mature psychological old~age. He might, alternatively, attempt to develop 
the strongest possible ego and neglect the unconscious. He might reason with himself that this 
givesliirn- the best possible-long~term-outcome· consisting-of-a strong-ego-reconciled with-its· 
unconscious. But. if he is a good Jungian, he will know that this involves a very considerable 
short and medium tenn loss of psychic wholeness. He must d~liberately precipitate the largest 
possible mid-life crisis. But he may not know the level of psyc~ological crisis he can withstand 
without breaking down. And how far can he reasonably be expectep to act against his own 
medium tenn interests in favour of a long-tenn interest? Will he not experiepce ll considerable 
amount of self-division as he contemplates these unenviable alternatives?64 
Turning to Jung's older man, we may similarly enquire as to the strategy he should adopt. How, 
exactly, is the sunset of his life distinguished from the sunrise? When the old man feels he should 
63.C,W:tl para. 756. 
64Some Jungians, perhaps aware of this kind of problem have followed E. Edinger ffigo and 
Archel)!pe Penguin 1972) in arguing thatrather than see the ego's parting from and return to the 
Self as a life-project, the ego should be seen as continually separating from and reuniting with the 
Self as it maintains the tension of the ego-Self axis. 
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surrender part of the ego to the demands of the unconscious how can he know whether this marks 
a return to infantilism or an advance into wholeness? Jung once remarked that "the way up and 
the way down are the same"6S. But it cannot be precisely the same if it is to be an advance. Jung 
did not regard the state of infantile or "primitive" wholeness as something to which we should 
aspife.66 But he was never able to give a fully satisfactory description of how our final state of 
wholeness differs from our initial state and of what means we should adopt to arrive at one rather 
than the other. These problems derive, ultimately, from Jung's inability to give much rational 
precision to what he means by the coincidence of opposites within the personality. 
To press Jung's psychology to this degree is to ask rational questions of it which, I admit, seem ill-
suited to its ethos. Jung was not a philosopher and we may violate his insights by expecting too 
much philosophical precision from him. What I am trying to do is to point to the limits of the 
validity of Jung's way of describing the development of the self. 
S. lpdjyiduatiop as the Process of Becomioe ap lpdiyidual 
The realisation of the Self marks, in certain respects, the antithesis of the persona. A person who 
is conscious only of his or her persona lives according to the norms, conventions and rules 
imposed by the collective conscious or society. The fully individuated person, by contrast, lives in 
harmony with the deep, inner collective unconscious. He does not live according to shared laws 
but according to his own law. "He has cancelled the validity of all other ways for himself. He has 
placed his law l,lbove !Jll conventions and so has shoved aside, as far as he is concerned, all those 
things that not oqly ~ to prevent the great danger but actually brought it on. "67 Individuation 
shatters the per~na and the norms of society in favour of the Self and individual vocation. The 
obvious example to illustrate Jung's point here would be Nietzsche's Superman. Jung, prefers, no 
doubt for rhetorical-reasons, to-choose-Christ-as his leading-example of this-phenomenon. Christ, 
on this account, was the solitary genius who took on the tyranny of the Roman empire and fought 
with it, in spiritualised form, in the wilderness temptation story.68 
Fulfilling one's need to become an individual is a major theme in Jung's psychology. It is most 
helpfully explicated by looking at how this need developed and was resolved in Jung's own 
relationship with Freud. Jung's relationship with Sigmund Freud was of decisive importance for 
the development of his psychology. In his autobiography <MDR) Jung discusses only three 
personal relationships at any length: those with his mother, his father and Freud. His relationship 
with Freud merits a whole section in M.QR. and Jung describes him as the first man of real 
65~6 para. 708 in a reference to Heraclitus. 
66~11 para. 264 "There is nothing particularly admirable about it [the primitive's wholeness]". 
It is the same old unconsciousness, apathy and filth." 
67The Inteuation of the Personality p295. 
68The Integration of the Personality page 297. 
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importance that he met in life.69 What Jung means by individuation is illuminated by reviewing 
how Jung's own identity was formed through attachment to and later breaking away from Freud.70 
lung's Differentiation of his own Self from Freud's Self 
In the initial stages of their relationship Jung seemed to derive his sense of identity predominantly 
from his attachment to Freud. Jung's first meeting with Freud took place in February 1907 and, if 
the aged Jung's memory is to be believed, lasted 13 hours.71 The relationship rapidly became an 
extraordinarily intense one72. Freud quickly assumed the role of a father figure for Jung73, Freud's 
greeting in correspondence to Jung progressively warmed from "Dear colleague", through, "Dear 
friend", to "My dear friend" and "My dear friend and heir". The climax of their relationship was 
a seven week Uip to the United States during which they were together every day and analysed 
each others dreams.74 This must have been a remarkably concentrated experience in which each 
encountered himself in the other over a prolonged length of time. 
Jung's natural father had been a weak man, someone whom Jung regarded himself as 
compensating for, rather than imitating. In Freud, Jung found the powerful father figure he had 
previously lacked. From 1907-1911 Jung's written work was strongly Freudian in character. Jung 
was content to identify professionally with Freud as a psychoanalyst and to be groomed as Freud's 
successor in the psychoanalytic movement. He learned to see himself as Freud saw him, in the 
language of Freudian psychoanalysis. During this period he gained his own identity, to some 
considerable extent, from a kind of psychological merger with Freud. 
Jung's break with Freud has usually been portrayed as either the refusal by a rebellious "Son" to 
accept the disciplines of psychoanalysis or else as the inability of a doctrinaire "Father" to accept 
the-junior man's-insights:-The latter·inhe picture-Jung·himselfpaints in MD&. in one-of-his last 
letters to Freud7S and in his ~ntly r~leas~ correspondence with Jolande Jacobi76, However, it 
may be that the break is better ~n as the outcome of Jung's attempts to transfer his idealising 
tendencies from Freud to his own self. ln!jtead of finding esteem from his intimate relationship 
with Freud, Jung began to seek esteelll from the realm of his own thoughts and psychic images. 
The value he had placed on Freud was transferred to his own psyche. In other words he 
romanticised and absolutised his own thoughts. Jung's need for heightened self-esteem took the 
form of a fusion between his own ideas and religious mythology - the language of ultimate 
69MOR (Fontana) p 172. 
70Jiomans (pp38-43) offers a particularly interesting account of this process with reference to 
Heinz Kohut's psychology of narcissism. 
?l.MIJR (Fontana) p172. 
72Letters 17J, 39J, 49J, 87F. 
73Letter 72J 
74.M.QR (Fontana) p181. 
75J.etter 330J dated December 1912. 
76Hitherto unpublished collection of letters sold at Sotheby's in May 1994. 
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concerns. This provides a highly plausible explanation of the form of Symbols of Transformation. 
This work is to be understood, as Emma lung noted in a letter to Freud dated November 1911, as 
lung's own self-analysis.77 Its rambling, almost unreadable style, results from lung's grandiose 
~sposition of his own thoughts onto a cosmic level. 
Freud's failure to give his approval to Jung's mythological work was a deep blow to Jung's self-
esteem. Jung now determined to cut himself free from Freud and rebuild a sense of self 
independently of Freud. The period 1913-18 is therefore marked by lung's most intense 
concentration on the self. lung continued here the process he began with Symbols of 
Transformation of encountering mythological images, struggling to avoid being taken over by 
them, and finally establishing appropriate distance from them. The most important means by 
which he did this was to designate the figures thrown up by his unconscious as archetypes. In so 
doing he was able to "place" his self relative to these figures and so drain them of their power 
over him. By coming to terms with the grandiose myths Jung established his own self-identity. 
The dangers Jung experienced during this period were of either identifying himself with the myths 
and so producing a grandiose sense of self, what he called "inflation", or else of abandoning the 
attempno build a self, what he called living as a mere persona. 
The individuation process can be regarded as having its origins in lung's struggle to establish a 
sense of self after he had broken with Freud. Individuation is thus primarily a matter of 
developing a sense of individuality vis-a-vis some significant "other". The task is prototypically 
one of coming to terms with some "other" with whom one has merged, although the method has 
more general application to the task of differentiating oneself from the mass. The process 
involves working out one's conflicts at the level of a dialogue with internal objects such that one 
can-build a proper-sense of "otherness" from them and-hence-form a coherent and-independent 
sense of self. lung suggests that the unity of the self is attained by both, on · the one hand, 
acknowledging the psychic inheritance we share with others and also, on the other hand, by 
establishing boundaries between self and others. 
Whilst Jung denies that individuation is an individualistic enterprise78, the focus of lung's 
psychology was on establishing the individual's proper relation to internal objects rather than on 
maintaining relationships in society. One can take this as offering a valuable complement to 
contemporary post-Freudian object relations psychologies which focus on the person's relations 
with "external objects". However, by itself I think lung's method does not take the social aspects 
of personhood sufficiently seriously. lung's "Self' is not a construct that is intended primarily to 
enable one to participate actively in society but rather aims to give one a sense of invulnerability 
77McGuire (1991) p247. 
78f:J/J para. 267f. 
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in the face of threatening others, in Jung's words, "an attitude that is beyond the reach of 
emotional entanglements and violent shocks- a consciousness detached from the world"79, It is 
appropriately symbolised, as Jung said, by the Tower he built himself at Bollingen: a secluded, 
enclosed fortress. 80 This seems to me an unattractive symbol of the unity of the self: the form of 
wholeness which we should seek is, I think, more appropriately pictured as open and dynamic, 
rather than self-enclosed and static. If we are social beings then, whilst boundaries are important, 
wholeness is more likely to arise from a readiness to enter into relationship rather than from an 
attitude of detachment. 
6. lpdiyiduatiop as Upjop of the Opposjtes of Good apd Eyil 
Jung held that individuation comprises the reconciliation of opposites, and of particular interest to 
me is his important but problematical contention that this includes reconciling the opposites of 
good and evil. Jung's view of evil was extensively explored in his correspondence with the 
Dominican theology professor Victor White: eventually the two friends found their perspectives 
irreconcilable81. In large part this aspect of Jung's thought stems from his negative childhood 
experiences of Christianity and from his negative experience of the Christian sexual ethic insofar 
as it related to his own married life. These experiences seem to have convinced him that the one-
sided pursuit of spiritual goods could be psychologically harmfut82 
Jung, like Freud, complained that the Christian sexual ethic was repressive and that psychological 
health required a more permissive ideal. But whereas Freud thought that greater freedom might be 
achieved by reducing the power of religion, Jung thought that only a transformation of religion 
could have the desired effect. 83 Whereas Freud envisaged a battle between the libido and the 
demands of moi'Qlity that would tend to pull the self apart, Jung aimed to find a new religious 
ethic that would-draw-together-morality and-sensuality-and hence unify the-self-.-
Jung sought for a new myth that did not exalt goodness and virtue as its highest ends but would, 
by contrast. allow for a high degree of sensual enjoyment. He worked out this myth during a 
series of psychotic-like visions and dreams over the period 1913-17. This interval is generally 
regarded as his most important and creative period. Jung himself says of it: "The years when I 
was pursuing my inner images were the most important in my life - in them everything essential 
79~13 para. 68. · 
80MQR Ch. VIII pp250-252 (FoJ.1tana), 
81Ref. Charet. 
82por the former see .MDR Chs.J-III and Storr (1973) Ch. 1; for the latter see the Freud/Jung 
correspondence, especially lette~ 17 SJ and 178J. 
83"J think we must give [psychoanalysis] time to infiltrate into people ... ever so gently to 
transform Christ back into the ~oothsaying god of the vine ... A genuine and proper ethical 
development .cannot abaqdon Christianity but must grow up within it. .. " (Letter 178J). 
I 
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was decided ... All my works, all my creative activity, has come from those initial fantasies and 
dreams"84• 
I want here to focus on just one of these episodes, the strange composition of the "Seven Sermons 
to the Dead", which offers what I think is Jung's strongest mythological statement of individuation 
as a union of good and evil. The Sermons contain a good deal of Gnostic imagery and allow Jung 
to situate his own ethic in a venerable tradition of thought85. The myth was composed in 1916 but 
Jung, fearing that it would condemn him as a "mystic", barred its inclusion in the Complete 
Works, and it was not publicly available until 1962. Perhaps because of their bizarre imagery 
lung's commentators have not always given the Sermons the attention they deserve86, In fact they 
are of considerable importance in understanding Jung's central concept of individuation. Jung 
himself credits this episode with nothing less than being a key to his life's work. 87 
The "Sermons" are of interest not just because of their content but also because of their form. 
lung was convinced that if people were to become whole they needed a myth by which they could 
make sense of. their lives. Rational philosophical (or Freudian analytical) principles are not 
enough, for they do not speak to the non-rational and a-moral parts of the self. If these aspects are 
to be properly integrated into the self, we need to be addressed by religious or mythological 
symbolism which resonates with the products of the unconscious. lung's criticism of Christian 
orthodoxy was that its imagery had become hardened into dogmatic and moral norms, and that 
Christianity had hence lost its power to address and integrate the whole self. In the "Sermons" we 
have lung's own attempt to create a myth which regains contact with primitive religious 
symbolism and which overcomes the allegedly one-sided emphasis on rationality and morality to 
which Christianity had fallen prey. 
The Seyen Sermons to the Dead 
The Seven Sermons are lung's interpretation of a highly dramatic "haunting" qf Jung's household 
that happened in 1906 and that is graphically recorded in his au~obiography88, Jung came from a 
family which had a history of parapsychological experience, and he wrote his Ph.D on the basis of 
his observations of seances conducted by his cousin Helene Preiswerk, a spiritualist medium. 
That Jung himself should be the subject of parapsychological experience is, therefore, not 
surprising. The main characters in the episode are "the dead", the ghosts of dead Christians who 
84MDR (Fontana) p225 & 217. 
85 Although lung mis- (or re-) interprets the Gnostic tradition in a number of ways. Most notably, 
lung takes the psychological goal to be the reconciliation of the light and dark parts of the self, 
whereas, for the Gnostics, the goal was the liberation of the light from the darkness. 
86Homans (1979) and Storr (197~) fail to mention them, and Stevens (1990) only cites them as 
evidence of lung's mental instability (Rl73). 
87MQR (Fontana) p217. 
88MQRp215. 
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are haunting Jung's household, and the Alexandrian Gnostic Basilides. The Sermons are to be 
understood both parapsychologically and psychologically89, Parapsychologically Jung is either 
channelling Basilides or using Basilides to address the dead. Psychologically, it is not Basilides 
but Jung who is talking, and the dead are not other persons but lung's own .unconscious. The dead 
come from Jerusalem, the birthplace of Christianity: where they "found not what they sought". 
They are Christians who lived and died according to a myth that did not answer their real needs. 
They have sought out Basilides (Jung) because he is able to answer their questions. Basilides' 
response takes the characteristically Gnostic fonn of a creation myth. 
In the beginning was the godhead, or pleroma, which stands for primordial unconsciousness. We 
created beings have an ambivalent relationship with the pleroma. On the one hand we "are the 
pleroma itself' (Sennon 1 ), for we never break wholly from our origins. On the other hand we 
"are from the pleroma infinitely removed" (Sennon 1), for we do gain autonomy. Psychological 
growth requires both independence from the unconscious, attained in the first half of life, and 
reconnection with the unconscious - the goal of the second half of life. The task of the creature is 
to differentiate itself from the Pleroma. Differentiation is synonymous with individuation, the 
"PRINCIPIUM INDIVDUATIONIS" (Sermon 1). In the first half of life this involves differentiation of 
the external world from the unconscious and in the second half it requires differentiation of the 
parts of the unconscious. 
The Pleroma comprises latent and undifferentiated pairs of opposites, notably "good and evil" 
(Sennon 1). Whilst the initial task of the creature is to separate out the sides of each opposite, our 
final task is to integrate both sides of all opposites. Integration means neither effacing the 
differences between each quality, nor cultivating only one side of each pair, but cultivating a 
sense of balance between the opposites. This applies especially in the moral life-.- "Wheil-westiive 
after [only] the good or [only] the beautiful, we thereby forget our own nature" (Sermon 1). Our 
task is not to strive for one-sided moral virtue but to realise all the qualities that are latent within 
us. "At bottom, therefore, there is only one striving, namely, the striving after your own being" 
(Sennon 1). The realisation of being involves a full acknowledgement and integration of moral 
and aesthetic opposites. "We labour to attain to the good and the beautiful, yet at the same time 
we also lay hold of the evil and the ugly, since in the Pleroma these are one with the good and the 
beautiful" (Sennon 1). 
The ali-good god of the Christians comprises one half of a pair of opposites within the Pleroma. 
He exists together with his moral opposite the devil: "To god, therefore, always belongeth the 
devil" (Sennon 2). The highest god "Abraxas" encompasses both the ali-good god of the 
89f'ollowing Segal (1992) p 37. 
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Christians and the devil (Sennon 2). Jung offers a lengthy and bewildering description of 
Abraxas (Sennon 3) of which the following is a representative sample: 
"From Abraxas LIFB. altogether indefinite, the mother of good and evil ... 
Abraxas is 'the ~uri, and at the same time the eternally sucking gorge of the void, the 
belittling and dismembering devil. 
The power of Abraxas is two-fold; but ye see it not, because for your eyes the warring 
opposites of this power are extinguished .... 
It is splendid as the lion ... 
It is the monster of the under-world ... 
It is holy begetting. 
It is love and love's murder. 
It is the saint and his betrayer ... " 
Whereas in the Pleroma the opposites are latent, in Abraxas they are fully realised. Where the 
Pleroma represents the psychological starting point, Abraxas represents the psychological goal of 
the Self.90 As an image of the Self, Abraxas is supremely life and power. Evidently Abraxas 
includes not merely the "naughty" (holy begetting) but also the really evil (love's murder). Jung 
does not claim that this image is an attractive one, merely that it is our inevitable destiny. We do 
best by reconciling ourselves to it: "To fear it is wisdom. To resist it not is redemption." (Sennon 
3) 
The Sennons express in mythical language some of the central themes of Jung's conception of the 
fully integrated Self, which he expounds in "scientific language" in those fonnal works written 
about-the-same as-the-Sermons; namely the two-essays (-1916 and-1-7-) that were to become-the 
Iwo ESSAYs on Analytical Psycholosy and an article entitled "The Transcendent Function". In 
these wholeness is said to be the principle duty of humanity and the endpoint of the fundamental 
principle of individuation. Wholeness consists in the union of opposites, most notably in the union 
of good and evil. The pursuit of wholeness is a higher duty than the pursuit of the Good Our 
"perfection" does not lie in moral goodness but in being more fully our (morally ambiguous) 
natural selves. Wholeness is not the acquisition of health, but is 'learning to live with a balance of 
health and sickness. The individuation principle works .tself out irresistibly; our wholeness 
consists in not resisting this process. Ultimate reality is not good and beautiful but is mixed. 
' 
Jung's insistence on the reconciliation of the oppos.tes of goQd and evil in the Self is highly 
problematic and paradoxical, and I shall return to this logical problem in his work in my final 
chapter. Nonetheless, there is an important strain of Christian theology which suggests, as Jung 
90So Segal p41. 
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does, that the pursuit of moral goodness may, by itself, be inadequate or even harmful. 
Augustine's theology of grace insisted that the starting point for the spiritual life is the realisation 
that human beings are unable to achieve goodness by their own efforts. Following Augustine, 
Protestant dJeology has given a higher degree of emphasis to dJe response of faith to divine grace 
than it has to dJe pursuit of moral righteousness. Paul Tillich, who was strongly influenced by 
Jung, suggested that faith is the acceptance that we are accepted91. Faith, for Tillich, has a 
Jungian form of self-acceptance as its psychological correlate. Recently the theologian James 
Forsyth has written that "faith begins with repentance for the sin which is revealed in one's 
striving for moral perfection"92. In common with Jung, these theologians remind us that strategies 
to unify the self must start from the point ofrecognising and accepting ourselves as we are, rather 
than disowning and denying the parts of ourselves that we do not like or which do not match up to 
our ideal selves. The natural moral ambiguity of the self must be fully acknowledged if attempts 
to unify the self under some guiding moral ideal are not to lead merely to hypocrisy or self-
deception. 
However, Jung underestimates the extent to which moral progress is both desirable and possible. 
Thus, except in its extreme forms, Protestant theology has always insisted that the response of 
faith to grace leads, and must lead, to good works.93 Jung's psychology, by contrast, so stresses 
self-acceptance that moral growth and virtuous action are given too little prominence. Moreover, 
the existence of tension between the self we feel we ought to be and the self we actually 
acknowledge ourselves to be does not of itself lead to hypocrisy94 but can engender growth in 
moral goods such as endurance, perseverance and courage. I suggest that growing in wholeness is 
a matter of living with this tension. Growth is arrested if, on the one hand, the actuality of what 
we are is denied (Jung's insight) or, on the other hand, if the moral ideal is abandoned (Jung's 
weakness).· 
Z Becomin& an lpdjyid~ted Self thrgu&h Symbolism 
' . ' 
Since individuation involves britlging together entities in the personality that are essentially unlike 
each other, some medium must be found whereby these entities can be related. Ordinary language 
and rationality are clearly inadequate since they are identified with only the conscious side of the 
psyche. Freud's method, the reduction of the workings of the psyche to erotic desire is also 
inadequate since, according to Jung, this kind of desire is associated more closely with the 
unconscious side of the psyche. Jung's proppsal is that we attend to the faculty of imagination, for 
91Tillich (1952) esp. Ch. VI "Courage and Transcendence". 
92Forsyth (1989) p129. 
93See, for example, the Meissen Azreement between the Anglican and Lutheran churches par. 15, 
with reference to older Protestant confessions. 
94-fhus Loewenthal's careful review (1995 Ch. 6) of the empirical evidence indicates that whereas 
religious ideals can be abused to sanction the kind of undesirable character traits about which 
Jung is worried, there is no direct association between such traits and genuine religiosity. 
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here both conscious and unconscious components are brought together. "Imagination holds in 
itself an iJTeducible value, for it is the psychic function whose roots ramify at the same time in the 
contents of the conscious mind and of the unconscious. "95 The psychologist makes use of the 
imagination by working with the symbols that the imagination throws up in its fantasies and 
dreams. 
The significance of the symbol is quite different for Jung compared with Freud. Jung accuses 
Freud of mistaking symbols for mere signs. In Freud's analysis the dream symbols were taken to 
be products of the "censor", which needed to be decoded so that the unconscious contents to 
which they referred could be discerned. For Jung the symbol does not simply point to something 
else, but embodies within itself something that is transcendent to consciousness. Freud's dream 
symbols could only point to some psychic antecedent. Jung's symbols, on the other hand, embody 
something that is in the process of "becoming" in the future. Freud's symbols had a past causal 
significance; Jung's symbols have a future teleological significance. 
The meaning of the mind's symbols must be deduced by two levels of exploration or what Jung 
calls "amplification". Firstly one must follow the intuitive leadings and associations made to the 
symbol by the patient him or herself. Secondly, the trained therapist must draw in associations 
and possible meanings from his or her expert knowledge of world religions and myths. According 
to Jung's theory of archetypes, these meanings are not random but fall into certain archetypal 
classes. The appropriate symbolic meaning is termed by Jung the "transcendent function"96. Once 
this has been disclosed the patient must consciously act upon it. "He is obliged in truth to take the 
way of individual life which is revealed to him ... 97 The transcendent function brings together 
conscious and unconscious so as to offer the patient a new orientation to life. 
As I have indicated, the meaning of the symbols cannot be dedu~ed from rational criteria. Rather, 
their meaning is associated with what Jung calls their "intense value for life"98, that is, their value 
in furthering individuation. Their truth-content is, quite pragmatically, linked to the power and 
"sense of rightness" of the individuated life that they lead to. Discerning the meaning of a symbol 
is therefore more a mauer of intuition and feeling than rational logic. The symbol carries with it 
archetypal power and significance. Once the symbol is correctly discerned, consciousness is 
seized by its power. In believing the symbol the personality is charged with energy. The release of 
libido deriving from the symbolic union of the opposites of consciousness/unconsciousness and 
95f:K1 para. 492. 
96"The transcendent function" (1916) in QY8. 
91f:.Yi_1 para. 497. 
98~7 para. 495. 
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reason/emotion grants a new power for living. The symbol unites both "sides" of the self in a new 
orientation to life.99 
The way of individuation involves a whole series of such re-orientations until the Self is fully 
realised and integrated. Jung's psychotherapy is in no sense a one-off "cure" but a continuous 
project. It provides the "contemporary" with insight into his own unconscious from which he may 
draw strength to resist the pressures to conform that he experiences in society. Only then will he 
able to forge a persona that is authentic to his own individuality. The capacity for inner dialogue; 
learned in becoming aware of and responding to the archetypal symbols, provides the touchstone 
for a clear and objective relationship with the outer world.100 
Jung offers a highly suggestive psychological extension of the ideas about the creative 
imagination and the symbolic realm that were developed by Romantic writers such as Schelling, 
Goethe and Coleridge. As I indicated in chapter 2, these authors felt that the imagination was 
capable of privileged access to the life-giving resources of the natural realm. For them, nature was 
not simply the passive object. of reflection but was actually produced in imaginative art and 
literature. They conceived of the self as an object that was uniquely created as one sought to 
express it. In like manner, Jung argues that the Self produces itself as the ego encounters, and 
makes imaginative associations with, the symbols thrown up by the unconscious. The uniquely 
personal interaction of an individual conscious ego with archetypal symbols that are common to 
humanity yields an individualised pattern of personal growth. Access to the realm of nature is 
now available from the creative possibilities of one's own psyche. 
However, I would wish to qualify Jung's account in two ways. Firstly, symbols do not have to be 
and ought not to be radicallyinaccessible to reason-in-the-way Jung envisaged. -Schelling, Goethe 
and Coleridge all supposed that symbols gained their power by representing the transcendent in a 
finite medium. lOt The symbol ~us transcends human reason but is not thereby in conflict with it. 
An apparent contradictiqn (such as th~ symbol's reconciliation of universal and particular reality) 
is the necessary result of the lirpitation~ of the finite mind. But a symbol which contains deliberate 
logical paradoxes, such as the reconcUiation of good and evil or rationality and irrationality is 
. I 
another matter. Coleridge, for example, believed strongly that symbols are of two kinds: the 
legitimate and the illegitimate.102 The former transcend reason but the latter contradict reason. 
99r:Jt.7 para. 492. 
100~8 para. 187. 
101Schelling talks of symbols as having the quality of "representation with complete indifference, 
so that the universal is wholly the particular, and the same time the particular is wholly the 
universal". So Goethe: "That is true symbolism, where the more particular represents the more 
general, not as a dream or shade, but as a vivid, instantaneous revelation of the Inscrutable"; and 
also Coleridge who says that the symbol"partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible". 
Quoted in Perkins (1994) p48. 
102Perkins (1994) p56. 
143 
Jung: Discovering the Self through Individuation 
My view is that Jung's symbols lose adequacy and power to the extent that they tend to contradict 
reason. In terms of therapeutic value, whilst one might allow that such symbols would satisfy the 
non-rational parts of the psyche, it is hard to see how they could satisfy the rational aspects of 
ourselves. 
Secondly, we need to recognise that Jung stood quite consciously within a tradition of symbolic 
interpretation informed primarily by Gnostic and Alchemical texts. Other traditions, such as 
Christian Orthodoxy, may (and do) interpret the same symbol differently, and hence recognise the 
self to be unified in different ways. Jung argues for the validity of his own mythical tradition on 
grounds of psychological effectiveness. Whether or not this claim could be justified empirically, 
we should, at least, register the point that his tradition is but a tradition, and a somewhat arcane 
one at that The Christian should not feel constrained by Jungian psychology to abandon 
interpretations of Christian symbols according to rules arising from within his or her own 
tradition. This would apply especially to cases where Christian interpretations have a greater 
degree of logical coherence than the ones supplied by Jung. If I may give just one example, Jung 
draws on conside~ble mythological evidence to suggest that there is an original identity between 
the figure of the hero and the image of the snake.t03 He follows an esoteric (Ophite) reading of 
Jn. 3:14 to suggest that the Christian scriptures fall within this pattern by showing the snake to be 
a symbol of Christ. His inference is that there is a primal unity between good and evil, between 
Yahweh and Satan. But taken within the broader context of Johannine typology it seems clear that 
Jn. 3:14 is primarily conceJ:Oed with the salvific power of Christ and that the point of the 
comparison is not the snake but the "exaltation". St John, and Christian orthodoxy in general, 
indicate a primary opposition between darkness and light, good and evil. Thet:e seem to be few 
good reasons why Christians should abandon their traditional reading of such a verse in favour of 
~a -Jungian reading which-is ~not only~ less- consonant~ with the context but-which-also yields· the 
paradox that good and evil are essentially united. Both the Christian and the Jungian 
interpretations recognise that the religious symbol of the exalted Christ has the power to save and 
heal, but whereas the latter sees this as referring to the union of good and evil in the self, the 
former sees it as achieved through a joining of the person to Christ, the source of goodness (so Jn 
3:15). 
8. The Spirit as Symbol Qf Inteeration 
In Jung's psychology religious symbols provide the crucial bridge between consciousness and the 
powers of the unconscious. They do this without prejudice Jo the question of whether the entities 
they purport to represent have any existence outside the psyf;:he.104 Jung finds that the God-image 
103~5 para 575ff. 
104E.g. Jung's reply to a certain Robert Smith concerning his bitter disagreement with Martin 
Buber began, "Buber and I start from an entirely different basis; I make no transcendental 
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is a traditional symbol of the Self, albeit that it is better suited to "ancients" than to 
"contemporaries" .lOS Unfortunately Jung finds that the primary Christian symbols of the Trinity 
and of the Christ-figure are inadequate inasmuch as he feels that they do not take sufficiently 
seriously the irrational and morally dubious components of the self.106, Jung's proposals for 
revising the Christian docUines of the Trinity and the Incarnation so that God includes an evil 
component are unpromising for orthodox Christians. Christians may, however, be able to do more 
with Jung's positive assessment of the docUine of the Holy Spirit For Jung, the symbol of spirit is 
a "psychic complex that contains the seeds of incalculable possibilities"107; it is a living symbol 
par excellence. Jung thinks that the truth of the Christian doctrine of the Spirit, in psychological 
terms, corresponds to the final stage in the growth of the psyche. The relation of the individual 
believer to the mysterious divine Spirit may be taken as a means of "articulating one's ego-
consciousness with a superordinate totality"108. Christian talk of "life in the Spirit" is to be 
understood psychologically as referring to the realisation of the Self. 
Jung's most sustained exploration of the notion of spirit is contained in his essay "Spirit and 
Ufe"t09. He suggests that the experienced power of a spirit (or the Spirit) over an individual 
arises from its roots in the affective unconscious, for "an ideal which lacks emotional force can 
never become a life-ruling factor"llo. This power may be experienced negatively or positively. A 
spirit might be "the image of a personified affect"111, that is, a part of the unconscious might split 
off into a complex capable of acting autonomously from the ego. In this case the person feels 
himself oppressed by some external force which causes him to behave in an irrational manner. 
More positively, we might use the term spirit to refer to "those sayings or ideals that store up the 
richest experience of life QDd the deepest reflection"112, Spirit is now experienced as an 
empowering ideal stimulating the ego to worthwhile activity. On this account a spirit is felt to be 
nralign ana-oppressive-if its demands-are-felt as a reaction againstthe-rational parts of the-self; On 
the other hand, a spirit (or the Spirit) is felt to be good and beneficial inasmuch as its demands are 
consonant with the rational will. 
If we pursue the positive sense of "spirit", we find that in its strongest manifestations the power 
by which the individual is gripped may go l:leyond a maxim or an idea that can be formulated and 
statements. I am essentially empirical, as I have stated more than once .. .I am not concerned with 
the truth or untruth of God's existence." (Quoted in Segal p 173t) 
105For contemporaries: "There is no deity in the mandala, nor is there any submission or 
reconciliation to a deity. The place of the deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man." 
~11 para. 139.) 
t06See his Psychological Anproach to the Dogma of the Trinity in ~11. 
107~ 8 para. 644 • 
. 108~11 para. 276. 
109Jn~8. 
110~8 para. 642. 
111~8 para. 628. 
1 1~8 para. 633. 
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"named". In certain fonns of experience it displays a peculiar life of its own in which it is felt as 
an independent being. So long as the spirit can be reduced to a rational rule it will not, of course, 
be experienced in this way. But, says Jung, "when the idea or principle involved is inscrutable, 
when its intentions are obscure in origin and in aim and yet enforce themselves, then the spirit is 
necessarily felt as an 'independent being, as a kind of higher consciousness, and its inscrutable, 
superior nature can no longer be expressed in the concepts of human reason" 113. 
Jung thinks that a life lived in the power of such a spirit would be wholly desirable and is, indeed, 
a necessary requirement of personal fulfilmenL "A mere ego-life, as we well know, is a most 
inadequate and unsatisfactory thing. Only a life lived in a certain spirit is worth living ... The 
fullness of life requires more than just an ego; it needs spirit, that is an independent, overriding 
complex, for it seems that this alone is capable of giving vital expression to those psychic 
potentialities that lie beyond the reach of ego-consciousness." 114 In Jung's view, the striving for 
individual autonomy is an "adolescent" phenomenon characteristic of the emergence of the ego. 
Psychological adulthood involves our relinquishment of exclusive independence and our 
acknowledgement of the realms of the unconscious. In "adulthood" the ego renounces its claims 
to be the master of the Self. Life according to the Spirit is one in which the need for autonomy is 
balanced with equally important psychological needs for receptivity and dependence. tiS 
Unfortunately Jung's conception of spirit is somewhat marred, from a dogmatic point of view, by 
his insistence that it reconciles in itself good and evil.tt6 Nonetheless, at its best, his description 
of the psychological mechanisms by which the notion of spirit integrates the self represents a real 
advance. Jung rebels against the Platonic (and Freudian) insistence that the self is best united 
under the hegemony of reason. "The intellect does indeed· do hann to the soul when it dares to 
possess itself of the heritage of thespirit."ll-7-He insists that "[intellect] is in-no way fitted to do 
this, for spirit is something higher than intellect"118. Spirit is superior to reason not because it 
' ' 
opposes and triumphs over reasqn but because "it embraces the latter and includes the feelings as 
well"t19. Spirit gains its power in virtue of its resonance with the affective and pre-rational parts 
of the self. It is experienced ~ benign inasmuch as it is consonant with the rational will. It is 
called "holy" insofar as it is has an inscrutable quality that transcends our ability to rationalise it 
113~8 para. 643. 
114~8 para. 645. 
115Ref. ~11 para. 273. 
116In his Psychological Approach to the Trinitv OYll para. 260 and graphically illustrated in the 
quaternity symbol shown on page 175. See also his strange account in Answer to Job ~11) of 
the Holy Spirit as a wrathful avenger who initiates an era in which the dark elements of God, 
which have hitherto been repressed by the one-sided Christ symbol, are unleashed. 
117~13 The Secret of the Golden Flower para. 7. 
118ibid. 
119ibid. 
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down to a definable maxim or law. In Jungian terms the self can only be truly integrated if it 
surrenders itself to the power of such a spirit. 
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The Humanistic Psychologists: Actualising 
the Self 
1. lptroductjop 
I now turn to the third of the main modem psychological schools that have influenced our 
contemporary sense of self, that of humanistic psychology. The concerns of humanistic 
psychology go beyond a strict science of the mind into the wider concerns of human flourishing. 
As a leading humanistic psychologist comments: "Humanistic psychology encompasses a 
philosophy - a view of what life is about and what life can be, if lived constructively" ,1 Insofar as 
it quite explicitly addresses general issues of human motivation and conceptions of the human 
good it opens out into theology and moral philosophy. Insofar as it offers descriptions of and 
prescriptions for the wider society, it borders on sociology. Humanistic psychology is thus a 
pervasive cultural force that interprets and shapes the way we conceive ourselves in 
psychological, theological, moral and sociological terms. In particular it has, since the 1960s, 
been one of the most important influences on what are sometimes called "the helping 
professions", such as social work, teaching and church pastoral care2. 
The leading humanistic psycholt)gists ·Jlfe all Americans, either by birth or by naturalisation, and 
the optimistic ethos of this fof111 of p~ychqlogy contrasts quite sharply with the attention to the 
darker side of human nature that char~cteri11es the continental European psychology of Freud and 
Jung. There is no single figure within humanistic psychology of comparable stature to Freud or 
Jung. Therefore, whereas previous chap~rs considered the thought of just one individual 
psychologist, here I begin by identifying fhe central emphases of humanistic psychology as a 
whole, before discussing .the work of the three people I think are of most importance in this 
movement, namely Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. 
tcharlotte BUhler in BUhler and Allen (1972) p2. 
2Cf. Pattison (1994) p5: "Such theories and techniques which have informed contemporary 
pastoral care have tended to be drawn from one major domain, that of humanistic psychology." 
Browning (1991) p245ff gives a critical American perspective on the impact of humanistic 
psychology on pastoral care. 
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2. The Nature qf Qumanistic Pucholggy 
A psychological viewpoint that might be described as humanistic could be traced back to William 
James (1842-1910), who advocated a psychology that left intact the wholeness of the feelings and 
experiences of the subject. This emphasis was renewed in the 1930s by personality theorists such 
as Goldstein. Allport and Maslow. However, humanistic psychology as an identifiable movement 
really dates from the early 1960s. The trend of thought established in the 1930s was made 
concrete by the setting up of the American Journal of Humanistic Psycholoay in 1961. The 
following year (1962) Maslow, Charlotte BUhler, James Bugental and others founded the 
American Association for Humanistic Psychology (AAHP). This latter became an international 
organisation, the Association for Humanistic Psychology, which held its first international 
conference in Holland in 1970. Also in 1970 the Division of Humanistic Psychology was formed 
within the American Psychological Association. 
The Articles of Association of the AAHP describe the field as follows: 
"Humanistic psychology is primarily an orientation toward the whole of psychology rather 
than a distinct area or school. It stands for the respect for the worth of persons, respect for 
differences of approach, open-mindedness as to acceptable methods, and interest in 
exploration of new aspects of human behaviour. As a "third force" in contemporary 
psychology, it is concerned with topics having little place in existing theories and systems: 
e.g., love, creativity, self, growth, organism, basic need-gratification, self-actualisation, higher 
values, being, becoming, spontaneity, play, humour, affection, naturalness, warmth, ego-
transcendence, objectivity, autonomy, responsibility, meaning, fair play, transcendental 
experience, peak experience, courage, and related concepts. "3 
This description is best understood not as delimiting a new field of study but as opening up the 
existing discipline of psychology to new approaches which better preserve the worth of the person 
and attend to the higher and more valuable capabilities of the human mind. As a "third force" it 
represents a reaction against the dominant approaches of behaviourism and psychoanalysis. 
Humanists regard behaviourism as offering too mechanistic a view of humanity and instead draw 
attention to the freedom of the individual. They regard psychoanalysis as too concerned with 
human pathology and basic drives, and stress instead the higher human motives and abilities. 
However, humimism has much more in common with psychoanalysis than behaviourism. It has 
particular affinities with Jungian notions of growth, and of discovering meaning and spiritual 
significance in life. 
3Quoted in Shaffer (1978) p2. 
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Humanistic psychology was popularised and disseminated through the human potential 
movement. This movement is associated particularly with the Esalen Institute founded in Big Sur, 
California in 1962. Esalen is probably best known for its development of Encounter Groups. The 
notion that people might experience personal growth of some kind in a wann and supportive 
group is now widely held in psychological therapy, education and in the churches. But Esalen also 
developed and practised a myriad of other techniques, from the fairly respectable Gestalt therapy 
to Wilhelm Reich's bizarre Bioenergetic Analysis. These techniques have in common a stress on 
bodily sensation, on expression of emotion, and freedom from conventional moral constraints. 
They endeavour to counter the feeling that people have become alienated from their bodies, their 
emotions and from each other. They are concerned with the restoration of the wholeness of the 
person, the incorporation of "bad" (i.e. socially or morally unacceptable) feelings into the person, 
and a new depth of inter-personal encounter. Human potential dispersed the values of humanistic 
psychology across the USA and into Western Europe. In the 1960s these techniques were 
perceived as strongly counter-cultural. Whilst they have now entered into the mainstream of 
Western culture they have nonetheless retained the somewhat subversive feel associated with 
protest against conventional societal norms. 
We may discern four central emphases within the movement, which I shall now discuss in turn.4 
Firstly, humanistic psychology is strongly experiential. It takes conscious experience rather than 
empirical analysis of physiology or prior causes as its basic datum. Here it is clearly opposed to 
the positivism of behaviourism. But it is also opposed to psychoanalysis, for the psychoanalyst 
will give an explanation for some mental state in terms of unconscious processes that the 
analysand is not aware of. The strength of the humanistic approach is that it agrees with our 
common-sense-perception- that reports-of conscious -experience-are of the first importance-in 
understanding another person. it also confers a valuable "sacredness" on personal experience. My 
everyday sense that my felt experienqe is not simply a product of conditioning or unconscious 
. ' 
mechanisms is confirmed. Moreover, if sopteone takes my experience seriously I feel they are 
taking me seriously and my sense of being a particular and unique self is enhanced. The 
corresponding weakness of the humanistiq appn~ac~ is that it may devalue physiological and 
psychic causes. Certain kinds of mental states, manic depression for example, are generally 
agreed to be caused by physiological imbalances. Again deception and self-deception may lead an 
observer to be misled by a repon of conscious experience. In general terms, an approach that 
stans with conscious experience gains in value to the extent that the person concerned is 
trustwonhy, "in touch" with him or herself and psychologically healthy 
4Cf. Shaffer plOff. 
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Secondly, humanistic psychology respects the wholeness of the individual. Over and above my 
physical perceptions or pains, or my mental functioning and personality characteristics, I am a 
unique self sttiving to unfold my capabilities and potentials. The sense of being me lends a 
particular quality to all my personal characteristics, such that my extroversion or my arthritis is 
not to be regarded as precisely the same as my neighbour's extroversion or arthritis. This is a 
powerful notion that has bon&C'onsiderable fruit in medical and psychological practice and is an 
important counterbalance to medical technologies that would treat people in an overly analytic or 
objectifying way. 
Thirdly, humanistic psychology insists that autonomy is of the essence of our humanity. I am 
most authentically myself when I am freely choosing my future and refusing to be bound by my 
past or by convention. Humanism, unlike behaviourism or psychoanalysis provides a 
psychological model that correlates with my common-sense perception that I do have free choice. 
In this it provides a valuable corrective to the more deterministic strands within contemporary 
psychology. However, it can work out therapeutically in an over-valuation of the possibilities of 
present freedom to choose or a devaluation of the past. Humanists may fmd it difficult to help 
someone whose present freedom of choice is limited by real environmental constraints. They can 
tend to see historical relations with parents as the source of all our problems. Finally humanists 
often work with too limited and negative a conception of freedom as freedom from constraint 
Fourthly humanistic psychology resists reducing human behaviour to basic drives. Humanists take 
the higher human capabilities, such as love and creativity, as essential to humanity and not as 
merely sublimated versions of more basic drives. In this respect we might compare them with 
Augustine, for whom the highest desire, the desire for God, was the most distinctively human 
capa6ility ancnlierefoie the sutijecCof dominating interest~ Unfortunately, however;-h:un'ilmism 
recovers the higher human capabilities at the expense of neglecting the unconscious and shadowy 
regions of the psyche. This can produce a one-sided understanding of the psyche in which the 
ease with which personal autonomy can be achieved is over-estimated. 
The religious roots of humanistic psychology lie in American Protestantism. There are some 
interesting similarities between the humanists' encounter grpups and therapy sessions and certain 
forms of eighteenth and nineteenth century Protestan~ piety. Both are concerned with the honest 
sharing of present experience within an intimate small group.s In this century, two of the most 
important precursors of the humanist psychologists Wf!re the prominent, if intellectually 
lightweight, Protestant ministers - Harry Emerson Fosdick and Norman Vincent Peale. Both men 
SRef. Thomas Oden The Intensive Group Experience Philadelphia Westminster 1972 and Vitz 
p103ff. Although he has not demonstrated a historical continuity between the two, Oden argues 
quite convincingly that the contemporary encounter group can be understood as a 
"demythologised" version of the pietistic group. 
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developed their idea in New York City during the 1930s and 40s, the formative place and period 
for much humanistic psychology. Fosdick, moreover, had close links with Union Theological 
Seminary in New York, at which the leading humanist psychologists Rollo May and Carl Rogers 
both studied. The title of Fosdick's third work On Being a Real Person (1943), a book which ran 
to thirty printings, foreshadows Rogers' most popular book On Becoming a Person (1961). In his 
book Fosdick proposes, in terms that would become basic to the humanistic psychological 
outlpok, that the goal of human life is personal integration or wholeness, a goal that will be 
reached through self-discovery, self-acceptance and self-love.6 Peale wrote in a similar vein in 
1937: "The greatest day in any individual's life is when he begins for the first time to realise 
himself. "7 The opening of his best-selling The Power of Positive Thinking sets a tone that would 
be echoed in a great deal of later humanistic psychological writing: "Believe in yourself! Have 
faith in your abilitiesl ... self-confidence leads to self-realisation and successful achievement."8 
The development of humanistic psychology seems to reflect a profound religious-cultural shift in 
America in the middle and later parts of this century. Fosdick articulated this well: "The basic 
urge of the human organism is towards wholeness. The primary command of our being is, Get 
yourself together, and the fundamental sin is to be chaotic and unfocused".9 Wholeness thus 
began to supersede salvation as the human goal. The fundamental sin was no longer pride, but the 
failure to realise one's potential to. In an era of increasing doubt and debate over metaphysical 
commitments, the realisation of each self was a psychological ideal that all could agree on. It was 
an ideal eminently suited to the increasingly pluralistic American liberal democracy. The 
religiously inclined might follow Peale in advocating the benefits of divine power in assisting the 
achievement of this goal, but the mainstream humanists could follow Rogers in disavowing the 
need for such divine assistance. 
Having discussed humanistic psychology as a whole, I now turn to consider three of its leading 
proponents, beginning with Erich Fromm. 
3. Erich Etomm 
3.1 Fromm's Life and Work 
Erich Fromm (1900-80) studied sociology and psychology at the universities of Heidelberg and 
Munich. He received psychoanalytic training at Berlin and subsequently studied and taught at the 
Frankfun Psychoanalytic Institute and the Institute for Social Research at Frankfun University. 
6Fosdick On Being a Real Person Ch. 2 quoted in Vitz (1994) plOO. 
7Peale The ArtofLiyim: (Abingdon-Cokesbury, New York 1937) plO quoted in Vitz p102. 
8Peale The Power of Positive Thinking (Prentice· Hall, New York, 1952) p 1. 
9fosdick On Being A Real Person (Harper New York 1943) Ch. 2 quoted in Vitz plOO. 
tOcf. Buhler and Allen (1972) p46: "Humanistic psychology points to a personal guilt aside from 
socially conditioned guilt feelings. Self-guilt may arise in an individual who squanders his life, 
failing to fulfil or develop his own best potentials." 
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He was deeply influenced by his experience of the collapse of German culture in the 1920s and of 
the rise of Nazism in the 1930s. Fronun emigrated from Germany to the United States in 1933, 
becoming a lecturer at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute and then working in a private 
psychological practice in New York City. He subsequently wrote and lectured extensively. His 
interests centred on psychology, although he also wrote on philosophy, ethics, religion and 
sociology. His most important books are The Fear of Freedom (ET 1942), which deals with his 
theory of personality, Man for Himself (ET 1949), in which he tries to establish a psychological 
basis for ethics, The Sane Society (ET 1955) which explores the relation between mental health 
and socio-economic conditions, and The Art ofLoying (ET 1957), in which he sets out his theory 
of love. Fromm may be regarded alternatively as a humanistic personality theorist11 or as a neo-
Freudian analystl2. He refers to his own work as "humanistic psychoanalysis"13. He thus forms an 
important and interesting bridge between the psychoanalytic perspectives I have discussed earlier 
and the perspective of humanistic psychology dealt with in this chapter. 
3.2 Fromm's Am>roach to Psychology 
Fromm begins from the premise that "the understanding of man's psyche must be based on the 
analysis of man's needs stemming from the conditions of his existence"14. The unique 
predicament of humanity, he maintains, is that it both belongs to nature and yet transcends nature. 
Humanity is a "freak"15 of nature, passively bound to obey the laws of nature at one level but 
emancipated from nature at another level. Humanity has a range of instinctual needs 
corresponding to those of the animals, yet in virtue of its distinctively human capacities for self-
awareness, reason and imagination, humanity remains unsatisfied if its purely animal needs are 
met. Fromm is concerned to delineate a set of distinctively human needs (in addition to animal 
needs such as those for food, sleep and sex) which must be met if we are to become fulfilled 
individuals; 
Since his starting point is the situation of humanity in the most general sense, Fromm is willing to 
accept evidence from all possible sources not just or indeed not even principally from the 
laboratory. Psychology as a science, he argues, is strictly limited in its possibilities16. Its proper 
role is not to tell us what man is but what man is not. Its proper aim "is the negative, the removal 
of distortions and illusions, not the positive, full and complete knowledge of a human being"17. 
Fromm argues that complete knowledge of a human being can never be knowledge "about" him 
llCf. Hall and Lindzey ( 1957) p 130ff; Shaffer ( 1972) p32. 
t2so J.A.C. Brown (1964). 
13Sane Society p70. 
t4sane Society p25. 
IS sane Society p23. 
16Art of Lovins p33. 
17"Man is not a Thing" Satyrday reyiew of literature March 16, 1957 pp9-11 quoted in Schaar 
(1964) p37. 
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but must be a direct, self-involving knowledge "of' him. The theoretical knowledge of science, 
insofar as it objectifies human beings, sets a limit to its own power of knowing. The highest form 
of knowledge of a person is the union experienced in love. Objective knowledge merely clears the 
way for this higher subjective experience of love. Only in love may I know a person in his or her 
ultimate essence lB. 
A comparison with Augustinian theology may be helpful at this point. Augustine held that God is 
both eternal wisdom and eternal caritas. Knowledge and love are therefore intimately related to 
one another. The spiritual journey consists of the mutually reinforcing growth of both knowledge 
and love of Goo.l9 Fromm, however, is more sympathetic to the later medieval mystical path to 
God in which love takes priority over knowledge20. So he says: "In mysticism, which is the 
consequent outcome of monotheism, the attempt is given up to know God by thought, and it is 
replaced by the experience of union with God in which there is no more room - and no need - for 
knowledge about God."21 
The view that establishing a warm, loving relationship with a person is of more significance 
psychologically than gaining knowledge about him, is characteristic of humanistic psychology. 
The stren~ of this approach li~~ in taking seriously the other as a whole person and in attending 
closely to the feelings of the other. However, it may under-rate the extent to which genuine love 
involves a meeting of minds and engagement with the beliefs and values of the other. It tends to 
assume there is an underlying "natural self' who is a bundle of feelings and emotions, whilst 
cognitive components are a relatively superficial part of the person. Moreover, it seems to me that 
we must preserve an element of understanding the other, of reasoning about what it is that I find 
loveable in the other, so that lov~ does not slide into mere sentimentality. 
The priority Fromm gives to love Qver knowledge suggests an important new strategy for 
integrating the self. Augustine, Freud 1p1d Jung all argued, in their different ways, that becoming a 
' ' 
whole person depends on gaining some kind of knowledge about the self, whether this be 
knowledge of one's place in the divine order or knowledge of one's unconscious depths. Fromm's 
approach suggests that the crucial thing is to develop a certain attitude to oneself. Wholeness is a 
matter of developing a certain quality of loving appreciation of the whole of the person, body and 
emotions as well as thought processes. One needs not so much to think about oneself in a cenain 
way as to feel appropriately towards oneself. Thus humanistic therapy involves a helping 
relationship in which one can learn to develop a loving acceptance of the whole of oneself. Such a 
relationship is concerned primarily with the exploration and expression of feelings. Of course 
18Art of Lovins p32. 
19mn. XV.5. 
20supra. Ch.2 §3.1. 
21 Art of Lovin& p32. 
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such an emphasis on "feeling good" about oneself can degenerate into narcissism, but it need not 
do, for the ability to feel appropriately towards ourselves is related to, and perhaps is even a 
precondition for, the ability to feel appropriately towards others. 
3.3 Fromm and Freud 
Fromm is frequently grouped together with Harry Stack Sullivan and Karen Horney as a neo-
Freudian. They form the "left-wing" of the post-Freudians, in contrast to more "orthodox" 
developments following Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. Where the latter intensified Freud's 
biological and instinctual emphasis, the former lessened the emphasis on instinct, preferring to 
stress the influence of social and cultural forces on human nature. The term "neo-Freudian" can 
mislead us into over stressing the similarities between Freud and Fromm; to replace or modify 
Freud's instinct theory with a theory of societal influence is to remove the central plank of Freud's 
system. Nonetheless, Fromm was deeply influenced by Freud, frequently quoted him, and spent 
much of his career trying to come to terms with him. 
Fromm's attempt to "place" Freud22, and hence relativise him, involved locating him and his 
psychology in a particular social context. Freud's homo sexualis, alleged Fromm, was none other 
than a variant on the capitalist homo economicus. Capitalism produced human beings who were 
isolated individuals requiring each other for the satisfaction of economic needs, and Freud had 
interpreted this situation in terms of individuals requiring each other for the satisfaction of 
libidinal needs. Freud's theory was not wrong as such, it was merely limited to bourgeois relations 
under capitalism. In view of its capitalist context, Freud's theory was naturally enough a 
manifestation of an economics of scarcity involving the meeting of needs, the satisfaction of 
"unpleasure" and the reduction of tension. Having identified this abnormal context, Fromm 
thought-he-could-now-offer a psychology··based-on-the-normal-economics of-abundance-that-one 
would find in a healthy society. Under "normal" conditions, when basic human needs were 
properly met. the essentially human instincts would be seen to be those of love and creativity, not 
sexual lust and aggression. 
Ill his earlier work Fromm subordinated Freud's instinct theory to socio-economic factors to a 
high degree23. Thus he says: "In certain fundamental respects the instinctual apparatus is a 
biological given; but it is highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factors goes to the 
economic conditions. "24 Psychoanalysis was now reduced to being the agent of dialectical 
materialism: it showed the psychic mechanisms by which economic relations are transformed into 
ideologies.2S At this early stage (1932) Fromm had merely replaced Freud's psychic determinism 
22"Freud's model of man and its social determinants" Fromm (1971a) Ch. 2. 
23E.g. in "Analytic Social Psychology" (1932) given as Ch. 8 of Fromm (1971a). 
24ibid. p148. 
2~bid. p155. 
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with Marx's economic determinism. But his mature attitude was somewhat more sympathetic to 
Freud. Freud had correctly discerned that humanity has a nature that is not entirely the product of 
socio-economics, but Freud had simply, through the influence of his own economic context, 
mistaken this nature. Fromm, through his attention to the existential situation of humanity, had 
now discerned this essential nature. Thus in his 1955 The Sane Society Fromm argues that there 
are a range of human needs that are to a considerable extent independent of culture which a 
healthy human society should try to meet. Fromm does not now offer a prescription of the healthy 
human being derived from a Marxist understanding of healthy economic relations. Rather, by 
analysing the needs of human beings Fromm can offer a prescription for the healing of society. 
Fromm indicates a decisive shift away from Freud's attention to the unconscious and to infant 
experience. Fromm dismisses the Oedipus complex as being specific merely to the culture Freud 
studied.26 For Fromm, the family is merely the agent of the socialising forces of the wider society. 
Socialisation is continued especially through the economic relationships of work. It is these 
relations, formed publicly and consciously, not the infant's relations with his or her parents, that 
Fromm thinks have the largest impact on human character.27 
The later Freud though that human life is formed in the tension between the equal and opposite 
instincts of Bros and Thanatos. In Fromm's view, by contrast, the negative and aggressive 
instincts are secondary derivatives of the positive and creative instincts. Bvil and destructiveness 
only arise when the primary potential for good and creativity is blocked. Fromm denies a naive 
belief in humanity's natural goodness.28 Rather, his position is that destructiveness exists as a 
"potentiality" in man's nature.29 But it is a potentiality which will not necessarily come to fruition; 
indeed it wiU only develop in the case of abnormal, pathogenic external conditions. In other 
words.-"man is not necessarily evil, -but-becomes-evil-only-if-the-proper-conditions for growth-and-
development are lacking. n30 
This, however, amounts to th~ same thing as an assertion of natural goodness. Fromm is not 
merely saying that human beings have the potential to develop in good or bad ways. He is arguing 
that human beings only develop evil potentials if their society is defective. Under optimal 
environmental conditions Fromm's human beings would be perfectly good. Fromm thus shifts all 
the blame for evil from the individual to forces at work in society. It is this move which, I think, 
marks out Fromm, and the humanists in general, most decisively from Freud and, indeed, from 
Jung and Augustine. Doubtless Fromm is right to draw to our attention the extent of societal 
26Fromm (1971a) p146. 
27Fear of Freedom p239ff. 
2Ksaue Society p37. 
29Man for Himself p217. 
3~an for Himself p218. 
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influence on our moral behaviour. But unless we are to assume that human beings are completely 
determined by their environment. and Fromm would certainly not want to say this, then we must 
allow at least some personal responsibility for evil. 
The humanistic distinction between a "natural self' that is purely good, from acquired 
characteristics that may be evil, makes it difficult for us to deal properly with any aspect of our 
true self that we consider to have tendencies to moral error. Evil within the self cannot be 
"named" as such. Traditional mechanisms for dealing with sin, such as confession, repentance and 
forgiveness are therefore not available. We can only attempt to transfer responsibility for our own 
sin onto others, such as parents, whom we may claim have adversely affected our personality. Of 
course sometimes we are right to do this; we may be more sinned against than sinning. But there 
will be other occasions when we are aware of moral conflict within the self that arises from us 
doing things we know we ought not to do. In these cases we are, like Augustine, aware that 
conflict is located deep within the self. If we cannot own our morally mixed nature in these 
situations it seems to me that we cannot properly deal with tendencies to wrongdoing and so be 
restored to a proper sense of psychic unity. 
3.4 The Self in Fromm 
Fromm's analysis of the human situation, as being both within nature and yet transcending nature, 
leads him to propose that the human subject is defined in terms of a cluster of five basic desires or 
needs, which can be expressed in a healthy or a pathological form, as follows3 1• 
Firstly, human beings have a need for relatedness. In gaining self-awareness a person perceives 
himseft' as having been tom away from nature. He is conscious of aloneness and separateness, and 
of the contingency-of-his- existence--in the -face-of-death. His existential- loneliness drives him 
towards an experience of union with other people. Such an experience is frequently achieved 
neurotically through relations with others that compromise the independence and integrity of the 
individual by introducing unhealthy dependence and inequality of power. In "masochistic" 
relations the individual surrenders part of himself to someone or some entity larger and more 
powerful than himself. In "sadistic" relations the individual gains esteem through the domination 
and incorporation of others. In both cases the sense of being an individual self is corrupted. By 
contrast, the need for relatedQess may be satisfied healthily through love. Only in loving 
relationships do the parties retain the proper separateness and integrity of their individual selves 
whilst also being held in union :with other~. Fromm holds that the self-actualised person will be 
one who achieves a Iovins "m9de of relatedness" to the world. This mode covers emotional 
responses to others and also, significantly, to oneself.32 
31saue Societ.v Ch. 3. 
32Man for Himselfp82ff; Art ofLoying p43f. 
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Secondly, human beings desire transcendence from nature. In its primary manifestation the drive 
for transcendence is expressed in creativity, and results in cultural products such as art and 
religion. Through creativity human beings raise themselves above the givenness of their existence 
mto the realm of purpo~fulne~s and freedom. If the 'drive 'for transcendence is frustrated it may 
be expressed in destructiveness. 
Yet, thirdly, human beings retain a need for rootedness in nature. This is expressed in the infant 
as an attachment to the mother and then later as an attachment to the natural family or race, and 
to the land. When this desire is fully realised it leads to an experience of oneness with the world, 
with all people and with the divine. But if frustrated it leads to racism and nationalism. 
Fourthly, human beings are driven by the need to establish a sense of identity. Fromm holds that a 
proper sense of identity is gained only through the subject's direct experiencing of himself as the 
bearer of his own powers. "The sense of self stems from the experience of myself as the subject 
of my experiences, my thought, my feeling, my decision, my judgement, my action ... "33. If the 
need for identity is frustrated an individual may attempt to define himself in terms of some socio-
economic role. But playing a role, says, Fromm, demotes the individual from the status of a 
person to a mere thing. "Things have no self and men who have become things can have no 
self."34 
Finally, human beings have a desire to find meaning. They try to locate themselves within the 
wider order of reality and to find an appropriate object of devotion. Fromm thinks that primitive 
expressions of this desire lead to irrational religions and objects of devotion that impede 
humanity's-development, -whilst mature -expressions-are- characterised-by-their rationality-and-their 
personal psychological benefit. 
The self as subject thus comprises five primary desires. The person realises himself insofar as 
these desires are properly satisfied. Fromm's self is orientated towards the future. It is firmly 
located in the domain of consciousness, the realm of the Freudian ego. The primitive, "animal" 
desires of the Freudian id are not Fromm's major concern, for these are not, in his view, what 
account for the distinctiveness of the human being. We might observe that Fromm's self is defined 
in quite different terms from the Jungian Self. The former is realised through action in the inter-
personal world, whilst the latter emerges through attentiveness to the promptings of the 
unconscious. 
33sane Society pl43. 
34sane Society pl43. 
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Fromm thinks that modem people are trapped in a vicious circle that erodes the sense of self. 
Under capitalism a person is alienated from his work, from others and from himself. Primary 
economic relations encourage a dissociation between the sense of identity (self as object) and the 
true self (self as subject). In his lostness, a person may sacrifice a genuine sense of identity for the 
1 1 I I 1 
security of belonging to a larger group35, The person now starts to act in obedience to some 
external authority, carrying out actions which are not authentically his, but belong to a role that he 
has been ordered to carry out.36 These lead eventually to the replacement of the original self-
identity by a pseudo-self (analogous to Jung's "persona"). The pseudo-self is only an agent who 
represents the role a person is supposed to play.37 Having lost the correspondence between self-
identity and true self the person now feels even more alienated from himself. He tries to make up 
for this by striving even harder to conform to the group, thereby becoming increasingly alienated 
from the true self. 
For Fromm the task of therapy is to recover the true self from its alienated state. Fromm thus 
conceives the process of psychoanalysis quite differently from Freud. It is primarily concerned 
with work on the conscious self, not with the repressed unconscious. For example, the importance 
of free association for Fromm is not - as Freud held - that it allows expression of unconscious 
contents that had been repressed by the ego, but that it allows the ego to express itself free of 
societal pressure,38 In the privacy of the psychoanalytic encounter the person can truly be him or 
herself. In psychoanalysis the analysand "tells the truth", not in the sense that he confesses the 
hidden contents of the mind, but that he produces something that is not adapted to what others 
expect him to say. 
For Fromm, one is truly and authentically oneself when one is at one's most spontaneous. One 
realises -one's self through "spontaneous-activity"39. Such behaviour-is-undertaken-of -one's own 
free will, is unforced, and is not "the uncritical adoption of patterns suggested from the 
outside"40, Fromm thinks that those who bqst exerpplify spontaneous behaviour are the artist and 
the small child. These people, he suggests, are able to think and feel what is really theirs. 
I 
Fromm's concern with spontaneity may be illuminated by seeing it within the tradition of thought 
that we have called "expressivism" and which may be traced back through the Romantic period 
and ultimately to Rousseau41. On this account our primary seqse of "significance" for living is 
held to come not from moral or rational norms disclosed in society but from the expression of our 
35Fear of Freedom p116. 
36Fear of Freedom pl77. 
37Fear of Freedom pl77. 
38Fear of Freedom pl77n. 
39fear of Freedom p219ff. 
40fear of Freedom p223. 
41supra Ch. 2 §3.3. 
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own natural selves. If we see ourselves in this way then spontaneity may be understood as 
providing a crucial enclave where we can be free of societal norms and be truly ourselves. 
Spontaneous action frees us from the expectations of others and allows us to give genuine 
expression to our own feelings. The artist is, par excellence, the person who is able to give 
creative expression to his own feelings. He is in touch with' himself, and is hiJllself, in a way that 
those who are merely fulfilling productive roles within the socio-economic system are not 
Spontaneity tends to oppose conscious role-playing, for often doing what comes naturally is 
different from doing wh~t conf,orms to the expectations of others. 
Here Fromm helpfully articulates and develops one important component of our modern identity: 
our sense of significiUlce comes from within ourselves and we feel particularly in touch with 
ourselves when we are being spontaneous. However, I think he tends to over-estimate the extent 
to which spontaneity necessarily grants us freedom from external authorities and groups. He fails 
to realise just how far all our thinking and acting takes place within a communal context and 
some authoritative tradition. For example, the analysand associating freely is still using a form of 
language learned from others. Moreover, he does not appreciate that in some situations being 
spontaneous and playing a role amount to the same thing. The analysand who associates freely 
thereby meets the expectations of the analyst. He is being authentically himself at the same time 
that he is playing a role. 
It is important not to expect too much from the notion of spontaneity and to appreciate that some 
forms of spontaneity are better than others. Children may be spontaneously nice or spontaneously 
horrible. The spontaneity of the child is not something we should encourage in adults simply 
because part of its attractiveness lies in its immaturity. Desirable adult spontaneity is a quality that 
has been -acquired-through certain kinds of habitual-behaviour:-The-spontaneity-of the great-artist 
is one that has been disciplined through practice in such a way that its expression leads to the 
production of beautiful art. The saint may,likewise,learn by habitual practice to be spontaneously 
good. By contrast the S.S. guard may 'have learned to be spontaneously nasty. All of which is to 
say that the notion of spontaneity qannot be completely separated from moral judgements. 
Spontaneity is not, as Fromm cpn sometimes indicate, desirable in itself, but is only desirable 
when given appropriate expression within some moral framework. 
4. Abraham Maslow 
4.1 Maslow's Life and Work 
Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) was an American psychologist and philosopher who is best known 
for his Self-Actualisation theory of psychology. Maslow studied psychology at the University of 
Wisconsin and Gestalt Psychology at the New School for Social Research in New York. He spent 
some time at Columbia Teachers College before joining the faculty of Brooklyn College in New 
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York City in 1937. In 1951 he was appointed head of the psychology department at Brandeis 
University Massachusetts where he remained until1969. Together with Carl Rogers, Rollo May 
and Charlotte Buhler, Maslow founded the American Association of Humanistic Psychology in 
1962. He is now widely regarded as the intellectual father of humanistic psychology. Maslow was 
made president of the American Psychological Association in 1967-68. His ideas have been 
influential in the USA and internationally through the counselling and human potential 
movements, as well as through educational, business and management practice. 
Maslow's major works are Motiya&ion and Personality (1954 and 1970) and Towards a 
P&ycbology of Beins (1962). Towards the end of his life he became interested in Trans-Personal 
psychology, what he called "the fourth force" in psychology. In 1969, having moved to California 
and developed links with the Esalen Institute, he helped found the Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology (JTP). Papers he wrote in this area were published posthumously as Towards the 
farther Reaches of Human Nature. However, I note the psychologist Paul Vitz's comment that the 
transpersonal discussions of spiritual experience and consciousness raising in JTP constitute a 
whole new realm of discourse that bears little relation to humanistic psychology or indeed to 
modem psychology as it is generally conceive<J42, and I do not consider these late explorations of 
Maslow here. 
4.2 Maslow's Ap,woach and Intellectual Influences 
Maslow was concerned to develop a psychological description of human nature, particularly in its 
motivational and ethical aspects. One of the mlijor differences that marks out Maslow from the 
earlier psychologists of this century is that he believed such a description must be based primarily 
on a study of the healthiest examples of humanity. Maslow felt that psychology had been 
mistaken-in-focusing its-researches-on-neurotic and-sick-individuals~-He felt-that if one-wanted-to 
learn about the full range of human attributes, including the brighter elements of human nature, 
such as love, joy and creativity, one must start with the healthiest human specimens. One might 
then learn what it was that contributed to the health of these individuals and hence what the 
neurotic individuals lacked.43 
Maslow followed an iterative method for defining the characteristics of mental health as follows. 
He proposed a crude definition of psychological health and then found a large set of subjects who 
seemed to meet the definition. He applied a range of standard tests to his subjects, eliminating 
those subjects who did not attain to the highest levels of psychological performance. The 
remaining subjects were interviewed to sh~n tpe definition of health. The revised definition 
was then used to genemte tests for health ~at could be used to eliminate a further proportion of 
42Vitz (1994) p118f. 
43Motiyation p180. 
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subjects. By this technique Maslow arrived both at a working definition of psychological health, 
or nonnal human nature, and a small set of subjects, self-actualisers, who exemplified his 
definition. Much of Maslow's writing is a description either of the needs that he has discovered 
must be met for a person to become a self-actualiser or of the characteristics of self-actualising 
life as a guide to normal human behaviour. 
Maslow defends his method as scientific, according to his generous definition of science as "a 
search for truth, insight, and understanding, and as a concern ·with iqtpprtant questions"44• He 
does, however, recognise that it is hard for him to meet two standard requirements of scientific 
work, namely repeatability and public access to his clinical data - most of his subjects supplied 
data confidentially. We might, more importantly, press the objection that he provides insufficient 
control against personal and cultural biases. He chooses many of his subjects from his own 
friends and acquaintances. The public and historical self-actualisers he lists number a suspiciously 
high proportion of Americans and the great majority are 'Western•.45 It is more accurate to 
suggest that Maslow's self-actualiser does not so much give us an objective standard of mental 
health as a culturally conditioned, if widely influential, ideal. 
Maslow claims his work is the synthesis of three iritellectual influences46: 
i) The "functionalism" of James and Dewey 
ii) The holism of Gestalt psychology 
iii) The dynamism of the psycho-analytic school (Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Reich). 
i) By "functionalism" I take it that Maslow means the notion that human beings are true to their 
nature insofar as they act or function in characteristically human ways. If I am right then he 
stands in a ttadition-going back far beyond-James-to Plato. His specific-debt to-James-lies not so 
much in "functionalism" but rather in a pragmatic approach to scientific enquiry. Maslow follows 
James in believing that science should be directed towards those areas that potentially yield the 
most benefits, rather than those which best exemplify a particular understanding of scientific 
method47. Perhaps Maslow's most important debt to Dewey is the latter's attempt to establish a 
morality based on the observed facts of human nature.48 Like Dewey, Maslow felt that morality 
must be pragmatically based on what human beings are like, rather than on some externally 
imposed code of what they ought to be like. However, there are two notable differences between 
the approaches of Dewey and Maslow. Where Dewey was more interested in the social factors 
44Motiyation pl4 
4SMotiyation pl52 
46Motiyation p35 
47Motiyation Ch. 2: "Problem centring vs. means centring in science" 
48Dewey ( 1922) p 12 
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detenninins behaviour Maslow focused on instinct, and where Dewey scorned teleological 
accounts of human nature Maslow's psychology made teleology central. 49 
ii) The Gestalt movement in psychology dates back to work done by Wertheimer, Koffka and 
Kohler prior to the first World warSO. This movement was originally concerned with perception, 
suggesting that people learn figures through recognition of the figure as a whole rather than by 
building it up from its parts. Maslow broadens the idea of Gestalt from the realm of perception to 
the personality in general. From Gestalt psycholog)' Maslow draws the notion that the individual 
is an organised, integrated whole. It follows that a person's needs cannot be considered in 
isolation from who the person is in him or herself. Thus Maslow says, "when John Smith is 
hungry, he is hungry all over; he is different as an individual from what he is at other times."S1 
This is a powerful idea that is of central importance to humanistic psychology. 
iii) From the psychodynamic tradition Maslow claims to derive the notion that a person is not 
only what he appears to be on the surface, but also comprises unrealised potentialities that are in 
the process of "becoming". Psychoanalysis gives his thought what Maslow claims is its "dynamic" 
character. However, Maslow's claim to be influenced by psychodynamics must be heavily 
qualified. He hardly refers to the unconscious at all: there is, for example, no entry under 
"unconscious" in the index to Motivation and Personality. Moreover Maslow retains little of the 
psychic tension and conflict characteristic of Freud's psychodynamics. Insofar as Maslow is 
influenced by psychodynamics it is generally only in the so-called neo-Freudian form exemplified 
by Fromm. 
Maslow fuses Gestalt and psychodynamic theory into what he calls a "holistic-dynamic" view of 
liuman-liature. At his moscaml>itiousMaslow see-rns to-suggest thache-has thereby-updated 
Aristotle's teleology; thus he says: "I suppose that if I had to put into a single phrase the contrast 
between the Aristotelian theory and the [humanistic] theory .. .I would maintain that we can see not 
only what man is, but what he may become ... We know better what lies hidden in man ... "s2 But 
this is much too grand a claim. For, on the one hand, Aristotle's theory was about nothing if not 
"becoming" and. on the other hand. Maslow's psychology hardly reveals anything that is "hidden" 
in human beings in the manner of orthodox Freudianism. 
49oewey p224 describes ultimate ends such as "perfection or self-realisation" as "a view foisted 
by Aristotle upon Western culture and endured for two thousand years". Instead he says (p232): 
"Ends are, in fact, literally endless, forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new 
consequences." 
sosee Hall and Lindzey (1957) p299. 
51 Motivation p20 
52Motiyation p271. 
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If "holistic-dynamism" represents an advance, we might suggest, less ambitiously, that where 
Gestalt therapy focuses on a realisation of wholeness in the immediate present of the individual, 
Maslow charts a growth into wholeness that takes into account needs in the individual's past, 
present and future. Where psychodynamic theory concentrates on primitive instincts Maslow 
returns to Aristotle in emphasising that the higher aspects of human nature must be taken into 
account if human beings are to realise themselves. Overall the methods of pragmatic enquiry 
enable Maslow to elucidate those higher and most distinctively human aspects which other 
modern (though not ancient) psychological schools had neglected. 
4.3 Maslow's Theocy of Motiyation 
Maslow takes it that human beings have an essential psychological structure that can be treated 
and discussed analogously to their physical structure. This structure consists of genetically based 
needs, capacities and tendencies. These needs are good, or at least neutral, and not evil. Normal 
and desirable development consists in actualising this nature, which is to say fulfilling the needs. 
However, whereas in animals the instincts are strong, humanity is characterised by the weakness 
of its instincts. The good instincts are therefore easily obscured and overridden by the demands of 
society. The task of the psychologist is to uncover humanity's essential instinctual nature, and this 
will best be done with reference to those who are our healthiest specimens, those for whom all the 
needs have been properly articulated and met. 53 
Maslow thus identifies what he considers a set of "basic needs" that characterise humanity. 
Moreover, by analysing these needs he concludes that some are more "prepotent" than others. 
That is to say, he finds that if a fundarpental need is left unmet it comes to dominate the whole of 
a person's thinking an~ acting to the e~clusion of all the other needs. A person who is hungry, for 
example, is so c:lrlveifby die neecnofintUo<xlthat the-whole-ofthe self-is-united-by and identified 
with the need. Once this need is fully or even partially met other needs begin to present 
themselves. Human behaviour is now motivated by fulfilling these slightly less fundamental 
needs. The tendency for a more fundamental needs to dominate the person if it is not met leads to 
the postulation of a "hierarchy" of needs, which Maslow concludes has seven elements54: 
1. Physiological needs for food, drink and sex. 
2. Safety needs such as security, structure, law and order. 
3. Belongingness and love needs such as friendship, affection, and a sense of rootedness. 
4. Esteem needs such as achievement and confidence, status and dominance. 
5. Cognitive needs for knowledge and understanding. 
6. Aesthetic needs for beauty and art. 
53Mptiyation Ch. 6 and summary on p273. 
54Motiyation Ch. 4 
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7. The need for self-actualisation. 
At each level of psychic functioning, thinks Maslow, behaviour is motivated by fulfilling unmet 
needs. However, the seventh type of need, self-actualisation, is different in kind from the other 
six. It refers not 'to needs which must be met from the wider environment, but to the need the 
individual has to express whatever is inside him or her self. It is the desire "to become everything 
that one is capable of becoming"ss. At the highest level of functioning the individual is not 
involved in drawing on external resources but in producing from within the self. The first six 
levels are states of deprivation of various kinds whilst the seventh level is a state of abundance. 
Like Fromm, Maslow says that the highest level of functioning, or - what is the same - of psychic 
health, is exemplified by the aitist56. However, unlike Fromm, he thinks that this highest level of 
functioning is generally not achieved by children.57 Maslow's self-actualiser is not simply 
someone who can spontaneously express what is within but someone who has "grown" to the 
point where this expression is held by others to be of value. 
The theory as it stands has two obvious problems. Firstly, it fails to account for certain kinds of 
self-discipline. What of the artist who lacks food or friends yet is not distracted from working at 
his or her craft into meeting these lower level needs? Maslow is able to remedy this problem by 
observing that people who have had their basic needs properly satisfied at an early stage of their 
development are then able to function, if necessary, in conditions where there is relative 
deprivation of the lower level goods. Thus an artist might be able to survive quite happily with 
little esteem or friendship from others if he already has a high degree of emotional resilience and 
self-confidence. Psychologically healthy people are not, as Freud thought, ultimately motivated by 
basic needs, but are freed to pursue the higher goal of self-actualisation. 
The second problem arises when Maslow makes the concept of self-actualisation stand for both 
psychological health and the en~-point of human psychological growth. When Maslow notes that 
children cannot be self-actuali~rs does this mean that they cannot be psychologically healthy? 
We surely have to take the self-~tualisation concept to stand for the end-point of human growth 
and not for psychological healrp. In Maslow's scheme, psychic health would now have to be 
something like the achieveme~t of as high a level of growth as is consistent with one's 
physiological development 
55Motiyation p46 
56Motiyation p148. 
57Motiyation pl50. 
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4.4 The Conce.pt of Self-Actualisation 
Maslow identified some 15 characteristics of self-actualising people, which may be summarised 
as follows58: 
-In relation to themselvl~s they are spontaneous, self-accepting, in touch with their own feelings 
and freely creative. 
- In relation to other people, they are capable of achieving deep relationships with a few, and 
towards humanity in general they have a warm, benevolent, democratic attitude similar to the 
"brotherly love" described by Fromm. Nonetheless, they remain essentially detached from others; 
they guard their privacy and resist conformity. 
- In relation to the world, self-actualisers clearly distinguish objective reality from human 
projection onto reality. We might say they have a scientific outlook or, in Freud's terms, that they 
have moved successfully from motivation by the pleasure principle to the reality principle. 
- In relation to the transcendent, they are capable of mystical or spiritual "peak" experiences, 
though these are not necessarily of a traditionally religious na~re. 
As I have already indicated, this description is of less interest as an "objective" measure of mental 
health than as providing a concise description of a cultural ideal. The widespread popular 
acceptance of Maslow's views indicates that the goods he talks of are generally highly prized 
within American and Western European societies. They may be regarded as criteria for a fulfilled 
life in our contemporary, Western, capitalist context. 59 
What is more noticeable· in Maslow's psychology than in Fromm's is serious reference to ends 
beyond oneself. The self-actualiser refrains from deep commitments of any sort, whether to 
people ot to-oocJ. one of the leading characteristics ofself-actualisersis-tneif inijependence or· 
culture and environment. Self-actualisers "do not need others in the ordinary sense"60. Even in the 
closest partner relationships "one has the feeling that they enjoy each other tremendously but 
would take philosophically a long separation or death"61• The self-actualiser's "peak experience" 
is not a high point in the continuing relationship with a personal God but a purely self-related 
moment of aesthetic wonderment of which Maslow says: "It is quite important to dissociate this 
experience from any theological or supernatural reference"62. This does not square well with our 
common experience that the best examples of humanity (as well, admittedly, as some of the 
worst) have been those who have been committed to some higher goal, whether the service of 
others, the service of some ideal or the service of God. 
58Motiyation Ch. 11. 
S9Whether one regards a high-level of psychological adjustment to such a society as a sign of 
health or sickness is a further question, not considered by l$slow. 
6'Motiyation p 161. 
6l Motivation p 199. 
62Motiyation-p 164. 
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Maslow would derive our ethical systems from a study of the self-actualisers. Maslow argues that, 
if human beings are essentially good, then those examples of humanity who have developed as 
healthily as possible, when behaving in as unconstrained a way as possible, will provide us with 
. ' . 
reliable guidelines for ethical action. He proposes that we derive our values not from reasoning 
about the human condition, still less by reference to divine commandments, but by "observing 
whatever our best specimens choose, and then assuming that these are the highest values for all 
mankind"63. 
However, I am not convinced that such a procedure, which allows no place for deliberation about 
generally agreed maxims, can be adequate. It cannot, for example, deal properly with examples of 
behaviour that are generally regarded as good and yet which do not conform to the kind of life 
exemplified by the self-actualisers. Martyrdom for the sake of truth is a case in point Maslow is 
unwilling to grant such an act any special ethical value. According to his theory there is no 
difference in principle between someone who risks his life for food, thus satisfying his hunger 
need, and someone who risks his life for the truth, thus satisfying some range of higher needs. 64 
Indeed, if all human behaviour merely reflects personal fulfilment of needs there is, as Maslow 
himself observes, really no difference between eating something myself and watching someone 
else eat, for these two activities merely give me pleasure at a lower or a higher need level6S. Such 
an argument might soothe the consciences of the opulent but is unlikely to convince the hungry. 
Maslow offers a rather different vision for what is involved in unifying the self from older, 
ethically-based ideals such as Augustine's. According to Maslow's view, the Augustinian 
denigration of bodily needs in favour of obligations to others actually poses a threat to the unity 
ofthe selr.-Fodfl~do not attend first to my-own-lower level needsthen-I-am-not genuinely able to 
meet those social demands whicp correspond to my own higher level needs. For most of us, o~ 
identity is likely to be formed by som~ synfbesis of Augustine's and Maslow's positions. We will 
recognise the importance of fulfilling our o~ needs, yet we will also be aware of duties to others 
which seem to exist independently of our qwn needs and which, from time to time, demand that 
our own needs be set aside. One way of dra)Ving together the two models, admittedly a way which 
grants a higher value to the Augustinian view, is by means of a distinction between an "ordo 
bonorum" and the Augustinian ordo caritati/!6, 
63Jldn& p169. 
64Motiyation plOt. 
65Motiyation plOt. 
661 owe the distinction between the ordo bonorum and the higher moral ordo caritatis to 
Browning (1991 pl60ft) who himself follows the Catholic moral theologian Louis Janssens. 
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We might suggest that Maslow's description of the self-actualiser is valuable, not so much at the 
level of ethics, but in articulating the range of what we might call "premoral" goods, or those 
goods belonging to the ordo bonorum. Premoral goods are not directly moral goods because we 
do not attribute to them moral qualities as such. But we do see them as objects or experiences that 
I , , , 
are good to pursue. Some of these goods, such as food and shelter, derive solely from our nature 
as human beings. Others, such as the need for autonomy, are shaped by culture. Maslow's work 
helps to clarify the order of such goods. Some goods are more urgent or "prepotent" than others; 
for example, health must be restored and bodies fed before learning can proceed. But these 
premoral goods are not good or evil in themselves. Too little food is evil as is too much food. My 
self-esteem may be a moral good, but it may be a moral evil if purchased at someone else's 
humiliation. Maslow's list is not the last word in defining the range of premoral goods. He may be 
wrong, for example, to suggest that food is more fundamental _than love, for a baby requires a 
mother's love before anything else and receives food only as a consequence of this: if the new-
born baby is not picked up and cared for by the mother it will quickly die67. Nonetheless, his 
hierarchy of needs has achieved a certain paradigmatic significance as a starting point for defining 
the premoral goods. 
In order to move from the realm of psychological description to ethics, this range of goods must 
be placed within a higher moral order, for example an Augustinian ordo caritatis. This order 
defines how the premoral goods are to be loved and distributed. The ordo caritatis requires that 
we love our neighbours as ourselves and above material possessions, and that we grant more love 
to God than to anything else. Goods are therefore to be distributed on the principle of equal 
regard and individuals are to be encouraged to act sacrificially to restore equality of regard where 
it is lacking. On these grounds my needs may legitimately be satisfied to the point where this is 
consistenrwith-the-endeavour to meet-my-neighbour's needs. Risking-my-life for the-truth;-where 
the question of my love for God and the just treatment of many others may be at stake, is now 
clearly seen as of higher moral worth than risking my life for my own food, where only my love of 
self is at stake. Similarly, my own self-esteem may be obtained ethically to the point where it is 
consistent with the esteem I grant to others but not where I seek more esteem than my neighbours. 
Contemporary attempts to unify the self may, perhaps, require to pay attention both to an ordo 
bonorum which expresses our natural needs and to an ordo caritatis which sets these needs in a 
broader moral context. 
S. Carl Rogers 
5.1 Ro&'fl's' Life and Work 
Carl Rogers was born in 1902 in Chicago, the fourth of six children. He came from a family that 
could trace its ancestry back 300 years within America. Rogers was not, then, a recent European 
67so Vitz (1994) p38. 
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emigrant, like many of his colleagues in the world of American psychology, but from a family 
deeply identified with the culture of Midwestern America. When Rogers was 12 his family moved 
to a large farm 30 miles west of Chicago. Reflecting on the move later, Rogers saw it as motivated 
by two different factors. Firstly, his father, a successful and prosperous businessman, wanted a 
farm for a hobby, but 'Carl came to believe that a second and more important reason was a desire 
on the part of his parents to protect their children from the "temptations" of suburban city life.68 
Rogers describes his family in the following terms: "I was brought up in a home marked by close 
family ties, a very sttict and uncompromising religious and ethical atmosphere, and what 
amounted to a worship of the virtue of hard work. My parents ... were in many subtle and 
affectionate ways, very controlling of our behaviour. It was assumed ... that we were different from 
other people ... We had good times together within the family, but we did not mix. So I was a pretty 
solitary boy."69 Rogers' family embodied the traditional values and close family ties of 
conservative, Puritan, American religion. 
In due course Rogers left home to study Agriculture at the University of Wisconsin. However, he 
felt a calling to Christian ministry and changed his course to History which he felt would give him 
a better preparation for ordination. At the age of 20, four years after the close of World War I, he 
was chosen to attend a World Student Christian Federation conference in Peking. This conference 
involved a six month tour and marked a watershed in Rogers' personal and spiritual development. 
To begin with his friendship with Helen Elliot blossomed into a deeply felt romance conducted by 
letter. He also experienced the constant company of an intelligent and stimulating group of peers. 
And lastly, he was brought face to face with the power and hostility of rival national feelings. 
Rogers recalls: "This was a most important experience for me .. .I saw how bitterly the French and 
Germans still hated each other .. .! was forced to realise ... that very sincere and honest people 
could believe-in-very-differenueligious doctrines. In -major ways-I -for the-frrst-time-emancipated 
myself from the religious thinking of my parents ... Looking back on it, I believe that here, more 
than at any other one time, I became an independent person. "70 Rogers' experience that, through 
the supportive relationship of his peers, and especially through his relationship with Helen, he was 
I 
enabled to throw off the consbicting religious values that his parents had imposed on him, was to 
be of central importance to his later counselling theory and practice. 
Having completing his studies at Wisconsin Rogers was accepted to train for ordained ministry at 
Union Theological Seminary in New York City. But Rogers came to feel deeply unhappy at the 
prospect of being required to believe a particular religious doctrine. After two years study he 
abandoned his vocation to the minisazy and continued his studies across the road at Columbia 
Teachers College where he now decided to train as a psychologist. He was appointed as a 
68Becoming a Person p6. 
69Becomina a Person p5. 
70ftecoming a Person p7. 
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counsellor at Rochester Clinic New York, a post which offered him the opportunity to work out 
his own, distinctive, non-directive approach to counselling. He moved via a teaching position in 
psychology at Ohio State University to Chicago University, where he was invited to initiate and 
direct a student counselling centre. His final university appointment was a rather unhappy post at 
Wisconsin. where he found that his counselling methods met with only modest success when used 
with seriously disturbed clients and where his work did not gain the respect of his fellow 
psychologists and psychiatrists. In 1963 he left the university system, moved to California and 
became closely involved with the Encounter Group movement. Towards the end of his life, and 
stimulated not least by Christian attacks on his work, he became increasingly hostile towards 
Christianity, regarding it as essentially hostile to human nature and caught up in guilt-inducing 
judgmentalism. 
Rogers' theory was deeply related to his life experience: escape from traditional religion, 
disillusion with academic psychology and academia in general, and the finding of peace and 
wholeness in therapeutic relationships. 
Rogers wrote 12 books and 200 articles. His work has been translated into 12languages. He has 
been hugely influential. A survey of American therapists carried out by the journal American 
Psycholoaist revealed him as, for them, the most influential figure in twentieth-century 
psychotherapy, surpassing even Freud.11 In Britain, the British Association for Counselling, 
which is dedicated to a basically Rogerian framework for counselling, now numbers some 13,000 
members. Yet he is generally held in low esteem by academic psychologists, a fact of which 
Rogers himself was keenly aware12. The British counsellor Brian Thorne sums up his influence 
nicely: "It may be that Rogers and client-centred therapy are looked at askance in academia and in 
sqme professioniU citcles but in countless self~help groups, in counselling -skills courses in 
colleges, churches and evening institutes, in human relations programmes within educational and 
institutional settings, it will be more often than not the work of Rogers which underpins the 
eqterprise. n73 
5,2 RoGrs' P§ycholo&ical Theory 
In general Rogers professed a dislike for theory and claimed that his own writing was grounded 
directly on the practical experience of his extensive clinical work. The theoretical elements of his 
work are effectively a synthesis of ¥aslow's self-actualisation theory with certain existential 
themes and some "self theory" that is originjll to Rogers. 
71Kirschenbaum and Henderson 1990a pxiii. 
72jbid. See also Rogers attack on academic psychology in American PsycholoW,st May 1973 
p379ff and the later reply to Rogers by Hans Strupp in American Psychologist August 1976 
p561ff under the combative title: "Clinical Psychology, Irrationalism and the Erosion of 
Excellence". 
73Thorne (1992) p78. 
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Rogers' scheme has three principal components: the organism, which is the total individual: the 
phenomenal field, which is the totality of the individual's experience: and the self, which is a 
differentiated portion of the phenomenal field and consists of a pattern of conscious perceptions 
and values of the "I" or "me". Rogers frequently refers to the first of these as the "organismic 
self', with the sense of self-as-subject, and to the third element as the "self-concept", with the 
sense of self-as-object. Rogers holds that the organismic self is motivated by the sole criterion of 
realising or actualising itself. This self-as-subject is relatively uninfluenced by the environment 
The self-concept, on the other hand, is formed by the interaction of the individual with the 
environment. It may introject values from the environment which distort its perception of the 
organismic self and which impede the latter's actualisation. The goal of therapy is to align the 
self-concept with the organismic self so as to maximise the conditions for self-actualisation. We 
may compare Fromm's notion of aligning the self-identity with the true self. 
Rogers holds that the person operates within his or her own uniquely perceived field of 
experience. This field includes perceptions of both the self and the external world. The perceptual 
field can only be known in any genuine or complete sense by the person themselves. The person 
reacts to this field and not to reality itself. Whatever he thinks is true forms his subjective reality, 
and it is this subjective reality not any supposedly objective state of affairs that determines how 
the person behaves. Rogers' radical subjectivism undercuts objective psychological approaches to 
the person, whether of a behavioural or psychoanalytic kind, which rely on empirical, scientific 
descriptions. For, according to Rogers, in human psychology "there is no such thing as scientific 
knowledge. There are only individual perceptions of what appears to each person to be such 
knowledge."74 It follows that the only valid kind of knowledge about the self is the knowledge 
that the-person himself brings. -Self-knowledge -is a matter-of the person-reflecting- clearly-and 
accurately upon himself without contamination from external values. The role of the counsellor is 
limited to providing the conditions under which the client can attain to an undistorted self· 
knowledge and self-love. 
According to Rogers the organism is motivated by a single drive which is "to actuaUse, maintain 
and enhance"75 itself. In the absence of parental and societal values the org~smic self would 
develop healthily and behave in a totally unconstrained way. However, in the co~ of growing 
up the child forms a concept of itself which is a compromise between the real organismic self and 
the expectations of family and society. The child will then attempt to disown ~spects of the 
organismic self that do not conform to the self-concept. Suppose, to quote one of Rogers 
examples, that a little boy torments his sister and is punished by his parents. He may react to this 
74Rogers "A Theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships" (1959) quoted in 
Thornep42. 
75CUent Centred Theryy p487. 
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situation by telling himself "I do not like to tease my sister", thereby denying his real feelings. 
The child then internalises the conflict between the spurious, introjected values of the parents and 
his own "true" values. The more the infant is made to take on the parents' values the higher the 
level of self-division. Rogers recommends instead that parents should accept the natural values of 
the child, though not necessarily approving of them. In this way the child can develop "a soundly 
structured self in which there is neither denial nor distortion of experience"76. 
The aim of therapy is to enable clients to re-adjust the self-concept so that it reflects a true 
appreciation of the self. Through the warm, accepting, non-judgmental attitude of the counsellor 
the client is enabled to explore and own feelings and aspects of behaviour that had previously 
been denied. The counsellor's main function is to listen. He can contribute no information or 
knowledge since "the best vantage point for understanding behaviour is from the internal frame of 
reference ofthe individual himself.'o77 The clienllearns to replace harsh, static, introjected values 
with natural, flexible values deriving from his own organismic self. An external value system is 
thus replaced by an internal valuing process. One's values are now continually modified to reflect 
new experiences that contribute to one's self-actualisation. The result is psychic autonomy and a 
completely individualised value system. Rogers describes the healthy ideal as a "fully-functional" 
person. Such a person is characterised by an increasing openness to their own experience, the 
ability to live fully in the present, a trust in their own intuition as a guide to action, a high degree 
of autonomy and a freedom from conventional norms.78 
5.3 The Sisnificance of Rosers 
Rogers' theory is open to numerous objections as follows. 
1. Freudians, Jungians and Augustinian Christians are united in their view that Rogers' insistence 
on- llie original goOdness of human oeffigs simply -fails to -square With the facts-of -human 
experience. Even the psychologist Rollo May, who stands broadly within the humanistic 
psychological tradition, commented to Rogers that "the issue of evil- or, rather, the issue of not 
confronting evil ... is the most important error in the humanist movement. "79 No-one who has ever 
brought up small children could reasoqably suppose that selfishness is not at least as natural a part 
of our make-up as benevolence. 
2. As I commented with regard to Frornm, tlte suggestion that the deep self is pure goodness leads 
to problems in naming, owning and dealing with the darker parts of the self. 
76cUent Centred Therapy p503. 
77cuent Centred Therapy p494. 
78Becomina a Person p184ff. 
79"0pen Letter to Rogers" quoted in Ed. Kirschenbaum 1990b p240. 
172 
The Humanistic Psychologists: Actualising the Self 
3. The notion of an "essential" organismic self that has its own (benign) values quite 
independendy of the (hannful) values of society does not match our experience of the process of 
moral education. Ethical values are acquired and learned in communities not by mere 
introspection. 80 
4. The rather artificial relationship envisaged in pure Rogerian counselling promises more in 
terms of "becoming a person" than it can deliver. The essence of an encounter between persons is 
a sharing of perspectives, values, and frames of reference81. Yet in Rogerian counselling the 
client encounters only his own frame of reference. There is no "1-thou" relationship, merely a 
self-confinning reflection of the I. The client gains the impression that he is being accepted by 
another, when he is merely learning to accept himself. If following the therapeutic encounter the 
client now has doubts about his own worthiness he has no finn grounds for self-acceptance. 
Rogerian counselling does not so much produce persons, securely constituted by 1-thou 
relationships, as individuals related only to themselves. A Rogerian counselling relationship may 
well have definite therapeutic benefits, perhaps mainly because it provides a safe place where 
feelings and thoughts can be expressed without fear of rejection. But it is only a parody of real 
encounters with others and cannot substitute for the real acceptance conferred, for example, by a 
friend. 
5. Rogers assumes that clients are the only source of reliable self-knowledge. He has no 
mechanisms for bringing to light unconscious knowledge nor of dealing with self-deceit. Our 
common experience is that we sometimes need to see ourselves as others see us before we can 
accurately know ourselves. 
Yet, despite the weaknesses of his theory, Rogers ideas have taken hold in a remarkable way. 
Rogerian counselling is, as Rogers was fond of saying, "an idea whose time has come"82, and it is 
-worth retlecting_why_this should be_so. 
Rogers' own life, geographically symbolised by his journey from the American mid-West via a 
liberal education in New York and thence to California, has a paradigmatic significance in 
twentieth century Western culture. Growing up in a strict religious atmosphere, rebelling against 
the parental religion, learning tolerance and self-acceptance, and searching for some kind of self-
chosen ethical basis for life independent of Christianity have been and to some extent still are 
culturally typical experiences. Rogers offers a means of coping in the absence of the traditional 
supports of family, community and faith. His central values of self-choice and personal autonomy 
are highly consonant with late twentieth century capitalism. The popular influence of his work in 
contrast to its low academic standing reflects a perception that academic psychology, and perhaps 
academia in general, fails to answer the questions people are asking. His suggestion that each of 
soso Macintyre (1988) and cf. Kohlberg (1976) p50. 
81Following Martin Buber; see, for example, Bober's comments in Ed. Kirschenbaum 1990b Ch. 
3. 
82E.g. American Psycbolo&ist No. 29 pll6 Carl Rogers "In Retrospect: 46 years". 
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us may supply our own values reflects a society where common values systems are breaking 
down. Finally, his stress on the significance of the individual and of personal experience, answers 
to the needs of people who feel increasingly anonymous and unsure of themselves in a 
fragmented world. 
6. Summary 
Against the deconstruction of the self by the postmodernists, the humanists offer many important 
and positive ways of defending and commending the concept of the self. Their insistence on a 
holistic approach to psychology provides an antidote to the dissecting techniques of conventional 
science. They suggest that we have a whole self that is more than the sum of its parts. This self 
may only be properly known through loving relationship, not through analysis. They testify to an 
essential self that is more than the product of social forces and that has the capability of realising 
itself in unique and creative ways. The humanistic psychologists give us ways of taking the higher 
elements of human nature seriously, showing that these do not have to be reduced to 
manifestations of primitive instincts. They testify to the sacredness of personal experience. They 
define and conceptualise for us the basic needs that must be satisfied if our full humanity is to be 
actualised. They are respectful of personal autonomy and the uniqueness of the individual. 
Humanistic counselling provides us with a safe place where feelings may be explored and where 
we may try to develop an appropriate attitude towards ourselves. The widespread acceptance of 
humanistic psychology in education, social work and pastoral care suggests that its values ring 
true in contemporary experience. 
Humanistic psychology offers us the possibility of unifying the self under the project of self-
actualisation. The_stress it places on self-loye_and self-realisation seem relevant to a culture in 
which narcissistic neuroses prevail. However, my main criticism of it is that it lacks depth and 
weight. Its refusal to take evil seriously means it is unable to account for the complexities of our 
character or the downright nastiness of much of human life. Finally, as critics of American culture 
such as Rieff, Bellah, Lasch and Macintyre, have argued, it is not clear whether its counsels are a 
remedy for our narcissism or whether they merely perpetuate it. 
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1. Review 
In the first chapter I suggested that our. Western sense of self might best be understood as a 
function of our orientation to morally significant goods. We are selves to the extent that we are 
beings of the requisite mental sophistication to possess sensitivity to sources of value. On this 
account the possibility of unifying the self is a matter of integrating all one's various sources of 
significance. Following Plato, this has typically been seen as a matter of uniting all one's powers 
in the service of rational pursuit of the good. 
I suggested that the Western sense of self is especially characterised by the sense that our mode 
of access to sources of significance is an inward one. This has been worked out in three major 
directions. Firstly, Augustine suggested that the self gained coherence through its pursuit of the 
Trinitarian God. Secondly, following Descartes, Locke and Kant, the subject might take his or her 
own capacity for rational thought as a source of significance. Freud stands within this school of 
thought. For Freud, the individual moves from neurosis to health insofar as the rational ego is able 
to gain mastery over the whole of the personality. Thirdly, following Montaigne, Hutcheson, 
Rousseau and the Romantic movement, the self might take its own natural sentiments and feelings 
as a source of significance.-Jung- and the humanistic-psychologists stand withi.D- this traCiiuon. 
Selthood, for these psychologists, consists in reaching within to retrieve and express our own 
unique, inner nature. The modern "psychological self'' is, I have suggested, defined by its 
orientation to these three sources of significance. Each source has an inward quality: the inner 
I 
light of God, our self-consciously rational thought, our innermost feelings and sentiments. The 
contemporary self gains wholen"ss insofar as it succeeds in constructing an identity relative to 
some combination of these three inner sources of significance. 
The Platonic ideal of rational self-mastery has, as I showed, come under particular attack in the 
last twenty years with the cultural shift to postmodernism. According to the postmodernists, the 
attempt at self-mastery is nothing other than the internalising within the self of societal repression 
of the individual. This assertion has led the most radical of the postmodernists, such as Lacan and 
Deleuze, to argue that the self must not be unified but must rather be deconstructed and 
destroyed. The more temperate position of the later Foucault is that new and liberating forms of 
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the self must be found. Foucault's own attempt at doing this involved a rejection of the whole 
post-Augustinian Western identity which I have judged unrealistic. What I am attempting to do 
here, instead, is to work within our historically conditioned sense of identity to see how it might 
be developed to meet the demands of our present context, one which places considerable stress on 
what I have called "unorder". 
2. How should these ustems of thou&ht be eyaluated? 
I have examined four major psychologists or psychological movements - Augustine, Freud, Jung 
and the humanistic psychologists - who between them articulate the three axes of moral space 
within which the contemporary self orientates itself. The question now arises as to how these 
systems should be evaluated. Three options suggest themselves. 
2.1 Empirical Testing 
Within Anglo-American culture at least, the highest respect is accorded to theories which are 
capable of being empirically tested. Insofar as each of the theorists I have considered make 
definite claims about the working and integration of the psyche one might hope that they could be 
susceptible to some son of empirical verification. One can envisage three forms that empirical 
verification might take, as follows. 
F'trSUy, one could tty to verify or falsify the psychologies by reference to lower-level neurological 
or physiological evidence. This was the approach taken by the early Freud in his attempts to link 
the pleasure principle to systems of neurones. However, Freud found that the neurological 
evidence would not take him very far and his later work was based, instead, on clinical and 
theoretical considerations. This is still broadly the case with respect to each of the psychologies I 
have considered; -wedo not have any neurological evidence forentities such- as the Oedipus 
complex, the animus archetype or the drive to self-actualisation. Neither, on the other hand, has 
brain science advanced to the point where it might offer definitive disproof of the theories we 
have considered. The psychologies are not immune from developments in brain science: if, for 
example, an account of the brain could be given which showed human beings to be heavily 
determined by genetic and chemical factors this would lend suppon to Freud's conception of the 
mind and tend to discredit the humanistic theories. But at present the psychologies I have 
discussed seem to be generally neutral with respect to lower level scientific theories. 
Secondly, one might attempt clinical testing to see how far human psychological functions (such 
as sublimation) and products (such as dream imagery) conform to the theories propounded by the 
psychologists. In some limited areas, for example the verification of an order of needs such as 
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that given by Maslow, a degree of clinical verification is possible. 1 But, more typically, the 
generality of the theories means this attempt is beset by problems. As Freud's own case studies 
demonstrate, his scheme is capable of the most ingenious explanations to cater for new and 
unexpected psychological phenomena. Again, the categories of the Jungian archetype are so 
flexible that it is quite'difficult to envisage dream imagery that could not be accommodated within 
the scheme. Fmally, it is hard to imagine how one would produce an empirical proof or disproof 
of an avowedly metaphysical construct such as the Augustinian "desire of God". The long and 
still unresolved controversy over how far Freud's clinical evidence counts as "scientific" indicates 
the difficulty of collecting universally acceptable clinical evidence for or against these kinds of 
psychological theories. 
Thirdly, one might attempt to evaluate the therapeutic effectiveness of the psychological theories. 
That is to say, one might ask how far a person who lives according to one of the schemes I have 
presented, or who is treated with or helped by techniques that follow from this scheme, is thereby 
made psychologically "healthier". A· great deal of work has been done, for example, to evaluate 
how far counselling helps people. But, unfonunately this kind of research has not so far generated 
simple conclusions of the kind we would need here, but indicates rather that psychological 
therapies can work for some people in some circumstances.2 The most soundly based research 
involves carefully defined studies of limited scope which measure how far a particular belief 
system or therapeutic process correlates with one panicular measure of psychological health or 
disease, such as anxiety levels or suicide rates. This kind of research can be applied equally to the 
therapeutic effectiveness of a life lived according to religious ideals as well as to an evaluation of 
the more specifically therapeutic ideals and techniques advocated by the modern psychologists. 3 
Whilst these "outcome studies" may offer some-help -in evaluating our-psychological theories, 
empirical science does not seem to offer the whole, or even most of the answer. This result should 
not strike us as surprising. The usual method of empirical science is to break down a problem into 
small parts so that controlled experim~nts can be run with manageable sets of data. However, the 
systems of thought we have considered tend to run in -the opposite direction. They are intent on 
making broad statements about human flourishing. They are much less concerned with specific 
testable theories than with overall conceptions. They do not so much provide us with hard facts as 
1 Although even here it remains controversial: see, for example, the criticisms of the empirical 
basis of Maslow's work made by Vitz (1994) pp37-40. 
2Ref. a statement by the American Psychiatric Association Commission on Psychotherapies 
(1982): "Although research in psychotherapy is still plagued by many problems connected with 
assignment of patients, use of statistics, outcome measures, and experimental design, the data 
have shown empirically that psychotherapy is effective with some populations with some 
problems." (quoted in Egan 1990 plOf.) 
3For example Loewenthal (1995) summarises the results of research carried out into the relative 
mental well-being of a number of religiously inspired communities including the Hutterites, 
Hebridean islanders and Jewish Hasidim. (Ch. 3) 
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with tools with which we may think about ourselves. In summary, they do not have a concrete and 
specific impact on psychological science so much as a general and pervasive influence on the 
whole culture within which psychological science operates. It therefore seems that their 
truthfulness is best evaluated at a higher, meta-scientific level. 
2.2 Philosophical Adequa«y as World-Views 
If the systems I have discussed are of a more general nature than what we normally consider to be 
scientifically testable theories, perhaps they should be evaluated at the most general level of all, 
that of world-views. The development of a coherent world-view is indeed to a certain extent the 
obverse of the possession of a unified sense of self. For, on the account of selfhood I have given, 
in coming to an understanding of who we are as selves we by implication come to an 
understanding of how things in the world have significance for us. The construction of a total self 
involves considering matters of ultimate significance including, for example, what significance, if 
any, God might have for us. A true understanding of ourselves is therefore a mirror image of a 
true understanding of the world and of God. 
Whilst there would be little doubt that Augustine was intent on developing a world-view, the 
suggestion that the modem psychologies constitute world-views seems more difficult to sustain. 
To be sure, Jung did claim for his psychology a certain metaphysical significance4, and the 
important commentator on Jung's work, Jolande Jacobi, quite definitely saw Jung's work as 
suggesting a world-view.' Moreover, the humanists have been more than willing to claim world-
view status for their systems.6 Freud, however, was reticent about describing psychoanalysis in 
such terms: he preferred to see himself as extending another world-view, the scientific view, into 
the domain of the mind.7 
Despite the enthusiasm of soqte Jungians and humanists, the modem psychologies I have 
discussed are better considered, pt the manner of Freud, as only a part of larger world-views. The 
difficulty of seriously evaluating the psychologies as world-views becomes apparent when we try 
4~ para. 525: "I always think of psychology as encompassing the whole of the psyche and that 
includes philosophy and theology ... For underlying all philosophies and all religions are the facts 
of the human soul which may ultimately be the arbiters of truth and error .. " 
SJacobi {1967) p vii: "The way ofindividuation ... the keystone of Jung's widely ramifying 
work ... amounts to a comprehensive view of life which embraces the all-too-human as weU as the 
personal and the suprapersonal." 
6Maslow (1970) px: "This new 'humanistic' Weltanschauung seems to be a new and far more 
hopeful and encouraging way of conceiving any and every area of human knowledge: e.g., 
economics, sociology, biology, and every profession: e.g. law, politics, medicine, and all of the 
social institutions: e.g., the family, education, religion, etc." 
Rogers (1980) pix: "I am no longer talking simply about psychotherapy but about a point of view, 
a philoSophy, an approach to life, a way of being, which fits any situation in which growth .. .is part 
of the goal." 
7XXU "New Introductory Lectures" Lecture 35, "The Question of a Weltanschauung" p159. 
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to rank them against philosophical criteria. One such standard set of criteria for examining the 
adequacy of alternative world-views is that given by Vincent Brummer8: (1) freedom from 
contradiction, (2) relevance, (3) impressiveness, (4) unity and (5) universality. Some of these 
criteria do seem to have a place here. We can, certainly envisage checking the psychologies for 
freedom from contradiction, and relevance. But it would seem misplaced to expect them to have a 
universal impressiveness. They are fundamentally concerned with the workings of the mind, not 
with politics, social ethics, history, nature or any one of a number of other areas of human interest 
which would fall within the ambit of a proper world-view. 
2.3 Fitness for Purpose 
Since it does not seem entirely appropriate to evaluate the psychologies either at the lowest level 
of empirical testing or at the highest level of adequacy as philosophical world-views, I suggest as 
a third option that they may be evaluated in tetrns of their fitness for the particular purpose of 
generating an integrated sense of selfhood or, at least, of contributing to whatever sense of 
wholeness may be feasible for us. This is to say, I shall consider how far it would be possible and 
realistic to "keep whole" one's sense of personal identity through adhering to one or other of these 
psychologies. In this case the theoretical criteria against which the psychologies should be 
evaluated seem to form a sub-set of the more general criteria for evaluating a world-view. This is 
to be expected in view of the "mirror" relationship between the sense of self and the sense of 
significance of things in the world for us that I pointed to above. However, rather than look for a 
world-view that expresses unity and impressiveness on a universal scale, we shall instead be 
interested in the narrower capability of power to integrate the self. The theoretical criteria are 
then as follows: 
1. Iiiteariitiye-f'O\\Ier. In ordeno-generate a unifioo·sense of-self~ the· system musrbe able to·refer 
me to something or someone (or to a co-ordinated plurality of entities) which impresses me as 
being determinative of meaning and which can pull together all aspects of my selfhood within a 
coherent structure. On a significance-based understanding of seltbood, If a person is not inspired 
by anyone or anything he or she will not be able to form a strong sense of self. 
2, Freedom Crom Contradiction. A system cannot enable us to maintain a unified sense of self if it 
contains basic contradictions. Paradoxes are allowable only if we can make it clear that they are 
only "apparently" contradictory. Real paradoxes, that suggest opposing prescriptions for 
behaviour, will tend to pull apart the sense of self. 
Ssrummer (1981) pl39ff. 
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3. Relevance. The system must have relevance to our lives as they are lived here and now. That it 
is to say, it must bear directly on the modem Western sense of identity. If its tenets have no direct 
bearing on our lives then these tenets are of merely speculative interest. 
My analysis here is limited to these theoretical criteria. However, it would seem possible (at least 
in principle) for empirical tests to be devised using questionnaires and interviews which would 
evaluate how far a person who claimed to be living according to one of these systems actually 
achieved the kinds of psychological benefits one would expect to be associated with a unified 
sense of self. Positively, one might expect evidence of a sense of purpose and meaning in life, a 
sense of inner peace, a strong sense of personal identity and evidence of a coherent set of moral 
values. Negatively, one might expect to find lower than average levels of anxiety and neurotic 
depressions. Empirical tests might then corroborate or modify what we would expect from a 
theoretical analysis of the systems, although, as I indicated earlier, the systems are probably too 
complex and metaphysical to be susceptible only or even mainly to empirical analysis. 
I wiU now evaluate each of the four systems in tum against the above theoretical criteria. 
3. Aueustjpe 
3.1 Integrative Power 
Augustine sets the one God as the strong centre to life. The quest for God is an over-riding life 
goal that serves to order all other needs and desires. The self is united through increasingly lining 
up its powers behind this single desire. The goal is a vision of eternal bliss and totally fulfilled 
delight which, provided it can be given a more dynamic interpretation, is a powerfuUy impressive 
one. 
The limitation with Augustine's thought, in this respect, is that it is too strongly unified. Our 
modem context is one in which we live within a plurality of moral sources and life goals. If 
Augustine's thought is to meet our present demands it may need to be adapted to allow for a 
greater space and freedom for the individual to pursue goals which are not automatically referred 
to and brought into line with the divine centre. One way in which this might be done is to give a 
greater emphasis than Augustine does to the Spirit who, in theological terms, is the principle of 
diversity. 
3.2 Freedom from Contradiction 
My treatment of Augustine suggests two apparent paradoxes which, though theological in origin, 
contain important psychological implications. (I will leave aside discussion of more purely 
theological paradoxes, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which have 
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usually been defended as "mysteries", that is, as truths above reason but not contrary to reason, as 
these bear only a secondary relation to my present psychological purposes.) 
a> The problem of the immanence and transcengence of God 
The presentation of Augustine's thought that I have given is built on the supposition that the God 
who is utterly transcendent is also wholly immanent. The God whom one desires is also the 
immanent principle of desire. 
However, this does not, I suggest. amount to a logical antimony or real paradox. Augustine 
explains his doctrine of God to his own satisfaction in terms of Neo-Platonic ontology. God 
belongs to a spiritual order which is wholly present at each point that it touches the lower physical 
order. If God is present at all he is present equally in each place. Should the categories of Neo-
Platonic philosophy fail to convince us, the same point can be made by an analogy from modem 
physics. The magnetic field set up by two electrically charged parallel plates is such that a small 
iron object placed between the plates will experience the same magnetic force irrespective of its 
physical location within this area. In other words, the magnetic force, if it exists at all, has the 
same value at all points between the plates. The iron object might be said to experience the field 
as wholly immanent to itself, whilst at the same time the field transcends the object. As with 
magnetic fields, so with God, immanence and transcendence may be conditions of one another. 
bl The problem of Grace and Freedom 
A second and more serious theological problem arises from Augustine's conception of the 
immanence of God. It can seem that the nearness of God's grace to man leaves no space for 
human freedom. An antimony seems to be set up between irresistible divine grace on the one 
hand ·and human freedom--on-the other. -Thus John-Rist-has commented-that -Augustine!s doctrine 
of grace poisons his whole theology.9 However, and as I shall now show, Augustine's theology 
does not rest on a paradox here so much as on a particular understanding of human freedom. 
We have been accustomed, at l"ast since the time of Aristotle, to highlighting the necessity of 
choice in any action that could count as voluntary or free. 10 The question raised by Augustine is 
how far choices directly against God's will count· as free choices. Whilst the early Augustine 
allowed that the will may freely choose against the good11 , Augustine's mature position is that 
choices against God are not to be desfribed as "free" but as "evil". A choice against God, says 
Augustine, could not be regarded as a "natural" function of the will; it is to the contrary 
profoundly "unnaturaJ"12, Indeed the perfection of humanity involves a reduction of this kind of 
9JIS 1969N.S. 20pp420-7. 
tONic. Eth. 3.i-iii. 
lief. the argument of the anti· Manichaean Freed9m of the Will Bk. 1. 
12E.g. ~ 12.3. 
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choice: people will no longer be able to sin.13 In Augustine's theology for a person to sin 
voluntarily is like an archer missing his target. It does not provide evidence of the archer's 
freedom to miss but of his faulty aim. It is not the freed will that makes such choices but the 
faulty will. The fact that people choose in accordance with some standard which falls short of the 
Good, i.e. voluntarily sin, is not a witness to their freedom but to their participation in fallen 
Adamic humanity. If asked why Adam first sinned Augustine would say that this was in no sense 
an act of freedom but an inexplicable defection from Being to unreality.14 
Rist identifies freedom with autonomy in our relations with GodlS, but this is precisely not 
Augustine's understanding. Augustine dissociates freedom of the will, at least in the question of 
moral action, from the having of more than one possible course of action. Augustine's 
understanding of the freedom of the will is not a rationale for voluntary sin. Augustine's doctrine 
is better understood with reference to the phenomenon of involuntary sin. People lack freedom of 
the will inasmuch as they find their will is divided. They are unable to will the good 
wholeheartedly and therefore cannot escape involuntary sin. The later Augustine16 insisted, 
against the Pelagians, on our inability to will the good wholeheartedly, even when we are sub 
gratia. The restoration of freedom is therefore not so much the restoration of choice as the 
restoration of wholeness to the will. 
When freedom of the will is understood in this way, the apparent antinomy that commentators 
such as Rist have found in Augustine's thought between irresistible grace and human freedom 
disappears. Human freedom, far from being opposed to grace, is conditional upon the receipt of 
grace. Unless the will is restored to wholeness through the action of divine grace it cannot be free. 
The Pelagians held that we are free to accept or reject grace. Augustine's response to this would 
nofbe- so much to deny that we can resist graceas to regard suclf aenial as pathological. The will 
is unfree to the extent that it is chained by habit to sinful patterns of behaviour. Past bad choices 
(both our own and those of our predecessors) therefore lie at the root of both our felt resistance to 
grace and our lack of freedom. Grace heals the action of fallen humanity in restoring us to 
wholeness of will and freedom. 
3.3 Relevance 
Augustine's theological psychology fails to be relevant to our modern sense of selfhood in several 
important respects, as follows. 
a) A Naqow Conception of Human Freedom 
13corrept. 33. 
14dlh 12.7. 
15Rist (1969) p424. 
16E.g. in nat et IU'· 50-58. 
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Whilst Augustine's doctrine of grace and freedom is logically coherent, it is another matter as to 
whether it is psychologically adequate for our present needs. Augustine describes freedom in 
terms of obedience to the divine order. His account is an important corrective to that strand of 
contemporary thought, exemplified here by the humanists, which defines freedom purely 
negatively as "freedom from constraint". Augustine offers a positive account of freedom as a 
psychological condition of the will. However, we cannot, as Augustine did, separate the ideal of 
freedom from the notion of personal choice altogether. The Church that summons us to a form of 
slavery which is perfect freedom may, after all, be summoning us only to a form of slavery. 
Augustinian freedom may rightly be accused of authoritarianism. Indeed from the time of the 
Donatists onwards it has provided a convenient rationale for compelling a uniformitY of religious 
belief. Modem people prize individual rights, autonomy and freedom to choose in a way that is 
quite foreign to Augustine's thought-world. Augustine's conception of freedom must be broadened 
to include the element of personal choice if it is to meet our modem needs. 
bl Too strong a concern with order 
It is understandable that, as the pax Romatla began to crumble around him, Augustine should 
have been deeply concerned for order. However, in our time, we want to grant appropriate space 
for spontaneity and have a deeper appreciation of the value of the non-ordered parts of the 
person. In relation to sex his desire for control reached a level that we would not only regard as 
unhealthy but also physiologically impossible. Under conditions of maximum health and integrity 
we now know that the body is not in every function subject to the soul's commands. Moreover, we 
should want to place a higher value than Augustine on unordered aspects of the personalitY such 
as the spontaneous expression of emotion, playfulness and bodily pleasure. 
¢> Alifui@lmvareness of the reiilins of the unconscious 
Augustine thought that any of his memories that were radically inaccessible and genuinely 
forgotten no longer formed a part of him. This meant that, in principle, the whole of the self could 
be open to the control of the will. We would now be suspicious of this claim. There may be parts 
of ourselves that are hidden from consciousness and yet are still very much a part of ourselves. 
Augustine's psychology needs to deepened to allow for the mysterious and pervasive effects of 
unconscious processes upon the conscious self. 
d) A failure to DPJ,lreciate the positive dimensions of conflict witqin the ~If 
Augustine invariably saw conflict within the self in a negative light. 't was, he thought, an 
indication of the failure of the rational mind fully to order the PjlSsions. He thought that the very 
existence of conflict was in itself a symptom of divine punispment of human sin. Of course 
Augustine never advised people to avoid conflict; he would rather say that awareness of the state 
of war between reason and passions was a mark of holiness. But he regarded the state of warfare 
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as something wholly regrettable and thought that insofar as we could detect progress in this life it 
would be manifested in a lessening of the unruly force of concupiscence within us.17 
Augustine thought that the only valid objective of internal conflict could be its cessation through 
moral victory. By contrast, his opponent Julian of Eclanuin saw the battle between the rational 
mind and the passions as having the additional objective of enabling people to develop moral 
strength. IS We shall want to side with Julian against Augustine here. It is unclear how we would 
develop certain moral qualities, such as endurance and ~our~ge, in the complete absence <?f 
temptation and the inner conflict that results. Moreover, after Freud, we understand more than 
ever before that the mind is characterised by the interplay of conflicting forces. The complete 
eradication of conflict seems to us unrealistic. The proper question is, rather, how such conflict 
can be used in the most creative ways. Whilst excessive tension is indicative of mental distress, a 
moderate degree of tension is good for us, acting as a spur to higher levels of moral endeavour 
and human performance. Indeed, the complete absence of tension might be a mark not so much of 
fulfilment as morbidity. Augustine's psychology requires a more nuanced understanding of 
internal conflict. 
e> An enumasis on rest to the exclusion of dynamism 
For Augustine, changelessness and motionlessness were necessary components of the divine 
perfection. His goal for human psychological development is, consequently, a motionless Platonic 
telos. Our modem view of psychology, as of cosmology, is much more dynamic and energetic 
than Augustine's. Whereas Augustine's cosmology assumed that motionlessness equated with 
maximum order, for us it represents a state of maximum entropy or maximum disorder. We 
understand that order is something which must be positively created and actively sustained. 
Absence of-change-in-a person-is primarily a condition-of-stagnation. If the state of "perfect-resf! --
is said to be a state of perfect peace, then we can only be talking of a cold, inactive form of 
peacefulness. A more dynamic understanding of the human goal is needed than that given by 
Augustine. 
fl Ap in&deguate understandio& of loye for God as caritqs 
Augustine's notion of human love for God is made up of desiring eros and static caritas 
components. Perfect love, for him, would be a state of contemplation in which the desiring 
components of love were fulfilled in pure caritas and the individual's will adhered perfectly to the 
divine will. The individual is "glued on behind" God. 
17
,S,mnQ 151.6. 
IS~ IV.2.9ff. 
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However, this image does not stress adequately that love for God is primarily a relationship of 
persons. Augustine has not fully broken free of the Neo-Platonic idea that the state of perfection 
would be a condition in which the individual merged with the divinity. This deficiency might have 
been remedied if Augustine had meditated on the biblical notion of friendship (phllta) with 
God. 19 phllia with God implies a mutual relationship in which both parties are free agents with 
respect to one another and may affect one another. It does not mean that an individual can 
autonomously enter into a relationship with God; as Augustine rightly insisted we are dependent 
on the initiative of divine grace. But the possibility that we may turn our backs on his gracious 
initiative must always be there, or else we lose· our personhood and become mere channels of 
grace. A revised model of love is needed which takes due account of the modem insistence on the 
value of human autonomy. 
gl Religious Exclusivity 
According to Augustine's theology the possibility of integrating the self is limited to those who 
explicitly confess the Christian gospel and commit themselves to seeking the Trinitarian God. 
Augustine envisaged a sharp divide between the city of the saved and the city of the lost. Whilst 
he firmly maintained that the identity of members of the former was known only to God, he 
would not have allowed that unbaptised members of pagan religions could have numbered 
amongst the saved or make any real spiritual progress. In our time it is quite clear that the 
possibility of psychological growth is not exclusively limited to those who are adherents of the 
Christian religion. Some theological means is therefore needed for allowing either that God is at 
work ln those who are not explicitly Christian, or for allowing that the self may be unified with 
referellce to g~s other than the Trinitarian God. 
bl-A1erurei1Cy tO devalue temppral and material-gijijQS -
Augustine struggled to be enthusiastic about the value of temporal and material goods. His use 
and enjoyment scheme of ordering, in particular, sharply relativised all our present temporal 
goods in favour of the one Eternal Good. As we have seen, even in so spiritual an activity as 
worshipping God, he remained suspicious of sensual enjoyment. Particularly in his later life, 
Augustine's assessment of the amount of happiness one could expect in this life was low. By 
contrast in our century, whilst we have certainly witnessed unprecedented levels of suffering, 
many in the West enjoy extremely high standards of living and suffer very little at all. Many of us 
have become accustomed to high levels of expectation for earthly happiness. Moreover, the 
inability to take pleasure in m~rial and sensual goods is now more usually regarded as a 
' 
psychological weakness rather than a streng~. A more adequate scheme for ordering material and 
psychological goods is needed than Augustlfle gives us. 
l!JRef. Burnaby (1938) p256ff. 
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0 Remoteness from Contemporary Context of HeWinG Relationships 
Augustine assumed that spiritual and psychological progress was most likely to be made in a 
strongly social context where one's thoughts, emotions, and ideally one's possessions, would be 
shared with friends. Our contemporary context is one in which, especially for men, this level of 
friendship is not a reality. Moreover, the kinds of problems which people today experience as 
most deeply troubling at a psychological level, such as past childhood relationships with parents 
or present sexual difficulties, are not of a nature that most of us would feel comfortable 
discussing even with good friends. For many today, it seems that a particular relationship with a 
counsellor, therapist or spiritual pj.rector is required where these kind'> of issues can be addressed. 
This form of relationship does not take the place of friendships, although it may be needed more 
in our contemporary postmodern context in which deep friendships seem more difficult to sustain 
than they have done in the past. Its main purpose is supplementary to friendship. It offers a 
privileged space in which problematic feelings can be worked through. It may supply an 
environment where damaging experiences that occurred in dysfunctional relationships can be 
rehearsed and dealt with, so that these relationships may be maintained and strengthened. 
4. Freud 
4.1 Inteuatiye Power 
Freud argues that the task of integrating the self is much more difficult than had previously been 
thought. He charts for us a new realm of the psyche, the unconscious, whose activities escape the 
ordering powers of the will. According to Freud, we simply cannot voluntarily line up all aspects 
of the self in pursuit of some ideal or goal. The unconscious has its own goals which it pursues 
whether we like them or not. Freud's ·picture of the self is a frankly pessimistic one. The self is 
composed of the fundamentally dissimilar elements of ego and id. Furthermore it is driven by a 
duality of instinctS, tlie creative Eros and the self-oescructive Thanatos, which continually tend to 
puU the self in opposing directions. 
In therapeutic terms we must recognise the limited scope of psychoanalysis. Melanie Klein, for 
example, assumes a bit too much in thinking that the goal of psychoanalysis is the integration of 
the self. Psychoanalysis is a set of strategies for addressing one particular class of failures of 
integration, namely that concerned with the irrational phenomena generated through intra-psychic 
conflict. The technique of analysis does not aim to bring complete unity and harmony but merely 
to ensure that the battle between the instincts is fought on a level playing field. In commenting on 
what might be expected from psychoanalysis, Freud aptly said: "Much will be gained if we 
succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that 
· has been restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness. "20 
20U305. 
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The re-arming of the ego involves draining the unconscious of some of its power, so that the ego 
is not bound by irrational neuroses. Here Freud ls able to offer us an enviable range of therapeutic 
techniques. Of central importance is the process of lifting repression. By workins through his or 
her emotions in the context of a relationship with the analyst, a patient gains the courage to 
at>andon his or her defensive strategies. The repressed contents of the unconscious may now be 
brought to consciousness and expressed normally. The ego is thus persuaded to give up its 
attachment to neurotic symptoms, and the id may find healthy outlets for its instinctual drives. 
The ego is thereby enabled, to some extent, to impose a rational order on the other parts of the 
psyche, and the person gains a limited degree of self-mastery and psychic unity. 
Psychoanalysis leaves untouched issues of personal integration that occur at the level of ordinary 
psychology and ethics, such as finding fulfilment in life or deliberating about moral values. 
Indeed Freud quite deliberately maintained a steady agnosticism here. In his view one must 
simply apply the analytic calculus of the reality principle and get on with the interminable warfare 
of normal human life. 
We must, of course, face the possibility that Freud was right here. It may be that only a limited 
degree of personal integration is possible, that we are not able to unify our lives behind 
meaningful goals. But most of us at least hope that there is more to life than this, as is indicated 
by the great contemporary interest in psychologies of the kind suggested by Maslow which -hold 
out the possibility of self-fulfilment. If orientating ourselves to some higher goal is merely what 
Freud would have called "illusion", then it still remains, for most of us, a more attractive way of 
living than the "reality" to which Freud bids us be reconciled. We may, perhaps, agree with 
Wollheim21, that the question of whether or not we ought to hope that there is more to our 
eXistence than thepsy<:hopathology of everyday-life is one-ofthe things-that most-sharply divides-
Freud from the spirit of the late twentieth century. 
On a significance-based account of selfhood, the self can only be integrated with reference to one 
or more powerful moral sources. Unfortunately, Freud's overwhelmingly critical attitude to 
morality does not allow him to give a proper exposition of any moral sources by which the self 
might1orientate itself. The closest he gets to a positive ethic is the occasional hint that the ego 
might be able to integrate the super-ego successfully. This would seem to amount to the ego 
synth~sising the moral ideas passed down through culture into a fully rational morality. But Freud 
offers no help in sorting out better or worse moral values. Thus, whilst psychoanalysis can give 
one cl~ty about one's inner conflicts, it gives little guidance for action once one has become fully 
self-aware. We are supposed to act rationally, but it is unclear what this rational action amounts 
21Wollheim (1977) p220. 
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to. Freud can help us to be honest about ourselves, but he does not resolve specific issues of 
choice. 
Overall, Freud's system acts as a valuable critical tool against too-easy attempts to unify the self. 
Freud forces us to take 1 seriously the un-orderly unconscious. But his own positive proposals, 
quite deliberately, do not take us very far in conferring personal integration. If a strong degree of 
unity is possible for the self we shall need to look beyond Freud to find it. Psychoanalysis help us 
clear away some of the obstacles lodged in the unconscious and so to achieve a limited degree of 
self-mastery. But if we want more than this we shall also need a stronger statement of the 
underlying harmony of the mind, a more compelling goal for the selfs development and a 
stronger moral framework within which the different powers of the self can be drawn together. 
4.2 Freedom from Contradiction 
Freud's writing is so vast, intricate and original that it would be surprising if it were completely 
free of internal contradiction. Criticism of Freud on these grounds has included, for example: the 
coherence of his notion of the unconscious as a realm which is in principle unknown yet about 
which we can gain empirical knowledge; the coherence of a model that involves partitioning the 
psyche; and the question of how his deterministic account of the mind can be compatible with the 
experience of human freedom. The first point has usually been countered in terms of the wide 
explanatory power of the concept of the unconscious and the second by insisting that Freud's 
divisions of the mind are not fixed anatomical boundaries but a flexible interpretative device. 
Freud's determinism is usually moderated by arguing that his description of the way human beings 
may be subject to prior psychological causes does not entail acceptance of a more general 
deterministic philosophical theory nor does it mean the self can never gain freedom from its 
psychologicaroond822.-Whilst none of theseTssues is finally settleo lao not thiiiK any corfstittite~r 
a fundamental paradox. 
4.3 Releyance 
Freud's insights into the natUre of the psyche will undoubtedly have an enduring significance. His 
conception of the unconscious, for example, is now widely held and forms an important part of 
contemporary Western self-consciousness. Nonetheless, Freud developed his psychology in the 
particular context of fin de siecle Vienna. His patients were typically neurotic middle class 
women suffering from sexual repressions of one kind or another. Moreover, his ideas took root in 
a particular intellectual context. that of rebellion against nineteenth century bourgeois religion and 
morality. The question of Freud's continuing relevance must be viewed against a contemporary, 
and somewhat different, social and intellectual context. 
22See. e.g. Oilman (1984) Ch 10; ed. Wollheim (1977) pp271-285. 
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ru Psycboanalysis is SU!ij)CCted of beins a disciplinary technique 
The Freudian demand for freedom from an allegedly repressive Christian religion and morality 
has now been met to a considerable extent. On the other hand, incitements to discourse about sex 
have never been more widespread. Schools are now required to teach sex education. Stories about 
sex form a large part 'of' the content of the popular newspapers. The question is now much less 
how we may be liberated from authoritative religion and morality. It is, rather, whether the entire 
discourse about sex is not itself a particularly powerful way of enslaving us. After Foucault, Freud 
- the great master of suspicion - is himself suspected of furthering the disempowerment of the 
individual. His analytics of sexuality may now be understood as greatly increasing the 
possibilities for supervising and disciplining the individual. The psychoanalytic "experts" are now 
increasingly seen as part of a network of societal controls from which we must gain liberation. At 
a therapeutic level, the dominant paradigm for "helping relationships" is increasingly the parity of 
status aimed at in humanistic counselling rather than Freud's authoritarian doctor-patient model. 
bl Psychoanalysis fails to address conteWPorao' neuroses 
It seems that the dominant neurosis of our time is no longer hysteria induced by sexual repression 
but narcissism induced by a crisis of meaning. But, as Freud himself admitted, psychoanalysis is 
unable to treat narcissistic disorders as they are characterised by a withdrawal of libido into the 
self and are therefore not susceptible to the transference method. The quest for meaning might, 
for example, be better answered by Jungian psychotherapy. Moreover, psychoanalysis is a severe 
discipline requiring patients who are capable of a tough psychological journey. Neuroses 
concerned with low self-esteem and self-regard may be better treated with the more empathetic 
humanistic psychologies. 
s.-.Iurru 
5.1 InteiWite Power 
Jung offers us a 'Yay of becoming whole which does not refer us to a transcendent God, nor to the 
orderiftg power of reason, but to the natural resources available within the mind. He suggests that, 
if we would only pay auention to it, the unconscious will supply us with symbols that are capable 
of hol.ding together parts of the self which we usually take to be opposed. These symbols are 
under~tood to be manifested in the products of the world's religions but are available most 
immediately in our dream and fantasy life. Through an encounter with a succession of these 
symbols we gradually discover and learn to accept an increasing number of hitherto neglected 
aspects of ourselves. We also learn what qualities distinguish u.s from humanity in general. The 
integrative power of Jung's therapy seems to lie in the possibility it offers for us to affirm the 
whole of ourselves, and in this affirmation to discover that we are both fully at one with nature 
and also unique individuals. 
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The two main limitations I observe are, firstly, the extent to which the goal Jung proposes is fully 
coherent (for which see the discussion in the next section) and, secondly, the question of whether 
Jung's scheme has strong enough roots in the inter-subjective world. It seems to me that, in 
addition to the symbols thrown up by its own mental life, the self is likely to require some point 
external to itself by which to orientate itself. Few of us have such a vivid awareness of our own 
mental states that these could, by themselves, form a secure datum around which the diverse 
powers of the mind could be arranged and held together. In any case, human beings are both 
personal and social and, as Lacan observes, in order to achieve wholeness they seem to require 
unconditional affirmation from another person. Of course, Lacan may be right in thinking th~t 
such unconditional affirmation cannot be obtained from other individuals who are ~s 
psychologically divided as we are ourselves. If so, the strategies of self-affirmation that Jung 
proposes may succeed in generating a certain degree of wholeness. But Jung's claim that the 
symbol of the Self offers a completely satisfying goal, or, in other words, that the Jungian way is 
by itself a fully sufficient source of significance for us is, I think, overstated. 
5.2 Freedom from Contradiction 
Jung's way is founded on the notion that the human goal is the reconciliation of opposites. But 
this notion requires considerable clarification. To begin with, Jung does not properly define the 
field of opposites he is concerned with. Does he mean all opposites? But this would be 
immediately self-contradictory. For any goal has its own opposite that is not included in itself. 
Wholeness, for example, has its own opposite, namely fragmentation, that is excluded from the 
psyche if wholeness is pursued. We cannot pursue the reconciliation of all opposites, but only the 
reconciliation of some limited class of opposites. We may, I think, reasonably take it that Jung is 
principally concerned with reconciling the moral opposites of good and evil. Furthermore we may 
aisdngtiish a strong lllld a Weak fotrn of tHis reconciliation. 
In its strong form Jung's thesis argu~s tha~ wholeness is found in the synthesis of qualities he 
takes to be real, logical opposites, notabJy good and evil, rationality and irrationality. Jung 
supposes that this frankly para4oxicaJ no .. on can be expressed in symbolic form. Symbols, he 
maintains, are capable of transcending the normal limitations on our rational thinking founded, as 
this is, on Aristotelian non-contradiction. 
However, I find Jung's argument stated in this form unsatisfactory. I allow that symbols, like 
metaphors, can sometimes bring together opposing qualities. For example, we might say that 
Christ is a rock (hard) and also a vine (soft). Here we have two metaphors in which incidental 
attributes, when brought together are opposed. But I am not sure what to make of a symbol which, 
in its essence, unites real opposites. Following Coleridge (see Chapter 5) I am inclined to regard 
such a use of symbolic expression as illegitimate. 
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Even if we allow that such symbols retain some meaning, it is not clear what kind of 
psychological atttaction an expression of wholeness that united good and evil would have for us. 
For the moral status of wholeness is now unclear. Presumably wholeness cannot be good in itself, 
for then evil would not so much have been reconciled as defeated. Should we say that wholeness 
merely inch1des the good? But if wholeness is not unambiguously good why should we pursue it? 
Perhaps what Jung is proposing is some kind of aesthetic which subsumes both morality and 
rationality to a higher, artistic, goal. But even this notion is not stated unambiguously. For the 
notion of the shadow would seem, essentially, to include the ugly and the aesthetically 
unacceptable. Indeed Jung's description of Abraxas, the end-point of reality, includes ugliness as 
one of its attributes. 
Jung's "coincidence of opposites" finds precedent within the Christian ttadition in the mystical 
theology of Nicholas of Cusa23. Nicholas argued that if we are to set out on the spiritual path 
towards God we must acknowledge that both: 
a) We do not yet know God and that we therefore love what we do not know, and 
b) We do know God since we cannot love what we do not know. 
In the love of God there is thus a coincidence of knowledge and of ignorance, or of what he calls 
"learned ignorance". This paradox is not, thought Nicholas, contrary to the nature of God, since at 
infinity the principle of non-contradiction does not hold. Things which seem absurd and 
contradictory can be held together in God. 
However, the point being made here is that God is above finite reason, that at the limit human 
reasonmayooabsortiei:l into sometliing-greater. Reason may approach Goo to a certain extentbut 
must yield to the realisation that, ultimately, it does not comprehend God. "God", for Nicholas, is 
a symbol that we cannot fully grasp with the intellect. Jung goes further than Nicholas in insisting 
that ultimate reality, the symbol of God or the Self, unites reason with unreason. The Self, for 
Jung, is a symbol which, in its essence, contains elements that are fundamentally opposed to 
reason. When it is stated in this form, I find it hard to know what to make of Jung's goal. 
Jung's argument is of more value in its weaker form, when we ~ his cotncide~Jtta oppositorum 
at the level of qualities that are only conventionally qpposed. F~r Jung sometimes means by evil 
not "real" evil but only what we "call" evil, we might say th~ naqghty or the socially unacceptable 
or the awkward. Here we can appreciate that the "whole" person is someone who has fully come 
to terms with and accepted the less desirable and presentable p~ of the personality. Jung helps 
us to see that the extroven person might become more rounded by acknowledging the 
23Christian Spirityality Vol. 2 ed. Jill Rait SCM 1988 p 170ff. 
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undiscovered introven aspects of his personality or (to use the terms loosely and colloquially) that 
a "spiritual" person might benefit from attention to the "sensuous" pans of his nature. Jung offers 
us an imponant slatement of what becoming whole means if we feel the force of that pan of the 
Romantic tradition (supra. Ch. 2 §3.3) which urges us to find meaning in the natural self. Jung 
shows us in an unprecedented way what it means for us to explore and celebrate the whole of out 
natural selves. 
In his concern to reconcile opposites, Jung's thought might better be understood with reference tQ 
Hindu patterns of thought than in the context of traditional Western patterns of spirituality (even 
those like that of Nicholas of Cusa which are concerned with opposing qualities). Hinduism can 
be read as giving precedence to a triad of gods: Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva.24 Vishnu expresses 
goodness and order (cf. the Jungian "consciousness") whilst Shiva expresses libido and 
destruction (cf. the Jungian "unconscious"). Brahman, as ultimate reality, may be taken as a 
synthesis of the qualities of both (cf. the Jungian "Self'). 
Jung's suspicion of predicating only good and not evil of the "God" or "Self' symbol was 
grounded in his fear that it might lead us to strive for an unhealthy form of goodness. Jung finds a 
panial ally here in the Dominican philosopher of religion Brian Davies25. Davies argues that there 
is an intimate connection between being a moral agent and being able to succeed or fail. He 
suggests that since Ood is not merely "a being" but the source of all being it makes no sense to 
talk of bim having either a historical background or a social context against which he might be 
construed as "failing" or "succeeding"; he just "is". Since God cannot be described as 
"successful" it makes no sense to say that he is "good". 
Davies and Jungooth alen us, in different ways, to the need to define goodriess rather carefully so 
that it does not carry undesirable connotations of success. We may "succeed" in becoming good 
in ways that unhealthily repress the shadow sides of the person. But, unfonunately Jung goes too 
far when he asserts, unlike Da~i"s, not merely that God is beyond human categories of good and 
evil but that he embodies botQ ~ood and evil at the same time. Were we to allow that ultimate 
reality has this basically confusing qtoral structure it would be very difficult for the self to 
orientate itself within any meaningful rporal framework. 
Jung is afraid that strict codes of mqralit¥ only lead to the denial of evil in our actual lives. 
Striving after perfection may result simply in self-deception. Thus far Jung's argument has a good 
deal of truth in it. But Jung then concludes that the Christian ethic must be abandoned. However, 
24Hindu Theology A Reader ed. Jose Pereir~ Imag~ Books, Doubleday and Co. New York 1976, 
p34. We should note, however, that Hinduism allows for a huge variety of beliefs: it is extremely 
difficult to fabricate a consistent Western-style the9logy out of the classical Hindu sources. 
25oavies (1982) p22ff. 
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the Christian tradition has been aware of the problem of self-deception (cf. 1 Jn. 1:8) and suggests 
a different conclusion, namely, that we must maintain the moral standard whilst confessing the 
limits to our own claims to righteousness (1 Jn. 1:9). Jung thinks the Church has downplayed the 
presence of evil within human beings, whereas, it least in the Augustinian tradition, it has 
emphasised the universality .of human sinfulness. In Augustinian theology human sinfulness and 
the imago Dei (cf. the Jungian Self) are continually held in tension, not with the former included 
in the latter but with the two in contrast. In replacing the moral imperative with the notion of 
acceptance it is Jung not the Church that is minimising the sinfulness of sin. 
In summary, Jung directs us to symbols which he believes have the power to integrate the self. 
These symbols aim to accommodate not just the conscious, rational and moral aspects of 
ourselves but also the unconscious, emotional and amoral parts of our nature. Jung reminds us 
that questions of ultimate meaning may lie beyond the grasp of the intellect. He reminds us of the 
presence of evil within the self and shows that this is sometimes best dealt with through being 
accepted and then transformed. 
In its strong form, Jung's "coincidence of opposites" is expressed in just too paradoxical a way for 
it to function effectively as our goal. It is very difficult to see how symbols which do not merely 
claim to transcend logical opposites but also actually embody these opposites could really hold 
together the different parts of the self. In particular it is not clear how a symbol that is both good 
and evil could act as a "moral source" according to which we may order our desires and actions. 
Jung's argument is better taken in its weaker form as providing us with resources for learning a 
healthy form of self-acceptance and helping us to affirm the whole of our natural selves. 
5.3 Relevance 
The Problem of Ipdiyjdualism 
Jung thought that his myth would be relevant only to a few. Those "ancients" who are committed 
to a religion would have no need of it. They would be satisfied with the, albeit questionably 
scientific, healing metaphors of t,heir own faiths. Amongst the "moderns", most would be content 
to live at the superficial level of the ~rsona and would lack the courage necessary to build an 
integrated Self. There would reqtain j!Jst a few "contemporaries" who realise the nature of their 
predicament and dedicate themselves to psychotherapy as a healing way. Yet his manner of 
understanding the self has proved rqore widely accepted in our society than he might have 
envisaged. For the problems Jung experienced in his own life are in some ways paradigmatic of 
. ' 
modem life, viz., the problem of building ~If-esteem; the need to avoid becoming a "mass man" 
in a mass society; and the struggle to fin~ meaning for life amidst unbelief. In an age when 
traditional, religious commitments have lo~t their power for many, and when ties between the 
individual and society are largely rational and instrumental, Jung's radical inward turn to find 
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healing resources from within one's own psyche seems a real option for large numbers of people. 
lung's thought thus feeds into a range of contemporary "spiritualities", both neo-pagan and 
Christian, which accord a leading role to exploration of one's own psyche. 
However, we are more aware now than when lung was writing of the extent to which the self is 
constituted not merely by its self-relations but by its relations with others. Jung minimises the 
extent to which the self is affected by either social or economic conditions. We find it hard to 
imagine that the self could be made perfectly whole simply by internal psychic readjustment. Few 
would regard Jung's symbol of the "tower" as a fully adequate goal of psychic unity. A large 
proportion of contemporary mental distress has social or economic causes. Here Jung's thought is 
of relatively limited relevance. Indeed insofar as it encourages an excessive preoccupation with 
one's own self it may tend to exacerbate such problems. 
ti. The Hurqapisgc Psxcholgz:ists 
6.1 Integrative Power 
For the humanists the self is united behind the goal of self-actualisation. All other human 
motivations are ordered under this goal. Self·actualisation claims a similar unitive power and 
function in humanistic psychology to that of the desire of God in Augustine's theology. The self-
actualised person is someone who has developed and can hold together the moral and rational 
parts of the person with the more spontaneous and creative aspects. The self-actualiser has a 
strong sense of inner peace. He is not closed in on himself but is capable of fanning strong 
relationships with others. The spiritual aspects of the person are fulfilled in a general awareness 
of the transcendent and an openness to religious experience. However, the goal of self-
actualisation fails to integrate the self in two important and related respects. 
Firstly, all responsibility for sin and evil is transferred from the individufll to society. The 
humanists identify a true, inner self that has no morally unacceptable components. If a person 
finds sinful tendencies within, the humanists can only urge that these be disow~ed ~ not a part of 
the true self. I find this inadequate for the same reason that Augustine found Manichaeism 
inadequate, namely that it does not properly account for one's sense of inner conflict. A proper 
sense of wholeness must be able to do something with the shadowy and unacceptable parts of the 
self. Secondly, the humanists broadly fail to take account of the Freudian and Jungian insights 
concerning the unconscious. There is no sense that inner tension might be a natural part of our 
psychological life. The goal of self-actuali~ation does not allow that different aspects of the self 
might be fulfilled in COIJlpetin~ and mutualJy exclusive ways, for example that choices will have 
to be made as to how much lime's sexu~ appetites might be fulfilled vis-a-vis one's moral 
conscience. Overall, the goal propost(d by the humanists is a superficial one which, whilst it 
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expresses well the values of a certain kind of youthful and optimistic American culture, does not 
properly account for the range and depth of our psychological life. 
6.2 Freedom from Contradiction 
The humanistic psychologies generally offer simple and straightforward accounts of hum$ 
nature that do not involve paradoxes. However, there is an element of contradiction in Fromm's 
work, arising from his analysis of society, that is not present in Maslow and Rogers. In Fromm's 
neo-Freudian system the individual is not merely an instinctually motivated self, but is also the 
product of societal forces. By contrast, in the "purer" humanism of Maslow and Rogers the role of 
society is clearly limited to supplying the needs of the individual: so long as these needs are met 
the individual will find within himself all the resources needed to actualise himself. Fromm's 
system risks a basic methodological contradiction: is the indiv,idual "really" the product of social 
forces (following Marx), or "really" the product of instinct (following Freud), or both - and if both 
how and in what proportions? With Maslow and Rogers it is much clearer that society has a 
subsidiary role as "resource" and that the healthy individual will be relatively immune from its 
shaping forces. Whatever we make of the minimising of the role of socio-economic factors in 
Maslow and Rogers it is, at least, theoretically consistent. 
6.3 Releyance 
a) Limitation to higher levels of psychological m~ed 
Christopher Lasch, drawing on a wide range of clinical evidence, argues that the typical patient 
asking for psychological help suffers from "vague, diffuse dissatisfactions with 
life ... purposelessness ... feelings of emptiness and depression ... and ... violent oscillations of self-
esteem."26 Humanistic psychology would appear to be relevant to precisely these kinds of people. 
It promises- to-confen1 feeling of self-acceptance througlr-the--expertence of me--counsellor's 
empathetic acceptance and to unite the self behind the project of self-actualisation. Humanistic 
counselling is relatively non-technical and inexpensive. It is therefore not confined to an elite but 
is widely available from voluntary agencies, self-help groups, doctor's surgeries and some clergy. 
Hbmanism is a "psychology of abundance" and generally presupposes that the lower level 
physical needs have been met. Humanism is less relevant to those whose problems are of a socio-
e(lonomic kind. Its optimistic faith in the innate human capability for self-improvement can do 
litde, for example, for those so ground down by poverty that they have little capacity for self-
cqoi~. Its adherents will not be those who are working so hard to stay alive that they have little 
time for the luxury of worrying about their self-esteem. It does not seem to have much to say to 
those, such as the mentally handicapped, who might reach their full potential at a young age and 
for whom the notion of a lifetime of psychological growth would mean litde. 
26Lasch (1985) p37. 
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bl Failure to talce human capacity for eyil seriously 
The failure of humanistic psychology to take human capacity for evil seriously must ultimately 
limit its relevance. A credible psychology must deal with the mysterious origins and reality of evil 
in a more sophisticaukl \.vay than that suggested by the humanists. By' relegating evil to a force 
that is purely external to the person, the humanists eliminate the sense of moral sll'Uggle that most 
of us generally recognise as intrinsic to our personality. The humanists leave us with a flat, one-
dimensional picture of the human person that cannot, by itself, do justice to the complexities of 
human life. 
7. AU&ustioe or/ami the Modern P§ycbqloa:ists? 
None of the three modem psychologies that I have reviewed can succeed in offering us a 
powerfully integrated sense of self: 
Er.cm1 helps us to be clearer about the conflicts within the psyche. He suggests ways in which we 
may make conscious our unconscious compulsions and so achieve a limited degree of self-
mastery. However, I have argued that our notion of seltbood entails more than the mere fact of 
consciousness. We are selves insofar as things have "significance" for us, that is insofar as we 
able to represent to ourselves different choices and possibilities that we regard as more or less 
morally valuable. Extending the domain of consciousness might therefore be a first step in 
achieving seltbood but it could never by itself ensure a unified sense of self. We need to be able 
to set our self-knowledge within some wider moral framework. We must ask what the significance 
is of the facts about ourselves that we have discovered and what they imply for our acting. Freud's 
"analytic attitude" is precisely a refusal to acknowledge any source for moral evaluations of this 
-kin--a:-Freud-offers-a--valuable-Ctitique -or-systems of morality; out something more positive than 
critique is needed if one is to form a strong sense of self. 
J.uD& claims to offer a means of integrating the self through the process of individuation. His goal 
is the symbolic "coincidence" of the opposites with the personality. But when we press the 
meaning of this coincidence we find it to be a paradoxical notion. We are left with an aim that is 
not only beyond reason but is also contrary to reason. It is very hard to see how we may unite the 
personality in pursuit of an end which is a mixture of good and evil. The notion of a "moral" 
source for our thinking and acting has been replaced by an ill-defined "symbolic" source. 
The Humanists propose that we unite the self behind the project of self-actualisation. Whilst their 
scheme is superficially attractive, it fails to account for the depth and complexity of the human 
personality, particularly in respect of those parts of ourselves which are inclined towards evil. We 
seem to have within us potential to develop in a wide, range of ways, some of which seem better 
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than others, and the humanists are not able to offer much guidance as to which ways we should 
consciously select or not. 
By contrast, and despite the numerous problems of relevance to our modem era that I identified, 
Auaustine succeeds to a large degree in offering an account of how the self may be integrated. 
Compared with Freud, Augustine succeeds in unifying the self because, unlike Freud, he posits 
one single unitive motive force, the desire for God, which underlies and may in due course order 
all our other motives and desires. Freud always, and rather unsatisfactorily, insisted on a duality 
of basic drives. Freud's self is basically a tension of opposites that can aspire to a fragile and 
transient unity. Augustine's self, whilst it is subject to tendencies to fragmentation, has an 
underlying unity which derives from its single orientation towards God. 
Compared with the humanists, Augustine succeeds by offering a much more adequate account of 
the dark sides of the person. The humanists eliminate tension from the self by discounting the evil 
and sinful parts of the person. As a result their fully actualised self is superficial and lacks depth. 
Augustine's self is one that continually struggles with internal evil and attains unity in the face of 
this struggle. 
Compared with Jung, Augustine meets with a broad measure of success by offering a goal which 
unites the moral and immoral, the rational and emotional parts of the person in a non-paradoxical 
way. God caters for each aspect of the self in an appropriate manner. Goodness in the soul is 
affinned. Sin and evil are forgiven: the basic unacceptabllity of evil in the face of goodness is not 
merely accepted but is dealt with. The rational parts of the person are fulfilled in the 
contemplation of God. The emotional aspects of the self are fulfilled in the worship of God. What 
AugustinelackS, and where his theologymusnle-extertded~ is-proper-attention-to-needs which, in 
the modem era have been given great emphasis such as physical desires and the quest for 
personal autonomy. The basic model is highly effective, even though it must be modified to meet 
the sense of self given to us today. 
Compared with all three of the modem psychological schools, Augustine succeeds in uniting the 
self because he refers the self to God. The self is able to unite all its faculties in the pursuit of a 
powerfully attractive Other. God functions as a very strong source of value. By contrast, the 
modem psychologists can refer the self to nothing stronger than itself. If the self is already weak, 
and presumably any self that admits to its need to pursue wholeness is admitting to some degree 
of insufficiency, then the self is drawn only by a weak source of significance. The self vainly 
attempts to pull itself up by its own fragile bootstraps. The initiators of these psychological 
schools were remarkable men who possessed an unusually high degree of ability to draw on their 
own internal resources in a self-reflexive manner. The great majority of those who follow them 
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will be unlikely to achieve this kind of feat. Moreover, the psychological turn inwards always 
risks collapsing into mere fascination with the self and self-absorption. By contrast, whilst 
Augustine's theology involves a tum inwards it does not risk collapsing into narcissism, since its 
object is never the self itself, but the God who lies at the root of the self. 
Finally, Augustine suggests that Christians do not merely pursue God in their own strength but 
that God is at work in them to draw them to himself. If (as I happen to believe) Augustinian 
theology is not only psychologically useful but also basically true, then it is po~sible. to experience 
here a divinely given uniting force within the personality that is not explicitly available in the 
modem psychologies. God himself supplies the power to draw together the different strands of 
our seltbood into a coherent whole. 
That Augustine provides a convincing account of the unified self should not, of course, come as a 
surprise. Our traditional Western notion of selthood has its roots, as I have shown, in the 
Augustinian synthesis of Christianity and Greek philosophy, and this traditional Western self is a 
unified self. Following Taylor, I suggested that the modem identity was constructed in relation to 
three groups of moral sources: the theistic source, the rational s_ource and the natural source. 
Freud is a leading exponent of the second, and Jung and the humanists are leading exponents of 
the third source. What my analysis tends to sugsest is that if the first, theistic, source were to be 
dropped from our identity entirely, it could become quite difficult to safeguard the unity of the 
self. The desire of God, or some such notion, provides a clear focal point around which the 
diverse powers of the self can be united. The Augustinian desire of God offers a strong source of 
significance which none of the psychological equivalents I have discussed could replace. In the 
absence of God, our Western sense of self would be likely to be weakened. It is entirely to be 
expected that some oftlie mosnrifluential arguments for a reduced-notion of selthood; such as 
' '' 
those of Parfit and Crick that I noted in chapter two, are associated with a non-theistic world-
view. 
Of course it may be held, as Lacan and Deleuze argued, that the centred, unified self is a 
construct we are better off without. In this case certain of the modem psychologists may be taken 
as freeing us from the strongly unified self associated with monotheism in favour of a self with 
partitions, or even in favour of multiple selves. This is the line taken by the neo-Jungian David 
Miller in his book The New Po!ytheism. Miller argues that monotheism, rational thought forms 
and the traditional Western centred self are all linked together in what he considers to be an 
outmoded and repressive world-view. He argues against the "fascism" (p26) of a rational self in 
favour of a self which understands itself by way of non-rational symbols and stories. Instead of 
seeing ourselves in the image of the one God, Miller thinks that we should create many different 
selves for ourselves in the images of a pantheon of gods and goddesses. Thus he says: 
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"Psychologically, polytheism is a matter of the radical experience of equally real, but mutually 
exclusive aspects of the self ... The person experiences himself as many selves each of which is felt 
to have autonomous power ... without regard to the centred will of a single ego"27• Here Jung is 
taken as the champion of a post-modem, post-rational, and post-monotheistic multiple self. 
But the unified self has a great deal more going for it than these detractors seem to realise. We 
usually recognise the accountability of different parts of the self to each other as a criterion of 
psychological health and human flourishing. Thus, in literature, characters whose intellectual 
faculties are not harmoniously united to their emotions are generally painted as sorry individuals. 
For example, Jane Austen's Marianne, in Sense and Sensibility, whilst she is portrayed as an 
attractive model of romantic "sentiment", falls in love with a rogue. Her inability to allow her 
feelings to be infonned by her rational judgement is her downfall, and she is the only one of 
Austen's heroines who is finally unable to marry the man of her choice. Charles Dickens' Bradley 
Headstone, in Our Mutual Friend. has the opposite problem. He is an unattractive figure who 
conducts his life according to a mechanical rationality. A severe schoolmaster who is unable to 
allow his rational thinking to be infonned by feeling, his emotions nonetheless periodically break 
through in uncontrollable expressions of rage. In ordinary life the inability to integrate reason and 
emotion is indicative of weakness of character. 
Moreover, a severe splitting of the self takes us from the realm of mere weakness to real mental 
pathology and illness. Thus the experience of multiple selves within the psyche is something we 
usually associate with extreme mental distress rather than with freedom. For all Deleuze's talk of 
"schizoanalysis", he does not seem to realise that schizophrenia is experienced by its sufferers as 
a disturbing an~ deeply unwelcome mental condition. At least in our Western culture, a strong 
and-uqifioosenseof~lf is a function of mentalliealtJnather than mental disease. 
If we think the unified self is something worth holding on to, and if the Christian theism of 
Augu$tine seems to offer more promise of integrating the self than the modem psychologists, we 
might be tempted to opt for a straightforward return to Augustine. Perhaps the modern 
psychologies are nothing but the corruption of an earlier and purer truth? Perhaps our best course 
is simply to recapture the strong theological sense of self given to us in an earlier era? 
This fonn of argument is suggested by the approach to the social sciences adopted by the Anglo-
Catholic theologian John Milbank in his Theology and Social Theor.y. Milbank's book has 
received an almost unparalleled degree of interest in recent British theological journals and has 
been described by the Augustine scholar and Professor of Moral Theology Oliver O'Donovan as 
27Miller (1978) p5. 
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"in a class of its own"28. Whilst the detail of Milbank's book is extremely complex the basic 
argument is simple. Milbank sees the development of the social sciences as bound up with the 
modification or rejection of classical Christian positions. He sees the logical outworking of the 
modem human sciences as lying in the nihilism of French postmodemism. This allows him to 
present us with a straightforward Kierkegaardian· Either/Or between the violence of the 
postmodemists or the ontological peace of Augustine's City of God. 
It would be possible, likewise, to see the psychologies I have discussed here solely in terms of 
how they modify and reject basic Christian positions. Of course they sometimes do this, and I 
have indicated where this occurs. But they do not merely do this. The modem psychologies offer 
new insights which deepen our sense of self and which reflect a sense of self that is relevant to the 
conditions of contemporary life. By contrast, however profound we might regard Augustine's 
thought, he was writing in the fifth, not the twentieth, century. We have problems and concerns 
that were not his. This is reflected in the critical comments I have made of Augustine on grounds 
of "relevance" in my analysis of him. A straight "return to Augustine" will inevitably make too 
light of the fifteen centuries of time that have passed between us. Milbank has considered 
contemporary knowledge, dismissed it and returned to the patristic era. The usual method of 
Western Christian theology, and the one I adopt here, is to do the reverse: to take the work of a 
patristic author as a starting point and to reflect on, modify and update his work in the light of 
contemporary conditions and knowledge. 
Milbank deserves credit for offering a powerful restatement of Augustine's social theory. I have, 
analogously, tried to show that Augustine's psychological theory is much more sophisticated than 
his more facile detractors would have us believe. But, unlike Milbank, I take Augustine's work to 
mark the stafiingpoint tatlienhan thcnerminus-of theological reflection. Therefore-I-pose the 
question of how Augustine's work needs to be funher developed if it is to form the basis of a 
viable sense of self today. 
8. Modifications to Aqgustjpe 
Our review of the modem psychologists suggests a considerable number of modifications and 
enhancements to an Augustinian framework for unifying the self as I shall shortly indicate. 
However, I first want to discuss one particular theological development which would address 
several of the points I identified. Alphabetic references throughout this section are to the 
weaknesses listed under section 3.3 above. 
28Studies in Christian Ethics Vol. 5 1992 No. 1 p80. 
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8.1 A More Aclecauare Pneumatolo~ 
A number of the weaknesses I noted in Augustine's position could be remedied by the 
development of a stronger pneumatology, as follows. 
As I suggested in chapter 3, Augustine's identification of the Spirit with caritas leads to an unduly 
static pneumatology. By contrast, in the Old Testament Spirit (ruach) is an energetic notion. If 
God is Spirit then he is to be conceived not as changeless and motionless but as energetic and 
dynamic. It follows that the psychological goal to which we aspire is best understood as a 
dynamic not a static one. [ref. (e) Insufficiently Dynamic Goal] 
In the Bible the Spirit is responsible for ecstatic phenomena (1 Sam. 10:10) and in particular for 
prophecy (Mic. 3:8, Amos 3:7). But he is also linked to wisdom (Wis 9:17). It is the same Spirit 
who imposes order on the primal chaos (Gen 1 :2) as who inspires un-ordered prophetic speech. 
Spirit thus envisages both order and non-order. Whereas the Platonic thumos tended to oppose 
reason, the biblical ruach/pneuma holds together in himself the rational and the non-rational. We 
are now much more inclined than Augustine to understand the self as a dynamic disequilibrium of 
different elements. This suggests we might do better to consider the spirit rather than the mind as 
the highest level of the self. 
Such a move iqvolves recovering elements of an earlier anthropology. The primary sense of the 
biblical ruach is wind, and its equivalents in Greek and Latin were anemos and animus. However, 
by Al!gustine's time, these latter terms had become intellectualised and came to mean what we 
call"soul". Hebrew anthropology did not operate in terms of higher or lower "parts" of the human 
being. However, as I shall now indicate, there would seem to be considerable biblical support for 
an· anlffiopology-ift whiclf fUiJch or pneuma is conceived as the dominant principle in-the-healthy 
individual. In particular, the spirit is in general regarded as a higher principle than what we call 
the "soul" (biblical nephesh or psyche). 
The Old Testament ruach refers to the divine breath which enters the world and constitutes the 
individual as a living being in unity and wholeness (Gen. 2:7). I,n anthropological contexts ruach 
is sometimes identified with the heart (lebab), the volitional centre of the person (e.g. Ps 32:2, 
77:6). By contrast nephesh refers to natural human life, especially in its desiring and emotional 
aspects. Nephesh is localised in the throa~ and signifies human beings as needy and requiring 
nourishment. The German Old Testamenf scholar Hans Kraus comments that, in the Psalms, 
nephesh "is 'I' in the totality of my unsatisfactory life (Ps. 31:7, 35:9, 42:5-6, etc.).29 Where 
nephesh signifies lack, ruach denotes power and completeness. 
29Kraus (1986) p145. 
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In the New Testament. St Paul uses the Greek psuche as an equivalent to the Hebrew nephesh. 
For Paul, psuche never carries the pagan Greek sense of the higher, immortal part of man. Whilst 
Paul's psuche can be the bearer of the divine pneuma, and the two terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably, Paul never identifies psuche with pneuma. When Paul wants to speak of the 
higher, God-related life he uses pneuma not psuche. Thus in 1 Cor. 2:14 and 15:44 Paul contrasts 
the truly spiritual (pneumatikos) with the merely "soullish" (psuchikos). Whereas the term 
pneuma occurs only rarely in pagan Greek literature, it is widely used by Paul and may be 
considered distinctive of his anthropology. Paul argues against the Gnostic view that the human 
person is essenlially spirit. Rather the person is properly considered as a unity of spirit, soul and 
body (1 Thess. 5:23). To be sure, the Hebrew Paul would not say that pneuma is the highest part 
of the person, although by the time of lrenaeus this inference had been drawn from his writing.30 
A self which has ruach or pneuma as its highest principle may be integrated in a rather different 
way from one that has mens or animus as its highest part. Unorder does not now have to be 
dominated by ordering reason but can exist in a dynamic harmony with order. This kind· of 
harmony is well exhibited in the phenomenon of play. It may be, as Johan Huizinga has 
suggested31, that the essentially human element in our make up does not just lie in our capacity 
for thought (homo sapiens) but in the fact that human beings can play (homo ludens). Many of the 
activities which most distinguish human beings from animals have the free character of a game: 
worshipping, celebrating festivals, creating art, enjoying a jam session, loving without an object 
or a reason. Children learn most through play; in playing we become more fully human. Play 
involves a balance of rules and order with enthusiastic spontaneity and creativity. 
Consider also the phenomenon of laughter. Animals do not really laugh, neither do computers. 
Laughter iSa Way of celebrating our existence-and of-enjoying humansociety. It may also be a 
powerful way of dealing with evil. "In humour,-human beings continue to confront the evil which 
by definition can never really be in~gra~d. Th~y relativise it without trivialising it and can 
therefore forgive. They do not accept the sjtuation and as a result do not allow themselves to be 
stopped or paralysed by it. n32 Genuine laughter is ~pontaneous, yet it is not entirely free of order. 
We can rule some jokes as out of order or in bad taste, We can detect a cruel laugh. 
30Jrenaeus Ady. Haer. V.vi.l commenting on 1 Thess 5:23 says: "But when the spirit here 
blended with the soul is united to [the flesh] the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of 
the outpouring of the Spirit, and this is he who was made in the image and likeness of God. But if 
the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left 
carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation, but not 
receiving the similitude through the Spirit, and thus is this being imperfect. II (In ANCL vot IX 
"The Writings of Ironies Vol. 2" p67ff.) 
31HuizingaJ. Homo Ludeos Foreward (unnumbered) Routl~dge 1949 cited in Suurmond (1994) 
~35. 2Suurmond (1994) p81. 
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It is the neurotic who is unable to play or whose laughter is always forced; for him unorder in the 
self is a source of threat which he must attempt to control. By contrast, the healthy person is able 
to give himself creatively and spontaneously, to play and to laugh well. In him, order and 
nonorder are united together in one spirit. [ref. (b) over-ordered] 
Life in the presence of the immanent Spirit has sometimes been taken as inhibiting of human 
freedom, but this need not be the case. Such a life can be understood as one in which a space is 
conferred on us in which we may flourish. Molunann notes the etymological links between ruach 
and rewah = breadth. "Ruach creates space. It sets in motion. It leads out of narrow places into 
wide vistas, thus conferring life ... 33 The Spirit offers a free space for the exercise of our freedom 
(cf. 2 Cor. 3:17). Life "in the Spirit" is a mode of life which we freely assent to and in which new 
options and choices open up before us. We have the subjective experience of being free when we 
freely choose to co-operate with the Spirit and when all our faculties feel content in this choice. 
To be possessed by the Holy Spirit should not be understood as being taken over by some alien, 
heteronomous being. The biblical ruach is properly conceived as an energetic rather than as a 
substantial notion. We are not talking here about superhuman substance as opposed to human 
substance. The Holy Spirit is "other" than us primarily in terms of His vastly greater energy and 
power. Whereas we are alive, the Holy Spirit also has power to confer life and to enliven. To be 
filled with the Holy Spirit is actually, as Molunann has extensively demonstrated in his The Spirit 
of Life. to be raised up to a new order of living. On a significance-based understanding of 
selfhood, the gift of the Spirit opens up a new source of moral significance that was not there 
previously. The whole of life may now be lived in the assured presence of the divine Spirit. Each 
of life's experiences takes on a significance and value that it would otherwise not have. In this 
form oflife the subjective feelirig of wholeness coinci~es willi the experience of freooom--:-[Ref. 
(a) Inadequate Concept of Freedom] 
It should not be assumed that th,e Spirit's a~tivity is restricted to the organisational boundaries of 
the Church or to those who explicitly confe~s to having a Christian faith. The Spirit ''blows where 
it wills". We may find evidence of the Spirit's worJc wherever human lives are being made whole. 
[Ref. (g) Religious Exclusivity] 
8.2 Learning from Freud 
Freud both shows the task of unifying the self to be more compl~x than had hitherto been realised 
and offers us additional methods for addressing this complexity. His major achievement is to 
open up the realm of the unconscious. He demonstrates how things that happened to us which we 
cannot recall can still form part of our psychological make-up. Ip particular he shows how events 
33Molunann (1992) p43 here quoting H. Schungel-Straumann. 
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in early childhood are very much a part of us and have a continuing influence on our lives. [ref. 
(c) Lack of Awareness of the Unconscious] 
Freud draws our attention to forces within the psyche that are fundamentally unordered. He 
legitimates the presence of instincts and passions that operate in a pre- or non-rational manner 
and which find their fulfilment in spontaneous experiences of pleasure. He suggests that the 
healthy self is composed of both ego and id, of order and non-order, of structure and energy. He 
shows how there are limits to the amount of control over the self that the rational ego might hope 
to obtain. He helps us to see that the self is more likely to be united through some degree of 
compromise between the competing forces than by the complete triumph of one over the other. 
Finally, he provides a more finely tuned notion of self-mastery than Augustine offered by 
distinguishing healthy, rational self-control from neurotic forms of repression. [ref. (b) Over-
Ordered] 
Freud's model of the psyche suggests that conflict between different regions of the psyche is a 
natural part of our make-up. We make psychological progress by rendering the conflicts 
conscious, not by eliminating them. Whilst Freud is inclined to see our endemic state of intra-
psychic conflict as one of the grounds for our state of common unhappiness, he also shows how it 
can produce some important benefits - not least in providing a spur for the development of human 
culture. [ref. (d) Negative View of Conflict] 
Freud suggests that the growth in self-knowledge that is necessary to achieve a unified self may 
well require the help of an objective other. We may question the effectiveness of the specific 
psychoanalytic techniques that were recommended by Freud, but would recognise the general 
need- for same piofessioniilly-tniirioo tlierapist or spiritual director or skillea fiienCl to help us 
come to terms with self-conflict. In some situations, for example where individuals have been 
abused as children or subject to deeply traumatic events, we would be inclined to follow Freud in 
seeing the value of analysis of dreams and other products of the unconscious as a clue to intra-
psychic conflict. We would be inclined to Jhink that psychoanalysis, or one of its contemporary 
successors, could sometimes be ben~fici~ in such cases34. [ref. (i) Contemporary Helping 
Relationships 1 
34see, for example, Sylvia Fra&er's (1989) story of coming to terms with being the victim of an 
incestuous relationship through a gradual revealing of forgotten memories. She comments (p252): 
"My life was structured on the uncovering of a mystery .. .! did not remember my past. .. until the 
evil was contained, until I was stable enough and happy enough that sorrow or anger or regret or 
pain was overwhelmed by joy at my release. To reach this state, I needed the help of friends and 
healers." · 
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8,3 l..eamin& from Jun~ 
The idea which is at the heart of Jung's system, the acceptance of one's shadow, may be somewhat 
reinterpreted so that it is not understood as acceptance of moral evil but as the acceptance of 
non-ordered aspects of the psyche. This is how the large volume of Christian-Jungian spiritual 
writing generally takes Jung.35 Jung teaches us that the "whole self' is more than the rational and 
moral parts of our nature. The self includes the more unseemly, instinctive and impulsive aspects 
of our personality. Where Freud thought the self should attempt as far as it could to control these 
parts, lung's insight is that they should be accepted. 
Sometimes Jung and Freud are presented as if they merely offered variants on the same 
psychodynamically orientated therapy. In fact, as my analysis shows, Jung offers radically 
different insights from Freud. Freud stands in the tradition of those who take the selfs capacity 
for rational thought as the essence of our selfhood. Jung, by contrast, stands within an alternative 
tradition that sees the realm of nature as constitutive of selfbood. Where Freud sees the 
unconscious as a dangerous swamp to be drained Jung sees it as a source of psychological 
treasure to be valued. Jung signals a decisive break with the Platonic project to unify the self 
under the hegemony of reason. He advocates a new way of uniting the self in which equal value is 
granted to the moral and the sensual, the ordered and the unordered. [ref. (b) Over-Ordered, (h) 
Undervaluing the Material and Temporal] 
8.4 Learning from the Humanists 
The humanists challenge the Augustinian assumption that freedom is primarily a matter of 
obedience to the divine moral order. They rightly point out that we appear to experience the 
l 
feeling of freedom not merely when we are able to will and act ~holeheartedly but also when we 
-sense lUI acrto-be uniqueiy-our-own. Our sense of dignity and v~ue as human-agents is enhanced 
by the perception that we are free to make choices for ourselves. This is a component of the 
modem identity by which few in the West are unaffected. Very often it applies to what we might 
call non-moral goods, for example the choice of clothes to wear or how to decorate our houses. 
Augustine, by contrast, did not rate this kind of choice very highly. So far as choices in the moral 
arena are concerned, we experience the subjective quality of freedom when our choices are in line 
with what we take to be our sources of moral value. But contemporary life is subject to much 
greater plurality and disagreement over moral values than it has been in the past. Freedom of 
conscience is now valued in a way that Augustine would not have recognised. An important 
component of the modem understanding of freedom is the absence of constraints which would 
prevent one from adhering to one's own perception of the morally good in favour of some 
communally held vision of the good. The humanists rightly emphasise the importance of 
35E.g. John Sandford "The Probl~m of Evil in Christianity and Analytical Psychology" in ed. 
Moore (1988) pp109-130. 
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autonomous choice for human flourishing. Freedom may now be said to involve three 
components: i) The freedom not to be constrained to live according to values which are not our 
own preferred values; ii) the ability to line up all aspects of the person in line with our values; iii) 
the ability to give a rational defence of our values as being the best values out of the different 
value-sets available to us. [Ref. (a) Inadequate Concept of Freedom] 
The humanists rightly draw our attention to the range of human needs which exist below the level 
of moral demand, at a level I called the ordo bonorum (chapter 6). They give us one attempt to 
clarify the order in which pre-moral goods must be supplied to human beings for them to flourish; 
indeed Maslow's hierarchy of needs has become the classic example of such an order. As I 
indicated, the goods in Maslow's hierarchy are not directly moral goods because, whilst we see 
them as objects or experiences that are good to pursue, we do not attribute to them moral qualities 
as such. The definition of pre-moral goods is a task of psychological description, not ethics. We 
move into the realm of ethics when these goods are placed within a wider moral order, such as an 
Augustinian "ordo caritatis". This order defines how the pre-moral goods are to be enjoyed and 
distributed. The ordo caritatis requires that goods are distributed on the principle of equal regard 
and that individuals are to be encouraged to act sacrificially to restore equality of regard where it 
is lacking. On these grounds my own physical and psychological needs may legitimately be 
satisfied to the point where this is consistent with the endeavour to meet my neighbour's needs. 
·Maslow's hierarchy of needs shows how positive value may be attached to pre-moral goods, and 
provides a check on Augustine's tendency to value only goods which lie in the ethical and spiritual 
realms. [Ref. (h) Undervaluing the Material and Temporal] 
The humanists suggest that the self-actualised person will be one who has achieved a particular 
"inooe -or relateaness" to the world At its best this- inooe is a -foilll of love which stresses 
friendship components (philia). Loving relationships in which one person loses him or herself in a 
dominating other or, conversely, relationships in which the person seeks to control another, are 
regarded as pathological. In the ideal loving relationship the parties retain the separateness and 
integrity of their individual selves whilst also being held in union with others. This notion of love 
seems more adequate as a means of describing our relationship to others and to God than the 
Augustinian caritas. [ref. (t) Love as caritas is inadequate] 
The ideal of equality envisaged in a reciprocal relationship of love is the starting point for the 
humanistic understanding of the relationship between counsellor and client. The counsellor offers 
to be an Aristotelian "other self'' through whom the client can gain a proper relationship with his 
or her own self. Within this context subjects can be aired and emotions expressed that an 
individual may not be able to deal with in ordinary friendship relationships. [ref. (i) Contemporary 
Context of Helping Relationships] 
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9. Attajpjnif to the Upjty of the Spirit 
I have suggested (8.1 above) that if we are to take with proper seriousness the contemporary 
stress on unordered parts of the personality we may do better to conceive of the highest part of 
the person as the spirit rather than the intellect. Rather than aiming in Platonic fashion to unite the 
self by subjugating the emotions to the mastery of reason36 we need to envisage a co-operative 
hannony of reason and affection in which proper space is granted to the spontaneous and pre-
rational elements of the self. This may be denoted theologically as a "unity of the spirit". It is 
understood to be conferred by the divine Spirit who inspires and unites all parts of the self in their 
common pursuit of God. 
Augustine understood that the re-modelling and integration of the self after the image of God 
could not be achieved either solely through response to what was given by one's intellect nor 
merely through self-willing.37 Only the strangely unpredictable pre-conscious response of the 
individual to sources of delight could move the will. This might be understood in terms of an 
encounter of the divine Spirit with the individual's spirit through which the individual is granted 
the ability to take delight in those things which make for true spiritual and psychological progress. 
Augustine's doctrine of the Spirit was deficient in many respects and I have indicated how it ought 
to be revised if it is to be more accurate theologically and more effective for us psychologically.38 
Of particular importance is the recovery of the biblical notion of Spirit as pre-rational energy. The 
divine Spirit unites in himself both the non-rational and the rational; he is therefore able to act as 
the agent for securing this form of unity in human beings. 
-Freud did not, as far as-nun aware, referto the -christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but we may; 
I 
with great caution, take his notion of psychological "energy" or libido as an analogy for the 
svirit. 39 The Spirit, like Freud's psychic energy I is the fundamental force at work to build up life 
in the face of forces of chaos and destruction. Spirit is at work equally in the psychic depths of the 
id, as in the conscious realms of the ego. It is manifested both in our primal, unordered and 
inarticulate strivings as well as in the mature and ordered expressions of love. 
As we have noted, Carl Jung made extensive reference to the spirit as a symbol for the integration 
of the self.40 Jung thought that the domination of the emotions by the intellect would lead to a 
necessarily one-sided psychology. Only if both "sides" of the person could be given equal scope 
36Ch. 1 §4.3 supra. 
37Ch. 3 §4.2.3 supra. 
38§8.1 supra. 
39Ch. 4 §4. 
40Ch. 5 §8. 
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for development would the person be made whole. He saw the Christian notion of life in the Spirit 
as one way of expressing this. In Jung's terms possession by the Spirit may be understood as the 
surrendering of oneself to some power which is able to draw on the energy of the unconscious 
and which is consonant with the ideals of the rational mind. The latter gives the Spirit the sense of 
being a "good" spirit (rather than demonic) whilst the former confers a sense of otherness and 
ineffability. In a life lived according to the Spirit there is a balance between individual autonomy 
and the sense of being dependent on some greater, trans-personal reality. The person who is 
"possessed" by the Spirit feels "compelled" to act in a way which yet agrees with his of her own 
-
deepest longings. Jung thought that only through such a life could the self be properly integrated 
and healed. 
Whilst the humanistic psychologists are not especially concerned with the Christian doctrine of 
the Spirit their whole programme emphasises what might broadly be termed the "spiritual" in the 
face of various kinds of psychological reductionism.41 Maslow in panicular thought that the self-
actualised person was someone who enjoyed "peak experiences" when the whole self was 
temporarily lost in a sense of wonderment in which the person experienced a rare moment of 
harmony with himself and with the world.42 
Hitheno some of the most imponant attempts to express the unity of the self in ways which do 
not take discursive reason as the highest principle of the mind have made reference to the place of 
an. and especially music, in human life.43 We have seen that Fromm and Maslow both cited the 
anist as the exemplar of the self-actualised person. Foucault's final position was that the self itself 
ought to become an aesthetic production.44 The "aesthetic" or "musical" self can, perhaps, be 
seen as a partial metaphor for the self which has attained to the unity of the spirit. 
Music is frequently held to have a much stronger capability than ordinary language for 
representing the depth and range of our emotionallife.45 Yet music is not merely a form of sheer 
emotionalism; our emotional reaction to music necessarily has a cognitive component. 46. Indeed 
Storr cites some experimental evidence to show that a full response to music requires the active 
involvement of both the left ("rational") and right ("intuitive") hemispheres of the brain.47 It 
appears that music demands of us a panicularly wide-ranging level of mental response. Moreover, 
41Ch. 6 §2. 
42ch. 6 §4.4. 
43E.g. Nietzsche (ET 1910); Langer (1963); Storr (1992). 
44Ch. 2 §5.4.3. 
45E.g. Nietzsche (ET 1910) para. 810; Langer p222. 
46Raffman (1993) p27. 
47Storr (1992) p38f. 
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some elements of this response go beyond what can be expressed in words. For certain technical 
but well substantiated reasons we are able to recognise in music more than we can say.48 
It thus seems that in our full response to a moving piece of music we may be able to attain to a 
profound level of psychic unity which has much in common with what I have called the "unity of 
the spirit". Both intellect and emotion are harnessed together in a manner which transcends both 
but does not nullify either. This seems to be a more adequate way of describing the form of 
psychic unity to which we should aspire than, for example, the paradoxical notion of coincidentia 
oppositorum given by Jung.49 The unity of the spirit, like the psychic unity we experience in the 
appreciation of music, goes beyond rational linguistic expressions without lapsing into 
irrationalism or mysticism. 
10. The Spjrjt apd the Corporate Coptext of Selfbood 
I have noted that each of the three main sources of the modern identity is an inward one. 
Positively this means that the modern Western sense of self has a high degree of depth and 
individuality. But, negatively, this may foster tendencies to individualism and excessive 
introspection, as has actually happened over the course of the twentieth century. The problem of 
individualism has become extremely pressing in our time with the growing realisation that many 
of our most urgent and important problems are social in nature. We face a rapidly deteriorating 
ecological situation which governments seem unable to tackle effectively. Linked to this, is the 
wide and growing level of inequality between peoples in the north and south of the planet. At a 
national level we are finding it increasingly difficult to retain a common moral basis for 
institutional and political life. We are experiencing the fragmentation of local communities and 
increasing levels of breakdown in marriages and disruption of family life. The array of dislocation 
at every socUU -u~verftom the married couple to -world;wide ecology indicates that a theory- of 
human selthood which focuses pn the individual in isolation from his or her relationships will 
prove seriously inadequate to cu~nt demands. 
The social nature of human personhood is reflected in Freud's work and, more especially, in 
Fromm and Maslow. Freud stressed the importance of attachment to an other for proper 
psychological development; this insight h!lS been developed and given a less directly sexual 
reference by the post-Freudian "object-relations" school. Fromm wrote of the primary need of 
relatedness that must be fulfilled if the self is to develop satisfactorily. In Maslow's hierarchy, the 
third (belongingness and love) and fourth (esteem) level of needs refer to our place in the wider 
4Hsee Raffman (1993) on structural, feeling and nuance ineffability in music. 
49[ndeed Storr aptly comments (1992 p155): "Jung's lack of aesthetic appreciation is a serious 
limitation of his thought, as it is of Freud's ... Had he been musical, a poet, a painter, or even a 
better writer, I think his psychology would have been more soundly based and would also have 
won greater acceptance." 
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society. In Maslow's scheme, one could not approach the degree of unity of self indicated by self-
actualisation without proper attention to relationships with others. 
The relational character of human personhood that is highlighted by contemporary psychologists 
may be interpreted theologically through a reflection on the place of the Spirit in our make-up. 
The Spirit is given in baptism, an event which sets the individual in new relationships with other 
members of the body of Christ and with God. St Paul maintains what Robert Jewett calls "a fluid 
frontier" between the idea of spirit as divine power and as an anthropological element. SO For Paul, 
the pneuma is the gift of God poured out on human beings which completes them and sets them in 
relation to God. Thus Paul can sometimes speak of this pneuma as God's and sometimes as his 
own (cf. I Cor 12:3: 14:14). Paul thinks of pneuma as the apportioned divine spirit which 
becomes the centre of the human being.Sl "The pneuma, though always God's Spirit .. .is also the 
innermost ego of the one who no longer lives by his own being but by God's being for him."52 
The spirit of the individual is thus at one and the same time a sharing in the common divine Spirit 
Any attempt to define the individual in isolation from others and from God will, therefore, always 
be incomplete. In scriptural terms a discussion of the human psuche (cf. Heb. nephesh) can only 
give a partial description of the human self. From the perspective of psuche the self is seen as 
desiring and needy. By contrast, from the perspective of pneuma the self is seen as fulfilled by its 
participation in an entity greater than itself. The Pauline picture of the pneumatic body of Christ 
is that of a set of "overlapping selves" constituted by their sharing in one Spirit. Since the Spirit is 
both the innermost ego or "true self' of the individual and also the common Spirit of the whole 
body, one is understood to become more deeply oneself precisely as one becomes more fully 
integrated into the life of the whole. 
The sense that one becomes more oneself at the same time that one becomes part of a larger body 
is experienced by Christians in their sharing in a common mission and, perhaps especially, in their 
participation in corporate worship. In the activity of worship I am most intensely myself and yet 
may simultaneously "lose myself' in the company of others. It is in corporate worship that the 
personal and social "unity of the spirit" is most deeply experienced and known. 
11 I The Spiritual and Psycboloaical Goal 
Each of the four psychological streams I have considered suggests a different goal for mental 
development: 
- Augustine envisages a condition of perfect rest, in which disorderly forces within the personality 
are stilled 
SOJewett (1971) p185. 
51 Jewett (1971) p197 (cf. Phil. 2:1). 
52:rDN:[ ed. Kittel Vol. VI Eerdmans Grand Rapids 1968 p436. 
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- Freud suggests the creation of a level playing field within the mind so that the opposing mental 
forces can compete on equal terms 
- Jung talks of a profound act of self-acceptance 
- The humanists envisage a condition of inner strength and autonomy such that the individual is 
preserved from damaging external forces in society. 
Augustine is right to the extent that he envisages our goal as an ordered one, but unhelpful in 
insisting that it is a static order. Freud rightly restores the sense of dynamism to the self, but is 
unhelpful insofar as he sees conflict within the self as more fundamental than peace. Jung 
helpfully shows us that we must learn to accept rather than repress or master the un-ordered parts 
of the self, but unhelpfully takes this to the point of suggesting that we must accept positively evil 
parts of the self. The humanists rightly insist on the preservation of human autonomy but have an 
unduly negative view of relationships with God and an over-optimistic view of human nature. 
I suggest that, drawing on all four of these streams, the psychological goal ought to be conceived 
as a situation of "dynamic ordering" of the self. This would take full account of the need to 
develop the non-ordered parts of the person, such as creativity, sexuality, capability for 
spontaneity, feeling and the expression of emotion. It recognises that there is a natural tension 
between these parts of the person and our rational, intellectual and moral components but it 
envisages that both "sides" of the person may grow in tandem. Our rationality may be more 
accurately deployed if informed by feeling and our emotions may be more finely tuned if guided 
by the intellect The self is united through its desire for a God whose moral order is discerned and 
uncovered by the self through exploration and discovery with others. The self does not achieve its 
unity through merely taking its place in the divinely ordered cosmos. Rather, it achieves its unity 
tfuough richer configurations onnorarexcelfence, creativity andjoy. 
The goal is not to be conceived as a life lived under the domination of the intellect, but a life lived 
in the power of the Spirit. The following passage from Moltmann sets out a vision for what 
uniting the self in the Spirit might amount to. This vision may be compared and contrasted with 
the Platonic ideal of uniting th~ self under the hegemony of reason with which I started. 
"The life [that] we say has been "l>orn 'again" or "born anew" from God's eternal Spirit also 
wants to grow, and to arrive at its pro~r form, configuration or Gestalt. Our senses are born 
again too. The enlightened eyes of the understanding wake to the awareness of God, to 
knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ. In the dictates of life the liberated will 
explores its new energies. The beating heart experiences God's love, is warmed by it into love 
for life, and comes alive from its source. The experience of God's Spirit is like breathing the 
air: God is continually breathing, as it were, upon the soul, and the soul is breathing unto God. 
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God's Spirit is life's vibrating, vitalising field of energy: we are in God, and God is in us. Our 
stirrings towards life are experienced by God, and we experience God's living energies. In the 
open air of the eternal Spirit, the new life unfurls. In the confidence of faith we plumb the 
depths of the Spirit, in love we explore its breadth, and in hope its open horizons. God's Spirit 
is our space for living. nS3 
53Moltmann (1992) p161. 
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